Mission from Conversion to Conversation

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Doctoral Thesis

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to be defended in public
on Wednesday, June 11, 2014
at 10.30 hours

by

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Foreword

At the completion of this doctoral thesis I owe a special debt of gratitude, first and foremost, to God, for the gift of life. I have been able to complete my course of study devoid of any health problems or other worrying challenges. I wish to acknowledge the support of various people and institutions without whose help this project would have been difficult to complete. Firstly, I extend my sincere thanks to Dr. Marco Moerschbacher and the staff at Missio Aachen, Germany, for the finances which have supported me in this project for the times I have been in Europe. Secondly, I thank my former bishop, Emmanuel Cardinal Wamala who was progressive with my idea of doing a research doctorate in mission studies at Nijmegen. Upon his retirement he especially introduced the same idea to his successor His Grace Dr. Cyprian Kizito Lwanga who allowed me to go on with the proposal of writing a doctoral thesis at Nijmegen. I am grateful for the trust that my bishops invested in me to let me come to Radboud University Nijmegen for theological studies!

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Introduction

Must there be a new model of mission in the Church today? This is the question which seems to confront the Christian Church in Uganda today as it grapples with the phenomena of multiculturalism and globalisation. These current trends would suggest dramatic shift from the traditional interpretation of Christian mission when Christians considered mission as the propagation of the faith for the conversion of souls and the expansion of the church; to interpretations that call for discovering God's initiative in the human world, beyond all religious, cultural, social, political and economic borders and in the farthest corners of society. And in discovering, disclosing and unveiling God's initiative, the Church, through its missionary concern, renders a service to the human world. In doing this, the church can help turn human existence into human coexistence. In a world in which people go their own way, mission brings them at crossroads, where, through missionary vehicles of encounter and dialogue, they discover the grace of becoming co-travellers.[1] These insights call for a re-consideration of the mission strategies as the church finds itself in the midst of a plurality of cultures and traditions. The advice of Max A.C. Warren which is frequently referred to, would apply quite well in such a situation: "When we approach the man of another faith than our own it will be in a spirit of expectancy to find how God has been speaking to him and what new understandings of the grace and love of God we may ourselves discover in the encounter. For God has not left himself without witnesses in any nation at any time."[2] Consequently the missionary attitude in approaching another people, another culture, and another religion is to take off ones shoes for the place one is approaching is holy.[3] This understanding gives Christian mission a new dimension altogether. Christians would seek to develop relevant mission theories to address the shifting times and seek to reach all people as people of God. In the context under consideration in this work, that is, a multicultural and globalising context, mission must promote a conversation of mankind so that all can narrate the wonders of God.

1. Conceptual Design

In the description of the conceptual design we elaborate on the research questions and objectives, the theoretical framework and the concepts used. Together they describe what we are going to study in this thesis.[4]

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[1] Peter Nissen, "Mission is a Must: A missiological profile of Rogier van Rossum," in *Mission is a Must: Intercultural Theology and the Mission of the Church*, ed. Frans Wijsen and Peter Nissen (Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2002), 3.

[2] Laurenti Magesa, *Rethinking Mission. Evangelization in Africa in a New Era* (Eldoret: AMECEA Gaba Publications, 2006), 35. See also John V.Taylor, *The Primal Vision: Christian Presence amid African Religion,* ed. Max Warren (London: SCM Press, 1963) 10.

[3] Ibid., 10.

[4] Cf. Piet Verschuren and Hans Doorewaard, *Designing a research project* (Utrecht: LEMMA, 1999), 25-108.

Research questions

The central belief in Christianity is that God has revealed himself as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, that is, as a Trinity. Also Christians believe that God has revealed himself as a Saviour and that the fundamental mission of his revelation is the salvation of all mankind. Because of this, subsequently, Christians interpret mission as having a Trinitarian origin, direction and end. Mission is not primarily an affair of men, as the mission of the Church, but rather the mission of God – Missio Dei. The mission of the Church and the mission of men in the Churches are participations in the mission of God. God's mission works through the church's mission but at the same time it is wider than the church's mission. Mission is not a church centred activity but rather a God-centred action.[5] Mission is understood as being derived from the very nature of God. The classic doctrine on the mission Dei as God the Father sending the Son, and God the Father and the Son sending the Holy Spirit was expanded to include yet another movement: The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit sending the church into the world.[6] As far as missionary thinking was concerned, this linking of mission with the doctrine of the Trinity constitutes an important innovation or we could say an inspiration. The image of mission was mission as participating in the sending of God. The mission of the church has no life of its own only in the hands of the sending God can it truly be called mission, not least since the missionary initiative comes from God alone. God is a missionary God. It is not the church that has a mission of salvation to fulfil in the world; it is the mission of the Son and the Holy Spirit through the Father that includes the Church. Mission is thereby seen as a movement from God to the world and the church is viewed as an instrument for that mission not vice versa. To participate in mission is to participate in the movement of God's love towards people, since God is a fountain of sending love. Mission has its origin in the heart of God. This is the deepest source of mission. It is impossible to penetrate deeper still; there is mission because God loves his people.[7]

Christians believe that the church right from the moment she was made manifest to the world on the day of Pentecost has, by her nature, been identified as a missionary church. This conviction is confirmed by the text of Vatican II decree *Ad Gentes Divinitus* which outlines this missionary nature: "The pilgrim Church is missionary by her very nature, since it is from the mission of the Son and the mission of the Holy Spirit that she draws her origin, in accordance with the decree of God the Father. Missionary activity is nothing else and nothing less than an epiphany, or a manifesting of God's decree, and its fulfilment in the world and in world history, in the course of which God, by means of mission, manifestly works out the history of salvation. By the preaching of the word and by the celebration of the sacraments, the centre and summit of which is the most Holy Eucharist, He

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[5] Michael Collins Reilly, *Spirituality for Missions: Historical, Theological and Cultural Factors for a Present-Day Missionary Spirituality* (Quezon City: Ateneo University Publications, 1976), 136-137.
[6] Cf. David Bosch, *Transforming Mission* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1991), 389-390.
[7] Ibid., 390.

brings about the presence of Christ, the author of salvation.[8] This decree proves the church's self-understanding that by her intrinsic nature is a missionary church with a missionary mandate.

As we have seen above the church identifies its mission with the mission of God. The Church feels obliged to exercise this mission because the incarnate God gave it a mandate in the scriptures: "But you will receive power when the Holy Spirit has come upon you; and you will be my witnesses in Jerusalem, in all Judea and Samaria, and to the ends of the earth" (Acts1:8; see also Mark 16:15-16; John 20:2; Luke 24:45-49). This missionary command of Jesus is an expression of a deep conviction of the early Church that she is a missionary movement. She received the commission from her Lord to proclaim the kingdom that he brought about, and to make disciples in his name. It is only in this dynamic perspective that the Church becomes meaningful.[9] From the above Christians believe that the command to communicate the message received from Jesus Christ defines the essence of the Church. And they interpret the universality of the Christian mission as rooted in the biblical texts with the result of this proclamation being discipleship, faith, baptism, forgiveness or in a word, salvation. This means that the message of Jesus is primarily one to be lived. Belief in Jesus must transform life.[10] In a nutshell, Christian mission can be understood as demonstrating the universal relevance of Christian truth.

From the history of Christian mission, there has been a gradual development in the application of the term mission and how it has been used in various ways in Christian theology. Until the 16th century it was nearly entirely used in systematic theology in a Trinitarian way. This Trinitarian interpretation is based on several key texts from the Gospel of Luke, but most of all from Jesus' speech at the last supper as related in John 13-17. Basic ideas are formulated in texts like John 14:24, "These words you hear are not my own; they belong to the Father who sent me," and John 15:26 records "When the Counsellor comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of Truth who goes out from the Father, he will testify about me." Another application of mission is the liturgical interpretation after the closing formula at the end of the Eucharistic celebration, *Ite, Missa est*. Here *Missa* stands for the dismissal, sending into the world. Diego Lainez (1512-1565), the second Superior General of the Jesuits, was probably the first to use the word mission exclusively for efforts to preach and baptise the non-Christians. From its very beginning this modern word mission was connected with the Counter-reformation and early modern colonialism. The formulation of the Code of Canon Law, (Codex

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[8] Second Vatican Council, *Ad Gentes Divinitus. On the Missionary Activity of the Church*, 7 December 1965, par. 2 & 9.

[9] Paul Vadakumpadan, "Ecclesiological Foundation of Mission" in *Following Christ in Mission: A Foundational Course in Missiology,* ed. Sebastian Karotemprel, et al. (Boston, MA: Pauline Books and Media, 1996), 104.

[10] Ibid., 150.

Iuris Canonici, CIC) authorized by the missionary Pope Benedictus XV in 1917 and valid since 19 May 1918, has very little on mission. But it has a ruling that: "according to divine law the churches have the right and authority to preach the gospel to all peoples, free from any civil authority."[11] For the pre-Vatican concept of mission the general status of the region was more important than the actual faith of the citizens. Here, what is taken into particular account is theological geography, when the classical concept of mission is to be understood. The criterion is not the individual need for conversion, but the formal status of territories, the division of the world in two parts, not along poor and rich, but according to the sole criterion of Papal authority, acknowledged in ordinary and not yet in extraordinary regions. The section on mission in the 1918 Code of Canon Law ends with a short remark: "Nobody can be compelled to accept the Catholic faith against her or his will."[12]

Until the 1950's the term mission was never used in a univocal sense; it carried a set of meanings. It referred to (i) the sending of missionaries to a designated territory, (ii) the activities undertaken by such missionaries, (iii) the geographical area where the missionaries were active, (iv) the agency which despatched the missionaries, (v) the non-Christian world or mission field, (vi) a local congregation without a resident minister and still dependent on the support of an older, established church, or (vii) a series of special services intended to deepen or spread the Christian faith, usually in a nominally Christian environment.[13] In a more theological synopsis, however, the concept, mission, has been used traditionally paraphrased as (a) propagation of the faith, (b) expansion of the reign of God, (c) conversion of the heathen, and (d) the founding of new churches.[14]

In the history of the church, the pioneering work of both Catholic and Protestant missionaries then assumed an absolute objective of saving souls and leading all the people in the mission lands to conversion to the Christian faith. This is constant with the twofold task for the church as distinguished by Josef Schmidlin: (1) to proclaim and spread the Christian faith and the Christian gospel and so, of necessity, to propagate itself; and (2) to preserve and strengthen this faith and this church.[15] In this context, the term conversion is used in its religious sense as the "transfer of religious identification and adaptation to a newly adopted religious faith."[16] If we make an in-depth look at the phenomenon of religious conversion, we see that it is abundantly discussed in the historical literature of the western world. However, what is less well documented, are the motives of the individual

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[11] cf. Stanslaus Woywod, *The New Code of Canon Law: A Summary and Commentary on the New Code of Canon Law* (New York: Joseph F. Wagner (Inc.) 1918), can. 1165.
[12] cf. The 1917 *Code of Canon Law*, can. 1194.
[13] Bosch, *Transforming Mission*, 1.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Francis Anekwe Oborji, *Concepts of Mission: The Evolution of Contemporary Missiology* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2006), 61.
[16] Natalie Isser and Lita Linzer Schwartz, *The History of Conversion and Contemporary Cults* (New York: Peter Lang, 1988), 18.

converts and the sincerity and intensity of their commitment to the new faith. Conversion, whatever form it takes, usually remains an exclusively personal experience, unnoticed and uncommemorated by outsiders.[17] This is so because "the personal aspect of religious conversions, apart from controversy, has never been a subject of very deep human interest."[18] But as for the missionaries, conversion, as a dominant mission theory of the time was considered as "the process by which the primary religious identification of a people changes."[19] The 19th century witnessed an unprecedented growth of a fervent missionary movement in the Church with missionaries burning in zeal for the conversion of the whole world. However, despite their zeal and desire for the conversion of all people, "some of these missionaries were incompetent enough, some were cantankerous, and many died."[20] Adrian Hastings makes a striking description of the missionary character and life-style of both the Catholic and Protestant Missionaries and their deficiencies. He argues that whereas the Catholic missionaries were well learned, disciplined, and systematic and adopted a strategy of adaptation in clothes, language, and food, they did not include theological adaptation.[21] And he describes the personality of a typical Protestant missionary in the 19th century setting thus: The normative early nineteenth-century missionary was a working man. To describe him as a member of the lower middle class would be to mislead. He was an artisan, a worker with a skill, and even such clergy as went were seldom of a very different background….many had had little, if any, training and were even convinced that training, education, and theology were rather pointless. What was needed was a good knowledge of the Bible, a great deal of faith, and a strong voice.[22] This implies that for the missionaries from the Christian communities, mission most often postulated conversion as the dominant model which portrayed the other as worse-off and urgently need to be helped with the means of Christian spiritual salvation, to help one ascend from darkness to light.

From the above, we can rightly deduce that the job in the missions, as at first they saw it, was one emphatically of preaching for "the conversion of the non-Christian individual and at the spreading of the faith among non-Christians."[23] Again at first sight one would imagine that the first mission strategy was to found a Christian community or teach trades since the personnel that comprised some missionary groups were "cobblers, tailors, carpenters, blacksmiths, weavers and whatever."[24] But what is to be noted is that the stress was neither upon ordering a church nor upon industrial mission, but rather upon evangelism, and it was assumed that such

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[17] John W. Eadie, ed., *The Conversion of Constantine* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 1.
[18] Lehmann L. H., *The Soul of a Priest* (Sea Cliff, New York: Christ's Missions Inc., 1933), 13.
[19] John David Yeadon Peel, "Conversion and Tradition in Two African Societies: Ijebu and Buganda," *Past & Present* , No. 77, (November, 1977): 108-141.
[20] Adrian Hastings, *The Church in Africa 1450-1950* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 243.
[21] Ibid, 254.
[22] Ibid, 258.
[23] Oborji, *Concepts of Mission*, 95.
[24] Ibid.

people could be excellent evangelists and would win more converts for the church, rather for Christ. This supposed that for the missionaries and the sending churches, their major emphasis was to, primarily, seek to convert the individual or rather individuals, and on the other, to join these individuals together in community, that through it the whole people may be renewed in Christ. They believed that conversion means the profession of Christian teaching on the one hand, and Baptism in the name of the Trinity, on the other. Although conversion and the implantation of the church made the church to take root in the Ugandan society and also reach the remotest corners of the earth, we have to argue that there have been various theories of doing mission corresponding with the different eras of the Christian faith.

At the beginning of the 21st century, there have been remarkable features in Christian outlook since the first century. With this period, the composition of the Christian church ethnically and culturally has changed out of recognition. There has been a massive accession to Christian faith. In fact one has to go back many centuries for any parallel to the number of new Christian communities. This accession has taken place outside Europe, in the southern continents, including many areas where before the present epoch, Christians were fewer in number. This is believed in the Christian faith that God's creative and saving will cannot be separated; it is a continuum since salvation is an integral salvation. It is both a 'shalom' and an invitation to participate in God's life. God created human beings for community and wills that the scattered children of God become the people of God. Regardless of how the church is defined Christianity is not purely a matter of individuals who go on their own independently of one another and without the protection and support of community, reach God.[25] Christian mission then has defined the salvation of all mankind as its primordial and ultimate purpose.

Against the background of globalisation and multiculturalism Christianity too, must adopt essentially significant models of mission to address the prevailing circumstances. In this research project, we are trying to propose a new model of doing mission in the context of a multicultural and globalising world.

The main research question is: What is an adequate model for mission for the Ugandan Church in the 21st century? And the sub questions are: (i) Why should mission adopt a new model in this age? (ii) What would the proposed mission model contribute to the theory (theology) of mission? (iii) How will the new mission model be implemented in the practice of mission?

Theoretical Framework

Since the end of Vatican II Council proceedings in 1965, the Church has grappled with the question of promoting the message of the gospel in the culturally

[25] Karl Müller, *Mission Theology: An Introduction* (Berlin: Steyler Verlag, 1987), 47.

pluralistic world of the ensuing period. There was the need to make the basic message of Christianity both comprehensible and attractive to the millions of people who looked at the assumption that they must adopt the Euro-American culture in which Christianity has been wrapped. Pope Paul VI admitted that "the kingdom which the Gospel proclaims is lived by people who are profoundly linked to a culture," so that "the building up of the Kingdom cannot avoid borrowing the elements of human culture. Though independent of cultures, the Gospel and evangelisation are not necessarily incompatible with them; rather they are capable of permeating them all without becoming subject to any one of them."[26] This observation goes against the strategy of imposition which Christian missionaries attempted when Christianity was first spread beyond Europe. By imposition we mean the enforced use of unmodified Roman forms, an attempt that gave way to translation, which is the preservation of Roman forms encoded in the local vernaculars.

The above description is a comparable semblance between mission strategies and international development programs. Michael V. Angrosino thinks that "the sequence of mission strategies is not unlike that of international development. Development agents were no less convinced than religious missionaries that they had truth and historical inevitability on their side. At first they presented their innovations in undigested form with little cognizance of the differences of communication styles, values, or customary practices of the people they contacted. Such programs often failed, not because of the insufficiency of the technology in which the innovators had such great faith, but because the innovations conflicted with local traditions and institutions. At least in part...developers are beginning to pay attention to sustainable development that incorporates respect for indigenous knowledge."[27] This lack of respect for indigenous knowledge has drawn a barrage of consistent criticism from scholars that the mission of the church all through history has always been loaded with a kind of ethnocentrism which has tainted the image of the church and hence impairs her mission and nature. The old missionary paradigm was at once "understood to be that of faithfully producing a replica of the missionary's sending church and culture. The slogan 'Christianity and Civilization' captured for that generation the essence of missions."[28] Such a model had as its consequence a clash between the missionary culture loaded with the baggage of the sending church and the indigenous cultures which were the recipients of the message of salvation.

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[26] Paul VI, Pope, *Evangelii Nuntiandi. Apostolic Exhortation on Evangelisation in the Modern World* (Rome, Vatican: December 8, 1975), 20.

[27] Michael V. Angrosino, "The Culture Concept and the Mission of the Roman Catholic Church," *American Anthropologist,* New Series, Vol. 96, No.4, (Dec., 1994), 824-832 at http://www.jstor.org /stable/682446 (accessed March 17, 2010).

[28] Wilbert Shenk, "The Intercultural Learning Process as a New Model of Mission," in *Towards an Intercultural Theology: Essays in Honour of J.A.B. Jongeneel,* ed. Martha Frederiks et. al. (Zoetermeer: Uitgeverij Meinema, 2003), 78.

The Pastoral Strategic Plan of Kampala Archdiocese (2010-2014), which will be analysed in detail later in this study, demonstrates that the church has to espouse an applicable model of mission for the Gospel message of salvation to remain valid and relevant in the prevailing circumstances. In mission history, the missiological models that have developed over time have undergone what Bosch describes as a paradigm shift. Bosch makes a clear distinction between paradigms in theology and in the natural sciences. This term has its origins in the science of Thomas Kuhn which Bosch appropriates for the study of theology and understanding of mission in particular. To begin with, there are in these respects important differences between theology and the natural sciences. In the natural sciences, for instance the new paradigm usually replaces the old definitely and irreversibly. After the Newtonian revolution it is simply no longer possible to understand the universe in Copernican let alone Ptolemaean categories.[29] In theology and in the arts old paradigms live on. Sometimes one may even have a revival of a former paradigm. This is evidenced inter alia in the recovery of Paul's letter to the Romans by Augustine in the 4th century, Martin Luther in the 16th century and Karl Barth in the 20th century.[30] Scientific and theological paradigms therefore are incomparable because they respond to different realities. As we shall see the different models of doing mission over the centuries, we shall recognize that the development of a new one does not disqualify the other; it only answers the inadequacies that prevail in a particular mode, but does not transplant it completely. In this work, we shall propose a new paradigm of mission practice in this age of multiculturalism and globalization. These 'signs of the time' call for a necessity for a fresh model of mission to address the prevailing circumstances. A detailed survey of the dominant mission models will serve as the beginning of the exploration of the contemporary mission era. We take communication between Christianity, culture and context as a selection criterion to describe various mission models.

In systematic missiology, the primary model of mission has been identified with the Münster School which considered 'conversion of individual souls' as the ultimate design of mission. Brock Kilbourne and James T. Richardson studied Conversion from a sociological perspective and conceptualized it in two paradigms. In the old paradigm, conversion is generally viewed in passivist and deterministic terms, whereas in the new paradigm conversion is generally explained from the standpoint of active agency, that is, self-directed behaviour, personal choice, meaning and negotiation. The prototype of the old paradigm is the conversion of Saul/Paul on the road to Damascus. For many within the Christian tradition and throughout Western civilization, the transformation of Paul constitutes what conversion should be. The Pauline experience and similar passivist conversions are usually described by the following characteristics: 1) sudden and dramatic, 2) irrational or magical in nature, 3) involving a powerful, external, and impersonal force, 4) usually a single event, 5) the negation of the old self and the affirmation of the new self, 6) change

[29] Bosch, *Transforming Mission*, 186.
[30] Ibid.

from one static state to another static state, 7) typically occurs during adolescence and is a "good thing," and 8) behaviour change usually follows belief change. Thus, in the old paradigm, the individual is conceptualized as a passive recipient of personality changes and life experiences. Whether psychologically predisposed or situationally tempered, individuals' conversions are considered determined, in large part, by impersonal and powerful forces acting upon them, within them, or both.

The prototypes of the new paradigm are seekers, or individuals who actively make plans, choices, and decisions, and generate many of their life experiences. Rather than pushed around by powerful, unseen, and uncontrollable forces, the seeker is an active agent. The seeker is generally characterized by the following: 1) volition, 2) autonomy, 3) search for meaning and purpose, 4) multiple conversions or conversion careers, 5) rational interpretation of experiences, 6) gradual and continuous conversion, 7) negotiation between the individual and the potential membership group, and 8) belief change that follows behaviour change, as the individual learns the role of being a new convert.[31] In both instances conversion is considered an individualised process and Salzman makes a particular distinction of psychopathological conversion, a highly charged emotional experience which is an attempt by the individual to solve serious personal problems or to deal with disintegrating intrapsychic conflicts. Often it involves the converts' attempts to channel hatred and hostile feelings arising out of a conflict with some authority figure.[32] The conversion is regressive and produces defensive changes in the convert that are similar to those that occur in individuals with distinct psychopathological disorders. Some of the characteristics of psychopathological post-conversion behaviour are:1)an exaggerated, irrational belief in new ideas, 2) a greater concern with form and doctrine than with the substance, 3) contempt and hatred for the prior belief, 4) intolerance for all deviates, 5) crusading zeal to convert others, and 6) a need for martyrdom and self-punishment.

Religious conversion is not an occurrence which will happen independently of human experience. The process of religious conversion as well as the attribution of its causes cannot be understood apart from actor and audience perspectives. Converts need the social standards of some reference group against which to measure themselves before their privately made or publicly proclaimed self-attributions of having converted acquire credibility to either themselves or to others. They need to know how to talk like a convert, how to behave like a convert, and how to look like convert. Social audiences also need the social standards of some reference group in order to evaluate a reported conversion experience. Conversion can be meaningfully understood, then, only within a social context and

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[31] Brock Kilbourne and James T. Richardson, "Paradigm Conflict, Types of Conversions, and Conversion Theories" *Sociological Analysis,* Vol. 50, No. 1 (Spring, 1989): 1-21 online article at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3710915 (accessed on Thursday March 18, 2010).

[32] Salzman, L., "The Psychology of Religious and Ideological Conversion" *Psychiatry,* Vol. 16 (1953), 177-187.

appears to always involve some choice of perspective by both the convert and the observer.

An alternative to the 'conversion of souls' model was developed by the School of Louvain which stressed the 'implantation of the Church.' This is also based on the concept of conversion, not individually but institutionally. Pierre Charles, a Jesuit theologian and a co-founder with, Rene Lange, of the School of Louvain, affirms that the goal of mission is not conversion, the salvation of souls, the rebirth as children of God; God looks after all of this. They suggest that the aim of mission rather is "to extend the borders of the visible church, to complete this work of expansion, to cover the whole world with prayers and adoration, to give back to the saviour all of his inheritance,"[33] therefore implanting the visible Church in the countries where it still has not been planted.[34] In the Louvain model of understanding of mission, there is a particular development which is attributed to the understanding of the Church as well. The church is understood not only to be a means of saving souls, but is also an end, because by being the society of the word made fresh, it represents the divine form in the world. Precisely due to this nature of the church, Christians have to implant it everywhere. Therefore the goal of mission is to implant a new local church, and the priority of missionary activity is the formation of an indigenous clergy and episcopate.[35] Even Charles and his fellow proponents of the Louvain school, above all think about an institutional and hierarchical, therefore visible church. The contrast with the conversion model they presented here has produced significant discomfort in mission territories where the implantation of the church would be resolved in a simple transposition of western ecclesiastical organisation lacking testimony, dialogue and the constitution of an effective indigenous community of believers. It could even be argued that it's a model which is deficient in the theological nature of the church, primarily, as people of God.

However, Charles' thought is that the missions, by their nature are a transitional activity. When the church will be visibly implanted throughout the whole world, there will no longer be missionaries and missions will no longer be spoken of. The most important criterion affirming the church's implantation in a territory is that the church does not have to be a nomad, but is solidly rooted; it has to be a permanent institution of salvation; it has to be able to have its own hierarchy and clergy. Mission at that point, can consider itself over, even if the local church will have to continue to offer conversion to those people, who, though living in its

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[33] Guisseppe Buono, *Missiology: Theology and Praxis,* trans. Marco Bagnarol (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2002), 62-65. See also A. Semois, "Vers Une définition de l'activité missionnaire," in *NZM* 3 (1947), 161-178.

[34] Pierre Charles, *Missiologie, Etudes, Conférences* I, (Louvain, 1939), 59.

[35] Ibid.

territory, are not its members. However, this would not be missionary activity in the strict sense of the term.[36]

After the Second World War another mission method developed. It acknowledged that conversion in its individual and institutional form did not work. The aim of mission remained more or less the same, but the mission method changed. The aim was still to bring the non-Christians to Christ or the Church. But the Church could meet them half-way by 'adaptation' or 'accommodating of Christianity' to local cultures.

Whereas the Second Vatican Council stressed 'incarnation' as foundation for mission, 'inculturation' became the dominant mission model after Vatican II Council. The Vatican II spirit of openness cleared the way for frank discussion of diversity within the global body of the Catholic Church. An Indian theologian D.S. Amalorpavadass, who was an enthusiastic advocate of diversity, applied the term indigenization to describe the process of conferring on Catholic liturgy, a cultural form that is native to the local community. He had an ambitious agenda for the liturgy, including the introduction of culturally appropriate gestures, forms of homage, scared objects, music, and meditative practices and the incorporation of scared Hindu texts, especially the Rig Veda, into the readings of the mass. Vatican theologians initially approved the concept of indigenization but were put off by the somewhat patronizing tone of the word itself. At the same time, a parallel concept, contextualisation, emerged and found favour with liberation theologians, who suggested that the life and mission of the church had to be made relevant to contemporary society. Because the Vatican distances herself from the political connotations of liberation theology, the term contextualisation was dropped by other church authors. The concept of inculturation has come to cover both of these related ideas.[37]

Inculturation implies that the church must be both true to her traditions and conscious of her universal mission. According to *Gaudium et Spes,* the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, the..."Church can enter into communion with different forms of culture, thereby enriching both herself and the cultures themselves."[38] Unlike the anthropological term acculturation, which refers to changes that result "when two or more different groups come into significant contact productive of changes in all,"[39] and interculturation which is an interaction

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[36] Cf. A. Semois, *Vers une définition*, 161-168; Gianni Colzan, *La Missionareta, della Chiesa* (Bologna, 1975), 326.

[37] Angrosino, "The Culture Concept and the Mission of the Roman Catholic Church," 824-832.

[38] Austin Flannery, ed., "Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World," In *Vatican II Conciliar and Post-Conciliar Documents*, rev. edition (Northport, NY; Costello, 1992), 903-1001.

[39] Jennifer A. Skuza, "Humanizing the Understanding of the Acculturation Experience with Phenomenology," *Human Studies,* Vol. 30, No. 4 (Dec., 2007), 447-465 at, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27642813 (accessed March 22, 2010).

among different Christian cultures,[40] inculturation carries more meaning and significance. Inculturation refers to encounters whose outcome is a convergence that does not replace either of the cultures from which it arose. Both parties to the inculturative exchange undergo internal transformation, but neither loses its autonomous identity. Acculturation may be accidental, but inculturation occurs when a dominant culture attempts to make itself accessible to a subdominant culture without losing its own particular character. In other words, the Church is "is in a stage of welcoming in a profound way those elements that she encounters in every culture, to assimilate them and integrate them into Christianity, and to root the Christian way in different cultures."[41] But we to contend that inculturation as a complex process demands an integral definition in order to match with the goal of the reality at whose service it is, namely mission whose target is salvation in its entirety.[42]

In addition to the above, inculturation as a process involves proclamation of the Gospel that calls people to conversion leading to a change of mentality that itself leads to cultural change and the response that builds a new community of love of God and neighbour. According to Ssettuuma, in this process of inculturation, culture and context mediate thrice. God's message is interpreted and contextualized in a particular culture and situation. The conversion is mediated through cultural transformation. Then a new culture, as worldview, attitudes and values systems, mediates the life and celebration of the new community. Hence inculturation could be understood as the dialogical, liberative and salvific encounter of God in Jesus Christ and His Gospel in the power of the Holy Spirit with a given people in its cultural and existential context.[43] Inculturation is not a definitive term that expresses the dialogue and liberating meeting between the Gospel and a given people and their existential situation. It is only applied in mission studies at least as the best term to express that reality.

Due to an ambiguity in the mission theology of Vatican Two as demonstrated in the tension between the mission decree Ad Gentes and the pastoral constitution Gaudium et Spes, which was seen by many missionaries and missiologists as the 'real' mission document of Vatican Two, during the 1970s and 1980s two alternatives to the 'inculturation' model emerged. One was the model of 'liberation,' stressing the 'question of social justice,' more or less in harmony with the social teaching of the Church. The other was the model of 'dialogue,' addressing mainly the issue of religious pluralism.

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[40] Ssettuuma Benedict, *Inculturation: Towards an Integrated Approach for Ownership, Permanence and Relevance of Christianity for a People* (Kampala: Angel Agencies, 2010), 14.

[41] Cf. "Working paper for the 1987 Synod of Bishops on Vocation and Mission of the Laity," *Origins*, 17: 1-20.

[42] Karl Müller, *Mission Theology: An Introduction* (Berlin: Steyler Verlag, 1987), 82-83.

[43] Ssettuuma, *Inculturation*, 10.

Dialogue has become a catchword in mission studies and it almost defines interreligious relations. It has developed in response to the multicultural development of societies in the past few years. Some people commonly understand it as aiming to facilitate understanding and tolerance between different religious communities or traditions. After the events of 11th September 2001, dialogue acquired new meanings. In the world of "war against terrorism", it has become an additional instrument to calm the excessive religious sentiment which is suspected to be the root of the hostility against the religious others. Furthermore scholars of religion, have made it part of the academic activities in several universities.

Among African missiologists it has been acknowledged widely that in the post-Cold War and post-Apartheid era the preceding mission models as described above are inadequate and a new mission model is needed to address the challenges of the 21st century,[44] a mission model that rediscovers the Agency of Africans.[45] Various missiologists have used the notion of 'conversation' to elaborate on this new mission model. However, they have used this notion in various ways. Some have used the notion of 'conversation' simply as an equivalent to 'communication' or 'dialogue' to study the object of mission.[46] Others have used it from a more methodical point of view as an equivalent to discourse,[47] or as a label for a new way of doing theology in Africa, "a way of doing theology in a community of dialogue partners that evokes elements of traditional African palaver".[48] Following John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff,[49] Tinyiko Maluleke argues that "what happened between missionaries and local people was an 'encounter', not a straight-forward conquest". And for this reason, "the encounter is branded a 'long *conversation*' rather than one that produced a *conversion*".[50] Still following the Comaroffs Maluleke adds that "even in the face of the 'long conversation' 'a new kind of hegemony' emerges".[51] In harmony with a grounded theory approach, the present study uses Richard Rorty's notion of 'conversation' as a 'sensitizing concept' to study mission theory and practice in past and present and to propose a new mission model for the future.

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44 Laurenti Magesa, *Rethinking Mission*.

45 Tinyiko Maluleke, "A rediscovery of the agency of Africans," in *Marginalised Africa: An International Perspective,* ed. Peter Kanyandago (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2002), 165-188.

46 Kirsteen Kim, "Missiology as global conversation of Contextual Theologies," Paper for the IAMS assembly in Malaysia (31 July-7 August 2004) at http://missionstudies.org/archive/conference/1papers/fp/Kim_Kirsteen_Full_paper.pdf (accessed on 10 May 2010).

47 Robert Doornenbal, *Crossroads: An Exploration of the Emerging-Missional Conversation with a Special Focus on 'Missional Leadership' and Its Challenges for Theological Education* (Delft: Eburon Academic Publishers, 2012).

48 Cf. Agbonkhianmeghe E. Orobator, "Introduction," In *Reconciliation, Justice and Peace – the Second African Synod,* ed. Agbonkhianmeghe E. Orobator (Nairobi: Acton Publishers, 2011), 3, 8.

49 Cf. Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, "Christianity and Colonialism in South Africa," in *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 13, Issue 1 (February 1986), 1-22.

50 Tinyiko Maluleke, "A rediscovery of the agency of Africans," 186.

51 Ibid., 187.

Research Objectives

The main objective of this research work is to develop a contextual theory (theology) of mission for the Ugandan Church in the 21st century. There are some realities which have come to form a dominant discourse in the age of the 21st century. The minor objectives are 1) to acquire insight into the concept conversation as used by the philosopher Richard Rorty; 2) to analyse mission theories and practices in past and present from this perspective, 3) to develop a mission model which is adequate for the future.

Some theorists argue that, "the fact that there are no privileged vocabularies means that it is up to us to take over and reshape current public ways of speaking as we see fit...since, new ways of speaking can help us get what we want.[52] This is intended to tackle "certain kinds of conversational constraints,"[53] in order to "solve the problem of mutual coexistence in a reasonable way."[54] Particularly my aim is to build on the projects of ecumenism and interreligious dialogue "that leads us to discover, in the Christian and non-Christian religious traditions, diverse forms of experiencing the God of Jesus Christ, activating with them a sincere conversation, especially about life."[55]

Definition of Concepts

The mission models described under 'theoretical framework' conceptualize in different ways a communication between Christianity, culture and context. 'Culture' is a complex term which has been defined in various ways. John Mary Waliggo describes culture as "the sum total of a people's way of life, history, religion, beliefs, values, identity, philosophy or worldview, their language and other means of communication, their institutions, ceremonies, their relationships and education, their professions and leaders, their vision of the past, present and future that differentiates them from other peoples because of a different locality, history, developments and life experiences."[56]

Although culture can be considered to be part of the context, the word context is often used in a different way. Whereas 'culture' in the above definition refers mainly to the symbol-system or 'deep structure' of the society, the word 'context' is used more often to refer to the 'surface structures' of society, or people's economic, social and political conditions. Both context and culture form the loci in which the Gospel is lived.

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[52] Lynne Rudder Baker, "On the very Idea of a Form of Life," *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy,* Vo. 27, Issue 1-4, (1984): 285.

[53] Seyla Benhabib, "Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition and Jürgen Habermas," *Habermas and the Public Square* ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1992), 81.

[54] Ibid., 82.

[55] Giusseppe Buono, *Missiology: Theology and Praxis*, 28.

[56] John Mary Waliggo, "Analysing the Cultural Sector for the Integral Evangelisation," *Manuscript* (1987) 10.

The last pillar of mission in our consideration is the Gospel. The Gospel in a word, is Jesus Christ, Himself, the one who is said to be anointed to proclaim Good News to the poor (Luke 4:16-24). Christ is considered to be the very essence and substance of Christianity and therefore can never be reduced to formulas or doctrines. Jesus Christ is the source, the centre, and the end of what Christianity stands for and announces to the world. Therefore Christianity is Christ, as Jacques Dupuis observed.[57] Using the three concepts described above, mission is often defined with 'inculturation' or 'contextualization' of the Gospel.[58]

We use the term conversation in the way Rorty uses it in epistemology to mean implicit inquiry and inquiry in hermeneutics is routine conversation.[59] The Rortian conversation is linked to the concept of truth. According to Rorty, truth is not something objective lying out there waiting to be discovered, but an outcome of an open non imposing way of communication to reach a consensus.[60] In Christianity, truth is the content of mission to be discovered by others. Truth is revealed and proclaimed, and is the one they have to live within their existential situation.

For analytic purposes we will link Richard Rorty's concept of 'conversation' with Michel Foucault's concept of 'discourse' as a way to structure and thereby constitute knowledge. Just as 'conversation', the concept of 'discourse' expresses the notion that there is no objective truth but that truth is constituted in an inter-subjective way through language use. This notion leads to the use of discourse analysis in chapter 3 and 4.

2. Technical Design

In the description of the technical design we elaborate on the research strategy, the sources and the methods and the structure of this thesis. Together these issues describe how we answer our questions and achieve our objectives.[61]

Research Strategy

This study is based on desk research. Periods of working in the office and in the library at the Radboud University Nijmegen were alternated by periods of working in the archives and the chancery of the Archdiocese of Kampala. But this study has also elements of a grounded theory approach as it is oriented towards theory development, namely a theory (theology) of mission. As was explained above, it uses Richard Rorty's notion of 'conversation' as a sensitising concept.[62]

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[57] Jacques Dupuis, *Who Do You Say I Am?* (New York, Orbis Books, 2001), 2.
[58] Cf. John Mary Waliggo et al*., Inculturation: Its meaning and urgency* (Kampala: St. Paul Publications, 1986).
[59] Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), 318.
[60] Richard Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), xxv; David Boersema, *Pragmatism and Reference* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009), 124-125.
[61] Cf. Verschuren, Doorewaard, *Designing a research project*, 109-207.
[62] Ibid., 174.

Since Glaser and Strauss developed the grounded theory approach, there has been a debate among the advocates of this approach about the question whether 'sensitising concepts' should be developed as much as possible from the research material, thus bottom-up (inductive), or whether they can be inferred from what we know already about the research issue from existing theories (deductive).[63] The present study follows the latter approach. It uses a very specific notion of conversation as a sensitising concept, but one that has not been used extensively in its field of study and aims at developing what this concept could mean in it, namely missiology

In comparison to other missiological studies, distinctive of this thesis is that we do not draw primarily on biblical or ecclesial sources but on philosophical texts. This is not unusual in missiology. Giancarlo Collet did the same basing his mission model on Habermas' concept of freedom and non-dominating communication;[64] and David Krieger did it basing his model of dialogue on Wittgenstein's language games.[65] In this sense this study contributes to a 'philosophy of mission'.[66]

Research Sources

Various books on mission models have been written making broad inventories of the history and theology of mission in general,[67] in a specific region or country,[68] or a diocese or society.[69] In this thesis we decided to make an in-depth study of a corpus of selected texts. It describes and analyses mission journals and pastoral letters or plans, coming from one specific territory, the present Archdiocese of Kampala, Uganda, and the missionary societies that started to practice mission there: the Congregation of Missionaries of St. Joseph, popularly known as Mill Hill missionaries; and the Society of Missionaries of Africa, popularly known as White Fathers. The thesis also draws on existing (theological) literature on mission models and (philosophical) literature on the concept of conversation.

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63 Cf. B. Glaser, A. Strauss, *Discovery of Grounded Theory* (Hawthorne N.Y: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967); A. Strauss, *Qualitative analysis for social scientists* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); A. Strauss, J. Corbin, *Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedure and Techniques* (Newbury, London: Sage, 1990).

64 Cf. Giancarlo Collet, *Das Missionsverständnis der Kirche in der gegenwärtigen Diskussion* (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1984).

65 Cf. David J. Krieger, *The New Universalism: Foundations for a Global Theology* (Maryknoll – New York: Orbis Books, 1991).

66 Cf. Jan Jongeneel, *Philosophy, Science and Theology of Mission in the 19th and 20th Century. Part 1: The Philosophy and Science of Mission* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1995).

67 Cf. Bosch, *Transforming Mission*; Oborji, *Concepts of Mission*.; Stephen Bevans, Roger Schroeder, *Constants in Context: A Theology of Mission for Today* (Maryknoll – New York: Orbis Books, 2004).

68 Cf. Magesa, *Rethinking Mission*; Frederick Tusingire, *The evangelization of Uganda. Challenges and Strategies*, (Kisubi: Marianum Publishing Company, 2003).

69 Cf. Fritz Stenger, *White Fathers in Colonial Central Africa* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2001); Paul Kollman, *The Evangelization of Slaves and Catholic Origins in Eastern Africa* (Maryknoll- New York: Orbis Book 2005).

Research Methods

For collecting data and texts we reviewed existing literature in libraries and consulted the archives of missionaries, for example, the Mill Hill Missionaries in Oosterbeek and the White Fathers in Dongen. We also obtained documents from the archives of the Generalate of the White Fathers in Rome and the archives and the chancery of the Archdiocese of Kampala. Insights into mission as a Christian quality require investigative approaches with methods which are constant with the same. The research will focus on available texts on mission strategies as a primary method of data generation.

Critical discourse analysis is used as a method of data analysis. Unlike content analysis which is based on an informative view of language (language reflects reality), discourse analysis is based on a performative view of language (language constitutes reality). Discourse analysis is concerned with tracing explanatory connections between language use and social reality. The method is based on three assumptions. First, discourse is a practice just as any other practice; the only difference is its linguistic form. Second, there is a dialectic relation between language ('text') use and social reality ('context'). Third, the relation between language and reality is mediated through discursive practices ('interaction'). From these assumptions follow three instruments: the analysis of the linguistic practice, i.e. the linguistic features of the text; the analysis of the discursive practice, i.e. the production, distribution and consumption of text; the analysis of the social practice, i.e. the effects of the text on mental models, subject positions and social relations.[70]

For reflecting on the data and developing a theory of mission as conversation we will make a critical correlation between the insights acquired through analysing texts and insights acquired through review of literature on mission and conversation.

Structure

The research project was conducted between 2006 and 2012 on a part-time basis and follows an iterative research design in which collecting and analysing sources were repeated in order to get in-depth insight into the shift from mission as conversion to mission as conversation. Throughout the research, we shall contend with Rorty to try "to see keeping a conversation going"[71] as a sufficient aim of the new mission paradigm and to see mission "as consisting in the ability to sustain a conversation and to see human beings as generators of new descriptions rather than beings one hopes to be able to describe accurately."[72]

The thesis has five chapters. First we elaborate on the philosophy of Richard Rorty and Rorty's concept of conversation (Chapter 1). Next we translate Rorty's

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[70] Cf. Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change* (Cambridge: Polity Press 1992), 62-100.
[71] Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 377-378.
[72] Ibid., 378.

philosophy into operational terms using critical discourse analysis as method (Chapter 2). Thereafter we analyse past (Chapter 3) and present (Chapter 4) mission theories, using mission journals, pastoral letters and plans as sources. Last but not least we develop conversation as a new mission model, which goes beyond dialogue (Chapter 5). We end this thesis by drawing conclusions.

3. Theoretical and societal relevance

With the phenomenon of multiculturalism and pluralism, there is an increasing design of intercultural studies which are comparative in nature. Yet most importantly the subject of translatability or un-translatability of concepts as a result of the various encounters still remains. The issue of translatability has attracted attention from the 19th century on. The subject has been studied from, for example, linguistic, cultural, and philosophical angles, usually combined with the notion of equivalence.[73] There are also historical surveys of views on translatability and for our purpose here, we shall follow the trend developed by de Pedro.[74] De Pedro discusses more than twenty views on translatability and applies the distinction between monadist and universalist approaches. According to the former, translation is impossible, either partially or absolutely. Among the adherents of this view, one can mention Wilhelm von Humboldt, in the early stages of his studies on the subject matter, Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf, Andre Martinet, and John C. Catford. By invoking such arguments as linguistic determinism, the uniqueness of human experience, or the incompatibility of two linguistic systems and cultures, they claim that successful translation does not exist. The Universalist point of view concerning translatability is represented by scholars such as Walter Benjamin, Roman Jakobson, Eugene Nida, and Wolfram Wilss. While monadists concentrate on the uniqueness of languages and experience in order to support their theses, Jakobson and Nida stress the common features of linguistic systems and the logic of experience across languages.[75] In his later studies on translation, von Humboldt also notes that all ideas can be expressed in any human language. Benjamin and Wilss shift attention from the internal elements of translation, that is, the linguistic system, to the external ones, such as time and the necessity for a given translation to appear, or the translators' competence. According to Benjamin, a given text which cannot be translated now, might be translated in the future if need be,[76] while Wilss maintains that it is "the limited ability of the translator in regard to text analysis"[77] that causes translation to fail. De Pedro concludes her historical survey of translatability with the observation that

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[73] Andrew Chesterman, *The memes of translation: The spread of ideas in Translation theory* (Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1997), 10; see also, Marcin Ptaszyński, "On the (un)translatability of jokes," *Perspectives: Studies in Translatology*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2004, 176-193.

[74] De Pedro Raquel, "The translatability of texts: a historical overview," *Meta: journal des traducteurs / Meta: Translators' Journal,* Vol. 44, No. 4,(1999): 546-559.

[75] Ibid., 550.

[76] Ibid., 548.

[77] Wilss Wolfram, *The Science of Translation: Problems and methods* (Tübingen: Günter Narr., 1982), 49.

according to recent approaches to the issue, (i) absolute linguistic or cultural untranslatability does not exist as (ii) most texts are translatable, and (iii) the subject is now studied under various headings, such as cross-cultural communication rather than in isolation.[78]

As for the untranslatability, we shall follow Catford's definition of untranslatability as connected with the notion of equivalence. He postulates that "untranslatability occurs when it is impossible to build functionally relevant features of the situation into the contextual meaning of the target language, or text."[79] These "functionally relevant features" are situational features that "are relevant to the communicative function of the text in that situation."[80] In specific cases, the definition of functional relevance depends largely on our own views, though "the co-text will supply information which the translator will use in coming to a decision."[81] Catford distinguishes between linguistic and cultural untranslatability. In the former type, "functionally relevant features include some which are in fact formal features of the language of the source language text" and "the target language has no formally corresponding feature."[82] This kind of untranslatability is due to ambiguities that occur in the source language text and constitute functionally relevant features. Such ambiguities result from polysemy or "shared exponence of two or more source language grammatical or lexical items", that is, cases "where two or more distinct grammatical or lexical items are expounded in one and the same phonological or graphological form"[83] In addition, linguistic untranslatability may occur due to oligosemy. Cultural untranslatability, on the other hand, arises "when a situational feature, functionally relevant for the source-language text, is completely absent from the culture of which the target language is a part."[84] Later in his book, Catford invalidates this distinction. He stresses the linguistic nature of cultural untranslatability, arguing that the latter often appears because the use in the target-language text of any approximate translation equivalent produces an unusual collocation in the target language.

But according to Ke Ping, untranslatability is caused by two factors. First, the total meaning of a given sign, which includes the referential, pragmatic, and intralingual meanings in the source language, rarely corresponds to that of a sign in the target language. Although translators, in theory, could employ commentary or annotation in order to make up for such lack of equivalence, this strategy cannot be applied indiscriminately; "for the practical reason that it would make the translation

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78 De Pedro Raquel, *The Translatability of texts*, 556.
79 John C. Catford, *A linguistic theory of translation: An Essay in Applied Linguistics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 94.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., 99.

longwinded and cumbersome."[85] Using the concept of a socio-semiotic spectrum, Ke distinguishes between three types of untranslatability: 1. Referential untranslatability occurs when a referential element in the source message is not known or readily comparable to an item in the target language. 2. Pragmatic untranslatability arises where some pragmatic meaning encoded in a source item is not encoded likewise in a functionally comparable unit in the target language, or where the exact pragmatic meaning carried by the source sign is/are unclear or indeterminable due to historical reasons or to the intentional equivocation on the part of the author. 3. Interlingual untranslatability "... is a situation in which the source expression is apparently not transferable due to some ... linguistic peculiarity it contains. It pertains only to those linguistic features that are fore grounded somehow in the context.[86] These insights into translatability or untranslatability of concepts show possibilities and limitations of intercultural or interreligious communication which as a consequence would be an ideal apparatus for conversation to emerge as a fresh mission paradigm for the church in the present era.

[85] Ke Ping, "Translatability vs. untranslatability: A Sociosemiotic perspective," *Babel International Journal of Translation,* Vol. 45, (No. 4, 1999): 289-300.
[86] Ibid., 292-294.

Chapter One:
Richard Rorty and the concept Conversation

Introduction

In this chapter, the main thrust is to investigate the development of Rorty's concept of conversation. We shall seek to demonstrate how it is rooted in the history of philosophy which preoccupied Rorty in his monumental work, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Firstly, I will introduce Richard Rorty's position on the history of philosophy. Secondly, I will investigate the intellectual context in which he is situated and the influence it has had on the whole philosophical edifice. Thirdly, I will discuss his idea of conversation as a philosophical concept which originates from Socratic Method of inductive definition of concepts related to problems of life ought to replace the dominant confrontational philosophical discourse of the modern era. This is in line with the "end of philosophy" strategy that describes what a post-philosophical culture might look like, one that rejects foundationalism, representationalism and the nostalgic longing for a God's eye view on the world energised by metaphysics of presence. Instead of starting from a universal perspective, a conversation searches for common shared grounds, which are themselves always historical/provisional in nature, in making sense of a pressing problem of life.[87] My aim in this chapter is to illustrate the development of the concept conversation as an effect of the critique of Western philosophical categories which influenced mission theory and practice in Uganda. This chapter will provide the theoretical framework to enable the discussion in the subsequent chapters have a firm basis for a proper reading of mission history in the church in Uganda from the perspective of conversation as the new mission practice.

Contextualising Richard Rorty in the Philosophical Realm

Richard Rorty is described as an epistemological maverick primarily devoted to undermining the foundationalist ambitions of Western philosophy. Rorty's most influential work has rejected the notion that moral and social progress depends on finding the metaphysical bedrock of human existence. For Rorty, such excavations are futile and feckless; historical experience goes all the way down. Philosophy is unavoidably situated in a historical-cultural framework. The question, then, of how we should live is not a methodological puzzle of abstract dimensions, but a substantive challenge of historical-linguistic proportions. In pursuing this sceptical path, he chooses the historicist anti-heroes of modern philosophy, that is, John Dewey, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Martin Heidegger, as his heroic inspiration. As Rorty reads these writers, they hold that there is neither universal Truth nor supra-historical Knowledge, but only an un-bounded contingency; we treat everything -

[87] Ssempala Cornelius, "*Pragmatism, Conversation and Hermeneutics: The Promises and Limits of Richard Rorty's Recognition of Contingency"* (Ph.D. Thesis, Leuven: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 2004), 276.

our language, our conscience, and our community - as a product of time and chance.[88] As a whole the work of Richard Rorty calls for a "post-philosophical" culture that gives up the quest of "objective truth and values," that abandons the pursuit of "representing the world accurately," and that rejects the philosophical distinction between knowing, or representing, subject and object.[89] In this Rorty rejects the ancient Greek philosophical dualisms: the one and the many, stability and change, universal and particular, mind and body.

Rorty also rejected the Archimedean point, or view from nowhere, or God's eye view. And he recommends that we reject the distinctions between the natural and human sciences, the quantitative and qualitative representation, philosophy, literature or poetry, whereby those on the left side are hoped to yield privileged representations of reality and see the items as different ways we use to cope with the world, none more important or more "true" than another.[90]

Rorty has described himself and been described by others with all kinds of imageries. David Hall presents some of these descriptions which characterise the thinking of Rorty: He calls himself at various times a nominalist, a historicist, a non-reductive physicalist. In more colourful language he claims to be a postmodern bourgeois liberal, a lonely provincial, a new fuzzie.[91] Again, he is variously described as a philosophical nihilist set on dismantling philosophy as such, or at least such pivotal areas as epistemology and ontology; a superficial pragmatist, misappropriating key figures in the history of philosophy from Plato to Kant with the purpose of exchanging the goal of objective truth for that of subjective 'usefulness'; or a postmodern cultural relativist denying all scope for 'culture transcending' authority in order to promote his own preferred, self-legitimating set of 'ethnocentric' Western values. On still another reading he's a rather woolly utopian liberal, plaintively calling for the spread of human suffering and an end to cruelty, but failing to find an adequate grounding for that project.[92]

In the introduction to *Rorty and his Critics*, Bob Brandom also describes Rorty as one of the most influential figure beyond the confines of professional academic philosophy. But the views that have made him famous as a public intellectual arise out of his specifically philosophical reflections on topics that remain central to the Anglo-American tradition of analytic philosophy: the nature and significance of objective reality and truth and our knowledge of them.[93] He is called a Socratic gadfly, the bad boy of American philosophy, stinging the philosophical

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88 Allan C. Hutchinson, "The Three R's: Reading/Rorty/Radically: A Review of Contingency, Solidarity and Irony by Richard Rorty," *The Harvard Law Review,* Vol. 103 No.2 (1989): 555-58.
89 Richard *Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth*, 1.
90 Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), xiii.
91 Cf. David L. Hall, *Richard Rorty: Prophet and Poet of the New Pragmatism* (New York: State University of New York Press, Albany, 1994), 11.
92 Emil Visnovsky, "Understanding Rorty" *Res Publica*, Volume 10, No. 1 (2004): 91-100.
93 Robert B. Brandom, ed. *Rorty and his Critics* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1999), ix.

establishment where it hurts or a slipshod iconoclast, who has done more harm than good and there is no getting around the fact that a lot of people from a wide variety of disciplines and perspectives have something to say about him.[94] Some accusations against Rorty are apparently a hoax as Malachowski says that "even Rorty's sternest philosophical critics deny his main claims. They think he is wrong on just about every front. But they seem unable to state their denial in terms that do not beg the question or tacitly assume what Rorty himself denies."[95] Some accusations like of employing the term "we" as little more than a projected "me" are considered a misunderstanding because Rorty likes to project the image of himself as leading a movement "we pragmatists", and he has generously hailed many of the philosophers here, such as Brandom, Davidson, and Putnam, as standing alongside him, demolishing the school gates. Also, his use of "we" is one of the hinges of his New Pragmatism and it presupposes consensus or invite it.[96]

His massive body of work has been called an aid for understanding the philosophical and intellectual issues that have preoccupied thinkers for the past several decades. This is so because Rorty has been a prolific reader with expansive interests and an uncanny ability to drop names not only from the entire philosophical tradition, but of novelists, poets, literary critics, legal scholars, historians and political theorists. He was a consummate collaborator, enthusiastically promoting the work of others and always willing to engage even his harshest critics in the hope of furthering on-going debate. One historian called Rorty "the embodiment of the contemporary, a barometer, perhaps, of intellectual pressures across so many discourses. …Rorty…moving as he does with such ease the entire intellectual terrain, expresses some of the arguably most vibrant areas of contemporary intellectual life. This tells why there is a suspicion that Rorty's work has been more influential than understood."[97]

Rorty in the History of Philosophy

Rorty was trained in the analytic tradition and this fits well with the observation made of analytic philosophers in regard to the history of philosophy. That sometimes their approach to the history of philosophy lacked sufficient self-consciousness.[98] This is presupposed by the way Rorty approached the history of philosophy which could be rightly placed in what is called the analytic ideal. This ideal has two considerations, (1) Objects of the activity: That the history of

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[94] Jonathan Ree, "Strenuous Unbelief," *London Review of Books*, vol. 20, No. 20 (October 15, 1998): 7-11; Christopher J. Voparil and Richard J. Bernstein, eds., *The Rorty Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2010), 3.

[95] Malachowski Allan, *Richard Rorty* (Chesham: Acumen, 2002), 168.

[96] David L. Hall, *Richard Rorty*, 14.

[97] Keith Jenkins, *On What is History?, From Carr and Elton, to Rorty and White* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 4.

[98] Christopher Janaway and Peter Alexander, "History of Philosophy: The Analytical Ideal," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volumes*, Vol. 62, (1988), 169-189 + 191-208.

philosophy is the study of texts which (a) are either written documents that survive from the past, or are derived from past documents by some appropriate form of transmission, and (b) address philosophical questions; (2) Aims of the activity: The history of philosophy aims (a) to interpret its object-texts in such a way as to discern what philosophical questions are addressed in them and what philosophical views expressed, (b) to ascertain the truth values of propositions, and the strength of arguments, in which these views are expressed, (c) to use what is thus ascertained about these propositions and arguments in constructing arguments for propositions which are regarded (or plausibly could come to be regarded) as contributions to present philosophical debate.[99]

Rorty read the history of philosophy and he discusses it from his own perspective, for the furtherance of his own purposes in philosophy, with total disregard of the general principal aims that have been outlined in its historical practice. Linda M. Alcoff outlines the principal aims of epistemology as; i) to achieve a general understanding of knowledge, belief, justification, truth, and other epistemic terms, either through conceptual analysis or through reflection on how they are used in practice; ii) to understand what it is to know something, that is, to define the difference between knowing and having a true belief; iii) to determine the limits of human knowledge and iv) to providing a legitimating explanation for our claims to know, and thus refute epistemological scepticism.[100] She claims that in all these, Michel Foucault contributes to the first three while rejecting the viability and necessity of the fourth. Rorty argues otherwise by considering the fourth and he reads the history of epistemology as organised almost exclusively around the problem of scepticism and he characterises pragmatism as an alternative to epistemology on these grounds.[101] The discussion here will not dwell too much on the epistemological views as expressed by Rorty and other scholars. Neither will an evaluation of Rorty's conception of epistemology and philosophy as excessively narrow, collapsing epistemology to foundationalism and metaphysics to a Kantian commitment hence excluding much of analytic philosophy from his definition be taken care of at the moment. The central plank is to survey the historical development of his ideas and the motivation thereof.

The intellectual context of Rorty

To understand well the ideas that characterise Rorty's work, it is appropriate that we make a brief survey of the intellectual environment that influenced Rorty and left an everlasting imprint on him. Some of Rorty's ideas on the traditional problems of philosophy, which were labelled spurious, were a perpetuation of the philosophical mistakes which have their appropriate characterisation in Dewey.

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[99] Ibid., 170.
[100] Linda Martin Alcoff, *Real Knowing: New Versions of Coherence Theory* (Itacha: Cornell University Press, 1996), 142.
[101] Ibid.

Dewey had claimed that the mistake was to think that we are non-material objects, souls or minds quite distinct from our bodies and the rest of the world.[102] Rorty took up this idea and adds that the mistake is to conceive the mind as a sort of mirror or canvas, and knowledge as accurate representation on this canvas.[103] But his main ideas are rooted in the reading of influential 17th century philosophers whom he blames for distorting the history of philosophy and creating instead epistemology which is his main concern as a historical deviation from the proper development of philosophical ideas. One of the great adversaries of Rorty is Rene Descartes whom he blames for distorting the philosophical development by creating the idea of the mind which from the beginning of philosophy was not considered at all. But the deeper meta-philosophical reason for this negative assessment is, as we have seen above, his adherence to Dewey's view that problems should be evaluated according to their relevance to contemporary life. For Dewey, all problems originate in some sort of social need, but they tend to outlive their usefulness; this is what he thought had happened with all the traditional problems of philosophy. And this is what Rorty thinks has happened with the mind-body problem. Ancient Greek philosophers felt the need to connect personhood and rationality, seventeenth-century philosophers felt the need to support the new science, and the remainder in our hands is a problem with no relevance to twenty-first century life whatsoever.

In light of the above developments and for the better understanding of Rorty's ideas, it is appropriate to discuss another indefinable school within the tradition of American pragmatism. This is the one that represents the epistemological sensibilities of nonfoundationalism to which Rorty is especially identified. Building on the work of an older generation that includes Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, Rorty together with other contemporary pragmatists such as Wilfrid Sellars, Willard Van Orman Quine, and Richard J. Bernstein share several common assumptions that might be described as nonfoundationalist.[104] All are keenly suspicious of the Cartesian understanding of the philosophical task in which thinking is called upon to establish a first philosophy, an architectonic of all knowledge grounded on some immediately experienced, self-certain principle that serves as "foundations" for the entire edifice of knowledge. All are opposed to traditional understandings of the philosophical justification of belief in which reasoning is expected to show the validity of claims to knowledge finally by appeal to indubitable "foundations" on which such claims rest. All regard the business of philosophy, at least at this moment in its history, as the Criticism of Cartesianism and the formulation of more adequate accounts of knowing in which claims to

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[102] John Dewey, *Creative Intelligence* (Carbondale: Southern University Press, 1981), 30-31.

[103] Cf. Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Post-Modern Condition: A report on Knowledge* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979).

[104] For the discussion that is following, I have relied heavily on the presentation of non-Foundationalist philosophies in John E. Thiel, *Nonfoundationalism* (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Fortress Press, 1994), 1-37; John E. Thiel, *Senses of Tradition: Continuity and Development in Catholic Faith* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 100-128.

knowledge are justified without appeal to foundationalist principles.[105] It can certainly be affirmed that foundationalism is as old as the Platonic tradition in western philosophy, whereas the nonfoundationalists frequently personify the foundationalist error by reference to Rene Descartes.

We have to contend that the foundations of knowing appear in such philosophical accounts as Plato's eternal forms, Descartes' clear and distinct ideas, John Locke's giveness of sense experience, or Kant's transcendental categories of understanding.[106] These foundations are esteemed by their proponents as immediately justified beliefs whose certainty justifies more derivative claims in the larger body of knowledge. The very purpose of the foundations is to ensure the indubitability of knowledge or at the very least the possibility of such unquestioned certainty. Foundationalists assign universality to whatever principle they advance as the authenticator of truth claims and they seem to assume that epistemic foundations permeate the entire system of knowledge and cause whatever truth dwells among its mediate claims. Hence, foundations provide a point of departure for logical deduction or a foothold for inductive thinking to climb toward valid knowledge.

Generally speaking, nonfoundationalist criticism makes its target any variety of rationalism or empiricism that expects foundations for knowledge, whether in ideas or sense data, to establish the certainty of epistemic claims. They postulate that foundationalists could justify claims to knowledge only if there are foundations for such claims, otherwise justification for knowledge becomes an infinite spiral of scepticism in which even the possibility of certainty in any instance is jeopardised.[107] Wilfred Sellars has argued that the foundationalist conceptualisation of knowledge is energised by the 'Myth of the Given' "the idea that there are inner episodes, whether thoughts or so called immediate experiences to which each of us has privileged access, inner episodes furnishing premises on which empirical knowledge rests as on a foundation."[108] For Sellars, there is no evidence that such a foundational, unmoved mover of knowledge exists. Quine like Sellars rejects any rationalist or traditionally empiricist manner of account for human knowledge.

He makes a few assertions that: One, philosophy provides no apriori propaedeutic or groundwork for science; neither does it offer some external vantage point from which knowledge can be constructed. Rather philosophy is continuous with science and its task is to critically examine the formation of concepts from sensory evidence. Two, the process of concept formation is inseparable from the formation of meaning in words, sentences, and the entire system of language itself. Meaning is not a transcendental quality, a foundation on which sentences must rest in order to

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105 Ibid., 117.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Wilfrid Sellars, *Science, Perception and Reality* (New York: Humanities Press, 1963), 140.

possess meaning, it is a function of how sentences are used and through such use acquire significance.[109] The nonfoundationalist views expressed here consider that the task of justification is that what is called knowledge is its justification; itself an open-ended process of explaining the beliefs valued in particular meaningful contexts. In the absence of "foundations," arguments are the principal means by which basic beliefs are themselves shaped and by which their values gain clarity and thus authority. Arguments, then, are indispensable to claims to knowledge in this nonfoundationalist perspective for the reasons they provide for beliefs not only support, relate, criticise and revise those claims but also are those claims themselves.

There was a crisis of legitimacy in the 16th century; reason is instituted as the sole guide both in intellectual and moral domains. Philosophers in the modern paradigm are alienated from tradition. They do their philosophising, and perceive themselves as doing philosophy, in a situation of cultural crisis, a crisis induced by the widespread consensus that the European intellectual, moral and religious tradition was fractured and that new 'foundations' for knowledge and belief had to be discovered. The wisdom of a (supposedly) unified tradition could no longer be consulted to resolve one's dilemmas. Inescapably, there was on the cultural agenda the question 'how do we go about deciding what to believe?', 'How do we conduct our understandings?' Those are the questions that arise in the wake of the demise of the 'wisdom of a unified tradition'. And for some modern philosophers the answer is, *'Aude Sapere!'* 'Let reason be your guide in clarifying intellectual and moral topics.'[110] Let the eye of the mind light your path in the attempt to clearly understand (representing) reality. In so doing, the modern philosophers make use of Ancient Greek strategies to overcome the problem of the one and the many, reality and appearance, stability and change.

Representationalism is thus another epistemic tradition which is identified with Rorty. It is part of, and/ or originates from the historical conditions of crisis of legitimacy of the modern age after the collapse of the central legitimating authority. It falls within the scope of the wider end of philosophy strategy. Philosophers since Plato have tended to approach all philosophical problems trying to represent reality, by an act of intellectual seeing, through the eye of the mind. This metaphor underlines the modern assumption that knowledge should aim at an accurate representation of the way things are in view of achieving universal, indubitable, eternal truths or an Archimedian viewpoint. Knowing, in the wake of a universal modern scepticism, is a relation between subject and object, not an intersubjective, consensual, discursive, cultural-linguistic affair but a matter of representation. These privileged representations, in the wake of the modern crisis of legitimation, provide foundations to legitimate the rest of the beliefs. The search for foundations

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[109] John E. Ethiel, *Senses of Tradition*, 118-119.

[110] Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Thomas A. Abbott, rev. ed. Lara Denis (Toronto: Broadview editions, 2005), 119.

has become an act of faith or a sort of vocation for philosophers. This idea occasions the dichotomy between the subject and object, and the according of epistemic authority to first person access to the object. True knowledge then comes to be seen in the form of a privileged, immediate and private property of the enlightened knower.

The Epistemology of Kant

In discussing Kant, the purpose is to broaden the intellectual context which influenced Rorty and serves as a background for the development of his ideas especially the concept of conversation which is under discussion in this paper. Before we delve deeper into the Kantian world, we would start with how Jürgen Habermas considers the constitutive elements of the conceptual frame that Kant inherited and transformed: (a) The epistemological turn that is connected with Descartes starts from the question of how we, thinking subjects, can reassure ourselves that we are at all capable of achieving knowledge. This leads to a new conceptualization of knowledge in terms of a subject's possession of 'ideas' of objects. The innovation is indicated by the third term, idea or 'representation' that now mediates between the knowing subject and the world. While the subject is one who has representations of objects, the world contains everything that can be represented by a subject for itself. (b) The knowing subject is identified with a self or an ego. This conception of self-reference has major implications; it allows for an answer to the epistemological question of how we can acquire second-order knowledge of how we gain first-order knowledge of objects. This is possible in virtue of self-reflection, reflection on the self as a subject having ideas or representations of whatever objects. In representing the representations, the thinking-self disclose an internal space, called subjectivity. Thus, the sphere of consciousness is intertwined with self-consciousness right from the beginning. (c) Self-reflection or apperception is at first taken to be an inconspicuous act that could give a clear epistemic meaning to the ancient ethical imperative 'know thyself'.[111]

Habermas continues to consider that this epistemological notion of self-reflection suggests a dualist paradigm of subject-object relations which can be spelled out in three basic assumptions: (i) Via introspection, the knowing subject has privileged access to its own more or less transparent and incorrigible ideas which appear in the mode of immediate evidence. (ii) This self-reflexive awareness of our own representings opens the way to a genetic account of the roots of our mediated knowledge of objects. (iii) Since the roots of knowledge in subjectivity can be grasped by introspection and since the assessment of knowledge depends on tracing its subjective roots, the intended kind of reassurance is based on the concept of truth as subjective evidence or certainty. And, (d) he takes these

[111] Cf. Jürgen Habermas, "From Kant to Hegel and Back again: The Move Towards Detranscendentalization," *European Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.7, No.2 (1999): 129-157.

assumptions – the myth of the given, the search for origins, and the idea of truth as certainty – articulate the conception of 'the mental' as distinguished from 'the physical'. There are three intuitive oppositions underlying this distinction. The mental is circumscribed by a boundary, drawn from the first-person perspective, between what is 'inside' and what is 'outside' of the consciousness of the self, or between ego and non-ego. This coincides with two further delimitations: the boundary between what is immediately given and what is given in an indirect way, the private and the public realm; and the boundary between what is certain and what is uncertain, the incorrigibly true and the fallible.

The consequence of the above understanding prompts the separation of the knowing subject from the sphere of its objects. This stimulates questions about the interaction between one side and the other, in particular the classical epistemological questions about the origin of knowledge and the direction of it and influence. Empiricism and rationalism answered the question of origin in favour of knowledge a posteriori and knowledge a priori respectively. While the answers to the question of causal direction developed in the realist and idealist traditions, were in favour, respectively, of the receptivity and the spontaneity of the human mind.[112] Some scholars postulate that according to current philosophical methodology and current readings of Kant, his key epistemological classifications were either badly mistaken or very confused.[113] Kant's epistemological quest is framed in terms of vindicating the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge with the central question being "How are synthetic a priori propositions possible?"[114] This question requires an answer to another question "What are the necessary conditions, if any, of our being able to speak intelligibly about the world of our experience?" It is this requirement which gives Kant's question its primary significance. When Kant insists that the notion of describing experience presupposes distinctions which are prior to any specific descriptive statement, he is arguing transcendentally. When he distinguishes two basic kinds of prior conditions, space-time and the categories, he is claiming that a conceptual scheme adequate to the requirements of empirical knowledge must enable us to do at least two things: to individuate and to attribute. It is argued further that some of Kant's transcendental arguments deal not merely with the conditions of making the empirical claims we do make, but rather with the conditions of making any intelligible claim at all about any conceivable kind of experience.[115]

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112 Ibid.

113 Patricia Kitcher, "Revisiting Kant's Epistemology: Skepticism, Apriority, and Psychologism" *Nous*, Vol. 29. No.3 (1995): 285-315.

114 Lewis W. Beck ed., *Kant's Theory of Knowledge* (Dordrecht-Holland: R. Reidel Publishing Company, 1974), 3.

115 Eva Schaper (Glasgow), "Arguing Transcendentally," paper accessed online at *www.degruyter.com* and downloaded at Radboud University Nijmegen and Authenticated by 172.16.1.226 (accessed June 5, 2012 1:40 PM).

Kitcher while continuing with his epistemology claims that by applying the term transcendental, Kant makes a number of assertions to strengthen his argument. First, he argues that the focus of transcendental epistemology is not individual knowledge claims about objects, but the manner in which one is able to know objects at all. Second, transcendental epistemology is concerned with the non-empirical origins of our mental representations of objects. He refers to certain concepts as pure, meaning that they are not of empirical origin and notes also that they belong to the understanding and not to sensibility. That is their origin is not in experience nor in our own sensibility, but in the understanding itself, that is, these concepts come from the understanding alone. Third, he posits that transcendental knowledge concerns the possibility of experience. This makes the same point twice: transcendental proofs proceed by considering the possibility of experience.[116] Transcendental epistemology is concerned with the manner of knowing objects and more specifically, it is inextricably linked to the investigation of the possibility that some concepts or mental representations are of non-empirical origin and also inextricably linked to exploring the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience. In all these ventures, Kant intended to open up new philosophical territory by exploring the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience. All in all we could claim that transcendental epistemology is concerned with the manner of knowing objects and more specifically, it is inextricably linked to the investigation of the possibility that some concepts or mental representations are of non-empirical origin and also inextricably linked to exploring the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience. Through investigating the possibility of experience, one discovers that certain representations that are not of empirical origin, but derives from our mental faculties, are necessary for experience. Alternatively, the way to demonstrate that one is in possession of certain representations that are not of empirical origin is to show that they are necessary conditions for the possibility of experience itself.[117]

Major Philosophical Themes in Rorty's works

Richard Rorty has been portrayed as one of the most original and influential contemporary philosophers but at the same time as one who adopted a distinctive and controversial brand of pragmatism. The characteristic idea of this pragmatism is that ideas and practices should be judged in terms of their usefulness, workability and practicality and that these are the criteria of their truth, rightness and value. It is a perspective that stresses the priority of action over principles. This background motivated his perceived views on the biggest themes available to a philosopher: philosophy itself and truth.[118] These two themes are deeply connected within Rorty

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116 Patricia Kitcher, "Revisiting Kant's Epistemology", 288.

117 Ibid.

118 Cf. James Tartaglia, *Rorty and the Mirror of Nature* (London: Routledge, 2007), 2; see also Peter Reason, "Pragmatist Philosophy and Action Research: Readings and Conversation with Richard Rorty," *Action Research*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2003): 102-123.

and he has enough to say about them. Rorty wants to undermine the confidence philosophers have in their subject as an autonomous discipline with its subject matter and its own methodology for dealing with that subject matter. He compares philosophy with history, geology, biology, and a whole host of other standard academic subjects and he thinks that philosophy is deeply suspect. He contrasts philosophy and the philosopher. Philosophy on the one hand, studies the basic and general ways of understanding the world by attempting to overcome perennial problems that can arise whenever those ways of understanding are reflected upon. The philosopher on the other hand, investigates the nature of the mind, knowledge, and time, but does so in full generality, as opposed to investigating minds of particular peoples, instances of knowledge, or historical eras.[119] For Rorty, philosophy should address problems for understanding the world in such terms, problems like finding a place for minds alongside physical objects or securing human claims to knowledge from sceptical challenges or explaining the elusiveness of the temporal present.[120] In some instance, this line of argument may be likened to Arthur Schopenhauer's pessimism where he laments about the meaning of human temporal existence. He laments human existence thus: "We are like lambs in a field disporting themselves under the eye of the butcher, who chooses out first one and then another for his prey. So it is that in our good days we are all unconscious of the evil fate may have presently in store for us – sickness, poverty, mutilations, loss of sight or reason. No little part of the torment of existence lies in this, that time is continually pressing upon us never letting us take breath, but always coming after us, like a taskmaster with a whip. If at any moment times stays his hand, it is only when we are delivered over to the misery of boredom."[121]

Philosophers throughout history have developed methods for solving these problems or at least in the hope of making progress towards solutions. Rorty singles out the method of placing philosophy on the secure path of a science by Immanuel Kant. He considers this as the most complex and thorough method ever developed. But despite this admiration for the Kantian method, Rorty's aim, in contrast to Kant, was to keep philosophy well away from the 'secure path of a science.'[122] Rorty is against this sort of technical professionalised philosophy because he has some fascinating reasons: First, he thinks that progress in philosophy is impossible, and that a scientific approach obscures this. Secondly, perennial philosophical problems are a little more than historical aberrations; out-dated ways of thinking which it is a mistake to perpetuate them. It is better to ignore them and be forgotten for they will never be solved as medieval scholars never solved the problems that interested them. Thirdly, while philosophy remains on the secure path of a science, it will be able to renew itself. The old problems will

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[119] Ibid., 103.
[120] Ibid., 104.
[121] Cf. Arthur Schopenhauer, *Studies in Pessimism*, trans. Thomas Bailey Saunders (New York, N.Y.: Cosmo, 2007): 6.
[122] James Tartaglia, *Rorty and the Mirror of Nature*, 3.

be forever recycled in new formulations, which will in turn spin off technical side-issues that only specialists can debate. With the increase in technicality, philosophical research becomes increasingly detached from the intuitive problems that first attracted its practitioners, and increasingly irrelevant to the rest of culture. And the more philosophers are required to specialise to understand the latest research, the less likely they are to have the synoptic and historical vision required to question their own research programs and recognise old debates resurfacing in contemporary jargon.[123] So, he wants to break the crust of convention, to disrupt normal philosophical activity.

These views of Rorty on the nature of philosophy distinguish his work as being primarily meta-philosophical with a purpose that he adopts them to make traditional lines of philosophical inquiry appear uninteresting, and thereby to persuade conventional philosophers to try something new. These views are motivated by views which were negatively evaluated by some philosophers like Davidson Donald claiming that "Rorty sees the history of western philosophy as a confused and victor-less battle between unintelligible scepticism and lame attempts to answer it."[124] Surely, it is this view of the history of the subject which lies behind Rorty's scepticism about normal philosophical research. He thinks that philosophy was designed for dubious purposes, and has no success in fulfilling those purposes anyway, despite trying for a very long time. Rorty goes much further than just trying to inject some historical suspicion into philosophy to keep it off the 'secure path of a science.' He has suggested that even philosophers of his disruptive breed should aim to work themselves out of a job and he has expressed the hope that his brand of 'antiphilosophy' might lead to a post-Philosophical culture. This call has some consequences for philosophy: one, the classic works of philosophy like Descartes' Meditation and Kant's Critique of Pure Reason for instance, will no longer be read in the same spirit, will no longer be taken literally. Philosophy will be thought of as a vaguely demarcated genre of literature, and nobody will think of this genre as dealing with real and important problems, apart from contributing to an on-going quest to unravel the fundamental enigmas of human existence. His idea is that the great texts of philosophy be thought of as just great texts. Hence philosophy turns into a form of literary study.

Another important theme that Rorty undermines together with philosophy is truth. He makes a blatant claim that, "We cannot regard truth as a goal of inquiry. The purpose of inquiry is to achieve agreement among human beings about what to do, to bring consensus on the end to be achieved and the means to be used to achieve those ends. Inquiry that does not achieve co-ordination of behaviour is not inquiry but simply wordplay."[125] There is a connection that Rorty makes between

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123 Ibid.

124 Davidson Donald, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," in *Reading Rorty. Critical Responses to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,* ed. Alan R. Malachowski (Oxford: Blackwell Ltd. 1990), 137.

125 Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and Social Hope* (London: Penguin Books, 1999), 25.

philosophy and truth for he sees philosophy as the last stronghold of a certain conception of truth, one which he thinks is holding back progress in intellectual life. He thinks that the abandonment of this conception of truth is required for the complete secularisation of human thought, and that a transformation in philosophy might, in the long run, have a positive role to play in this much wider transformation. The conception of truth in question here is that of objective truth, in the literal sense of a truth that comes from objects as contrasted with the subjective truth which depends as much on the subject as the object.[126] The traditional way of understanding objective truth is in terms of a relation of correspondence between our language and the world.[127] The idea of objective truth, then, may be summed up as the idea that whether or not the things we say, think, or write are true, depends on whether or not they correspond to how the world really is. Rorty thinks differently from other philosophers, who take this idea to sound like an innocuous piece of common sense, that this idea is anything but innocuous. On his view, it is a residue of religious thought hidden deep down within ordinary ways of thinking, a residue which philosophy has unwittingly helped to perpetuate. Rorty traces the origins of this situation and finds an answer in the Enlightenment movement of the 18th century. Kant proposed as a motto for this movement: Have courage to make use of your own understanding."[128] The motivating idea was to cast off the authority of the church, the monarchy and ancient texts, and to instead rely upon human reason for understanding the world. Instead of believing in God, the truth had already been revealed through certain institutions, people should instead try to work out for themselves by means of science and philosophy.

The above ideas made an unprecedented contribution to the secularisation of culture, but did not go far enough. According to Rorty an element of religious thought remained that has prevented the secularisation process from reaching completion. This is because the notion of objective truth was left untouched. Belief in divine guidance was thereby simply displaced rather than discarded, for truth continued to be thought of as something forced upon us by a non-human agency. Faith in God was gradually transformed into faith in science, because with the religious conception of truth intact, the most we could do was progress from believing that truth is dictated by God, to believing that the truth is dictated by an independent, objective world. In the present age, science is the obvious place to look for such a description, and scientifically minded people do indeed often assume that the progress of science is bringing us ever closer to the final truth about the universe, to what physicists call 'a theory of everything.'[129] Thinking this

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126 James Tartaglia, *Rorty and the Mirror*, 5.

127 Gerald Vision, "Veritable Reflections," in *Reading Rorty: Critical Responses to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (and Beyond),* ed. Alan Malachowski (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 75-77.

128 Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" in *Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy,* trans. and ed. M. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 11-22.

129 The Theory of Everything is a term for the ultimate theory of the universe—a set of equations capable of describing all phenomena that have been observed, or that will ever be observed. It is the modern

way only requires extending the common-sense view of progress in science as consisting in the production of ever more accurate descriptions of reality. For Rorty the fact that we are so inclined to think this way is the legacy of an age in which the world was seen as the creation of a being that had a language of his own and he supposes that there must be one privileged description of the world. Despite this, however, we still witness to a myriad of descriptions of the world; some are much more useful than others, and scientific descriptions have proved extremely useful in the development of new technologies. The nagging question is: why we should seek to explain differences in usefulness with the notion of objective truth? Rorty thinks there is no good reason, only an historical explanation.

The striking consequence of this view is that to be consistent atheists, Rorty reiterates that people need to give up on realism, that is, on the belief that reality has its own intrinsic nature independently of how we describe or experience it, and about which there is an objective truth to discover. With this in mind, Rorty has strengthened the old atheist conviction that religious belief stems from a longing for permanent parental guidance. He thinks that a culture that gives up on realism has matured and would realise that what matters is our loyalty to other human beings clinging together against the dark, not our hope of getting things right. In such a culture, the authority of non-human objectivity would be replaced by human solidarity, and forms of description would not be ranked according to their supposed ability to correspond to the true nature of reality, but only according to their usefulness, something which varies from context to context. Thus liberated, people would realise that there may be as much or more reason to believe in human rights than fundamental physical particles, since neither sort of belief is forced on us.

These two themes, that is, philosophy and objective truth run throughout and motivate Rorty's many and diverse writings. They are intimately connected. Rorty sees philosophy as the guardian of objective truth. He considers Philosophy as the academic subject which sets out to determine what objective truth is and under which circumstances we can have access to it. Rorty does not think that without objective truth and the cluster of ideas which revolve around it, philosophy as traditionally conceived makes any sense. So to pursue well his meta-philosophical agenda, his views on truth provide a clear motivation for his progress in his work. Therefore, for the purpose of assessing well his thoughts, the discussion will prioritise his meta-philosophy since his views on truth derive from his reading of the history of philosophy and from certain arguments within that history. This will

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incarnation of the reductionist ideal of the ancient Greeks, an approach to the natural world that has been fabulously successful in bettering the lot of mankind and continues in many people's minds to be the central paradigm of physics. Cf. Stephen W. Hawking, *The Theory of Everything: The origin and Fate of the universe* (Beverly Hills CA: Phoenix Books, 2005), 20-28.

provide a basis for an epistemological background to discuss mission history in the Ugandan context which is the central idea of this work.

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature

Rorty's major work, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, is an attempt to do philosophy historically. In this work, he challenged a conception of philosophy that was almost universally accepted among mainstream Anglo-American philosophers in the 1970s. This conception of philosophy, inherited from Descartes and given its clearest formulation by Kant, holds that before philosophers begin to speculate about what is and what ought to be, they should first get clear about what they can know and what they can't know. He tried to show that a widely accepted picture is deeply problematic and he does so by engaging with historical figures who have accepted this picture.[130] Rorty wants to convince the reader that a certain conception of the mind is problematic and needs to be rethought or abandoned. But he makes this point by carefully and selectively drawing on history. *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* undermines the representational picture by engaging critically with its famous representatives, and showing that their versions of this picture are incoherent, or based on faulty assumptions or something of the sort. He suggests that he must proceed in this way, that any attempt to rid ourselves of the representational picture or any dubious picture must take that picture's history. There seems to be four distinct parts to his procedure. First, Rorty selects the historical figures with whom he wishes to engage: Locke, Descartes, Kant and others. Second, he tries to get the readers to see these figures as proponents of the representational picture. As for Kant and Locke who are not totally representationalist, he traces little noticed lines of influence among these thinkers, pointing out striking similarities in their use of concepts and so on. Third, he engages critically with these figures. He not only claims that they embody representational picture, he argues that their versions of this picture faces insuperable difficulties. Finally, on the basis of these engagements with particular figures, one draws the conclusion about the picture as a whole.[131] It has been a shared belief that as well as being provocative, Rorty's work is of singular relevance to contemporary concerns as will the subsequent sections indicate.

As it has been noted above, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* has its major target as the foundationalist project of trying to provide a theory of knowledge based on the notion of representation. The publication of *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* in 1979 was, in his own words in the preface, an effort to try "to isolate more of the assumptions behind the problematic of modern philosophy, in the hope of generalizing and extending Sellars' and Quine's criticisms of traditional

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130 Robert Peircey, *The Uses of the Past from Heidegger to Rorty: Doing Philosophy Historically* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 31.
131 Ibid., 33-34.

empiricism."[132] Rorty was forty-seven when this book was published; it was met with attacks from some analytic philosophers upon his views of epistemology, truth, and representation. This response was countered by a much more enthusiastic one from critics of literature, who appreciated that his approach was pragmatic rather than analytic and that his models were the American pragmatists William James and John Dewey. Rorty's approach is to reveal the dubious historical motivations which led to the entrenchment of this idea, and to show that recent arguments in analytic philosophy make any such project untenable. In this way, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* aims to undermine all philosophical work which owes a debt to foundationalism and representationalism, broadly interpreted. He goes even much further than this, because he thinks that the very idea of a separate and systematic subject called 'philosophy' is inextricably linked to its original foundationalist motivations. As a consequence, he also aims to discourage attempts to re-start philosophy on a non-foundationalist, non-representationalist basis. His position is that... "All hope for first philosophy should be abandoned; nay, even the wish for such a thing should disappear, and that would imply the end of epistemology as we know it, and good riddance."[133] This position is taken on the assumption that philosophy is an impossible dream, the dream of philosophy as grounding, and sitting in judgement of, science and the rest of the epistemic culture, on account of philosophy's providing us with apodictic knowledge in a very special sphere, namely the foundations of knowledge.

With that in mind the resultant argument is that there is a necessity of replacing this vision with a relativistic, fallibilistic, and coherentistic account of knowledge. But after setting that task, Rorty states that the aim of *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* is therapeutic. It is to cure the reader of the traditional idea of philosophy. Since Kant's time philosophy has been conceived of as "...the attempt to underwrite or debunk claims to knowledge made by science, morality, art or religion. ...it can do so because it understands the foundations of knowledge ...the mental processes or the activity of representation which make knowledge possible."[134] Rorty does not offer the reader new theories on these subjects. Rather he makes an attempt to relieve us of the very idea of knowledge, mind and representation as things we ought to have a theory about. In devising this therapy, Rorty uses the constructive efforts of several analytic philosophers like Sellars, Quine, Davidson, Kuhn and others and he still hopes "to convince the reader that the dialectic with analytic philosophy needs to be carried a few steps further. These additional steps will, I think, put us in a position to criticise the very notion of analytic philosophy, and indeed of philosophy itself as it has been understood since the time of Kant."[135] This view presents some difficulties in grasping the central argument that Rorty

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[132] Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Xiii.
[133] Anders Tolland, *Epistemological Relativism and Relativistic Epistemology* (Goteborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1991), 3.
[134] Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 3.
[135] Ibid., 7-9.

makes in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. It turns out to be a very complex piece of literature that demands expert knowledge and skills to comprehend it intelligibly.

Nevertheless, it has to be noted that *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, is dotted with certain obstacles which need to be highlighted before one begins a critical reading of it and following the arguments therein. The first and most obvious obstacle is that PMN makes unusual demands of the reader by drawing together numerous complex positions from throughout the history of philosophy in order to build its argument. Rorty's range of reference is notoriously vast and daunting, and his presupposition of familiarity with all of these philosophical positions has excluded many interested parties from first-hand acquaintance with his work. Secondly, readers are unduly sceptical about Rorty's history; as it is a well-known fact that his interpretations are very controversial. There are scores of articles by Wittgenstein, Heidegger and even Dewey scholars all disputing Rorty's interpretations, and that two figures in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Quine and Thomas Kuhn, personally disowned Rorty's use of their work. But Rorty's interpretations actually tend to be fairly conventional much as he clearly admires appropriation and strong misreading[136] and this is not obviously how he does this. What he does is purify philosophers, leave out the bits he does not like, those which can be intensely annoying but is no great cause for concern. Thirdly, is the combination of Rorty's distinctive writing style and large-scale subject matter which can come across as exciting and dramatic, making it easy to be uncritically carried along by Rorty's narrative, or else imprecise and evasive, making it just as easy to be uncritically dismissive of what can seem like endless sweeping generalisations. An early review which took the latter perspective described *Philosophy and Mirror of Nature* as long on claims and polemic, but short on argument.[137] The fourth obstacle is that *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* is designed to provide relief from philosophical puzzlement and this can be of little interest to those who are not puzzled especially those readers without any background education in philosophy.[138] To appreciate Rorty's attempt at debunking the traditional philosophical picture, one must have seen its power to grasp the claims that Rorty puts forward.

Rorty's Critique of Philosophy in his work Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature

Rorty's book is divided into three parts and consists of eight chapters. Part 1, Our Glassy Essence, comprises two chapters, 'The Invention of the Mind' and 'Persons Without Minds'; part 2, Mirroring, which is the central part of the book, contains four chapters, 'The Idea of a Theory of Knowledge', 'Privileged Representations', Epistemology and Empirical Psychology', and Epistemology and Philosophy of

136 Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, 151.
137 Harry Ruja, "Review of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, No. 42 (1981): 299-300.
138 James Tartaglia, *Rorty and the Mirror of Nature*, 22-24.

Language'; and part 3, Philosophy, concludes with two chapters, 'From Epistemology to Hermeneutics', and 'Philosophy Without Mirrors.' We have to contend that historically, epistemology has been linked to the idea of a first philosophy and with this Rorty present a real challenge to epistemologists. In this work, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Rorty wants to do away with the problems of the past as associated with Kant and Descartes. He argues that the roots of the fundamental errors of traditional philosophy go far back beyond Kant, back to the choice of metaphor made by the ancient Greeks. They chose to describe our capacity to grasp universals, with reason, by the metaphor of looking at. Just as one acquires knowledge of material objects by perceiving them with the eye of the body, one acquires knowledge of universals by perceiving them with the inner eye – the mind's eye. Mind identified with reason, the possession of which is what separates Man from beasts, was thought to be identical with the Soul, an essential part of Man that leaves the body at death.

Thus we have inherited from the Ancient Greeks a conception of a Mind's Eye which lets the concepts of reason and personhood get intertwined. This entanglement has managed to linger on even though our conception of mind has changed. It is claimed in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* that it was Descartes who executed the most radical change by expanding the mind. The Greeks thought of sensations as being taken care of by the body rather than by the Nous. For Descartes, not only contemplation of universals, but every kind of thought and every type of sensation or feeling in the Mind, were included, that is given to the Mind. This opened the way for and was related to another innovation by Descartes, one which in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* is seen as another part of the problem of traditional philosophy, the idea of the Mind as mirroring the world. The thoughts and perceptions given to the mind's eye were mere representations, and what they represented, the World, was not itself given.

Rorty devotes Part One to a critical examination of some current and traditional controversies in the philosophy of mind. One contemporary quarrel to which Rorty pays special attention concerns the viability of a 'materialist theory of mind.' Some philosophers, whom Rorty calls neo-dualists, contend that 'how something feels,' such as a particular pain, tickle, itch, or other sensation, or 'what it is like to be something' such as a man or a bat, 'cannot be identical with any physical property, or at least any physical property which we know anything about.'[139] It is claimed in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* that what made Descartes pack thought and sensations together to form the modern conception of the mind was their shared property of indubitability. Starting from him this indubitability was given a metaphysical explanation, namely "....nothing is closer to the mind than itself"[140] what we knew with certainty were the representations themselves, not what they

[139] Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 28.
[140] Ibid., 59.

represented. Mind became with Shakespeare's words, Our Glassy Essence,[141] transparent to itself. This provides a new kind of scepticism, one concerned with the possibility of knowing anything outside the mind. This 'veil of ideas', scepticism has been a companion to philosophers ever since. It also provided the basis for epistemology, the activity of inspecting and improving mind's mirror in order to get accurate representations, which is truth. The question posed is, 'if one is not happy with Descartes' criterion of indubitability, what can be used in its stead to separate the mental and the physical? Rorty in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* states that '...Kant and Strawson have given convincing arguments for the claim that we can only identify mental states as states of spatially located persons.'[142] If that is correct, non-spatiality cannot be used as a criterion ...health is a non-spatial state of a person too.

There is a contention raised whether intentionality and phenomenality are criteria of the mental? As for intentionality, PMN accepts Wittgenstein's and Sellars' functionalistic account with 'the answer to the question "Why is the intentional non material?" is "because any functional state, any state which can only be grasped by relating what is observed to a larger context, is in a trivial sense, non-material."'[143] Moreover using phenomenality as a criterion turns out to be the same as using Descartes' criterion because the only thing that is special about the phenomenal properties is that they allow no appearance-reality distinction. One cannot be mistaken about one's own mental states. He makes an interesting statement that feelings just are appearances. Their reality is exhausted in how they seem. They are pure seemings.[144] This thinking, however, gets one into trouble with Kant and Strawson. This is because one has then stopped talking about pains as states of people or properties predicated of people and started talking about pains as particulars, a special sort of particular whose nature is exhausted by a single property.[145]

Rorty thinks that to identify the mental with the phenomenal, thus limiting the content of mind to mental images, raw feels and the like, is to drift far from the ancient conception of mind. The problems about reason and personhood have been replaced by these rather dusty little questions about the possible identity of pains and neurons.'[146] Treating pains and the like as particulars reopens the possibility of making non-locatedness the criterion of the mental. Rorty in PMN

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[141] This sharp poetic phrase appears in Shakespeare's poem 'Measure for Measure' in his description of the human person and his nature. Cf. Shakespeare, *The Complete works*, ed. George Lyman Kittredge, Boston, 1936, 2.2.114-122; Cunningham J.V., "Essence, and the Phoenix and Turtle," *ELH* Vol. 19, No 4 (Dec. 1952), 265-276; Milton Singer, "Signs of the Self: An Exploration in Semiotic Anthropology" *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 82, No.3 (September 1980): 485-507.

[142] Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 20.

[143] Ibid., 26.

[144] Ibid., 29.

[145] Ibid., 30.

[146] Ibid., 33.

does not think much of that strategy he claims that '....contemporary philosophers, having updated Descartes, can be dualists without their dualism making the slightest difference to any human interest or concern, without interfering with science or lending any support to religion. For insofar as dualism reduces to the bare insistence that pains and thoughts have no places, nothing whatever hangs on the distinction between mind and body.'[147] In all these endeavours, Rorty wants to do away with the conception of the mind, but it could be recognised that the therapeutic argumentation he makes in PMN does not halt by accusing the modern conception of mind of being uninteresting.

In Chapter Two "Persons without Minds," it is devoted to an attack on an idea that is central to the modern philosophical conception of the mental, namely the idea of metaphysically based indubitability. The Chapter also spells out an anti-Cartesian, Wittgensteinian view of the nature of "our privileged access to the mental."[148] The primary target of the attack is what Rorty calls Principle P'. With principle P he meant that 'whenever we make an incorrigible report on a state of ourselves, there must be a property we are presented with which induces us to make the report.'[149] This principle relates the epistemological notions of incorrigibility and indubitability to the metaphysical idea of entities completely given to Mind's Eye. It is one of Rorty's principal theses in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* that the conception of the 'mind' as a separate substance, in which mental processes are located, far from being a concept based on direct experience, is an 'invention' of Descartes, which has misled philosophers since his time. That there is no need for us to refer to experience in 'mentalese' language he supports in part by his own invention of the science-fiction tale of some Antipodeans who live on the opposite side of the galaxy to ours and who get on perfectly well without language that requires mentalist predicates.

He postulates Antipodea as a distant planet inhabited by featherless bipeds. Physiologically these Antipodeans were almost identical to humans, and their culture was also about the same as ours, humans, but with two exceptions. First, 'they had notions like 'wanting to' and 'intending to' and 'believing that' and 'feeling terrible' and 'feeling marvellous.' But they had no notion that these signified mental states, states of a peculiar and distinct sort, quite different from sitting down, having a cold and being sexually aroused. The Antipodeans did not explain the difference between persons and non-persons by such notions as mind, consciousness, spirit.[150] Second, neurology and biochemistry were enormously advanced on Antipodea, and the result of this penetrated deeply into ordinary life. When their infants veered towards hot stoves, mothers cried out, 'He'll stimulate his C-fibres'. Sometimes they would say things like 'It looked like an elephant, but

147 Ibid., 68.
148 Ibid., 69.
149 Ibid., 84.
150 Ibid., 70.

then it struck me that elephants don't occur on this continent, so I realised that it must be a mastodon.' But they would also sometimes say, in just the same circumstances things like 'I had G-412 together with F-11, but then I had S-147, so I realised that it must be a mastodon.'[151] Philosophers from earth came to Antipodea and naturally they asked themselves: Do Antipodeans have minds, that is, do they have mental sensations? Some facts were easily established: the Antipodeans were able to offer direct, non-inferential reports both on how they felt and on their neurological states, and their language contained expressions corresponding to our 'seem like/to' and 'feels like.' So, thinking about the Antipodeans makes one realise that one could easily have lacked a mind-body problem, that if there were no mind-body problem it would make no difference in human life and that consequently could be easily forgotten.

However, they talked about 'seeming' to be in neurological states as well as seeming to see P, in both cases mistakes were impossible, and when it came to knowing whether one really was in a certain neurological state or not, the Antipodeans admitted that a mistake was always possible, even if the state was for example, T-435, the neurological state corresponded to utterances of "my C-fibres seem to be stimulated." There seemed to be nothing which the Antipodeans were incorrigible about except how things seemed to them was a matter of what raw feels they had, as opposed to what they were inclined to say.'[152] To the Antipodeans the whole question seemed to be based on confusion. "All Antipodeans are familiar with the states of their nerves and all Terrans with their raw feels. For the Antipodeans do not have notions of entities known incorrigibly but only of reports (seems-statements) which are incorrigible and which may be about any sort of entity. They understand that the Terrans do have the former notion, but they are baffled why they think they need it although they can see how, in ignorance of neurology, a lot of strange notions might have become current.[153] The whole Terran vocabulary of 'acts of apprehension', 'cognitive states', 'feelings', and others strikes them as an unfortunate turn for a language to have taken. They see no way of getting us out of it except by proposing that we raise some of our children to speak Antipodean and see whether they don't do as well as a control group. The Antipodean materialists, in other words, see our notion of mind and matter as a reflection of an unfortunate linguistic development.[154] Instead of invoking principle P, one can account for the incorrigibility of 'seems-statements' and the like by claiming that it is a fact of language. The fact that 'seems to seem' "...is an expression without a use is a fact about the notion of "appearance," not a tip-off to the presence of phenomenal properties."

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[151] Ibid., 71.
[152] Ibid., 77.
[153] Ibid., 106.
[154] Ibid., 87.

If we stick to principle P, "then we must admit either (a) that the Antipodean language, just by virtue of containing some incorrigible reports, is about raw feels, or (b) that we shall never know whether the Antipodeans speak a language just because we shall never know whether they have raw feels, or (c) that the whole issue about raw feels is a fake because the example of the Antipodeans shows that we never had any raw feels ourselves. These three possibilities correspond roughly to three positions in the philosophy of mind: behaviourism, scepticism about other minds, and materialism.[155] The solution Rorty recommends in PMN is to abandon principle P as being just another off-shoot of the 'Myth of the Given', while remembering that there is some truth to be found in each of the three standard positions. Here also, the main argument of the Antipodeans story "is that since there is no way in which earthly philosophers can show anything to be missing from their way of speaking, then, presumably, we too could just as well be talking Antipodean, and a materialist theory of behaviour thereby receives support."[156]

But what would be sound in behaviourism since the only example given in PMN of a behaviourist is that of Ryle? It is reported that Gilbert Ryle, in the 1940s launched a powerful attack on dualism with his dogma of the 'Ghost in the Machine' arguing instead for a behaviourist understanding of the mind according to which concepts of the mental states are concepts of behaviour. With that understanding it would be absurd to say of the Antipodeans that they have no minds, thus no language, and therefore simply are not persons, just because they lack raw feels. But the Antipodeans having no notion of the mind whatsoever just talk about their brain states. Instead of saying, I love you; they just say 'Give me brain state X-835. With this example of the Antipodeans, he articulates one of the problems of behaviourism that it has not freed itself from the Cartesian idea that there is a 'ground floor' of entities which are somehow naturally known first hand, naturally knowable directly and therefore in some sense more real, though to the behaviourist it is states of physical objects, not mental states, that have this status. Rorty in PMN claims that direct knowledge...."is simply knowledge which is had without its possessor having gone through any conscious inference. But there is no suggestion that some entities are especially well suited to be known in this way. What we know noninferentially is a matter of what we happen to be familiar with."[157] Some people make non inferential reports of electrons, some of Dutch elm disease, some of their blood pressure. Antipodeans on the other hand make it of their neurological states.

As for scepticism about other minds, Rorty makes claims that the sound intuition is just that raw feels are as good particulars as tables or archangels or electrons, as good inhabitants of the world, as good candidates for ontological status. He states

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155 Ibid., 95.
156 Keneth T. Gallagher, "Rorty's Antipodeans: An Impossible Illustration?" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* Vol. 45, No.3 (1985): 449-455.
157 Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 106.

further that we do indeed have a special, superior way of knowing about our own raw feels, that we have privileged access to private entities.[158] This privileged access is, of course only a species of the direct knowledge just mentioned. To explain it one needs not to resort to anything like the 'givenness' to Mind's eye, which would imply confining the objects of this knowledge to a hermetically non-social sphere. Of traditional Cartesian scepticism about other minds Rorty makes claims in PMN that ...'it is not impossible, it is just pointless, unless some further reason for doubt is given other than that certainty cannot be had.[159]

The materialist starts from what Rorty in PMN considered to be a plausible prediction, namely, that reference to neurological microstructures and processes may replace reference to short-term mental states (sensations, thoughts, and mental images) in the explanation of human behaviour.[160] The materialist gets into trouble when he tries to draw a metaphysical conclusion and states that mental states are nothing but neural states. This sounds excessively paradoxical. Rorty thinks that the materialist "should stop reacting to stories such as that about the Antipodeans by saying metaphysical things, and confine himself to such claims as 'No distinctive or descriptive power would be lost if we had spoken Antipodean all our lives."[161] But if this is correct would it not imply that materialism has won? The correct response is to say No. Saying that presupposes that the ontological categorization into mental versus physical is eternally valid and not an historical contingency that might lose, or perhaps already has lost, all importance. For the same reason, if it should turn out that neurophysiology is incapable of predicting behaviour, 'even if neurons turn out to swerve, - to be buffeted by forces as yet unknown to science, Descartes would be vindicated.'[162] In a nutshell, what we have been following in Part I is Rorty's therapeutic argumentation against the traditional idea of 'Man's Glassy Essence in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. This is relevant to Rorty's approach to epistemology but in PMN, he claims that no descriptive power would be lost if we all started speaking Antipodean.

Historically, the notion of reason has been linked to the idea of knowledge as Mind Mirroring World. Part II of *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* 'attempts to dissolve the modern version of the problem of reason, the notion that there is a problem about the possibility or extent of accurate representation which is the concern of a discipline called epistemology.'[163] Part II begins with an attempt to trace the historical roots of modern epistemology. The foundation is, once again, the ancient perceptual metaphor, the attempt to model knowledge on perception, viewing knowledge as confrontation with the objects of knowledge. This metaphor easily

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158 Ibid., 107.
159 Ibid., 112.
160 Ibid., 114.
161 Ibid., 120.
162 Ibid., 124.
163 Ibid., 126.

leads one to accept the 'Platonic principle,' that differences in certainty must correspond to differences in the objects known'[164] and corresponding differences in the faculties with which we perceive/confront objects of knowledge. This implies that knowing with certainty is a matter of proper causation. The object which the proposition is about imposes the proposition's truth. The idea of necessary truth is just the idea of a proposition which is believed because the 'grip' of the object upon us is ineluctable.[165]. Descartes' invention of the mind gave philosophy a field that could be known with certainty. This is not enough, however, to produce modern epistemology by giving a causal account of how the mind works. This was made possible because Locke 'thought, as had Aristotle of 'knowledge of' as prior to 'knowledge that,' and thus of knowledge as a relation between persons and objects rather than persons and propositions.[166] Locke also regarded ideas as 'immediate objects' of the mind or understanding and asserts that ideas are present to the mind instead of things, which are not present to the mind.[167] This mean that one could ground knowledge, that is, justify it by something other than coherence, namely by an account of how the mind receives sense data. Kant attacked Locke's confusion of the possession of sense data with judgement; most vigorously expressed in his criticism of the confusion of "a succession of apprehensions with an apprehension of succession,"[168] yet with Kant the modern notion of epistemology fully, and explicitly, emerged.

Lockean descriptions of the mechanics of mind were not necessarily something distinguished from and above the rest of science. Following the epistemological turn that Descartes brought to philosophy, Locke with his own empiricist version of foundationalism prefaced by a rejection of God-given innate ideas, since despite his belief that the existence of God was the most obvious Truth that Reason discovers,[169] he thought that there was good empirical evidence to deny that there is anything which everybody knows, and hence good reason to deny there is anything we are all born knowing. The central tenet of his theory was that all knowledge derives from experience, experience dividing into the ideas we derive from the five senses such as yellow, sweet, loud and others and the ideas we derive from the operations of our minds, such as thinking, wanting. These simple ideas are the building blocks of all human knowledge.[170] Kant contributed what was needed, that is, the distinction between form, the part of experience we supply ourselves, and content, what is given to us from the outside. Science is concerned with what experience, the synthesis of form and content could tell us; philosophy

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164 Ibid., 156.
165 Ibid., 157.
166 Ibid., 142.
167 Yasuhiko Tomida, "Locke's Representationalism Without Veil" *British Journal for the History of Philosophy,* vol. 13, No. 4 (2005): 675-696.
168 Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 146.
169 Locke John, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. P. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), IV.10.§1.
170 Tartaglia, *Rorty and the Mirror of Nature,* 29-30.

studies the form-side of experience, what is necessarily true of all experience. Though Kant was aware of its conceptual/judgmental character, to him knowledge still remained something inner, and grounding it was still a matter of giving a 'mechanical account' of explaining how experiences are manufactured; and Continental, twentieth century epistemology (the Husserlians) stuck to this notion of constitution. Starting with Russell, Anglo-Saxon epistemology, that is, analytic philosophy, rejected this Kantian invention, but, while viewing the content of consciousness as Lockean sense data, still made use of the form-content distinction in performing the linguistic turn.

Logical form was the subject matter that made analytic epistemology possible. One could see statements about sense data as basic and say that philosophy was to study the evidential relations between basic and non-basic propositions, or one could study other logical or conceptual relations. In either case one was studying truths necessary by virtue or meaning.[171] Analytic epistemology is based on the notion of two kinds of privileged representations: intuitions, sense data, and concepts, logical forms. Both of these came under attack within the tradition of analytic philosophy itself. Quine challenged the distinction between the logically/conceptually necessary and the contingent, between being true by virtue of meaning and being true by virtue of experience. Sellars blew up 'the Myth of the Given' by pointing out that epistemic justification takes place in the logical space of reasons, that it is a matter of giving arguments. Anything non-epistemic, like having sense data, might be helpful in explaining a belief causally, but not in justifying it. *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* claims that if Sellars and Quine are right there is nothing left of the traditional analytic philosophical program. "If there are no intuitions into which to resolve concepts (in the manner of the Aufbau) or any internal relations among concepts to make possible 'grammatical discoveries' (in the manner of Oxford Philosophy), then indeed it is hard to imagine what an analysis might be."[172] The upshot of the first half of part II of *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* is that if one accepts the criticism made there one has to abandon any hope for epistemology. In the last two chapters of this part of PMN two attempts to preserve at least part of the epistemological project of analytic philosophy – while accepting Sellars and Quine – are attacked, namely the attempts to associate epistemology to psychology and the philosophy of language. Both attempts fail. Nothing can supply the kind of foundation that the epistemological project needs, namely, something above and independent of knowledge.

If one takes a closer look at what is central to the concerns of this argument, that is, the description of epistemological behaviourism, it is necessary to go beyond mere summary to interpretation and analysis. Epistemological behaviourism is claimed to be the basic conception of knowledge present in the writings of Quine and Sellars, the two figures widely regarded as the greatest philosophers of the last

171 Anders Tolland, *Epistemological Relativism and Relativistic Epistemology,* 13.
172 Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 172.

century. Rorty's idea is that the combination of Sellars' attack on the 'Myth of the Given' and Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction collapsed the two Kantian distinctions which analytic philosophy depended upon. Moreover they did not realise it, Sellars and Quine were using the same argument on which weighs equally against representationalism, objective truth, and any conception of philosophy as what Dewey called the quest for certainty.[173] It is clear that it is at least part of the conception of knowledge in PMN. Epistemological behaviourism is not a claim that necessary and sufficient behavioural conditions can be given for example 'S knows that P'. Rather it is a claim that philosophy will have no more to offer than common sense (supplemented by biology and history ...) about knowledge and truth.[174] Epistemological behaviourism is also a denial that 'once we understand, as historians of knowledge do, when and why various beliefs have been adopted or discarded, there is something called "the relation of knowledge to reality" left over to be understood.'[175] Epistemological behaviourism refuses to attempt a certain kind of explanation, namely, justification/grounding of knowledge by inner entities. 'It amounts to a protest against archetypical philosophical problem of how to reduce norms, rules and justification to facts, generalisations, and explanations.'[176] When it comes to a positive characterisation, epistemological behaviourism clearly implies holism, fallibilism and the idea that warranted assertability should replace truth as correspondence. But beyond that, PMN displays a strong ambivalence about epistemological behaviourism.

One version is what is called "epistemological-behaviourism-as-coherence", expressed in passages like...'nothing counts as justification unless by reference to what is already acceptable, and that there is no way to get outside our beliefs and our language so as to find some test other than coherence.'[177] This is a well-known line of thought and perhaps may not be uncontroversial. The version of epistemological behaviourism that dominates PMN is different and more provocative. It is argued in PMN that we need a change of metaphor for understanding knowledge. Instead of using the traditional metaphor of confrontation (visual perception), we should turn to the metaphor of Conversation. This dominating version may be called "epistemological-behaviourism-as-conversation". This version puts the emphasis on the group. It comes to something like this saying: "S knows that P" is a remark about the status of S's reports among his peers.

If one thinks of 'rational certainty' as a matter of victory in argument rather than of relation to an object known, we shall look toward our interlocutors rather than to our faculties for the explanation of phenomenon. Our certainty will be a matter of

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[173] Ibid., 171.
[174] Ibid., 176.
[175] Ibid., 178.
[176] Ibid., 18.
[177] Ibid., 178.

conversation between persons, rather than a matter of interaction with nonhuman reality. So we shall not see a difference in kind between "necessary" and "contingent" truths. At most, we shall see differences in degree of ease in objecting to our beliefs.[178] Thus for Quine, a necessary truth is just a statement such that nobody has given us any interesting alternatives which would lead us to question it.[179] These two versions of epistemological behaviourism are not compatible with each other, at least at first glance. Epistemological-behaviourism-as-coherence puts the emphasis on beliefs; we have to look for the basis of epistemic acceptability among the rest of our beliefs. Epistemological-behaviourism-as-conversation does not look to beliefs. Instead it focuses on the other participants and their reactions, whether, the subject's position is accepted or not. We have to look for a compromise to these two positions. We can move the idea of coherence closer to this notion of conversation by pointing to PMN's emphasis on the social nature of coherence. For Rorty "....justification is not a matter of a special relation between ideas (or words) and objects, but of conversation, of social practice. Conversational justification, so to speak, is naturally holistic, whereas the notion of justification embedded in the epistemological tradition is reductive and atomistic. The crucial premise of this argument is that we understand knowledge when we understand the social justification of belief,[180] Sellars' psychological nominalism is not a theory of how the mind works, nor of how knowledge is born in the infant breast, nor of the "nature of concepts," nor of any other matter of fact. It is a remark about the difference between facts and rules, a remark to the effect that we can only come under epistemic rules when we have entered the community where the game governed by these rules is played.[181] Language and coherence, and thereby knowledge – are not private but social. It is the community that decides the epistemic rules. Sellars' psychological nominalism as Rorty in PMN construes it, indicates that it is no more surprising that the community is the criterion for who knows than it is that it is the criterion for whether or not 18 year olds are allowed to drive cars.

As far as this could be seen, this does not bridge the gap between centring on coherence among beliefs and centring on actual acceptance in a group. We can add a social dimension to the coherence approach by looking to the coherence among the beliefs of the community rather than the individual, and by emphasising such aspects as the dependency on authority and the epistemic division of labour; it is still vastly different from centring on actual acceptance. Another way to bridge the gap is perhaps by pointing to the difference between being inside and outside a language game. Inside a language game it is coherence that counts. But outside any established language game, any trial to introduce a new language game, what matters is the acceptance by the group. Inside an established language game one

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178 Ibid., 156.
179 Ibid., 175.
180 Ibid., 170.
181 Ibid., 187.

can rely on the implicit or explicit rules of the game, but the establishment of these rules can only be a matter of whether they are accepted by the community or not. This is what Rorty means but cannot say it in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* for the simple reason that he cannot surely say it. Using this compromise implies using the notion of implicit rules of a language game; the explicit rules of each known language game are too few to control the game. One of the more important tenets of *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* is that there are no such things as implicit, hidden, rules. It cannot therefore make sense of the notion of established, but hidden rules. The only thing that remains, apart from a few explicit rules, is a matter of fact acceptance.

Parts I and II are mostly an attack on traditional philosophy. Part III contains some criticism too, but it also presents an alternative to epistemology: hermeneutics and edifying philosophy. This alternative agrees with the epistemological behaviourism presented in part II. To explain Rorty's conception of hermeneutics in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, the notion of commensuration is crucial. To be commensurable means to be 'able to be brought under a set of rules which tell us how rational agreement can be reached on what would settle the issue on the very point where statements seem to conflict.'[182] Epistemology is based on the assumption that all serious-minded contributions to a given discourse are commensurable. The dominating notion of epistemology is that to be rational "....we need to be able to find agreement with other human beings. ....The assumption that an epistemology can be constructed is the assumption that such common ground exists.[183] Of course, with this common ground, the nature of knowledge might be concealed. But hermeneutics, on the other hand, accepts incommensurability.

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature makes a distinction between normal and abnormal discourse, parallel to Kuhn's normal science – revolutionary science distinction and with Michel Foucault's distinction between madness and civilisation.[184] This is so because normal discourse is that which is conducted within an agreed-upon set of conventions. It is about what counts as a relevant contribution, what counts as answering the question, what counts as having a good argument.[185] Whereas abnormal discourse happens when no or too few conventions are adhered to by the parties involved. And hermeneutics is presented as the study of an abnormal discourse from the point of view of some normal discourse. It becomes an attempt to make sense of what is going on at a stage where we are still too unsure about it to describe it.[186] It is assumed that one can be epistemological about normal

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182 Ibid., 316.
183 Ibid., 316.
184 Cf. Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), 3-158.
185 Ibid., 320.
186 Ibid., 320.

discourse and could codify the conventions shared within, and well-known to the group. Epistemology hence is normal discourse about normal discourse. Rorty characterises hermeneutics as a kind of study, or calls it "discourse about as-yet-commensurable discourses."[187] This is considered as misleading because hermeneutics is neither the discipline of studying abnormal discourse, nor meant as a successor subject to epistemology. "Hermeneutics is not the name for a discipline, or for a method of achieving the sort of results which epistemology failed to achieve, nor a program of research. On the contrary, hermeneutics is an expression of hope that the cultural space left by the demise of epistemology will not be filled, that our culture should become one in which the demand for constraint and confrontation is no longer felt."[188]

Hermeneutics is considered as an attitude rather than a particular type of discipline or even discourse. This attitude is not a matter of trying, when one encounters an as-yet-incommensurable discourse, to bridge the gap between it and one's normal discourse by finding a common ground. This would be an epistemological attitude, not a hermeneutical one. The hermeneutics of *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* has nothing to do with finding the middle ground, thus making a *Horizontverschmelzung* between two discourses possible. From a hermeneutic point of view one should, and must, approach alien discourses 'non-reductively and in the hope of picking up a new angle on things.'[189] Rorty's hermeneutics is further illustrated by what is said of Galileo versus Cardinal Bellarmine conflict. He thinks that 'to suggest that there is room for rational disagreement here and not simply for a black-and-white struggle between reason and superstition is to endanger the very notion of philosophy.'[190]

It is presumed that according to PMN, the epistemological way of explaining the irrationality of Bellarmine is to say that he and Galileo shared a common ground, a Nature of Human Rationality, which was violated by his, but not by Galileo's way of looking at science. According to Rorty in PMN, Galileo's concept of science was an 'invention' and not the making explicit of something pre-existing. He says that "no conceivable epistemology, no study of the nature of human knowledge, could have discovered it before it was hammered out.'[191] The upshot of this seems to be that the account of rationality that makes Bellarmine appear irrational is 'a post factum and Whiggish one, on which constructed an epistemology on the basis of the vocabulary or assumptions of the winning side in a scientific dispute.'[192] The change in the conception of science from Medieval to modern time 'was not brought about by "rational arguments" in some sense of "rational" in which for

[187] Ibid., 343.
[188] Ibid., 315.
[189] Ibid., 321.
[190] Ibid., 328.
[191] Ibid., 330.
[192] Ibid., 324.

example, the changes lately brought about in regard to society's attitude toward slavery, abstract art, homosexuals, or endangered species, would not count as "rational."[193] He argues further that, traditionally hermeneutics has been associated with the idea of spirit/the mental by being the method of the *Geisteswissenschaften.* PMN's notion of hermeneutics has no intrinsic relation to any of these. Abnormal discourse is possible on any subject.

The realm of normal discourse and epistemology is 'whatever is so routine and familiar and manageable that we trust our own language implicitly.[194] Those subject matters that are 'unfamiliar and unmanageable that we begin to wonder whether our 'language' is adequate to them'[195] are the point where abnormal discourse and hermeneutics become relevant. This division corresponds to that "...between that portion of the field of inquiry where we feel rather uncertain that we have the right vocabulary at hand and that portion where we feel rather certain that we do. This does, at the moment, roughly coincide with the distinction between the fields of the *Geistes-* and the *Naturwissenschaften.* But this coincidence may be mere coincidence."[196] There is no metaphysical reason why human beings should be capable of saying incommensurable things, nor do any guarantee that they will continue to do so.[197] Rorty thinks that human beings might become completely predictable and the non-human world might start to squirm out of any scientific, conceptual net.

According to Rorty in PMN hermeneutics is the only one part to replace traditional, epistemology-dominated philosophy, namely edification and edifying philosophy. Edification is 'the project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking'[198] of finding a new and more interesting way of expressing ourselves, and thus of coping with the world.'[199] The basic strategy behind the alternative presented in PMN is that edification is to replace knowledge and certainty as the goal of thinking. Edification can be achieved by practicing hermeneutics. 'But it may instead consist in the poetic activity of thinking up such new aims, new words, or new disciplines.[200] Science, the quest for truth, is in no way privileged. From an edificational point of view one can see "...the descriptions of ourselves we find in....the *Naturwissenschaften* as on a par with the various alternative descriptions offered by poets, novelists, depth psychologists, sculptors, anthropologists, and mystics. The former are not privileged representations in virtue of the fact that at the moment there is more consensuses in the sciences than in the arts. They are simply among the repertoire of self-descriptions at our

193 Ibid., 332.
194 Ibid., 352.
195 Ibid., 352.
196 Ibid., 352.
197 Ibid., 347.
198 Ibid., 360.
199 Ibid., 259.
200 Ibid., 360.

disposal."[201] Taking some hints from Sartre, it is implied in PMN that edification is closely related to what it is to be a human. If all discourses were commensurable, a person would only be *en-soi;* it would be possible to ascribe to him a universally valid essence. But, as abnormal discourse is always possible, no objective facts, that is, objective as related to some normal discourse can ever tell us unconditionally how to live our lives. This does not mean that PMN accepts the positivistic fact-value distinction; the trouble with the fact-value distinction is that it is contrived precisely to blur the fact that alternative descriptions are possible. ...It distinguishes the fact that to use one set of true sentences to describe ourselves is already to choose an attitude toward ourselves, whereas to use another set of true sentences is to adopt a contrary attitude.[202]

Edification is part of what results from PMN's viewing knowledge, in fact all culture, as conversation rather confrontation. The question posed here is that what is the role of philosophy in the conversation of mankind? PMN outlines three tasks for philosophy, or for philosophers. First, philosophers can take part in the edificatory, poetic activity that is, inventing new words and new disciplines. The second is related to hermeneutics. It is the role of the informed dilettante, the polypragmatic, Socratic intermediary between various discourses. In his salon, so to speak, hermetic thinkers are charmed out of their self-enclosed practices. Disagreements between disciplines and discourses are compromised or transcended in the course of the conversation.[203] The third is to do what PMN called 'edifying philosophy' as opposed to systematic philosophy. The systematic philosopher is impressed by the success of some theory or activity (like Galilean Mechanics, or Darwin, or mathematical logic), and therefore wants us to reshape all inquiry, and all of culture, on its model, thereby permitting objectivity and rationality to prevail in areas previously obscured by convention and superstition,[204] that is, make everything commensurable, turn it all into one normal discourse. This would endanger the free flow of abnormal discourse in edificatory conversation. Edifying philosophers, the paradigmatic examples being late Heidegger, late Witggenstein, late Dewey, attack the endeavours of the systematic philosophers of their time. Great systematic philosophers, like great scientists, build for eternity. Great edifying philosophers destroy for the sake of their own generation.[205]

He admires edifying philosophers that they do not put forward theories about how things are. They "...have to decry the very notion of having a view, while avoiding having a view about having views.....We might just be saying something, participating in a conversation rather than contributing to an inquiry. Perhaps saying things is not just always saying how things are. Perhaps saying that is itself

[201] Ibid., 362.
[202] Ibid., 363ff.
[203] Ibid., 317.
[204] Ibid., 367.
[205] Ibid., 369.

not a case of saying how things are.... To see edifying philosophers as conversational partners is an alternative to seeing them as holding views on subjects of common concern. One way of thinking of wisdom as something of which the love is not the same as that of argument, and of which the achievement does not consist in finding the correct vocabulary for representing essence, is to think of it as the practical wisdom necessary to participate in a conversation. One way to see edifying philosophy as the love of wisdom is to see it as the attempt to prevent conversation from degenerating into inquiry, into an exchange of views. Edifying philosophers can never end philosophy, but they can help prevent it from attaining the secure path of a science.[206]

Rorty's Edification, Conversation, Hermeneutics and Redescription

The arguments that Rorty put forward in his work *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* prompt one to pose a fundamental question: 'what Rorty is really trying to achieve throughout his work'? And in providing answers to this question, a barrage of hostility and stinging criticism has targeted him and his ideas which Malachowski dismisses claiming that generally, as a philosopher Rorty has been hyper-criticised while also being misunderstood. He considers the accusations as precisely the kind of anti-Rortian stereotypes which overlook three key points: First, the incommensurability of Rorty's project with the traditional projects of philosophy from Plato to Kant or even to Quine; second, the legitimacy of this incommensurability; third, the relevance of Rorty's project which seeks to indicate the way forward by showing that it is possible, and advisable, to break new philosophical ground, stimulate new ways of thinking and thereby generate more productive results.[207] Rorty wants to change the subject of philosophy from both the outside, on a meta-philosophical level, and from the inside, via a re-philosophising of the whole range of issues of modern philosophy. On a meta-philosophical level he challenges the ground for viewing philosophy as an ahistorical discipline, a science, whose aim is to discover the most fundamental truths about the nature of reality as it is in itself. For him, philosophical problems and their solutions are historical, contingent and optional rather than necessary or eternal. On an intra-disciplinary level, he urges philosophers to leave three main things behind. Firstly, Platonism's set of philosophical dualisms like appearance-reality, matter-mind, made-found, sensible intellectual and others along with kindred Socratic-Platonic manoeuvres as replacing passion with reason, equating virtue with knowledge, sacrificing pleasure for truth, and searching for stable, objective, neutral foundations of thought. Secondly, dropping Cartesianism, this is the view that the mind represents the essence of man as well as the mirror of nature. And thirdly, Kantianisn, as a doctrine based on dualisms between intuition and concept, the given and the constructed, the contingent and the necessary, and the idea that philosophy-as-a theory-of-knowledge grounds and justifies all other

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206 Ibid., 371ff.

207 Alan Malachowski, *Richard Rorty* (Chesham: Acumen, 2002), 65.

fields of knowledge and culture.[208] Through all of this Rorty wants to redirect the whole business of philosophy from epistemological to social, cultural, ethical, political and aesthetic issues, and to create a vocabulary for what he calls a 'post-philosophic culture.' It's a sweeping agenda, an attempt to reshape the self-image of human beings, to re-describe it, to start to think of human life in different ways from those bequeathed to him by modern philosophy and culture.

Rorty has been described as 'anti-philosopher, anti-essentialist, anti-representationalist, and anti-foundationalist. He is as well, variously described: a philosophical nihilist set on dismantling philosophy as such, or at least such pivotal areas as epistemology and ontology; a superficial pragmatist, misappropriating key figures in the history of philosophy from Plato to Kant with the purpose of exchanging the goal of objective truth for that of subjective 'usefulness'; or a postmodern cultural relativist denying all scope for 'culture transcending' authority in order to promote his own preferred, self-legitimating set of 'ethnocentric' Western values. On still another reading he's a rather woolly utopian liberal, plaintively calling for the spread of human suffering and an end to cruelty, but failing to find an adequate grounding for that project. Thus when Rorty has sought to 'go political' with his thinking, the charge has often been made that the key defining features of his own project make it unable to make any practical contribution to the resolution of the kinds of social problem he himself is most exercised by (for instance, that 'the poor are getting poorer and the rich are getting richer').[209]

But this sort of caricature did not deter Rorty to purse his agenda with such single-mindedness to the extent of realising his set schema, which is to replace pure epistemological concerns with a model in which claims to knowledge are justified as a matter of social practice with changes in the rules of which are fostered not by rational argumentation but by metaphors, images and historical contingencies. This is motivated by his consistent pragmatic conviction that the traditional philosophical agenda of epistemology and metaphysics arose out of historical developments and so, philosophers willing, is legitimately replaceable by some other agenda. The central idea is that everything in human life is the product of time and chance as opposed to necessity, essence, reality, truth and obligation.[210] In all these endeavours he positions himself as a valuable far-sighted thinker who throws up new ideas, puts an interesting spin on some old ones, and helps broaden the philosophical canon and redefine the course of philosophical history. For him, there is not any one ultimate context of the sort required to make sense of the assertion that one way of describing a thing is more fundamental or essential to it

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[208] Emil Visnovsky, "Understanding Rorty's Relevance" *Res Publica*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2004): 91-100.
[209] Richard Rorty, "Intellectuals and the Poor in the Contemporary United States," in *Discourse, Intellectuals, Social Communication,* ed. *Emily Visnovsky and G. Bianchi, (*Bratislava: Veda, 1997), 285.
[210] Alan Malachowski, *Richard Rorty*, 99-110.

than all others. There are only limited contexts set by changing circumstances and purposes.

Rorty's Liberating Historicism versus a demonising and patronising Historicism

The approach that Rorty applied to turn against the whole system of western philosophy and undermine it to the extent of relegating it to the periphery of intellectual discourse carries some dire consequences to the European epistemic systems which for centuries have dominated university faculties. It as well poses some challenges to those areas of human life which have, for centuries, been informed and formed by this philosophical tradition. That's why Richard Bernstein commented on the reception of Rorty's book, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* and claimed that "some will find it a deeply disturbing book while others will find it liberating and exhilarating."[211] On reading Rorty's book, one notices its difference in approach to history of philosophy and its liberating effect from a warped historicism as the one which we find in Hegel and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl. Rorty's historicism points to a way in which philosophy can play a much more vital and central role in liberating us from stale metaphors and fundamental misconceptions about what philosophy can achieve. This is completely different from the historicism of Hegel which Francis Fukuyama describes in a sombre style: "For better or worse, much of Hegel's historicism has become part of our contemporary intellectual baggage. The notion that mankind has progressed through a series of primitive stages of consciousness on his path to the present, and that these stages corresponded to concrete forms of social organization, such as tribal, slave owning, theocratic, and finally democratic egalitarian societies, has become inseparable from the modern understanding of man."[212] Rorty strips the European epistemic system of its mantle of comfort and puts into question its patronising influence over other epistemic systems. It had been observed approvingly of the power that Hegel's historicism gave a sense of how there might be genuine novelty in the development of thought and society.

This influence on Hegel was rendered possible by Kant who perfected and codified the two distinction that are necessary to develop the notion of alternative conceptual framework, the distinction between spontaneity and receptivity and the distinction between necessary and contingent truth. Since it is almost impossible not to think of the mind as divided into active and passive faculties, the former using concepts to interpret what the world imposes on the latter.[213] These Kantian

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211 Richard J. Bernstein, "Philosophy in the Conversation of Mankind" *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 33, No. 4, June 1980, 745-775 published by Philosophy Education Society Inc. at http://www.jstor.org /stable/20127425 (accessed on April 26, 2010).

212 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" in *Twentieth Century Political Theory: A Reader*, 2nd edition, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006) 422.

213 Richard Rorty, "The World Well Lost," *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 69, No. 19, Sixty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division (October 26, 1972): 649-665

assertions might have motivated Hegel in his work the *Philosophy of History* to claim that "The History of the World travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of History, Asia the beginning."[214] Europe is the end of History in at least two senses: 1) it is the end, as in the terminus, the point beyond which there is no other, the culmination of all that came prior to it and 2), it is the end, as in the goal, the purpose, the final product to the achievement of which all earlier efforts were tending. On either interpretation, the triumphalism and import of Hegel's assertions are unmistakable. And the object of the *Philosophy of History* is to bring to "the completion of History ... the simple conception of Reason; that Reason is the Sovereign of the World that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process."[215] Hegel goes on to make outrageous claims that History is a rational process, that it tends towards an end, and that it is the object of philosophy to apprehend this movement in its various stages.

The ultimate subject of History is Spirit and the essence, to which it tends, towards the realization of which its movement is directed, is Freedom. But to make this journey, Spirit gets itself embodied in Peoples, Nations, Volk, and peoples are to be judged by how much and in what way they have apprehended this essence of Spirit in them. For Hegel, only a few peoples are what he calls "world-historical peoples." These are peoples who may rightly be adjudged to belong in History and to participate in its march towards that attainment of its final end. The "Orientals" caught a glimpse of Spirit and therefore made history only through the despot. The Greeks and the Romans saw it some more but missed out on the works. As it turns out, thanks to Christianity, only the Germans or northern Europeans saw Spirit in its full glory and secured a patent on Freedom as a result. To that extent, we must as part of the *Philosophy of History* be interested in its Geographical Basis. He continues to assert that, "It is not our concern to become acquainted with the land occupied by nations as an external locale, but with the natural type of the locality, as intimately connected with the type and character of the people which is the offspring of such soil. This character is not nothing more nor less than the mode of and form in which nations make their appearance in History, and take place and position in it."[216] On this point he concludes by suggesting that "the true theatre of History is therefore the temperate zone; or rather its northern half, because the earth there presents itself in a continental form, and has a broad breast, as the Greeks say."[217]

However, it is believed that it is Lucien Lévy-Bruhl who systematically constructed in detail what is understood to be the fundamental differences between "primitive"

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214 Hegel G.W.F., *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), 103.

215 Ibid., 9.

216 Ibid., 80-81.

217 Ibid., 80.

and "modern" mentalities.[218] He received his first degree in philosophy in 1879 and a doctorate in the same field in 1884 from the *École Normale Supérieure* and he focused much of his intellectual efforts on studies in the history of philosophy and moral philosophy before finally turning to what would become his highly controversial studies of primitive mentality.[219] Levy-Bruhl is discussed in this paper because his ideas are influenced by Kant and the representationalist tradition of which Rorty is critical in his work *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Also, it must be affirmed that Lévy-Bruhl was a philosopher, rather than an anthropologist he is often interpreted as being so. As a philosopher he based his theory on a priori philosophical categories which he maintained from beginning to end and that he imposed these categories on ethnography. It could be argued that he was philosopher involved in the epistemology of metaphysics.[220] In Lévy-Bruhl we see a perpetuation of that stock of dichotomies like realism/antirealism, objectivism/relativism, and fact/value, cognitive/expressive that have defined continental philosophy for centuries.[221] This dichotomy was of course well established in epistemology and it is this same dichotomy which is the key to the structure of Lévy-Bruhl's theory, for he translated it into scientific mentality on the one hand and primitive mentality on the other.

In his theory, he postulated that scientific mentality adhered to the rules of logical discourse and empirical investigation as established in rhetoric and in contemporary science. According to these rules, categories were mutually exclusive, so that nothing could be two things at once, nor could they be in two places at once. However, avoiding philosophy and theology, he drew his examples from the open fields of anthropology or more precisely from ethnography, from the customs and sentiments of non-Western primitives. But it is argued that in actual sense, he was engaged in a philosophical debate regarding epistemology of metaphysics in Europe.[222] The main motivation for his work was the question about how many anthropologists were schooled in philosophy or theology to a degree sufficient to perceive underlying issues? And among these underlying issues, he drew two major categories which came to characterise his works, that is, scientific mentality and primitive mentality.

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218 Cf. Stenger, *White Fathers in Colonial Central Africa*, 4-5.

219 Cf. His works include Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, *Primitive Mentality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923); Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, *How Natives Think* (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1926) but originally published in 1910; Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, *Primitives and the Supernatural* (New York: Dutton, 1931); Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, *La Mythologie Primitive* (Paris: Alcan, 1935); Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, *L'Expérience mystique et les symbols chez les primitifs* (Paris: Alcan, 1938); Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, *The Soul of the Primitive* (London: George Allen and UnWin Ltd 1965), but originally published in 1927.

220 Mousalimas, S. A., "The concept of participation in Lévy-Bruhl's Primitive Mentality," *JASO,* Vol.21 No.1 (1990): 33-46.

221 Ssempala Cornelius, *Pragmatism, Conversation and Hermeneutics*, 276.

222 Ibid., 276.

In his works he made an array of arguments and alleged facts where he endeavours to draw a line of demarcation between the non-Western and Western peoples,[223] where the latter were held to be organized according to logical modes of thought that are primarily grounded upon cognitive functioning, the former were thought to be fundamentally pre-logical, infused with imaginal and emotional currents that often served to distort the stability and coherence of the world as first given to the senses.[224] He described primitive mentality primarily by two aspects, that is, it was mystical and pre-logical. He explained that these were not two distinct characteristics, but instead two aspects of the same fundamental quality. Mystical signified the content of thought, pre-logical indicated the connections between thoughts. Mystical signified the content of collective representations in primitive mentality. Representations were a social reality, they were common to the members of a given social group, had existence beyond individual members, and were transmitted from one generation to another. The transmission occurred through customs, through myths, and supremely through group rituals. He then made sharp contrasts that while for the modern mind, mental representations are cognitive phenomena that are precise and differentiated, for primitive mentality, mental representations are far more complex, undifferentiated, and infused with emotion, feeling, and passion.[225] Furthermore, he asserted that in addition to being suffused with such emotional and motor currents, primitive mentality is almost exclusively directed by culturally constituted collective representations and as such is bound up with pre-perceptions, pre-conceptions, pre-connections, and we might almost say with prejudgments, which serve to alter the functioning of such mental capacities as reason, logic, and inference.[226]

Another aspect of primitive mentality focused on the connections within the collective representations. This aspect was the pre-logic and for Lévy-Bruhl the prefix had two meanings. The first was obvious; the mentality was antecedent to logic. The second meaning of the prefix in prelogical meant that the logical rules were no way involved, even to be suspended or to be opposed as it is, respectively in alogical or antilogical. Again, driven by an alternative logic, Lévy-Bruhl held that primitive mentality operates such that an individual confronts a world constituted by collective representations that are largely impervious to experience. As he put it, primitives see with eyes like ours, but they do not perceive with the same minds. We might almost say that their perceptions are made up of a nucleus surrounded by a layer of varying density of representations which are social in their origin."[227] For Lévy-Bruhl, it was precisely this collectively generated representational saturation

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[223] Messay Kebede, *Africa's Quest for a Philosophy of Decolonisation* (Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2004), 1.
[224] Jason C. Thropp, "Minding Experience: An Exploration of the Concept of 'Experience' in the Early French Anthropology of Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl, and Levi Strauss," *The Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences,* Vol. 39, No. 4 (Fall 2003): 365-382 published online in Wiley Interscience (www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI 10.1002/JHBS.10131 (accessed on May 25, 2010).
[225] Lucien Lévy Bruhl, *How Natives Think* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1926/1910), 36.
[226] Ibid., 5.
[227] Ibid., 44.

that accounted for the differential functioning of primitive logic that operates without regard to the law of contradiction.[228] Because the primitives' collective representations serve to direct their perception beyond immediate sensory data to the occult forces and the imperceptible elements thought to operate beyond the purview of our various sensory modalities, the primitive mind was understood by Lévy-Bruhl to be driven to see connections between otherwise "logically" disparate phenomena, for instance, between a man and his totem animal. In his estimation, therefore, categorical thinking and instances of mutual exclusivity, which are the putative hallmarks of logical thought, are abandoned in primitive mentality, which instead operates upon a law of participation whereby the mind is not merely presented with an object, but "communes with it and participates in it, not only in the ideological, but also in the physical and mystic sense of the word."[229]

In referring to one of Lévy-Bruhl's works '*Primitive Mentality*,' Jasop Thropp discussed this bipartite model of "primitive experience" when he argued that, "Our modern experience is the sum-total of a comparatively small number of data and infinitude of inferences. That of the primitive mind on the other hand contains but a small proportion of inferences; but it contains many direct data to which we deny objectively."[230] The analyses he makes are all impregnated with the same type of evaluation. Primitives are peoples dominated by passions; their body occupies the central place in their thinking to the extent of stifling rational thinking. He argues that reason has not yet established its power over the body so that emotion dominates even in operations that are supposedly intellectual. According to Kebede, this western canon of evaluation, that is, this preponderance of the body denotes a lower rank in the hierarchy of being. To call primitives pre-logical is the same thing as saying that they are sensuous. Their inability to control sensuousness explains their failure at disassociating the intellectual from the emotional.[231] As his theory became known, the dichotomy attracted intense criticism especially from anthropologists who had lived with the so-called primitive peoples. Critics included Bronislaw Malinowski in a lecture in 1925 published in 1948, Robert Lowie and Paul Radin.[232] They recognised Lévy-Bruhl's fundamental dichotomy and rightly rejected it so. But despite some intellectual efforts to rehabilitate Lévy-Bruhl and rebut the propositions that he forwarded, there has been a lingering attachment, for

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[228] The Law of Contradiction means that two antithetical propositions cannot both be true at the same time and in the same sense. X cannot be non-X. A thing cannot be and not be simultaneously. And nothing that is true can be self-contradictory or inconsistent with any other truth. All logic depends on this simple principle. Rational thought and meaningful discourse demand it. To deny it is to deny all truth in one fell swoop. Until a little more than a hundred years ago, the law of contradiction was almost universally accepted by philosophers as a self-evident truth.

[229] Lévy-Bruhl, *How Natives Think,* 362.

[230] Jason C. Thropp, "Minding Experience: An Exploration of the Concept of 'Experience' in the Early French Anthropology of Durkheim," 365-382.

[231] Kebede Messay, *Africa's Quest for a Philosophy of Decolonisation*, 8.

[232] Cf. Malinowski Bronislaw, *Magic, Science and Religion, and Other Essays* (New York: Free Press, 1948), 25-26; Lowie Robert, *The History of Ethnological Thought* (New York: Rinehart and Co. 1937), 216-221; Radin Paul, *Primitive man as Philosopher* (New York: D.Appletorn), 1927.

generations, to his ideas and they have come to be ossified and institutionalised in the global discourse. The explanation to this phenomenon could only be adequately explained by Rorty and not only does he give an account of it, but he takes practical steps to erase it completely from the intellectual consciousness and start off with new working and usable theories and concepts instead.

How Rorty crafts the end of philosophy strategy?

In order to figure out well the strategy of Rorty in his end-of-philosophy ploy, one has to situate him in the general modernist philosophical thought as delineated in the three principal phases. First, Counter-Philosophy: This is the position in the nineteenth century which saw the advent of various doctrines that had as their common distinctive theme the dethronement of the spiritual-speculative outlook of the western tradition and its replacement with distinctly counter-speculative forms of world explanation. Second, meta-philosophy: This arose at the turn of the 20th century in the new schools of philosophical inquiry which appeared and made it their business to disclose and correct, from a second-order, critical standpoint, what are alleged as the fatal fallacies of all western philosophy. Finally, post-philosophy: This is the limit of ultra-philosophy which, in post-modernism, declares both the dogmatic and the critical forms of the opposition to philosophy self-defeating, and proposes instead to expose the whole legacy of reasoned discourse as spurious and annulled in itself. Each successive shape of the ultra-modernist thesis has its own distinctive approach to how the end of philosophy is properly to be thought; each has its unique interpretation, and indeed misinterpretation, of what it is in the speculative tradition that must be rejected; and each, in its own way runs afoul of an ineradicable paradox that plagues every step of the way.

It seems like Rorty was well versed in all these phases and this could be noticed how he begins his last Chapter in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* and the subsequent propositions that come forth. From the outset of this part, he makes a suggestion that it is essentialism which is the overarching prejudice we need to overcome for the sake of cultural progress and the Mirror of Nature was just a subservient idea. Rorty wants to demolish this philosophical edifice that is enslaving because of its dichotomies and put in place a liberating corpus of knowledge that promotes human wellness and solidarity. He follows a historical path by going back from the ancient Greek philosophy to the modern Cartesian idea. He describes it that according to essentialism which is common to Democritus and Descartes, it is of the essence of human beings to seek to acquire knowledge by discovering essences, as for instance in the search for fundamental particles in Physics or first principles in philosophy. This picture of "man-as-essentially-knower-of-essences"[233] generates a conception of inquiry as the search

[233] Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 364.

for truth, where to know the truth about something is to know its essence. Rorty's plan is to sketch an alternative by combining Gadamer's hermeneutics with some themes drawn from Existentialism. The main importance Rorty sees in Gadamer's hermeneutics is that it offers an alternative conception of inquiry which allows one to distance[234] oneself from essentialism by placing the search for truth within a wider context. This is a context in which edification rather than knowledge is the goal of thinking[235] and the search for truth is just one among many ways in which one might be edified.[236] Rorty provides Gadamer's conception of edification with an Existentialist twist by saying that "redescribing ourselves is the most important thing we can do.[237] Thus Rorty wants people to stop worrying about the truth and start worrying about edification, where edification is a project of self-creation and unceasing development, accomplished by finding ever new and more interesting ways to describe ourselves, others, and the world around us. Unlike the search for objective truth, this project has no terminating point, it is an infinite striving[238] in which the way is to keep finding new descriptions to expand our horizons and incorporate new points of view. The success is not by reading or even approaching a goal, but rather by never allowing oneself to settle upon one view of the world or ourselves, and instead always looking to expand or change that view. He argues that fact accumulation is only one among many ingredients with this process of edification, but it was blown out of proportion by the essentialist tradition.

While discussing edification, he proposes two main ways in which it is to proceed: First, through hermeneutically engaging with the incommensurable discourses employed by different academic disciplines, different cultures, different historical periods or any combination thereof; even imaginary aliens can have their uses as we have seen. Second, is the poetic activity of devising new incommensurable discourses. The aim in both cases is to take us out of our old selves by the power of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings.[239] Rorty wants this to be the new impetus for inquiry after the demise of objective truth, one which is self-consciously internal to inquiry, rather than provided by an imaginary external goal. This impetus is required to prevent culture from freezing over, and is to be achieved by continually throwing spanners into the works to interrupt normal discourses. Richard Bernstein has suggested that "Rorty is calling for the invention of incommensurable vocabularies over new forms of *dissensus,* not epistemological consensus."[240] So the drive to progress becomes the drive against intellectual complacency, since progress will grind to a halt if we assume we already understand, or even that we are already on the right track.

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234 Ibid., 358.
235 Ibid., 359.
236 Ibid., 360.
237 Ibid., 358-59.
238 Ibid., 377.
239 Ibid., 360.
240 Richard Bernstein, *The New Constellation* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 62.

In arguing for edifying philosophy what Rorty actually says is just that philosophy needs to abandon all vestiges of the Mirror of Nature paradigm which Kant used to create an autonomous academic subject with a professional self-image. This means that philosophers can no longer adjudicate areas of culture, praising physics and maligning homeopathy, for instance, on the pretence of knowing something about knowing which nobody else knows so well.[241] Without the Mirror of Nature, philosophy has no special subject matter, no special method, and not even a unique point of view. Rorty nevertheless rejects the claims that there can or should be no such profession. But he contends that the profession will go on because people will continue to read the great dead philosophers and universities will need people to teach them. Philosophers can also contribute some useful kibitzing between subjects, though the only reason Rorty can think of, for why philosophers should be better suited to this role than any other sort of academic, is that the professional philosopher's background in the history of philosophy allows them to spot 'stale philosophical clichés which the other participants have stumbled across in their reading, but about which professional philosophers know the pros and cons by heart.'[242]

The conclusion that he makes on this point, takes on a more positive aspect, however, in light of his anti-essentialism and historicism. He said in his classic paper *'Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida*:' ''All that philosophy as a name for a sector of culture means is 'talk about Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Frege, Russell...and all that lot. Philosophy is best seen as a kind of writing. It is delimited, as is any literary genre, not by form or matter, but by tradition – a family romance involving for example Parmenides, Honest old Uncle Kant, and bad brother Derrida.''[243] If we think of philosophy in this way, namely as a tradition of writing woven around a certain family tree, then we can see Rorty's conclusion in a new light. He wants a radically new plot development. This needs to be an almost clear break, since traditional philosophy had little going for it, but Rorty does not want to rule out the possibility of the great philosophy texts becoming the basis for something useful in the future if interpreted in novel enough ways. In this, he seems to suggest that the works of philosophers should rather be treated as literary works most suitable in the literature and language departments, but not as unique texts offering novelty or anything special.

Finally, Rorty makes an interesting, witty and sharp conclusion which would provide good insights in this study towards a new concept of mission theory and practice. He makes an historical review of philosophy with sharp brevity and assertion that from the beginning, philosophy has worried about the relation

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241 Rorty, *The Mirror of Nature*, 392.

242 Ibid., 393.

243 Richard Rorty, "Philosophy as a kind of writing: An Essay on Derrida," *New Literary History*, Vol. 10, No.1 Literary Hermeneutics (autumn 1978): 144-160 published online by The Johns Hopkins University Press at http://www.jstor.org/stable/468309 (accessed on May 16, 2010).

between thought and its object, representation and represented. The old problem about reference to the inexistent, for example, has been handled in various unsatisfactory ways because of a failure to distinguish properly philosophical questions about meaning and reference from extraneous questions motivated by scientific, ethical, and religious concerns. Once these questions are properly isolated, however, we can see philosophy as a field which has its centre in a series of questions about the relations between words and the world. The recent purifying move from talk of ideas to talk of meanings had dissipated the epistemological scepticism which motivated much of past philosophy. This has left philosophy a more limited, but more self-conscious, rigorous, and coherent area of inquiry.

He however immediately adds on what might be the final blow to the existence of philosophy by arguing that philosophy started off as a confused combination of the love of wisdom and the love of argument. It began with Plato's notion that the rigour of mathematical argumentation exposed, and could be used to correct, the pretensions of the politicians and the poets. As philosophical thought changed and grew, inseminated by this ambivalent eros, it produced shoots which took root on their own. Both wisdom and argumentation became far more various than Plato dreamed. Given such nineteenth century complications as the Bildungsroman,[244] non-Euclidean geometries, ideological historiography, the literary dandy, and the political anarchist, there is no way in which one can isolate philosophy as occupying a distinctive place in culture or concerned with a distinctive subject or proceeding by some distinctive method. One cannot even seek an essence for philosophy as an academic *Fach*[245] because one would first have to choose the country in whose universities' catalogues one was to look.[246]

According to this Rortian argumentation, it would appear that philosophy as has been known for centuries is not anymore a privileged subject of study with a significant existence in the plethora of academic subjects in institutions of learning. And any enthusiastic pessimist would immediately announce the death and definitive end of philosophy and call for the immediate installation of its successor in the university faculties. Yet again those scholars who specialised in philosophy would be asked to abdicate their positions and fit themselves in the scheme of other subjects which have taken over the privileged position of philosophy. The

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244 The Bildungsroman is the novel of personal development or of education that originated in Germany in the latter half of the 18th century and has since become one of the major narrative genres in European and Anglo-American literature. It charts the protagonist's actual or metaphorical journey from youth to maturity. Initially the aim of this journey is reconciliation between the desire for individuation or self-fulfilment and the demands of socialisation or adaptation to a given social reality. Since the genre deals with subjectivity and the relationship between self and society, many novels concerned with psychological characterisation and questions of identity use Bildungsroman elements.

245 The German Fach (pl. Fächer) is used here to refer to either compartment or category. But originally it is a method of classifying singers, primarily opera singers, by the range, weight, and colour of their voices. It is primarily used in Europe, especially in German-speaking countries and in repertory opera houses.

246 Cf. Richard Rorty, *Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida*: 141-160.

students of philosophy would be requested to take other courses or just switch to the successors of philosophy just installed. In this apparent confusion and philosophical lacuna, Rorty pronounces the end of philosophy and proposes conversation as what he thinks would successfully replace philosophy. He considers that, that is what should constitute the post-philosophical culture and form the basis for human knowledge and inform other systems of human life.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have followed the developments of Rorty's ideas as he set himself the task to deconstruct the whole continental philosophical tradition as previously known. We have seen that he crafted this project with such ingenuity by drawing together numerous complex positions from throughout the history of philosophy in order to build his argument. In many instances he admires appropriation and strong misreading with the claim that what he does is to purify philosophy, leave out the bits he does not like and those which can be intensely annoying. In doing all this, he renders philosophy scrawny and the understanding and explication of Truth is left without any foundations. The two are considered together, because for him, philosophy is the guardian of objective truth. It has to be realised that the concept of Truth and especially objective truth has occupied an essential position in the history of philosophy. And he considers that this pre-occupation with truth does not make any meaning if people are stranded with their existential questions without any considerable answer. So, he does not approve any philosophical inquiry which does not impact people's concrete circumstances. As a result of this strategy, he ushers in what is characterized as the post-philosophical culture, a culture without foundations, but which is built on the ideal of keeping the conversation going. Rorty's project has strident consequences for mission history in the Christian tradition especially if we consider the *philosophia ancilla theologiae* motif that has informed much of western Christian and philosophical thought. Another intriguing scenario is that all through history, theology has always developed its epistemology in interaction with philosophy.[247] Now that the foundations upon which Christian theology has depended to articulate her claim for universal truth have been cracked, there is a need to address the new mission situation with a relevant and related mission strategy. In short, we are going to venture into the quest for mission in a non-foundationalist perspective.

In the next chapter, we are going to develop the implications of this meta-philosophical culture on the understanding and articulation of the concept of truth. But above all we shall explore the philosophical meaning of conversation in the explication of truth and its affinity to mission history in this age of multiculturalism

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[247] Chris Hermans, "Practical Theology Theory-Building based on a pragmatic notion of weak rationality," in *Religion inside and outside Traditional Institutions,* ed. Heinz Streib (Leiden, Boston: Brill publications, 2007): 93-123.

and a globalising world. And finally make attempts to develop it as a viable mission concept in the Church's missionary endeavour.

Chapter Two:
Conversation, pragmatism and discourse

Introduction

In the previous chapter it has become evident that philosophy as traditionally understood is a thinking which is no longer relevant for a post-modern consciousness and world. If it might still have a role it can only be in some radically attenuated sense, that is, as writing its own obituary, clearing away of the rubble of its own ruined foundations, speculating as to what it might now mean to live and think post-philosophically.[248] One of Richard Rorty's most famous and controversial philosophical positions has been his replacement of knowledge with conversation, whereby the old goals of progress, truth, and consensus under ideal conditions are replaced with his ideal of "keeping the conversation going."[249] Part of Rorty's point in giving historical accounts of philosophy is to urge listeners to realize that traditional epistemological projects have failed. In light of this, there is no need for asking questions motivated by such projects, and get back to vital questions. It is enough to embrace a more pragmatist view along the lines of John Dewey to philosophy and accept the social dimensions of inquiry, thought, and action. In doing this, Rorty believes it is helpful to speak in terms of conversations and vocabularies rather than truth, representation, and foundations of knowledge. And this is part of his overall rejection of grounding as transcendental or universal. Rather people make normative claims that are always situated within particular social contexts and always bear the stamp of some chosen values and practices. So, when Rorty makes his own normative claims to keep the conversation going, he does not mean for conversation to yield truth, or consensus, final answers, or final norms. On the other hand, Rorty still makes normative claims meant to persuade and influence. And exactly what is meant by and what is required for Rorty's norm, that is, to keep the conversation going is not entirely clear.[250] Indeed the very idea of conversational maintenance requires some philosophical unpacking. In particular, a distinction needs to be made between genuine conversations and simply talking or going through the motions of conversation if one is to make the most of this recommendation.

Harsh criticisms have been directed against Rorty's ideas; the details of which go beyond the scope of this study and therefore we do not intend to venture into them. But following Malachowski, we cannot brush aside Rorty's ideas as if they carry no value and meaning for human solidarity.[251] If studied in depth, evaluated

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[248] Jackson, F.L., "Post-Modernism and the Recovery of the Philosophical Tradition," *Animus* Vol. 1, (December 23, 1996): 3-28, available online at www.swgc.mun.ca/animus (accessed on June 4, 2010).
[249] Richard Rorty, *The Mirror of Nature*, 377.
[250] Elizabeth F. Cook, "Rorty on Conversation as an achievement of Hope," *Contemporary Pragmatism*, Vol. 1 No. 1 (2004): 83-102.
[251] Allan Malachowski, *Richard Rorty*, 65.

and refined for their realistic utility and significance, they can enrich civilisation and promote human wellbeing and fairness. The whole treatise on Rorty, which we have been following up to this point, was to establish how his idea of conversation came about. In this chapter we explore how we can employ this idea as a sensitising concept in analysing mission theory in the past (chapter 3) and the present (chapter 4), in view of the future (chapter 5). The particular goal that was set in the general objectives right from the beginning was to bring Rorty's concept of conversation in a meaningful relation to the Christian concept of mission. Hence the title of this thesis is: Mission from Conversion to Conversation.

Conversation, Pragmatism and Religion

The use of the concept conversation is located in pragmatism, a tradition in which Rorty is rooted which carry that particular intellectual respectability of religion as a human endeavour. This represents some of pragmatism's most controversial claims and positions since in certain circles, the view persists that pragmatism is in fact indifferent and even inhospitable to religion. But in its defence of religion, some commentators hail the pragmatist evaluation of religion as exactly indicative of the openness and tolerance that a pragmatist life orientation facilitates in both societal and intellectual circles. Giles Gunn in his article dealing with religion and the recent revival of pragmatism, remarks that "…philosophers like John E. Smith, Richard J. Bernstein and John McDermott view pragmatism not only as a philosophical theory in need of defence but also as an intellectual method capable of keeping open the lines of communication between philosophy and some of the other departments of the intellectual life."[252] The fundamental presupposition of pragmatism as a philosophy is that all ideas including beliefs, propositions, convictions and theories are instruments that human beings design and use in order to so organise their environment that the latter can adapt to their practical and existential needs. They argue that ideas function in human lives for the sake of the removal of difficulties or the solution of problems or disconcerting puzzles. Ideas or beliefs consequently are true when they work, that is, when they meet with success in pursuing the goal for which they were invented. This implies a distinct rejection of the age-old correspondence theory of truth, in terms of which a knowledge claim is true when it corresponds with how things actually are in the world. In other words, truth is the correspondence between a thing in the world and the intellect. Rorty claims that the founding proposition of pragmatism is that there is no difference of any real consequence, that is, "no difference that makes a difference between the statements' it works because it is true, and it is true because it works."[253]

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[252] Giles Gunn, "Religion and the Recent Revival of Pragmatism" in *The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social Thought, Law and Culture,* ed. Morris Dickstein (Duke: Duke University Press, 1998), 440.
[253] Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, 1982, xxxvii.

Religion played a not inconsiderable, if not always obvious, role in the thinking of the founding generation of pragmatism. The ideas developed by Charles Sanders Peirce are of significant role in this section. He developed the idea that the sole motive, idea and function of thought is to produce belief. He ascribes three properties to a belief: first, it is something that we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and third, it involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or say for short, a habit. Beliefs therefore are habits of action. His point is that there exists the closest possible relationship between what we think or believe, and some action that is precipitated by that belief. Belief always and necessarily arises and functions within the ambit of some practical goal that we seek through concerted action. For Peirce, as for all the pragmatists, the idea that belief is divorced from action and arrived at purely for its own sake or for the sake of inherent intellectual insight or gratification is inconceivable.[254]

William James applied Peirce's idea of beliefs as "habits of action" directly to religious beliefs. James made his known pragmatic view of religion in his essay "*The Will to Believe.*" This title seems to suggest the implausibility of thinking about beliefs as "habits of action." But while defending the claim that religious beliefs are habits of action, the relationship between beliefs and actions need to be specified more closely. For this purpose, he introduces a threefold distinction that needs to be applied to beliefs in order to attain the status of justifiable religious beliefs. Beliefs can according to these distinctions be regarded as hypotheses that we accept or reject according to three sets of options presented us. These options are living or dead, forced or avoidable and momentous or trivial.[255] Following Peirce's idea of beliefs as "habits of action" that are always motivated by some social or practical project within which they function, he insists that we disbelieve all facts and theories for which we find no use.[256] Our non-intellectual nature does influence our convictions. For James pure insights and logic are not the only things that produce that which we believe. His central thesis in "*The Will to Believe*" is stated as: Our passional nature not only lawfully, may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, "Do not decide, but leave the question open" is itself a passional[257] decision, just like deciding yes or no, and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth.[258] He again, on this point, makes a good juxtaposition between belief and truth. He thinks "Beliefs are themselves parts of the sum total of the world's experience, and become matter, therefore, for the next day's funding operations. In the realm of truth-processes

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254 Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel, eds., *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Vol.1,1867-1893*, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1992), 129.

255 Cf. William James, "The Will to Believe" in *James and Dewey on Belief and experience,* ed. John M. Capps and Donald Capps (Illinois: Illinois University Press, 2005), 95-96.

256 Ibid., 96.

257 By passional is meant such states as desire, hope, and other noncognitive states which can legitimately be had without evidence.

258 Cf. James, "The Will to Believe," 96.

facts come independently and determine our beliefs provisionally. But these beliefs make us act, and as fast as they do so, they bring into sight or into existence new facts which re-determine the beliefs accordingly. So the whole coil and ball of truth, as it rolls up, is the product of a double influence. Truths emerge from facts; but they dip forward into facts again and add to them; which facts again create or reveal new truths and so on indefinitely. The 'facts' themselves meanwhile are not true. They simply are. Truth is the function of the beliefs that start and terminate among them. What we say about reality thus depends on the perspective into which we throw it"[259] We need truth, that is, we need to believe in order to act. Before knowing, there is the need to know, which an absolutely vital need is.

Any belief, in conclusion, has a fideistic component that ignites it and enables its perpetration. And this faith, or will to believe, is pragmatically will to act. A hypothesis that is not made alive by an active, favourite, passional, inherently prejudiced, we could say, choice is a dead hypothesis, and consequently it has to be admitted that the emotional sphere is not at all extraneous to intellectual knowledge. It actually nourishes it and it enables it to hold, in many cases, those aspects of 'objectivity' and rigour that, as we have already noticed, are nothing else than specific emotive tonalities. Intellectual knowledge is not "what remains after wish and will and sentimental preference have taken wing,"[260] but, lived as a belief in truth, it answers to a deep need of our being.

Another pragmatist, John Dewey, made an assessment of the intellectual respectability of the ideas and practice of religion in a more radical form than James. Dewey as is James and Peirce shares that pragmatist strategy of apportioning belief to human needs. His discussions and appraisal of religion occur much rather in the context of his sustained concerns about human practice, particularly in the broader contexts of civil life, education, politics and the theory and praxis of democracy. His pragmatism, both as a philosophy and a political disposition is born from a fundamental scepticism of authority. Pragmatism as a philosophy is born from a deep seated distrust of traditional sources of authority. He appreciates democracy as a theory and practice of self-reliance and therefore has little patience with religion in respect of religion's tendency to promote dependence on super-human powers. Central to Dewey's thought is also his emphasis on contingency, humility, and his rejection of the possibility of certainty. As a pragmatist, Dewey's thinking always remains oriented to the domain of practical action. Philosophy, for him, only makes sense to the extent that it impinges on human praxis. His philosophy of religion can in essence be understood as a conversation between religious experience and the political life, a conversation that is necessary since religion is prima facie threatens democratic practice.

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[259] William James, "Pragmatism. A New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking" in *Pragmatism and The Meaning of Truth*, ed. Alfred J. Ayer (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 107-108.
[260] William James, "The Will to Believe," 96.

However, it was in *'A Common Faith'* Dewey's best known work on religion, which embodies his suggestion that religious faith, if it is to be taken seriously, must be "common" not in the sense of ordinary or "not extraordinary," but in the sense of shared and open to intersubjective scrutiny. It should be common in the way that resembles values and beliefs that are put to test in the sustained critical conversation that a democratic society essentially is. The main task in the book is to develop another conception of the nature of the religious phase of experience, one that separates it from the supernatural. He hopes that the upshot of his analysis will be that "…what is genuinely religious will undergo emancipation when it is relieved from the supernatural, that then, for the first time, the religious aspect of experience will be free to develop freely on its own account."[261] Dewey's position on religion hinges on a fundamental distinction that dominates the argument in the book, the distinction between a religion and the religious.[262] He claims that the trouble in which religion generally finds itself in the modern world might well be the effect of the way in which religions prevent the religious quality from coming to consciousness and finding an appropriate moral and intellectual expression.

In the above book, he makes a distinction between religion and religious. Religion always signifies a special body of beliefs and practices having some kind of institutional organisation, loose or tight. In contrast, the adjective religious, denotes nothing in the way of a specifiable entity, either institutional or as a system of beliefs …it does not denote anything that can exist by itself or that can be organised into a particular and distinctive form of existence. It denotes attitudes that may be taken toward every object and every proposed end or ideal. To clarify what he means by the religious, he describes existential attitudes closely associated with religion such as "adaptation" "orientation" and "accommodation" and claims that people often think that these attitudes are brought about by embracing particular religions. He, however, prefers to turn the statement around. His counter claim is that whenever the changes in human attitudes designated by these phenomena occur, there is a religious attitude. It is not a religion that brings it about, when it, adaptation, orientation and accommodation occur, from whatever cause and by whatever means, there is a religious outlook and function." The religious also has to do with an imaginative process bent on the harmonising of the self, in a way that is akin to Santayana's observations about poetry. "The implication is that faith is a kind of anticipatory vision of things that are now invisible because of the limitations of our finite and erring nature."[263] In this process, morality is also involved: "The religious is 'morality touched by emotion' only when the ends of moral conviction arouse emotions that are not only intense but are actuated and supported by ends so inclusive that they unify the self."[264] For Dewey, the value of religion is not embedded in a set of beliefs in some

[261] John Dewey, *A Common Faith* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), 2.
[262] Ibid., 1-28.
[263] Ibid., 20.
[264] Ibid., 22.

supernatural power, but a discernment springing from a certain type of experience. Religions do not bring about this experience; the experience has a certain nature that might be called the religious. The experience emanates from our efforts to imaginatively harmonise and unify our inner selves, to "to introduce perspective into the piecemeal and shifting episodes of existence. What must be understood is that whatever introduces genuine perspective is religious, not that a religion is something that introduces it."[265]

For Dewey, the religious is that which connects us, in wonder and humility, with our environment and with nature. Dewey abhors the fact that religions are so often born out of fear and a sense of hopelessness that can only be alleviated by committing to a supernatural force that can safeguard us against "the powers of dark." That notion of a religion tends to isolate people from the world of physical nature and one's fellow beings. Such isolation is something that Dewey describes as distinctly unreligious. Again, it must be clearly distinguished from what he calls the religious: "Our successes are dependent upon the cooperation of nature. The sense of dignity of human nature is as religious as is the sense of awe and reverence when it rests upon a sense of human nature as a cooperating part of a larger whole."[266] In concluding this part on Dewey's articulation of his ideas on religion, he expresses the religious as exactly that quality of experience that acknowledges our personal incompleteness and our dependence upon the solidarity of fellow human beings to realise the values that bind us together. The concluding passage of 'A Common Faith' reads: "We who now live are parts of a humanity that extends into the remote past, a humanity that has interacted with nature. The things of civilisation we most prize are not of ourselves. They exist by grace of the doings and sufferings of the continuous human community in which we are a link. Ours is the responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding the heritage of values we have received, so that those who come after us may receive it more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared than we received it. Here are all the elements for a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class or race. Such a faith has always been implicitly the common faith of mankind. It remains to make it explicit and militant."[267]

We conclude Dewey's explication of religion with his suggestion that this religious ideal of the unification of the self, facilitated by imagination, is not conceived outside the interactions of a dynamic human community. And that the religious is exactly that quality of experience that acknowledges our personal incompleteness and our dependence upon the solidarity of fellow human beings to realise the values that bind us together. This is motivated by the fact that knowledge as a human accomplishment is a product of the cooperative and communicative operations of human beings living together. Its communal origin is an indication of

[265] Ibid., 24.
[266] Ibid., 25.
[267] Ibid., 87.

its rightful communal use.[268] In this conclusion, we recognise that the ideas of Dewey on religion highlight an important fact that this sector cannot be dispensed with in the human endeavour. And also that in the pragmatic tradition, knowledge is a product of conversation as a communal interactive apparatus. The community therefore pursues its existential goals once it maintains the ideal of keeping the conversation going.

The meaning of Conversation

Currently an increasing number of fields of thought, especially in the social sciences, are adopting conversation as a basic metaphor.[269] The concept "Conversation" in Rorty is not so pronounced as his account of liberal irony which is one of the most prominent but also most controversial treatments of irony in contemporary philosophy.[270] But Rortian conversation is best understood if we position it in pragmatism, the philosophical tradition in which Rorty was rooted and, which shaped his ideas. In a preface to his book, *'Meaning and Modernity: Social Theory in the Pragmatic Attitude*,' Eugene Halton assumed that "…conversation is a central concept of pragmatism, but the conversation is one ultimately rooted within a generalised conception of nature, a conception in which nature itself is a bioscosmic emergent dialogue."[271] Conversation in the form of written dialogue has been used in philosophy and epistemology from the time of the ancient Greeks. One of Socrates' distinctive contributions is the use of dialogue as a means to uncover the truth. Some of the best known philosophers and scientists used dialogue in their work, including, Plato, Boethius, Nietzsche, Renyi, Heyting and Lakatos. Over and above mere use, conversation has been explicitly adopted as a central epistemological concept by many philosophers and theorists including: Bakhtin, Collingwood, Gadamer, Gergen, Habermas, Harre, Lakatos, Lorenzen, Mead, Oakshott, Peters, Rorty, Shotter, Volosinov, Vygotsky and Wittgenstein. For example, the philosophy of Collingwood proposes a dialogical logic of question and answer instead of the mono-logic of propositions. Shotter argues for a rhetorical-response (conversational) view of interpersonal relations and knowledge.[272] Here conversation is identified as an epistemological concept used by a generations of philosophers stretching from the ancient period to the contemporary times. This is indicative that this concept is convertible with human experience and consequently inseparable from human pursuits. In this way, it is truly regarded as a human endeavour.

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[268] Ibid., 86.

[269] Paul Ernest, *Social Constructivism as a Philosophy of Mathematics* (New York: State University of New York press, Albany, 1998), 162.

[270] Brad Frazier, *Rorty and Kierkegaard on Irony and Moral Commitment* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 7.

[271] Eugene Rochberg-Halton, *Meaning and Modernity: Social Theory in the Pragmatic Attitude* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), xii.

[272] Paul Ernest, *Social Constructivism as a Philosophy of Mathematics*, 163-167.

Rorty adopts conversation explicitly as his philosophical basis for epistemological and mathematical knowledge. He argues that it is the human reality underpinning and supporting knowing. He claims that: "If, however, we think of rational certainty as a matter of victory in argument rather than of relation to an object known, we shall look toward our interlocutors rather than to our faculties for the explanation of the phenomenon. If we think of our certainty about the Pythagorean Theorem as our confidence, based on experience with arguments on such matters, that nobody will find an objection to the premises from which we infer it, then we shall not seek to explain it by the relation of reason to triangularity. Our certainty will be a matter of conversation between persons, rather than a matter of interaction with non-human reality."[273] He goes on further to assert that "conversation is the ultimate context in which knowledge is to be understood"[274] and that conversational justification, so to speak, is naturally holistic, whereas the notion of justification embedded in the epistemological tradition is reductive and atomistic.[275] If it is to be adopted on an epistemological basis, clarification of the nature of conversation is needed. The interpretation to be offered here will shed more light on the Rortyan conversation and make it more intelligible and operational in this research.

There are three levels on which this concept is to be understood: First, conversation originates at the interpersonal level where persons on one or more shared forms of life engage in direct conversations, based in one or more shared language games, adopting a late-Wittgensteinian perspective. At this level, conversation is one of the basic modes of interpersonal human interactions, perhaps the most basic one. Mediated forms of conversation involving written texts, understood broadly to include all forms of notations, diagram and materially embodied complexes of signs, represent an important extension of this notion. Gadamer adds that "The primacy of conversation can also be seen in derivative forms in which the correspondence between the question and the answer is obscured. Letters for example are an interesting transitional phenomenon, a kind of written conversation that, as it were, stretches out the movement of talking at cross purposes before each other's point."[276] Therefore the transition from spoken to written textual forms of conversation is a crucial one. It creates a different relation-ship between author and utterance, and allows the utterance to be objectified and preserved beyond the moment of the illocutionary act. It allows mathematical texts and arguments, proofs in particular, to be construed as monological, with all answers anticipated and incorporated in the text.

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273 Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 156-157.
274 Ibid., 389.
275 Ibid., 170.
276 Cf. Hans Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2nd rev. edn, trans. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G.Marshall (London, New York: Continuum, 2004) 362.

Second, there is conversation at the cultural level. This could be well articulated with Michael Oakshott who argues that humanity inhabits a world of ideas and whose growth and development is the conversation of humankind.[277] This larger scale conversation is the direct sum of oral conversations in oral cultures. However the rich, complex, symbolic culture of the history of mathematics as we know it is only possible through extended conversation, based on the production and use of texts in permanent form

Third, there is internalized private conversation. Many theorists including Plato, Gergen, Harré, Mead, Shotter, and Vygotsky argue that thought itself is internalized conversation, and that socially situated conversation between persons plays a crucial role in the formation of mind. Consequently it is also a central underlying feature of the subsequent use of mind. Even the private and individual functions of mind are socially constructed, although once formed they can take on a life of their own and operate a long way removed from any collective or public conversation. An example is given of mathematicians who can operate in isolation for extended periods of time, having internalised some of the conversational roles and procedures they learnt through conversation of the first and second kinds. These include, most notably, the role of proponent, in which a line of thinking or thought experiment is followed through sympathetically, for understanding, and the role of critic, in which it is examined for weaknesses and flaws.[278]

Rorty's Conversation

Rorty's idea of conversation is drawn on his own notion of language and thought. But as he himself states, the notion of conversation that he discusses is an allusion to Oakshott's famous work, "*The Voice of Poetry in the conversation of Mankind*." Michael Oakshott dedicated the whole of his work to discuss the concept conversation as a human activity. He was prompted to write this treatise by the philosophical mode of the time which recognised that all human utterance is in one mode[279] and that all utterances are regarded as contributions to an inquiry, or a debate among inquirers, about ourselves and the world we inhabit. Oakshott is not satisfied with this position for he considers this "understanding of human activity and intercourse as an inquiry, while appearing to accommodate a variety of voices, in fact recognises only one, namely, the voice of argumentative discourse, the voice of science, and all others are acknowledged merely in respect of their aptitude to imitate this voice."[280] But Oakshott recognises that the diverse idioms of utterance which make up current human intercourse have some meeting place and compose a manifold of some sort and he asserts that this meeting place is not an inquiry or

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[277] Michael Oakshott, *The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind* (London: Bowes & Bowes, 1959), 19.
[278] Cf. Ernest Paul, "The Dialogical Nature of Mathematics," in *Mathematics, Education, and Philosophy: An International Perspective*, ed. Ernest Paul (London: The Falmer Press, 1994), 33-46.
[279] Michael Oakshott, *The Voice of poetry in the Conversation of Mankind*, 9.
[280] Ibid., 9.

an argument, but a conversation.[281] His understanding of conversation is that participants are not engaged in an inquiry or a debate; there is no 'truth' to be discovered, no proposition to be proved, no conclusion sought. They are not concerned to inform, to persuade, or to refute one another and therefore the cogency of their utterances does not depend upon their all speaking in the same idiom. They may differ without disagreeing. A conversation may have passages of argument and a speaker is not forbidden to be demonstrative, but reasoning is neither sovereign nor alone, and the conversation itself does not compose an argument.

Oakshott's conversation is not an enterprise designed to yield an extrinsic profit, a contest where a winner gets a prize, nor is it an activity of exegesis; it is rather an unrehearsed intellectual adventure. He makes an unfamiliar comparison between conversation and gambling claiming that its significance lies neither in winning nor in losing, but in wagering.[282] He makes an important remark that "properly speaking, conversation is impossible in the absence of a diversity of voices, because in it difference universes of discourse meet, acknowledge each other and enjoy an oblique relationship which neither requires nor forecasts their being assimilated to one another."[283]

Oakshott makes very remarkable contributions in this treatise on conversation which will find their fulfilment in Rorty and this prompts us to dwell on it for an extra paragraph. He argues that conversation is the appropriate image of human intercourse; appropriate because it recognises the qualities, the diversities, and the proper relationships of human utterances. Although he admits that in a conversation "there is argument and inquiry and information, but wherever these are profitable they are to be recognised as passages in this conversation, and perhaps they are not the most captivating of the passages." He values the "ability to participate in this conversation, and not the ability to reason cogently, to make discoveries about the world, or to contrive a better world, which distinguishes the human being from the animal."[284] Each voice in the conversation is the reflection of a human activity and this conversation is not only the greatest but also the most hardly sustained of all the accomplishments of mankind. Again each voice is at once a manner of speaking and a determinate utterance. As a manner of speaking, each is wholly conversable and each voice represents a serious engagement and without this seriousness the conversation would lack impetus. But in its participation in the conversation each voice learns to be playful, learns to understand itself conversationally and recognise itself as a voice among voices.

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[281] Ibid., 10.
[282] Ibid., 11.
[283] Ibid., 11.
[284] Ibid., 11.

Additionally, he expresses a pernickety development in the seventeenth century when the tones of the voice of science together in modulation with the voice of practical activity called politics became the masters of conversation and asserted themselves more and more unmistakably. He notes that "But for the conversation to be appropriated by one or two voices is an insidious vice because in the passage of time it takes on the appearance of a virtue. All utterance should be relevant; but relevance in conversation is determined by the course of the conversation itself, it owes nothing to an external standard. Consequently an established monopoly will not only make it difficult for another voice to be heard, it is convicted in advance of irrelevance."[285] Oakshott believes that there is no easy escape from this impasse. An excluded voice may take wing against the wind, but it will do so at the risk of turning the conversation into a dispute. Or it may gain a hearing by imitating the voices of the monopolists; but it will be a hearing for only a counterfeit utterance.[286] He makes a proposal that, "To rescue the conversation from the bog into which it has fallen and to restore to it some of its lost freedom of movement would require a philosophy more profound than anything I have to offer."[287]

In Rorty, we could notice that profound philosophy required for the better appreciation of conversation as Oakshott had suggested above. Rorty makes a brilliant contribution in the development of, and he holds high hopes for, conversation and indeed, he stakes his whole philosophy on it. He observes that: "If we see knowing not as having an essence, but rather as a right, by current standards, to believe, then we are well on the way to seeing conversation as the ultimate context within which knowledge is to be understood. Our focus shifts from the relation between human beings and the objects of their inquiry to the relation between alternative standards of justification, and from there to the actual changes in those standards which make up intellectual history."[288] He maintains that for social life and for private self-creation, the ideal is conversation, dialogue, narrative, and vocabularies. In his social philosophy the ideal of conversation is that the goals for society are derived from democratic conversation. He explains that all that matters for liberal politics is "the widely shared conviction that...we shall call true or good whatever is the outcome of free discussion that if we take care of political freedom, truth and goodness will take care of themselves."[289] But again he quickly adds on that "Free discussion here does not mean 'free from ideology,' but simply the sort which goes on when the press, the judiciary, the elections, and the universities are free, social mobility is frequent and rapid, literacy is universal, higher education is common, and peace and wealth have made possible the leisure necessary to listen to lots of different people and think about what they say. I share with Habermas the Peircelike claim that the only general account to be given of our

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[285] Ibid., 15.
[286] Ibid., 15.
[287] Ibid., 15.
[288] Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 389-390.
[289] Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 84.

criteria for truth is one which refers to 'undistorted communication,' but I do not think there is much to be said about what counts as 'undistorted' except 'the sort you get when you have democratic political institutions and the conditions for making these institutions function.[290]

The notion of truth in Rorty is discussed in contradistinction to the angle of truth in science whereby science as the paradigmatic human activity discovers truth rather than makes it.[291] Rorty nudges those philosophers who regard 'making truth' as a merely metaphorical and thoroughly misleading phrase. He argues that "we need to make a distinction between the claim that the world is out there and the claim that truth is out there. To say that the world is out there, that it is not our creation, is to say, with common sense, that most things in space and time are the effects of causes which do not include human mental states. To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human languages, and that human languages are human creation."[292] Rorty therefore states affirmatively that "truth cannot be out there – cannot exist independently of the human mind – because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. The world on its own, unaided by the describing activities of human beings, cannot."[293] This, therefore, suggests that human language is essential in making the world intelligible to the knowing subject.

Rorty goes on to attach the notion of 'truth making' to human capacity for language or communication at that. He says that the world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it cannot propose a language for us to speak. Only other human beings can do that. The realisation that the world does not tell us what language games to play should not, however, lead us to say that a decision about which to play is arbitrary, nor to say that it is the expression of something deep within us.[294] In brief, we could articulate that Rorty's conversation disdains the western tradition which centres on the notion of the search for Truth for its own sake, that is, not because it will be good for oneself or for one's real or imaginary community, but because such a notion attempts to give sense to one's existence by turning away from solidarity to objectivity.[295]

The above understandings imply that the Rortian conception of conversation is related to the concept of truth. Here is a link between Rorty's concept of conversation and the Christian concept of mission. As we noted in our general

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290 Ibid., 84.
291 Ibid., 3.
292 Ibid., 4-5.
293 Ibid., 5.
294 Ibid., 6.
295 Richard Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?" in *Knowledge and Inquiry Readings in Epistemology,* ed. Brad K. Wray (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, Ltd, 1985), 422-437.

overview of concepts of mission (see the theoretical framework in the general introduction), until the Second Vatican Council, more particularly the Declaration on the attitude of the Church toward non-Christian religions *Nostra Aetate* (Nr. 2), Christian mission was interpreted as propagating the Christian revelation which was considered to be true to the followers of non-Christian religions which were perceived as false.[296] The difference between Rorty's concept of conversation and the Christian concept of mission lies in the interpretation of truth. As we have seen above, for Rorty 'truth is made' by the human capacity for language. In Christianity, truth is 'out there' and waits to be found. A distinctive feature of Christian mission is that it has made universal and absolute truth-claims from its very beginning, rooted in classist culture and Aristotle's logic.[297] The foundations of western culture, from which most of the missionaries who came to Uganda were formed, were steeped in an epistemological tradition that carried sharp distinctions between a knowing subject and a known object which Rorty blames on the Cartesian distinction between mind and matter.[298] This distinction is in way related to the Law of Contradiction which postulates that "...a thing cannot have opposite attributes at the same time."[299] We saw in Chapter One, that Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, who was a well-trained philosopher but only most known in anthropology, interpreted these philosophical categories and he imposed them on ethnography. It was also noted that in Lévy-Bruhl, we see a perpetuation of that stock of dichotomies like realism/antirealism, objectivism/relativism and fact/value, cognitive/expressive that defined continental philosophy for centuries. This dichotomy was of course well established in epistemology and it is this same dichotomy which is the key to the structure of Lévy-Bruhl's theory, for he translated it into scientific mentality on the one hand and primitive mentality on the other.[300] Western culture had all along considered autonomous reason as the central point of reference in the rationalist tradition. This fact prompts Mike Goheen to argue that: When autonomous reason, the light of the classical tradition, is the arbiter of truth, the gospel cannot be propagated as truth but is reduced to the category of values, private opinion, and subjective taste."[301] The Church, in a way, adopted Descartes' position and could be faulted of relegating the gospel truth to the margins of mission.

This is so because one set of beliefs, which is the gospel as truth is domesticated within the assumptions of modern thought. This can be explained with one of the four typologies of religious encounter as enumerated by Daniel Migliore: First, complete or partial replacement of the other religion (Evangelical); second, fulfilment of the other religions (Vat. II Roman Catholic Church); third, mutuality

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296 Cf. Stephan Bevans, Roger Schroeder, *Constants in Context*, 49-80.
297 Cf. Knitter, *No other name?* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1985), 31-32, 217-223.
298 Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and Mirror of Nature*, 65.
299 Isaac Husik, "Aristotle on the Law of Contradiction and the Basis of the Syllogism," Mind Vol. 15, No. 58 (April 1906): 215-222.
300 Cornelius Ssempala, *Pragmatism, Conversation and Hermeneutics*, 276.
301 Mike Goheen, *Liberating the Gospel from its modern cage*, 366.

of the religions (liberal protestant and liberal Roman Catholic); fourth, acceptance of the particularity and incommensurability of religions (liberal). Traditional mission models have been identified with the first typology which declares that Jesus Christ alone is the Saviour and Lord of all and that salvation is possible only through explicit faith in him. Since Jesus Christ is the only saviour of the world, "the way, the truth and the life" (Jn.14:6), and since the other religions do not know or proclaim the grace of God in Jesus Christ, there is neither revelation nor salvation in religions other than Christianity.[302] For Christians Truth becomes the content of mission to be discovered by others. Truth is given and proclaimed, and the one they have to live within their existential situation. To speak of truth in this sense appears on the face of it to invoke, a claim to some kind of universality or publicness, though this view of truth as universal requires claims to truth to be submitted to testing through accepted modes of rational public discussion. The key question to pose at this juncture is: In what way is Christian truth considered to be universal? Is it universal in modernity's sense, as being accessible or at least defendable and capable of articulation through public-universal forms of rationality? Or is it bound so tightly to the community and tradition of faith that it is incapable of attaining any external public form? Further, does the universality of Christian truth mean that its public form is univocal, constant across all changes in time, place and culture, because the Christian community in which this Truth has been placed is in some sense also universal; therefore, that which makes it Christian endures unchanged, no matter what external changes there might be?

In attempting to respond to this difficulty we shall basically rely on Alistair McFadyen, who boldly and clearly holds the view that Christianity is true (indeed, is the Truth) and that its truth is in some sense universal.[303] He bases his arguments on the facts that Christian truth claims depend on certain events having taken place in history. However, these might be understood, but by the implications of its monotheism, even though its monotheism takes a Trinitarian form, something which makes a decisive difference to its conception of truth and publicness. Monotheism commits one to the view that the one God is the basic fact about the world; that in God's singularity and universality the world's plurality does achieve a unity, though not necessarily a uniformity. Even if that unity is an eschatological reality which allows pluralism the last word now, that turns out after all to be only the next-to-last word. The eschatological nature of Christian Truth does not mean that there is nothing universal; it merely postpones the dawning of the universal. Christianity has a more specific reason for conceiving of itself in terms of universality, and this on the basis of its most basic content, Jesus Christ. For however Jesus' relationship to redemption might be understood, any recognisably

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302 Daniel L. Migliore, *Faith seeking Understanding: An Introduction to Christian Theology*, 2nd edn. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2004), 307; Paul Knitter, *Introducing Theologies of Religions* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2002), 10-23.

303 Alistair MacFdyen, "Truth as Mission: The Christian Claim to Universal Truth in a Pluralist Public World," *Scottish Journal of Theology*, Vol. 46, Issue 4 (November 1993): 437-456.

Christian account of it will be based on the assumption that Jesus effects a universalisation of the conditions of redemption; that is, with Jesus redemption is no longer restricted by the particularity of membership of the tribe of Israel. A specifically Christian comprehension of the universality of its truth and of the appropriate form of its publicness is likely to be based on that which makes Christianity materially different from all other forms of monotheism – Jesus. He is the Truth and the foundation of all truth.

In accordance with the above, perhaps the relevant question would be: How does Christian truth come about? Or, why is Christ the Truth for Christians? There are a number of assertions in response to this question. Christ is considered the truth because he referred everything back to God, perceived things and acted in the context of a proper relation to God. Christian truth therefore is not primarily propositional, it is relational. It concerns the proper relationship of humanity, creation and God, a relationship which is promised as the future fulfilment of the whole of reality before God. And Christ, in Orthodox understanding, is this Truth, this relationship, in incarnate and anticipatory form. Jesus is the truth, since it is in him that God makes a Godself available to and for human beings and in him that there is a correspondence of this double-availability for God. As a consequence of this double-availability, the future liberation of all things in the kingdom is not merely proclaimed but, through this proclamation, becomes anticipatory.

Christianity and the Enlightenment share the proposition that there is a single account of truth and a single form of rationality.[304] Christendom entailed a supposition that Christian faith was (or at least should be) part of a single, univocal public world. Christendom was based on the assumption that Christian Truth could and should be extended throughout a culture within which it should play a central public-institutional role by regulating all public life. It is tempting to define Christendom as a monoculture, but such singularity and uniformity were never, in fact achieved. The public sphere, even in Christendom, was pluralist, containing a variety of interpretations of Christian, counter-Christian and other truths as the history of 'heretical,' counter-Christian and politically revolutionary groups attests.[305] Christendom was the achievement of political power which attempted to silence alternative truths, interests and voices in Europe with the more or less realised imposition of the single voice, the monolithic truth, and which exported this truth abroad through the subjugation of primitive interests, truths and voices. Christendom was a project undertaken on the assumption that the Truth was

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[304] David Krieger, *The New Universalism: Foundations for a Global Theology* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1991), 9-44.

[305] From the later eleventh century onwards, in particular, there had been a steady stream of religious movements which in varying degrees represented a challenge to the authority of the church by acting outside its communion: the Albigensiand, the Waldensians, the Patarines, the Cathars, whatever their differences in outlook and origin, all came to be marked off from the main body of believers by their renunciation of church's mediation. Also, the fact that the Church is split between East and West testifies to this historical plurality within Christendom.

known and was to be coordinated with every public and every sphere of the public in a particular way. This means that the content of the Christian story, of its Truth, does sit well in alliance between institutionalised Christianity and the imperial power which levels the public sphere to a single voice. The cross is a form of execution which was reserved for those who did not enjoy the rights and responsibilities of Roman citizenship, it might even be considered a tool to silence those excluded from normal practical life on the basis of their class, caste or nationhood. As such it was a tool for silencing plurality. There are other, more formal reasons for resisting the idea that there is a single account of truth and a single form of rationality which may be pressed on the public sphere. As far as Christian faith is concerned, this idea would mean that there is a single, unequivocal account of Christian Truth which is known outside of any particular situation, and which is to be imposed upon, or defended within, that situation in a uniform and imperialistic way.

The truth that accompanied traditional mission theories and practices had a deep foundation in the enlightenment tradition haunted by the Cartesian legacy that "there is available a kind of truth which certain in the sense that it cannot be disbelieved, objective truth, scientific truth, truth that is achieved by the employment of a hermeneutical method."[306] This form of Cartesian truth advocates the priority of doubt over faith in the knowing process. Doubt, not faith, was to be the path to knowledge. By relentless scepticism, the famous critical principle, every claim to truth was to be put through the critical sieve in which only the indubitable would be retained.[307]

The alternative understanding of truth poses a challenge to the traditional model of communication. According to Frans Wijsen, "the relationship between mission (missiology) and communication (communication science) is neither a new nor an accidental one."[308] Wijsen discusses this subject by recalling the work of two well-known Dutch missiologists who had a great impact on the world-wide discussion on this topic within the circles of the World Council of Churches in the 1950s.

According to Hendrik Kraemer mission is "communication of the Christian faith." He distinguished between two closely interrelated aspects: communication of and communication between.[309] Kraemer develops this subject further by arguing that "human beings are created towards communication with God. This is the basis for communication between people. But communication between people fails because the primordial break of communication with God. This mode of communication,

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306 Newbigin Lesslie, "The Role of the Bible in our Church," Unpublished paper as quoted by Mike Goheen, in *Missionalia*, Vol.30, No.3 (November 2002): 360-375.
307 Oliver A. Johnson, *Scepticism and Cognitivism: A study in the Foundations of Knowledge* (California: University of California Press, 1978), 43-44.
308 Frans Wijsen, *There is Only One God: A Social-Scientific and Theological Study of Popular Religion and Evangelization in Sukumaland, Northwest Tanzania* (Kampen: Kok, 1993), 243.
309 Ibid.

that is, communication of and communication between could perfectly reconcile the polarised Rortian terms; objectivity and solidarity[310] and hence cater for both the horizontal and vertical dimensions of human communication. The presupposition is that communion within God's self, one-in-three and three-in-one, is the icon of the communion of God with humans and the communion of humans with one another. That is to say, from God's inner unity two directional relationships are actualised in the faith community: a vertical koinonia between God and humankind and a horizontal koinonia among humans. The former takes its bidding from understanding God as transcendental and the other; the latter from seeing God as immanent and incarnate.[311] This form of communication presupposes the existence of God as the source and origin of all human communication; this is a truth which confronts man from without, a truth that "will make you free" (Jn.8:32) if without qualification you submit to it.[312]

Frans Wijsen discusses the mission model proposed by Johannes Hoekendijk as "communicating with a fellow traveller" and he argues that Hoekendijk introduced a new understanding of mission.[313] He adds that, "To Hoekendijk mission is not in the first place winning people for the Church, but demonstrating the Kingdom of God" and that the aim of evangelisation is not so much the conversion of the individual souls but the humanisation of the world.[314] This is the same understanding of mission as the one of Max Warren and John Taylor whom we quoted in the general introduction. This resonates with the New Testament description where it gives the impression that mission begins with a kind of explosion of joy. The news that the rejected and crucified Jesus is alive is something that cannot possibly be suppressed. It must be told. The mission of the Church in the pages of the New Testament is more like the fallout from a vast explosion, radioactive fallout which is not lethal, but life giving. In the letters of St. Paul, it is difficult to find any suggestion that he anywhere lays it on the conscience of readers that they ought to be active in mission. For himself, it is inconceivable that he should keep silent. "Woe to me if I do not preach the gospel" (1Cor. 9:16). Wijsen would argue with this view in the background that, there is a need to do away with an understanding of Christ that hinders communication and promote an understanding of Christ that makes possible a 'communication without domination' because the uniqueness of Christ is relational rather than exclusive, dialectical or inclusive.[315] Wijsen reiterates that Christ is necessary for salvation and for the fullness of salvation, but he fails to mention the incarnation, as an important event

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310 Richard Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?" *Knowledge and Inquiry Readings in Epistemology*, 422-437.

311 Lorelei Fuchs F., SA, *Koinonia and the Quest for an Ecumenical Ecclesiology: From Foundations through Dialogue to Symbolic Competence for Communionality* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 2008), 29.

312 Peter A. Schouls, *Descartes and the Enlightenment* (Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989), 37.

313 Wijsen, *There is Only One God*, 243.

314 Ibid.

315 Ibid, 244; See also, Paul Knitter, *No Other Name? A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes Toward the World Religions* (Mary Knoll N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1985), 171.

that would give meaning in all this argumentation. The incarnation is an utterly new event in which God moves toward human beings in love and enables human love of God and neighbour. This movement in the incarnation is the direct movement of God mediated only through the incarnate Word himself.[316] The Epistles of St. Paul[317] dissipates the gloom of darkness by the light of Christ's Incarnation. He teaches the doctrine of universal fellow-membership, and of universal brotherhood, consequent on the incarnation of Christ which offset a new global conversation.

This brings us finally to two considerations. The first consideration is that Christian mission followed the enlightenment spirit with its dichotomous dimension of truth. This was noticeable in mission practices where it is still maintained that religious dichotomies still haunt the nature of the church. Adorno and Horkheimer would comment that Truth in the enlightenment is rejected as historical and rather considered as an unchanging constant to be set against the movement of history.[318] This kind of truth, usually, is applauded as absolute in the sense that it cannot be questioned on the basis of external evidence or arguments. It is plain in the sense that it requires little if any interpretation. It is unchangeable in the sense that it need not be adapted to contemporary circumstances.[319] Frans Wijsen is very categorical when he explicitly points out that: "In our European understanding of truth, truth is defined by exclusion."[320] The understanding of truth expressed here could be regarded as the basis of Christian exclusivism where the central claims of Christian faith are incompatible with those of other religious traditions which are rejected as false. One of the major charges brought against exclusivism is that it is dependent upon notions of faith and truth which, while perhaps legitimate in other domains, are inappropriate in religion. Christian exclusivists, it is claimed, assume that the most important aspect of religion is religious belief and that the various religions advance beliefs about reality which are mutually incompatible. However, this assumption is said to be problematic on at least two counts. First, it unduly emphasises the propositional element in religions. And second, it adopts an exclusivist view of truth that is out of place in religion.[321] Even if there is a sense in ordinary life or science in which truth can be regarded as propositional and exclusive, to think of religious truth in these terms is to indicate that one really does not understand what religious faith and truth are all about. For religious truth is not

316 Paul D. Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance: *Theologian of the Trinity* (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2009), 113.
317 Cf. Colossians 4:16; Ephesians 2:6 (New Jerusalem Bible).
318 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (London: Verso, 1997), ix.
319 Daniel O. Conkle, "Secular Fundamentalism, Religious Fundamentalism, and the Search for Truth in Contemporary America" *Journal of Law and Religion*, Vol. 12, No. 2 published by Journal of Law and Religion, Inc., (1995-1996): 337-370 online at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1051585 (accessed on June 16, 2010).
320 Frans Wijsen, "I have all kinds of medicines: Dialogue and Syncretism in African Christianity," in *The Polemical Dialogue: Research into Dialogue, Truth, and Truthfulness,* ed. Valkenberg W.G.B.M. and Wijsen F.J.S. (Saarbrücken: Verlag für Entwicklungspolitik, 1997), 143.
321 Harold A. Netland, *Dissonant Voices: Religious Pluralism and the Question of Truth* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1991), 112.

like ordinary truth, it is unique and thus not necessarily subject to the limitations inherent in ordinary truth; because the notion of propositional truth and exclusive truth is misleading and inappropriate when applied to religion.

This could be better understood if a proper response to these criticisms will involve defending the legitimacy of the concepts of propositional and exclusive truth in religion. It would be fitting to first take a consideration of what is meant by a propositional truth. Most philosophers make a fundamental distinction between sentences and statements or propositions. The distinction is essentially between "what is said (or written)" and "what is used to say what is said." What is said is said through a sentence or by means of a sentence, but it is not identical with the sentence. Sentences are always in a given language such as English, German, Dutch or Swahili...whereas what is expressed by the sentence is not. Significantly, the same statement can be expressed in many different sentences in the same language. For this and other reasons philosophers make a distinction between sentences and statements or propositions. Here we can regard "statements" and "propositions" as virtually synonymous. Roughly, a proposition is the meaning expressed by a declarative sentence or as "what is conveyed" by a sentence which makes an implicit or explicit assertion. It should be emphasised that propositions cannot be identified with mental acts such as believing, judging, asserting and many others. Strictly speaking, propositions are not in the mind, although the mind does apprehend them. To assert that truth is propositional, then, is to recognise that although "true" and "false" can be used in a variety of ways, in the logically basic sense truth is a quality or property of propositions. That truth is a property of propositions such that a proposition is true if and only if the state of affairs to which it refers is as the proposition asserts it to be, otherwise it is false. All propositions are either true or false and, strictly speaking, only propositions are either true or false. Propositions can thus be thought of as the minimal vehicle of truth. Although this understanding of truth is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy there are many religious circles that reject it as inadequate and even misleading in religion.

Hence, religious truth is not propositional but personal. Human behaviour, in word or deed, is the nexus between man's inner life and the surrounding world. Truth at the personalistic level is that quality by which both halves of that relationship are chaste and appropriate, are true; what is intended is that the locus of truth is not propositions, statements, or beliefs, but rather is in persons. Religious truth does not reflect correspondence with reality so much as it signifies integrity, sincerity, faithfulness, authenticity of life, and existentially appropriating certain beliefs in one's life and conduct. The religious traditions can be seen as more or less in the sense of enabling those who look at life and the universe through their patterns to perceive smaller or larger, less important or more important areas of reality, to formulate and to ponder less or more significant issues to act less or more truly,

less or more truly to be.[322] Truth is not a static property of propositions or doctrines but rather a dynamic product of human involvement with what is said to be true. Personal truth is not something detached from actual life, it demands existential appropriation. No statement might be accepted as true that has not been inwardly appropriated by its author. Here Ludwig Wittgenstein is referred to as having had an enormous influence upon recent analytic philosophy. It is argued that although he was primarily interested in problems in the philosophy of mind, language, and mathematics, his views had had significant impact upon discussions of religious language. He emphasised the importance of understanding the relevant "form of life" and "language game" in which particular kind of discourse occurs if we are to understand the discourse in question. There are many kinds of discourse, and one must be sensitive to the context and circumstance in which each kind of discourse occurs if one is to understand what is said.[323] The situation in the 17th and 18th centuries could well articulate this, for while ordinary church goers continued to live in the world of the bible, intellectuals and theologians were more and more controlled by the humanist tradition. The consequences were that even those who sought to defend Christian faith did so, on the basis that it was reasonable, that is to say, it did not contradict the fundamental humanist assumptions.[324]

The second consideration is that truth is the outcome of open-ended and non-dominating communication, that is, conversation. According to Rorty, truth is not something objective lying out there waiting to be discovered, but an outcome of an open non imposing way of communication to reach a consensus.[325] This Rortian distinction corresponds to religious truths as different from propositional truth because religious truth, it is supposed, is not propositional truth about God but consists rather in the existential encounter with God himself.[326] The great Swiss theologian Emil Brunner in his influential work, "Truth as Encounter," drew a sharp contrast between scientific or philosophical truth and truth in the Christian faith. Whereas the former kinds of truth are concerned with propositions, truth in the Biblical sense should be understood as "personal encounter." He states that "Truth as encounter is not truth about something, not even truth about something mental, about ideas. Rather, it is that truth which breaks in pieces the impersonal concept of truth and mind, truth that can be expressed only in the "I – Thou" form. All use of impersonal terms to describe it, the divine, the transcendent, the absolute, is indeed the inadequate way invented by the thinking of the solitary self

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322 Ibid., 119.

323 Newton Garver, *This Complicated Form of Life: Essays on Wittgenstein*, (Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1994), 244-246; Shang Zhiyang, "Language and Inculturation" in *Hermeneutics and Inculturation,* ed. George F. MacLean, Antonio Gallo and Robert Magliola (Washington: The Council For Research in Values and Philosophy, 2003), 193-194.

324 Lesslie Newbigin, *The Gospel in a Pluralist Society* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 1989), 2-3.

325 Richard Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth*, xxv; David Boersema, *Pragmatism and Reference*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009), 124-125.

326 Ibid., 116.

to speak of it, or more correctly, of Him."[327] Truth as encounter is thus something utterly unique to religion and is not to be found in science or philosophy. Brunner continued to claim that the "truth" in God's revelation is the truth which may be described as the encounter of the human "I" with God's "Thou" in Jesus Christ. Many theologians accept this contention that religious truth is not to be construed in terms of propositional truth but rather in terms of the dynamic relation of personal encounter between the human and the divine.

Conversation as discourse

So far, we have followed the philosophical development of Rorty's concept of conversation and it's affinity to mission theory especially in the understanding and interpretation of the concept of truth. In this section we link Rorty's concept of conversation with the concept of discourse as it is developed by Michel Foucault and critical discourse analysts.[328] Both concepts, conversation and discourse, are concerned with language and truth, more particularly with the rejection of objective truth and with inter-subjective truth as constituted through discourse. According to Foucault, people do not have access to absolute truth as they cannot speak from a position outside discourse. Thus, truth is not something that exists outside conversation or discourse.

There is a close affinity between Rortian conversation (not to be confused with the notion of conversation as is used in conversation analysis) and Foucauldian discourse in the sense that both philosophers lost their faith in universal or absolute truth. But we saw in Chapter One that Rorty's discourse is understood in binary forms, that is, normal and abnormal discourse. Rorty asserts that normal discourse allows us to apply foundational reasoning when it is useful to do so. In a sense, it is the starting point for intellectual activity, for abnormal discourse is possible and meaningful only when it occurs with a consciousness of how it departs from a well understood norm. Abnormal discourse always presents itself as an alternative, for instance, to tradition, to a dominant view. As a consequence, it "is always parasitic upon normal discourse"[329] However, both Rorty and Foucault assume that truth is constituted inter-subjectively through language use. Foucault's '*The Archeology of Knowledge'* has become the main inspiration for most discourse analysts although many do not follow him uncritically. Foucault provides more a theory than a method for doing discourse analysis. Critical discourse analysts go with Foucault beyond Foucault in the sense that the influence of language use on social reality is not deterministic but dialectic.[330]

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[327] Emil Brunner, *Truth as Encounter,* 2nd ed., (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1964), 24.

[328] This is not to suggest that Rorty agrees with Foucault in everything. See, Ssempala, *Pragmatism, Conversation and Hermeneutics,* 181-186.

[329] Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 1979, 365-366.

[330] Cf. Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and social change* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992), 60.

From a Foucauldian inspiration there have been a number of analyses of mission practices in the past by Mudimbe,[331] Stenger,[332] Nehring,[333] Asad,[334] Chidester.[335] Using a methodology developed from the ideas of Michel Foucault, Mudimbe proceeds to examine "discourses" about Africa by Europeans and Africans with a focus on evaluation of African traditional thought. He examines the intellectual "invention" of a primitive African and its relationship to the changing paradigms of modern European social sciences. Following Foucault he attempts to construct as "Archaeology" of thought about Africa with special focus on the discipline of anthropology. Archaeology enables the researcher to treat every human discourse as a "moment" and thus discover meanings not consciously intended by the authors of the discourses. This frame work enables Foucault to trace the change in the western discourses on "non-western" societies from those projecting the "achievements of the civilized world against the primitiveness of non-literate societies, to those which allow for the possibility of decolonialization of the social sciences."[336] This is the context in which Mudimbe examines the development of European evaluation of African traditional thought from the missionaries through the several generations of anthropologists. From that base Mudimbe addresses the African responses with special emphasis on the "Négritude" and post-Négritude generations. Stenger, who analyzes the missionary discourse of the White Fathers in Central Africa, uses a form of discourse analysis that is inspired by Foucault.[337]

In the present study critical discourse analysis as is developed by Norman Fairclough is applied to historical documents of the missionaries in order to acquire insight into the mode of transmission of truth the missionaries used in their work during primary evangelization, using conversation as a sensitising concept that guides our analysis. Whereas in the old-style grounded theory approach the meaning of the guiding concepts must be left open as much as possible at the start of the research project, since the aim of the project is to make the meaning more concrete in the course of the research, in the newer forms of the grounded theory approach the sensitising concepts are more theoretically informed. In stressing the importance of key terms and phrases, Norman Farclough's first stage of analysis

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331 Valentine Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988).
332 Stenger Fritz, *White Fathers in Colonial Central Africa.*
333 Nehring, A.. *Orientalismus und Mission. Die Repräsentation der Tamilischen Gesellschaft und Religion durch Leipzicher Missionare, 1840-1940* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2003).
334 Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion. Discipline and reasons for power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1993).
335 David, Chidester, *Savage systems. Colonialism and comparative religion in Southern Africa* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996).
336 Cf. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa,* 27.
337 Cf. Stenger, *White Fathers*, 176-177.

called 'description' comes close to the grounded theory approach and interpretivist tradition.[338]

By applying the method of Critical Discourse Analysis as will be implemented here, we shall follow the description of Norman Fairclough who asserts that, "it systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggle of power."[339] Given that many authors have written abundantly on the chronological history and skilfully narrated how events happened in the Ugandan mission history with such depth and precision,[340] the major pre-occupation here will be reading particular concrete texts of missionaries like mission Chronicles, diaries, historical accounts and missionary reports of the missionary orders. The texts under consideration will be analysed combining the three analytic perspectives and three analytic methods. The main contention is that by applying Critical Discourse Analysis the dominant mission theory will be easily acknowledged and the dichotomy between mission theory and practice would be made evident.

Critical discourse analysis

Critical discourse analysis is a contemporary approach to the study of language use and discourses in social institutions. It builds from three broad theoretical orientations. First, it draws from poststructuralists discourse theory and critical linguistics which focuses on how social relations, identity, knowledge and power are constructed through written and spoken texts in human and social settings. According to Foucault and Derrida, language and discourse are not transparent or neutral means for describing or analysing the social and biological world. Rather they effectively construct, regulate and control knowledge, social relations and institutions, and indeed, such analytic and exegetic practices as scholarship and research. Second, it draws from Bourdieu's sociology the assumption that actual textual practices and interactions with texts become embodied forms of cultural capital with exchange value in particular social fields. Third, it draws from Neo-Marxist cultural theory the assumption that these discourses are produced and used

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338 Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 72. Fairclough's critical discourse analysis and the approach that we use in this thesis is not to be confused with 'conversation analysis' as our use of the term 'conversation' might suggest. Cf. Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 16-20.

339 Fairclough Norman, *Critical Discourse Analysis* (London: Longman, 1995, 132); Teun van Dijk, "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis," in *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader,* ed. Witherell, Taylor and Yates (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2001), 300-331.

340 Cf. Yves Tourigny, *So Abundant a Harvest* (London: Darton, Longman &Todd, 1979); Tusingire Frederick, *The Evangelisation of Uganda: Challenges and Strategies* (Kisubi: Marianum Press Ltd, 2003); Gale H. P., *Uganda and the Mill Hill Fathers* (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd, 1959); Gailyn van Rheenen, *Church Planting in Uganda: A Comparative study* (California: William Carey Library, 1976); Archbishop Henry Streicher, *The Martyrs of Uganda* (London: Catholic Truth Society 1957).

within political economies, and that they thus produce the articulate broader ideological interests, social formations and movements within those fields.[341] The practical techniques of critical discourse analysis are derived from various disciplinary fields. Work in pragmatics, narratology and speech act theory argues that texts are forms of social action that occur in complex social contexts. Research and theory in systemic functional linguistics shows how linguistic forms can be systematically related to social and ideological functions. Critical discourse analysis uses analytic tools from these fields to address persistent questions about larger, systemic relations of class, gender and culture. In this research, this work has been turned to the examination of how identity and class are constructed across a range of texts in the Ugandan mission fields.

A fundamental principle of CDA is the idea that discourse situates participants according to roles determined by relations of power.[342] It is argued that discourse and language in everyday life may function ideologically. They may be used to make asymmetrical relations of power and particular textual portrayals of social and biological worlds appear given, commonsensical and natural. Accordingly the task of critical discourse analysis is both deconstructive and constructive.[343] In its deconstructive moment it aims to disrupt and render problematic the themes and power relations of everyday talk and writing. In its constructive moment, it has been applied to the development of critical literary curriculum that aims towards an expansion of students' capacities to critique and analyse discourse and social relations, and towards a more equitable distribution of discourse resources.[344] The principal unit of analysis for critical discourse analysis is the text. Texts are taken to be social actions, meaningful and coherent instances of spoken and written language use. Yet their shape and form is not random or arbitrary. There are specific text types or genres that serve conventional social uses and functions. That implies that particular kinds of texts attempt to do things in social institutions with predictable ideational and material effects. These include functional written texts, for instance business letters, forms, policies, textbooks, spoken face-to-face interactions, for instances clinical exchanges, service exchanges classroom lectures, and multimodal visual, electronic and gestural texts, for instance, internet home pages. Taken as historically and culturally specific social actions, genres are dynamic and continually subject to innovation and re-invention. They remain affiliated nonetheless with particular conventionalised discourses. For example business

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341 Stuart Hall, "The Meaning of New Times," in Stuart Hall *Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies,* ed. Morley David and Chen Kuan-Hsing (London: Routledge, 1996), 222-236.

342 Noel Heather, *Religious Language and Critical Discourse Analysis: Ideology and Identity in Christian Discourse Today* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2000), 33.

343 Greg Marston, *Social Policy and Discourse Analysis: Policy Change in Public Housing* (Hants: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2004), 5; John Flowerdew, "Critical Discourse Analysis and Strategies of Resistance," in *Advances in Discourse Studies,* ed. Vijay K. Bhatia and John Flowerdew et al, (London: Routledge, 2008), 195-210.

344 Allan Luke, "Critical Discourse Analysis," in *International Encyclopaedia of the Sociology of Education,* ed. Lawrence Saha (Oxford: Elsevier Science Ltd, 1997), 54.

letters are likely to feature discourses of finance and business; tabloid news reports would be sites for discourses of romance and sexuality. As conventional forms, then, genres and sub-genres thus both constrain and enable meanings and social relations between speakers and listeners, writers and readers.

In applying the term discourse, I am proposing to regard language use as a form of social practice, rather than a purely individual activity or a reflex of situational variables. This has various implications. Principally, it implies that discourse is a mode of action, one form in which people may act upon the world and especially and especially upon each other; as well as a mode of representation. This is a mode of language use which has been made familiar, though often in individualistic terms, by linguistic philosophy and linguistic pragmatics. In Discourse analysis, all genres can be analysed in terms of their sequenced structures of propositions, their textual macrostructures. The structures of spoken and written narratives have identifiable segments, movements or chunks. The study of narrative structures has been used to study the representation of gender relations, cultures and cultural groups, wars and other major historical events, and civic and political structures in textbooks. However, the major concern against critical discourse analysis and its post-structural roots is that "...it seems to represent just one more manifestation of logo-centrism, one more attempt to totalise, to close the unity of an absolute truth."[345] And this may raise some objections as to its capacity in reading mission history and practice in Uganda.

It may be argued disparagingly that Critical Discourse Analysis could not apply in the reading of mission history. And that it is not of any worth in interpreting the prevailing mission theories and practice in the Church in Uganda. And of course there are many concerns raised against the state of Critical Discourse Analysis which may lead many to fail to appreciate its efficacy: What are we to make of a field that ties itself in word and deed, theory and method, to a normative, explicitly political inquiry into social, economic and cultural power? How do we appraise research that sets out to disrupt and interrupt ideological common sense, everyday language use, and the codification of discourse power by dominant groups of interests?[346] But if these apparent aberrations against CDA are considered, then to do so would be to ignore a distinguished if incomplete history of attempts at a normative political linguistics from the Voloshnov/ Bakhtin circle to the more recent work of Michel Pecheux, Jacob Mey, and others. It would also fail to engage with the late-twentieth century acknowledgement among social scientists of the constitutive force of language and discourse in social formation and discipline, economic exploitation and power. It may not be surprising to affirm that CDA stands in this sustainable counter-tradition in linguistics and overtly sceptical of the

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345 Shaun Waterman, "Discourse and Domination: Michel Foucault and the Problem of Ideology," in *Archaeology After Structuralism,* ed. Ian Bapty and Tim Yates (London: Routledge, 1990), 70-102.

346 Allan Luke, "Beyond Science and Ideology Critique: Developments in Critical Discourse Analysis" *Annual Review of Applied Linguistics*, Vol. 22 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 96-110.

claims of those post-war interactional and sociolinguistic approaches to the social that are premised on liberal and neoliberal theories of the individual and society.[347] The foremost consideration is that Critical Discourse Analysis is more akin to a repertoire of political, epistemic stances, that is, principled reading positions and practices for the critical analysis of the place and force of language, discourse, text, and image in changing contemporary social, economic, and cultural conditions.[348] A more constructive approach might be to treat it as a discourse itself, contingent upon particular historical conditions, agents and possibilities. It is a field of force, power, and relations in formation.

The task set for the next two chapters is to read the original texts of missionaries and Critical Discourse Analysis appears as a viable instrument in this undertaking because it: (a) views a prevailing social order as historically situated and therefore relative, socially constructed and changeable; (b) views a prevailing social order and social processes as constituted and sustained less by the will of individuals than by the pervasiveness of particular constructions or versions of reality, often referred to as discourses; (c) views discourse as coloured by and productive of ideology; (d) views power in society not so much as imposed on individual subjects as an inevitable effect of a way particular discursive configurations or arrangements privilege the status and positions of some people over others; (e) views human subjectivity as at least in part constructed or inscribed by discourse, and discourse as manifested in the various ways people are and enact the sorts of people they are; (f) views reality as textually and intertextually mediated via verbal and non-verbal language systems, and texts as sites for both the inculcation and the contestation of discourses; (g) views the systematic analysis and interpretation of texts as potentially revelatory of ways in which discourse consolidate power and colonise human subjects through often covert position calls.[349] Yet again it is argued that CDA sees discourse or language use in speech and writing, as a form of social practice. And to describe discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situations, institutions and social structures which frame it; the discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned; it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects, that is, they can help produce and reproduce

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347 Ibid., 97.

348 Teun van Dijk, "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis" *Discourse and Society*, Vol. 4, (April 1993): 249-283.

349 Locke Terry, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, (London, New York: Continuum, 2004), 1-2; Fairclough Norman, Wodak R, "Critical Discourse Analysis" in *Discourse as Social Interaction: Discourse Studies: A multidisciplinary Introduction, Vol, 1,* ed. Teun van Dijk (London: Sage Publications, 1997), 258-284.

unequal power relations between, for instance, social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people.[350]

It is important to take the consideration of Teun van Dijk who assumes that "one crucial presupposition of adequate critical discourse analysis is to understand the nature of social power and dominance.[351] He argues that once we have such an insight, we may begin to formulate ideas about how discourse contributes to their production. Social power is based on privileged access to socially valued resources, such as wealth, income, position, status, force, group membership, education or knowledge. All special access to various genres, forms or contexts of discourse and communication is also an important power resource. Power involves control, namely by members of one group over those of other groups. Such control may pertain to action and cognition. This implies that the powerful group may limit the freedom of action of others, but influence their minds. Besides the elementary recourse to force to directly control action, modern and often more effective power is mostly cognitive, and enacted by persuasion, dissimulation or manipulation, among other strategic ways to change the mind of others in one's own interest. CDA looks at managing the minds of others are essentially a function of text and talk and is interested in power abuse.

It is argued that beyond the level of the individual identity lies that of the group, which can be defined in terms of social cognition. This is formed and developed in ways cognate with the construction of individual subjectivity. Van Dijk portrays this process as mind management at a social level in his definition of social cognition: Socially shared representations of societal arrangements, groups and relations, as well as mental operations such as interpretation, thinking and arguing, inferencing and learning, among others, together define what we understand by social cognition…Although embodied in the minds of individuals, social cognitions are social because they are shared and presupposed by group members, monitor social actions and interaction, and because they underlie the social and cultural organization of society as a whole…[352] Underlyingly, as van Dijk points out, the maintenance of social cognition is usually associated with the exercise of power. People singly or in groups, who have privileged access to a situation where they can influence others' thinking may well be able to initiate and maintain opinions which reflect their models of how things are or should be. The term hegemony is used to qualify such a situation where, as a consequence of conditioning, mind-sets are so

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350 Gilbert Weiss, Ruth Wodak, eds., *Critical Discourse Analysis: Theory and Interdisciplinarity* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 13.

351 Teun van Dijk, "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis" in *Discourse Theory and Practice,* ed. Margaret Wetherel, Stephanie Taylor, Simon J. Yates (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2001), 300-317; also, Teun van Dijk, "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis," *Discourse and Society*, 249-284.

352 Teun van Dijk, "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis," in *The Sociolinguistics Reader,Vol.2,* ed. Cheshire Jenny and Trudgill Peter (London: Arnold, 1998) 367-393.

altered that they are changed to a state where they freely support the point of view of the dominant.[353]

The concept of hegemony, and its associated concepts of consensus, acceptance and the management of the mind, also suggests that a critical analysis of discourse and dominance is far from straightforward, and does not always imply a clear picture of villains and victims. It is suggested that many forms of dominance appear to be jointly produced through intricate forms of social interaction, communication and discourse. Power and dominance are usually organised and institutionalised. The social dominance of groups is thus not merely enacted, individually, but by its group members.

These texts will be approached from two related standpoints, which are reading and analysing. As pertaining to reading the texts, the main motivation is drawn from Shapiro who evokes this idea that any text can be read as a tissue of codes. This implies that in keeping with the textual practices derived from the above idea, the meanings a reader derives from a text are provoked in part by the recognisable codes, or terms or expressions invoking specific interpretative practices which the text contains. The signifying effects of these codes operate to the extent that the readers of a text operate within the same signifying practices as the writer. The idea of the code therefore implies that a text is not locked in a set of stable referents to which it refers and from which it derives its meaning, but is rather unstable, taking meanings from the interaction of the writing practices it represents with the reading practices it encounters.[354]

As regards, analysing these texts, the basic assumption is that language is at the heart of critical discourse analysis. The emphasis placed on language in discourse analysis calls for the premise that no language is totally devoid of meaning. That language use calls for intelligibility and language use is distinct from other kinds of noise making. This is better illustrated by Clegg who assumes that ..."Language is the central focus of all post-structuralism. In the broadest terms, language defines the possibilities of meaningful existence at the same time as it limits them. Through language, our sense of ourselves as distinct subjectivities is constituted. Subjectivity is constituted through a myriad of what post-structuralists term 'discursive practices,' that is, practices of talk, text, writing, cognition, argumentation, and representation generally."[355] This understanding was ushered in by the developments that came with the linguistic turn in the twentieth century thought, which changed language from being thought of as a medium for expressing meanings that pre-exist linguistic formulation to a system that constitutes meaningfulness in its own terms.[356] This development is in lieu with the two major

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353 Ibid., 372.
354 Shapiro J. Michael, *Language and Politics* (New York: New York University Press, 1984), 74.
355 Clegg R. Stewart, *Frameworks of Power* (London: Sage books, 1989), 151.
356 Locke Terry, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, 11.

theoretical insights which Norman Fairclough adopts from Foucault about discourse analysis and incorporates them in the textually oriented discourse analysis. The first is a constitutive view of discourse, which involves seeing discourse as actively constituting or constructing society on various dimensions; that is discourse constitutes the objects of knowledge, social subjects and forms of self, social relationships, and the conceptual frameworks. In analysing this text, there is a recurring feature that corresponds to the second insight where there is an emphasis on the interdependency of the discourse practices of a society or institutions; texts always draw upon and transform other contemporary and historically prior texts – intertextuality – and any given type of discourse practice is generated out of combinations of others, and is defined by its relationship to others.[357]

Critical Discourse Analysts use various methods of analysis. These methods are given different names. We shall follow the method and scheme that Frans Wijsen, following Fairclough, applies in his approach to discourse analysis in religious studies.[358] Wijsen as is Fairclough starts from the following assumptions. First, discourse is a practice just as any other practice. Secondly, there is a dialectic relation between discourse (discursive) and reality (the non-discursive). Thirdly, the relation between discourse and reality is mediated through discursive practice. As Wijsen, we too, shall first explain three analytic perspectives, thereafter explain three analytic methods, and last but not least design a model for analysis.[359]

Perspectives of analysis

With other qualitative approaches, for instance, content analysis or conversation analysis, discourse analysts are interested in participants' perspectives. But unlike these other qualitative approaches, critical discourse analysts are not interested in participants' perspectives as such. They are interested in how participants' perspectives are related to the social positions of the participants and more particularly, to their interests to reproduce or to transform the societal order.[360] Although Wijsen uses the term 'participant' in discourse analysis in religious studies, Fairclough does not approve of that term. He prefers the term subject to participant because it has the double sense of agent, like the 'subjects of history,' and affected, as in 'Queen's subjects'; this captures the concept of the subject as qualified to act through being constrained – subjected – to an institutional frame.[361]

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357 Fairclough Norman, *Discourse and Social Change*, 39-40.

358 Frans Wijsen, "Discourse Analysis in Religious Studies: The Case of Interreligious Worship in Friesland", *Anthropos,* Vol. 105, (2010/1): 1-15; Fairclough Norman, *Language and Power, 2nd* ed. (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2001), 19-20.

359 Frans Wijsen, *Discourse Analysis in Religious Studies*, 3.

360 Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 65.

361 Fairclough Norman, "Critical and Descriptive Goals in Discourse Analysis," *Journal of Pragmatics*, Vol. 9 (December 1985): 739-763.

Wijsen goes on to discuss what Critical Discourse Analysts distinguish as different dimensions of one and the same practice and how they look at them from different perspectives: the individual dimension or micro perspective, the institutional dimension or mesoperspective, and the societal dimension or macro perspective. Examples given include the interactions between teachers and pupils, doctors and patients, or parent and children and these are not only related to views of what specific institutions such as school, hospital, and family are, but also to processes of in the wider society such as democratisation or commercialisation. These examples show that the ideational and interpersonal, or social identity and social relations, dimensions go together. The same applies to interactions between husband and wife, employer and employees, shop attendants and customers, politicians and electorate, civil servants and citizens. It should be noted that whereas radical post-structuralists tend to assume that discourse positions the speakers, and the discursive psychologists tend to assume that speakers position themselves through discourse, Fairclough and other critical discourse analysts assume that it is both. Speakers position themselves but they are also positioned by the discourse. It is assumed that the relation between the discursive and non-discursive is a dialectical one. This is an important analytic insight that will keep appear in the discussion and conclusion. If the above is placed in the perspective of the textually oriented discourse analysis we could distinguish the dimensions of the author as an individual with a historical social location and his identification with the social institution, and the societal context in which he is located.

Discourse analysis as a method of analysis for mission practice in Uganda

Right from the beginning, we have to establish the similarities and differences in the use of critical discourse analysis in mission studies. Like Friz Stenger, we make use of critical discourse analysis in reading and analysing mission practice in Uganda. However, unlike him, although he claims that he uses discourse analysis, he does not use discourse analysis in a methodical and technical way as we do in this work. In the traditional understanding of mission, mission is concerned with senders and receivers. In analysing Mission practice in Uganda with the tools of Discourse Analysis in the background of the concept conversation, the major consideration would be the understanding of mission as concerned with senders and receivers. These social identities are derived from the Christian conception of the nature of God as the author of mission. The classical doctrine of the *Missio Dei* as God the Father sending the Son, and God the Father and the Son sending the Holy Spirit is expanded to include yet another movement: Father, Son and Holy Spirit sending the Church into the world. In this sense mission is not primarily an activity of the Church, but an attribute of a sending God. Mission is thereby seen as a movement from God to the world.[362] This understanding would lead us to the fact that mission is constituted of senders and receivers as its major social identities.

[362] David Bosch, *Transforming Mission*, 390; Darrell L. Guder, *The Continuing Conversion of the Church* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000), 20.

Also these two social identities constitute the fundamental relationship that exists in mission and the analysis will go in establishing the language and vocabulary that is used in their communication. In our analysis, we shall read and analyse the texts and how the same texts speak about these social identities as well as the language that describes them. The major thrust will be to discover the social identities, for instance clergy – laity, the social relations such as egalitarian, hierarchical, monological or dialogical. Using communication science referred to above, the alternative understanding of mission is not about senders and receivers but participants in a communication process, and the message is not fixed but fluid.

Identity, that is, how we perceive and make sense of each other, is fundamental to all social interaction and to the construction of society and culture. People seek to know about others' beliefs, affiliations, and the intentions in order to interpret their words and actions and to predict their future behaviour. These qualities are not directly observable; instead, others see external manifestations, or signals, of one's internal state. With identity, the process does not build up impressions of another trait by trait. Instead there is an interpretation of a number of pre-existing prototypes and the observations made of people lead others to categorise them as being like one or another of these prototypes. Thus, from a limited set of inter-actions and observations we can create a richly detailed impression of another. Understanding how these prototypes are created and modified, how they are shared across a culture, and how we use them to categorise people is an essential part of understanding identity. In talking about social identity, "...is codified as the part of the self which refers to cognitions ensuing from social ecological positions."[363] Others consider social identity as "our way of thinking about ourselves and others based on social groupings."[364] However, the feeling of belonging to a group and the phenomena of identification are only possible in connection with groups or categories one does not belong to. Thus social identity refers to the fact that the individual perceives himself/herself as similar to others of the same background (the we) but social identity also refers to a difference, to a specificity of that we in connection with members of other groups or categories (the them).[365]

Critical Discourse Analysts use various methods of analysis. These methods are given different names. Like Fairclough, Wijsen also speaks about the analysis of linguistic practice, the analysis of discursive practice, and the analysis of social practice. Alternative names are the analysis of text, of interaction, and of context; or simply description, interpretation, and explanation.[366]

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363 Stephen Worchel, *Social Identity: International Perspectives* (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 1998), 2.
364 Kelly Hannum, *Social Identity: Knowing Yourself, Knowing Others* (Greensboro, North Carolina: Centre for Creative Leadership, 2007), 8.
365 Stephen Worchel, *Social Identity: International perspective*, 3.
366 Frans Wijsen, *Discourse Analysis in Religious Studies*, 3; Fairclough Norman, *Discourse and Social Change*, 72.

In analysing the missionary texts, the focus will be on sample texts picked from the number of texts as described. And the first method for consideration is analysis of the linguistic practice, or the formal features of a text. Language analysis is a complex and sometimes quite technical sphere in its own right which incorporates many types and techniques of analysis and is presumed to be the opening to the obscure details of society. This explains why language is a form of social practice with three consequential implications: first, that language is a part of society, and not somehow external to it. Second, that language is a social process and third, that language is a socially conditioned process, conditioned that is, by other non-linguistic parts of society.[367] For this stage, Fairclough suggests various analytic tools. Here the focus is laid principally on vocabulary, where vocabulary deals mainly with individual words, without getting into the details of grammar that deals with words combined into clauses and sentences, cohesion deals with how clauses and sentences are linked together, and text structure deals with large scale organisational properties of texts.[368] Words are not neutral. There is always a political and an ideological significance behind their use.[369] As it has been argued in this text, according to critical discourse analysts, discourse is a practice as any other practice. In the perspective of the pragmatic turn, language use is not only a way of saying things (informative); it is a way of doing things (performative), or exercising power as Pierre Bourdieu puts it that "Language is not only an instrument of communication or even of knowledge, but also an instrument of power. One seeks not only to be understood but also to be believed, obeyed, respected, and distinguished."[370] The only difference discourse has from other practices is its linguistic form.

In the analysis, for instance, the main analytic questions are: How does the author speak about mission? What words does he use? And how does he describe the people in the missions? These questions presuppose that a "text can be seen as a product and as a process. Texts as a product can be stored, retrieved, bought and sold, cited and summarised and so forth. Texts as processes can be grasped through regarding what might be called texturing, the making of texts, as specific modality of social action, of social production or making of meanings, under-standings, knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, feelings, social relations, social and personal entities.[371]

The second method for consideration is the analysis of the discursive practice. This involves three processes of text production, distribution, and consumption, and the

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367 Fairclough Norman, *Language and Power*, 19.
368 Fairclough Norman, *Discourse and Social Change*, 75.
369 Ibid., 77.
370 Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, ed. transl. John B. Thompson (Cambridge UK: Polity Press, 1991), 24; Eric R. Wolf, *Envisioning Power: Ideologies of Dominance and Crisis* (California: California University Press, 1999), 55.
371 Norman Fairclough, "Peripheral Vision: Discourse Analysis in Organisation Studies: The case for Critical Realism," *Organisation Studies*, Vol. 26 No.6 (June 2005): 915-939.

nature of these processes varies between different types of discourse according to social factors.[372] In the course of text production, Fairclough makes a distinction between, the animator, the person who actually makes the sounds, or the marks on paper, the 'author', the one who puts the words together and is responsible for the wording, and the 'principal', the one whose position is represented by the words.[373] As for text consumption, it is understood that "texts are consumed differently in different social contexts."[374] This is partly attributed to the sort of interpretative work which is applied to them, and partly of the modes of interpretation which are available. Furthermore as for the consumption of texts like their production, it may be either individual or collective. In the same understanding, Irma Taavitsainen apply the term 'appropriation' as used by Roger Chartier to describe the process by which meaning in a text is produced, the ways in which discourses affect the reader and lead to a new form of comprehension of oneself and the world.[375] It is contended that "texts have plural and even contrasted uses, and audiences understand them in diverse ways."[376] And lastly on this point is text distribution, whereby some texts have a simple distribution whereas others have complex distribution. The main raison d'être behind this is that in discourse analysis there is an assumption that there is a dialectic relationship between language use and social structures, where we assume that what participants say is shaped by and shapes social structures, either by reproducing them or transforming them.[377] In other words, critical discourse analysts are interested in the socio-cognitive effects of language use that is the ideational and interpersonal effects.

The third method of analysis for our consideration is social practice, that is, the ideological effects and hegemonic processes in which discourse is a feature. For Fairclough, hegemony concerns power that is achieved through constructing alliances and integrating classes and groups through consent, so that "the articulation and re-articulation of orders of discourse is correspondingly one stake in hegemonic struggle."[378] It is from this third dimension that Fairclough constructs his approach to change. Hegemonies change, and this can be witnessed in discursive change, when the latter is viewed from the angle of intertextuality. The way in which discourse is being represented, respoken, or rewritten sheds light on the emergence of new orders of discourse, struggles over normativity, attempts at control, and resistance against regimes of power.

Fairclough is explicit with regard to his ambitions. The model of discourse he develops is framed in a theory of ideological processes in society, for discourse is

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372 Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 78.
373 Ibid., 78.
374 Ibid., 79.
375 Irma Taavitsainen, "Genres and the Appropriation of Science" *Opening Windows on Texts and Discourses of the Past,* edited by Janne Skaffari et. al. (Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V., 2005), 180.
376 Ibid., 180.
377 Fairclough Norman, *Discourse and Social Change,* 64.
378 Ibid., 93.

seen in terms of processes of hegemony and changes in hegemony. Fairclough successfully identifies large-scale hegemonic processes such as democratization, commodification, and technologization on the basis of heteroglossic constructions of text genres and styles. He also identifies the multiple ways in which individuals move through such institutionalized discursive regimes, constructing themselves, social categories, and social realities. At the same time, the general direction is one in which social theory is used to provide a linguistic metadiscourse and in which the target is a refined and more powerful technique of text analysis.[379] According to critical discourse analysts, linguistic practice and socio-practice are mediated through discursive practice. The discursive practice is crucial as the dialectic relation between linguistic practice – text – and social practice – context – based on it.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have made Rorty's concept of conversation more operational for studying mission. We have also established a link between Rorty's notion of conversation and the Christian notion of mission showing that truth is central in both concepts. There are divergent interpretations of truth but it remains a concern that pre-occupies Christian mission and it was at the centre of Rorty's quest. The questions about truth are perennial questions and they keep popping up in every age seeking sufficient answers. We have also noted that language was a major concern for Rorty especially in his emphasis on redescription, vocabulary and metaphors and we could notice the position of language in mission practice because of proclamation as its principal activity. When we talk of language, we refer to a carrier of meaning and a site of ideology. This brings us to the application of critical discourse analysis in the reading and analysis of mission and pastoral texts to decipher how the concept of truth has been talked about in the past and the present mission practice.

We have developed critical discourse analysis as a tool and method for reading and analysing mission history in Uganda to help us find out the method of mission practice in the past and pastoral practice in the present. This is intended to make conversation as a sensitising concept more concrete and to come up with a theory of mission as conversation. Since Critical Discourse Analysis is concerned with opaque relations of discourse in a text, we want to find out how missionaries constituted themselves and how they constituted the identity of the people in Uganda. Discourse analysis will also enable us to discover the discourses that shape mission and pastoral practice in Uganda and the methods employed in these endeavours. It is also intended to generate data for developing conversation as the

[379] Jan Blommaert and Chris Bulcaen, "Critical Discourse Analysis," *Annual Review of Anthropology,* Vol. 29 (October 2000): 447-466; Jan Blommaert, *Discourse: A Critical Introduction* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 31.

new mission paradigm in the church in Uganda in this age characterised by multiculturalism, globalisation and migration.

Chapter Three:
Mission Concepts in the past: A Discourse Analysis

Introduction

Uganda is one of the African countries with a high percentage of Christians. While describing Uganda's religious landscape, Philip Jenkins, states that "In religious terms, Uganda represents one of the triumphs of the missionary movement, in a country where Christianity was newly planted in the mid-nineteenth century. Today, about 40 percent of the population is Protestant, 35 percent Catholic, and 10 percent Muslim, while the remainder follow traditional African religions."[380] On the Catholic side, this could be explained by strategies of the three Catholic missionary institutes which were involved in most of the pioneer work of the evangelization of Uganda: The Missionaries of Africa (or White Fathers), Mill Hill Missionaries and the Comboni Missionaries (or Verona Fathers). It is claimed that they all had a common advantage of suitability for the work they had to do in Uganda since they had been founded purposely for that kind of work. Relying on historical sources, Frederick Tusingire assumes that both Cardinal Lavigerie the founder of the White Fathers and Daniel Comboni the founder of the Comboni Missionaries are among the best missionary strategists of the 19th century.[381] For our purpose here, we could schematise the missionary period in two phases: The early missionary period: this marks the arrival of missionaries from Europe in 1879 to the end of Vatican II in 1965; and the contemporary missionary period which marks the re-organisation of dioceses in Uganda in 1966 to-date. This schema is proposed for methodical purposes only in this research to corroborate the data in the writings of the missionaries in each phase and the shifts in discourse and their correlation to the shifts in the social context to align it with the mission paradigms under study. As it has been indicated above, we shall apply the method of critical discourse analysis in this task of reading, describing and analysing texts from Uganda's mission history.

1. Description of Missionary Documents

In order to achieve our objective in this section, we shall make a summary of some selected documents from the missionary period.[382] The choice of these texts is based on the view that language use differs in the description of social identities and social relations and contexts according to the shifting periods of encounter and the perception of the author. There are four documents for our consideration here drawn from the writings of and about the White Fathers and the writings of the

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380 Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 91.

381 Tusingire Frederick, *The Evangelisation of Uganda: Challenges and Strategies*, 25.

382 Here we use the term description not in the sense of Fairclough who uses this term as an equivalent to the first stage of analysis, the analysis of the linguistic practice.

Mill Hill Missionaries, the two missionary societies that had the earliest contact with the people of Uganda in the late 19th century. The writings for our consideration in this chapter are the following: (1) *A Short History of the Vicariate of the Upper Nile, Uganda*, by Rt. Rev. J. Biermans, MHM, (2) *Planting the Faith in Darkest Africa: The life story of Father Simeon Lourdel*, by Sr. Frances Alice Monica Forbes, RSCJ, (3) *Leaves from a White Father's Diary*, by Fr. A. E. Howell, WF and (4) *Les Chroniques Trimestrielles* (1879-1909) of the Apostolic Vicariate of Northern Nyanza.

A Short History of the Vicariate of the Upper Nile, Uganda[383]

This text was written by, Right Rev. Bishop John Biermans, Bishop of Gargara and Vicar Apostolic of the Upper Nile, Nsambya, Kampala, Uganda, in 1920. It is 39 pages long and divided into eleven Chapters. It was written to coincide with the 25 years of the Mill Hill Missionary work in Uganda. Bishop Biermans states the purpose as "...to give an account of the establishment of the Mill Hill Mission in Uganda and the origin of the Upper Nile Vicariate and to mark the progress that has been made during the first twenty five years." He discusses in detail the events that characterised the journey from Mombasa to Uganda like walking in the wilderness of Africa, managing the porters and negotiating their way through the various territories in which they passed and other challenges like fatigue, wild animals, hostile peoples, sickness and wounds or swollen feet as a result of walking long distances. He claims that since he was not part of that caravan, he expresses inadequacy in giving the full account of the details of the journey and hence he refers to the letters and personal accounts of the pioneer missionaries who were in that caravan and how they narrate that journey in their own style.[384]

It is generally a story of progress and missionary triumph. In the text he observes that: "The Vicariate had now been in existence seventeen years, during which time it had made such wonderful progress in Uganda and Usoga that the priests could no longer cope with the work – they were too few in number. The numbers of Christians had swelled to such an extent, that the Churches were packed and crowds had to assist at mass outside. ....And each station had the same story: huge numbers, crowded churches, no accommodation or food for those who came from far. Even at the present, with more churches and priests, so great are the numbers of Christians who wish to receive the Sacraments at Christmas and Easter, that for three whole days before these two feasts, the Fathers in the Mission do no other work but hearing confessions from early morn to late night."[385]

Despite the above glowing progress account of the mission, he also notes some challenges that the missionaries had to endure in their work. He states that: "To

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[383] John, Biermans, *A Short History of the Vicariate of the Upper Nile, Uganda* (London: St. Joseph's Society for Foreign Missions, 1920).
[384] Ibid., 3-6.
[385] Ibid., 31.

people unacquainted with conditions in Africa, the above account of what has been done during the twenty-five years of the existence of the Upper Nile Vicariate may not seem extraordinary. But let them bear in mind that we are in a country, where one has always to be most careful of his health, even under the best conditions of housing, food, etc., where the fierce rays of a blazing sun beat down on one all day long and all the year round, where fever-bearing mosquitoes, and other biting and stinging insects seek their sustenance in human blood, where swamps and marshes charge the air with poisonous damps, where long and tiring journeys up and down hill, have constantly to be made to visit the distant sick and dying, where single priests are working a parish as big as a home diocese, where building, carpentry, brick-making, surveying and other professionals, fall under the heading of ordinary parish duties. And it must not be forgotten, that in addition to the natural difficulties of the country, the work of the Vicariate had to weather the troubled times of King Mwanga's revolt, of the Sudanese Rebellion, of the devastating Famine in Usoga, of that destroying angel, called sleeping sickness, of the late European War, of famine again last year all over the Vicariate, when thirty two thousand people died of starvation in the countries of Usoga and Bukedi alone, and of annual outbreaks of Plague and Small-pox....."[386] It ends with an invocation to God to call favoured souls, to go out of their father's house and come into the land that he will show them, so long will the stream of charity flow steadily to the countries where "Souls sit in darkness and alienation from their Supreme Good."

Planting the Faith in Darkest Africa: The life story of Father Simeon Lourdel[387]

This is a book written about the history of the most interesting, adventurous and successful of modern African mission fields and the life of Fr. Simeon Lourdel, WF, and the pioneer Catholic missionary to Uganda. It is divided into eleven chapters each describing an event in the establishment of the Ugandan mission. It covers the period of 1879-1895.

Chapter one is a profile of Fr. Simeon Lourdel and how he was shaped into a missionary. It gives the details about his personal natural qualities and his resolve to be a missionary. It goes into the details of the formation programs in the seminary in France, joining the White Fathers' Novitiate at the Maison Caree, Algiers and his first appointment as a missionary in the Arab villages in Algeria. These experiences formed him into a formidable character that would give shape to the White Fathers' missions in Uganda.

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386 Ibid., 37-38.

387 This book was written by Mother Frances Alice Monica Forbes, RSCJ, and a religious sister of the Sacred Heart. She was born in Scotland in 1869, and at the age of 31 in 1900 she converted to Catholicism and joined the contemplative order of the Society of the Sacred Heart. She wrote a series of short lives of saints that were published as the Standard bearers of faith. The book was originally published by Sands and Co. and Robbie Dempsey transcribed the text used here from the book.

Chapters Two and Three describe Central Africa the place where the White Fathers came to establish their first mission field. It discusses Cardinal Lavigerie, whose vision shaped the Central African mission. Also these chapters detail the problems and difficulties which partially were met within the missions. Chief among is the lack of roads and the wilderness in which the missionaries had to trek hundreds of kilometres. He lists some difficulties in the region as paganism with its foul rites, its witchdoctors and polygamy; the tropical jungle with malaria, the scourge of the Whites; sleeping sickness, the scourge of the natives; the compendium of all evils, slave trade; the hostility of Mohammedan and Protestants, the political and commercial intrigue of European countries, civil war with its battles, sieges, flights, returns, burnings.

Chapter four and five describe the first impression that the missionaries had of the people of Uganda and the progress of their work. It portrays the people as decently clothed and their society as well stratified with different classes of people ranging from the lowest to the King. It illustrates the approach of the missionaries to the local political establishment and their first challenges in winning converts. It also highlights the first painful experiences and confrontations between the new faith and the beliefs of the people which resulted in calumny. But despite the challenges that the missionaries attained some progress when they baptised their first catechumens on 27th of March, 1880. There is a series of baptisms and enquiries from young restless Ugandans who wanted to embrace the new faith. The progress ends on a sad note that this early period of success was short-lived as it was immediately followed by persecutions.

Chapter six describes the suspicion that the work of the missionaries elicited which resulted in their exile. The events that lead to the exile of the missionaries started with the animosity that the Arabs had of the missionaries. They had a great influence over the King and wanted him to declare Islam the religion of the country. The missionaries protested such a measure and Fr. Lourdel proposed to the King to have Mohamedans and Christians enter separate grass huts and be set on fire. The one that will not catch fire would be the winner. The Mohamedans refused such a thing and the Christian missionaries won the show. But for fear of persecutions, still they went into exile to Tanganyika.

Chapter's seven to eleven narrate the events which unfolded in Uganda at the absence of the missionaries. The King, Muteesa, who had forced them into exile was dead and was succeeded by his son Mwanga who sent boats to Tanganyika to bring back the missionaries. But no sooner had they come back than a terrible persecution rose again and this resulted in the Nnamugongo martyrdom. The rest of the book is about the intrigues between Protestant and Catholic missionaries and between the Christians and Mohamedans. But it ends in a triumphalism as it indicates the growth of the church and the erection of a new vicariate of Upper Nile.

Leaves from a White Father's Diary

This diary by Fr. A. E. Howell, WF, was written between the years 1934-1938. It is divided into 15 chapters with an appendix. Each chapter is concerned with a specific mission station where the author stopped. It is a personal account of events of a European missionary priest in the mission areas where the White Fathers were working. It recounts the experiences and first impression of a missionary who is making a journey across East and Central Africa for the first time.

Since Uganda is a landlocked country, all the trips to Uganda in early times started at Mombasa. The author starts his journey at Mombasa as in the olden times. Unlike his earlier confreres who had to organise caravans and took 90 days to walk on foot, his journey in a train from Mombasa to Kampala, would only take him 48 hours. He narrates his experience from Mombasa with amazement as he had experiences beyond his imagination. He praises the meals which would shame the food on some British trains; the waiters are all well dressed with white socks and he carries only a small suitcase, because he would buy everything he needs in Uganda itself.

Chapters one to six cover his journey from Mombasa to Kampala. This involves his experiences of the journey and places that he saw and the sense wonder that characterised his trip. In towns like Nairobi where he found broad boulevards like Paris, and drinking an iced beer and best ice cream doughnuts and other personal experiences, leads him to mantralike conclusion...still nothing of "darkest Africa." His impression of Uganda and the people and the mission stations run by the White Fathers is impressive. He describes the people as mostly aristocratic, clean, happy and prosperous and the country as spellbound by the bright beauty of the scene. He narrates the work of the missionaries as a success for in one mission station the Missionaries had ten thousand souls, an elementary school for boys and girls, a hospital and dispensary, an enormous technical school fully equipped, cars and bicycles being repaired and iron-work in full swing.

Furthermore, in a visit to another mission station he describes his experience as breath-taking. For in Villa Maria station in Masaka, there are native priests caring for some sixteen thousand Christians living over an area of perhaps seven hundred and fifty square miles. There is also a junior seminary in the neighbourhood with a brass band and the boys speak Latin so thoroughly well. The White Sisters too are working in co-operation with the native priests. The native sisters are in charge of girls' schools and a first class hospital. In these chapters the author describes Uganda, the people and work of the missionaries with such catch-words as "a surprise of my life," "very good and impressive" and there is nothing like "darkest Africa."

Chapters seven to fifteen cover his journey across the White Fathers' Missions in Rwanda, Urundi (Burundi) and Tanganyika. And for the purposes of delineating this study we cannot go into the details of his accounts in these territories. But there is a consistent pattern of praise and aura of excitement at the way the missionaries have transformed the image of Africa with their missionary work that covered the spiritual and material needs of the people. However, despite the glorious picture that he paints of the missions, he takes time to highlight some painful experiences in the history of the missions in Central Africa. Many missionaries were massacred and others succumbed to what he describes as the hostile climate of Africa. But he justifies this with the centuries old saying attributed to Tertullian: *"Sanguis Martyrum semen Ecclesiae."* This is translated as...the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church." This diary is a great resource in this study as it gives the first-hand accounts of the second-generation missionaries to Africa.

Les Chroniques Trimestrielles (1879-1909)

The Quarterly Chronicles known by their French name (*Les Chroniques Trimestrielles*) were periodicals printed for limited circulation among the missionaries of the Society of the White Fathers. These documents contain a printed selection of the most significant extracts from the White Fathers dairies and correspondences, fairly full in respect of certain periods and episodes, and reports of the society's houses. In this research, the documents for reading and analysis are those that concern with the Apostolic Vicariate of Northern Nyanza and cover the period of 1879-1909. They were written in French the official language of the White Fathers Society.

In section I the document describes the nature, size and changes of the mission of Apostolic Northern Nyanza. It narrates its history, how it was created, along with that of Tanganyika, by a rescript of Pope Leo XIII on 24th February 1878, following a petition presented to Pius IX. It was erected into a Provicariat by a decree of 27th September 1888 and into an Apostolic Vicariate on 31st May 1883. The southern boundary of the Vicariate of Nyanza was fixed by decree of 10th December 1886 and this lead to the creation of the mission of Tanganyika. A decree of 15th January 1894 attached to the Vicariate of Central Africa which was assigned to the Verona Fathers, the northern part of the Vicariate of Nyanza that is from Lake Albert up to Bahr el Ghazal. In the same year, the Decree of 13th July 1894 Propaganda divided the Vicariate of Nyanza into three parts: Upper Nile, Southern Nyanza and Northern Nyanza. Upper Nile Vicariate was ceded to the Congregation of Missionaries of St. Joseph of Mill Hill, founded by Cardinal Vaugham, and its first Vicar Apostolic is Msgr. Hanlon. The text gives a catalogue of persecutions that the mission of Nyanza faced: Pagan persecution, under King Mwanga, which gave the Martyrs of Uganda (1885-1886); The Muslim persecution (1888) and the Protestant persecution (1892 -1893).

In section II the text goes on to mention the superiors who served in the mission of Northern Nyanza and the dates of their tenure. First is Bishop Livinhac who was Superior of the Mission of Nyanza between 1st. February 1878 - 12th. October 1880. He was Pro-Vicar Apostolic between 12th. October 1880 - 15th. June 1883. He was Vicar Apostolic and given canonical nomination 15th June 1883 and ordained at Carthage by Msgr. Lavigerie, on 14th September 1884, elected Superior General of the Society of the White Fathers on 23rd September 1889. He went to Europe on 6th June 1890 after ordaining Bishop Hirth at Kamoga. Second, is Msgr. Hirth who got the canonical nomination on 14th December 1889, consecrated by Bishop Livinhac on 25th May 1890. He was Vicar Apostolic of Nyanza until 13th July 1894 the time during which the Vicariate was partitioned into three parts. Bishop Hirth then became Vicar Apostolic of Southern Nyanza, but he was still Apostolic Administrator of the Northern Nyanza Vicariate until the appointment of Bishop Guillermain on 12th January 1895. Third, was Msgr. Guillermain who got the canonical nomination on 12th January 1895, ordained at Lubaga by Msgr. Hanlon on 28th October 1895, and he died on 14th July 1896 at Villa Maria, Buddu. Fourth, was Bishop Streicher who was nominated Bishop on 1st February 1897, ordained at Kamoga by Bishop Hirth on 15th August 1897.

Section III gives the details of the mission stations which were suppressed and the attempts to found others. In December 1879, there were attempts to create some mission stations along the Nile route. Uaya (Bukoba) from 18th July to 3rd September 1880 is currently in Southern Nyanza Vicariate. Sacred Heart Mranda station (South of the Lake) founded in late October 1880 to 14th November 1881 is currently in Southern Nyanza Vicariate. St. Joseph Mdaburu (Ugogo) from 5th March 1881 to 15th June 1882 is in Zanzibar central. St. Joseph Tabora - Kipalapala; at Tabora from 2nd September 1881 to 17th September 1883; at Kipalapala until 9th July 1889 currently in Unyanyembe. The station was reopened in 1900 in the Vicariate of Unyanyembe. Djiwe-La Singa St. Mary of Ukune from 15th April 1884 to 13th March 1885, currently in Unyanyembe. Niegesi Our Lady of Exile from end of January 1889 to March 1891 and currently in Southern Nyanza. Our Lady of Hope (Usoga) from mid-March to Mid-October 1891 is currently in the Vicariate of Upper Nile. Our Lady of the Equator in late May 1892 to January 1893 currently in Northern Nyanza.

Section IV recounts the foundation of the mission stations in the Vicariate by late 1906 and the developments that took place in each station. Rubaga under the patronage of St. Mary was founded on 17th February 1879 and the Sisters Houses were established in September 1899. The Chronicle gives further details that Fr. Lourdel arrived alone on 17th February 1879; Bishop Livinhac and Fr. Girault arrived on 25th June 1879. The station had to be closed three times: From 8th November 1882 to 14th July 1885 because of the pagan persecution; from 18th October 1888 to 5th October 1889 because of the Muslim persecution and from 24th January to 29th March 1892 because of the Protestant persecution. Kisubi

mission station under the patronage of Our Lady founded on 8th December 1895 and the house of the sisters was established on 28th December 1905. The seminary was established at Kisubi since 8th December 1895 and was transferred to Bukalasa because of sleeping sickness which had affected the students. The premises were converted into a hospital for the sleeping sickness patients. Entebbe Mission station under the patronage of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary was founded in 1902. Nandere, Our Lady of Grace in Bulemezi County was founded in January 1900. Bukumi, Our Lady of the Guard in Bugangadzi was founded on 13th May 1894. Bujuni, Our Lady of Help of Christians in Bugangadzi was founded on 11th November 1899. Before the final establishment, there had been a mobile mission from October 1896 to May 1897. Hoima, Our Lady of Lourdes in Unyoro was founded in January 1900. The Chronicle mentions it once that in 1897 Fr. Moullec had founded in Unyoro the station, Our Lady of the Guard. Virika, Our Lady of the Snows, Toro was founded on 17th November 1895. Butiti, Our Lady of Salvation, Mwenge was founded in 1904. Mbarara, Our Lady of Perpetual Help in Ankole was founded on 16th October 1902.

The Chronicles give more details of the foundation of various mission stations and the challenges that were faced as well as the developments. Kasozi mission station of Our Lady of Peace, Koki was founded on 8th October 1895. This Mission station of Koki suffered during the revolt of Mwanga and was abandoned from 11th July 1897 to 13th August 1897 and later again in late December 1897. It was burned and looted in January 1898 and was revived on 12th December 1898. Kanabulemu Our Lady of Nazareth in Buddu was founded on 1st November 1902. Bikira Mariya, Our Lady of Victories in Buddu was founded on 15th July 1892. It was suppressed on 20th October 1902, because of the bubonic plague. It was revived on 1st January 1904. Father Van put there the pupils of the school of catechists which had been founded on 1st January 1903 at Rubaga and had to leave for the lack of space. Since the Christmas of 1905 the mission itself was revived at Bikira. Narozari, Our Lady of the Rosary, in Buddu was founded on 7th October 1900. It was a mobile mission since April 1900. Villa Maria, Immaculate Conception, Buddu was founded on 15th May 1892 and the house for the Sisters was established in 1900. The station was established first at Kasozi in Mid-March 1891 and was abandoned in February 1892 because of the Protestant persecution. It was revived on 2nd April 1892 and transferred to Villa Mariya on 15th May 1892. Bukalasa in Buddu was founded on 6th December 1903. The seminary was started at Villa Mariya on 1st February 1893 and in late December of that year it was transferred to Rubaga, where it remained until when it moved to Kisubi on 8th December 1895. Sleeping sickness in Kisubi forced it again to change: while the minor seminary was at Bukalasa by 6th December 1903, the major seminarians were going to Bikira Mariya, on 10th February 1904. In 1905 major and minor seminaries were located together in Bukalasa near Villa Mariya. Mitala-Mariya, Our Lady of the Mountains, in Mawokota County was founded on 25th October 1899. Bumangi, Our Lady of Good Help, Ssese Islands was founded on 21st November 1893. The mission of

Ssese, begun by Bishop Livinhac at Bugoma between January and April 1890 was revived on 8th September 1891. A second abandonment was caused by the Protestant persecution (January - October 1892) and finally the station was transferred to Bumangi on 21st November 1893 where she remained ever since. Busubizi, Our Lady of Mt. Carmel in Singo County was founded on 11th November 1899.

In the subsequent sections the Chronicles give in detail the work done at particular mission stations. However, not all the mission stations in the Vicariate are included in this detailed description of their work. It is only a few that are listed and the criterion for the choice of these ones is not given. The first station is Rubaga Mission. It reports that the mission of Rubaga has received blessings from the Lord with the missionary Fathers, Brothers and Sisters all having strength and health and they were responding to the benevolence of the good Master with hard work. The missionaries are reported as being overworked and hence had little time to write. But then some few comments are given on the development of this mission station.

The text reports the growth of the mission of Rubaga and as a consequence it gave birth to several daughters who form a beautiful crown around her. These are the missions of Kisubi, Entebbe, Mawokota, Singo and Bulemezi. And because of the extraordinary developments of these missions, the Vicar Apostolic was forced to overhaul the district by attaching to the mission station Christian centres too far from one another. In this arrangement, the mission of Rubaga ceded to the mission of Bulemezi three towns and three Catechists and to the mission of Entebbe six towns and six catechists. On the other hand, the mission of Mawokota ceded to that of Rubaga the whole northern part of this province, that is thirteen towns and as many Catechists. Because this part of Mawokota has many people, the population of the mission of Rubaga has been increased by several thousands. The text gives the areas which form the mission of Rubaga: Kyadondo in the north, Busiro in the northwest, Mawokota in the west and Buwaya in the South.

Another important element reported about the mission of Rubaga is preaching of the fathers. The text speaks about preaching in the first person plural. "We preach several times a day: the neophytes, catechumens, children who are preparing for First Communion. Every Sunday, in addition to the homily in Church, we also preach to novices who are preparing themselves at the Sisters place to become catechists, and also to the sponsored children who are divided into two groups, one for girls and another for boys." The text makes a positive remark that many Baganda can read and reading of the Gospel is a real treat for them, giving their souls substantial food.

The text goes into the details of how the missionaries did apostolic tours in the mission territory. They describe their visits and how they make on the Baganda the

best impression. The text uses the term Baganda, natives and men in rugged character as a description of the people. The visits of the missionaries are reported with such glowing style that when the missionaries go to the villages all adults and small children want to attend the events and that the talk for a long time in the evenings about these around the family hearth which cause many conversions. It talks of the patronage of the boys with 262 members and the girls being 421 and how all these listen to a special talk every Sunday and receive Holy Communion every first Friday of the month.

In reporting about sleeping sickness, the text reports that it continues to decimate the Baganda. He adds on in a rather ironic mood that "when Providence punishes people in this world, it always has a merciful plan for them, that is, to strike the body and heal the soul." The text argues that those who may have died of sleeping sickness are now in paradise next to the good thief, who during their lives had only the appetite for crimes. He lists what he describes as another good from sleeping sickness. He mentions that what the good Lord has taken out of this scourge is to present to the Baganda an opportunity to meditate on and to understand the serious words of our Lord Jesus Christ as quoted in Latin: *Attendite a falsis prophetis ... Ex fructibus cognoscetis eorum eos. Bonus Pastor animam suam dat pro ovibus suis; mercenarius autem videt lupum venientem et dimittit oves et fugit*…. He describes a visit to one of the people suffering from sleeping sickness, being abandoned by his Protestant sisters in a banana plantation that was in the bush. He describes this person as an unfortunate man who shed tears and responded to the consoling words with stifling sobs: "I was helpless; I was dying of hunger and thirst and disease, but the Saviour whom you preach to me brought you in this deserted place. I will be relieved." He compares this man, whom he describes as unfortunate to the leper of the city of Aosta, who hugged the trees of the forest, praying to God to give them life for him and to give him a friend.

When writing about schools, he refers to the chapter in the 1900 Buganda Agreement which desired that some young indigenous Catholics be chosen carefully to study the language of the European Conqueror. He gives as the reasons for this, "that we do not get cases of influential functions or employment being given exclusively to Protestants or Moslems, to the great detriment of our work." He mentions the initiative taken in this regards that "despite the limited resources at disposal, a school of this kind be established." However, the text contends that despite several attempts that had been made, but due to lack of premises and staff, we had not obtained any serious results." But immediately with reference to Providence, he mentions that the required place was provided in the large brick house that the Catholic regent had previously built on the territory of the mission of Rubaga and the class was created in the space that was available in the building.

The courses offered in this school were: First English course which was regularly attended by sixteen young adult people of 15 to 18 years carefully selected from

among the most intelligent and above all the most pious. The knowledge of English would enable them to perform the duties of interpreters in the administration of the Protectorate and promote the good of the Catholic religion. He gives details of other progress of this course. The second English course for younger children is intended to take the place of those whom we have just talked about. This course is paid for; every week each of the twenty children who attends must bring an English coin, the equivalent of French coins. The third course is regular school for those who learn to write, and the most advanced of which are taught the four rules of arithmetic. And finally, a writing and arithmetic course for the chiefs. The reasons given for this course is to educate them because they must have enough frequent relations with these gentlemen of Administration, officers, geographers, and others whom he describes as caring little to learn Luganda speak embryonic Kiswahili or correspond, at least or some, by letters written in English. He mentions that the rules of arithmetic are necessary for leaders because of their jobs, since they must count the tax; divide the pay of workers and others. Though he reports that they have great difficulty in memorising the multiplication tables, but there is no despair seeing them achieve satisfactory results. The report about Lubaga mission ends with a prayer-like statement: "May the Divine Master bless our poor efforts in the way which, however dangerous it may be, cannot fail to lead to a noble and comforting end."

In writing about Kisubi Mission station, the text opens with the havoc that sleeping sickness has done to this mission territory. It goes into the details of how whole villages on the banks of the lake or in the peninsulas are almost deserted and those at some distance from the lake or on high hills have known only isolated cases of the disease. It gives the statistics as examples to show the brunt of the disease on the population. In Bugiri peninsula where there were 150 plantations representing a population of 700 to 800 people, there remain not more than 2 banana plantations with about 12 people. But the text reports that some areas have suffered less from the terrible disease. An example is given where only twenty cases of sleeping sickness out of the population of about 500 inhabitants are affected. It mentions that the mission territory of Kisubi is the smallest in the Vicariate that starting in the morning one can go to one or the other of its ends and return in the evening. However, the population of this territory is given as 5000 inhabitants described as devout Christians who frequently receive the sacraments and practice their religion well. He makes a consoling statement that Our Christianity has not suffered too much from being near Entebbe. There are many children.

As for the report about St. Anthony hospital, the text says that it was founded to bring together patients of sleeping sickness. It describes a certain Father Varangot as a good father who loves his dear sick people that he visits them every day. It gives the pastoral activities that the father does in the hospital. That every morning he goes to say Mass, once a week he hears the confession of all those who wish and there are many who receive their weekly Holy Communion. It reports that the

Father takes care of the sick and for their spiritual and material needs. That he dresses them, feeds them, and gets their wounds dressed. The text places the father at the helm of almost everything in the hospital. The two White sisters are considered as responsible for only the cleanliness of various types of patients, and to teach catechism to those who have not yet been baptised. The text considers the five native nurses as dedicated through a spirit of religion to the service of these unfortunate people. In describing the patients, they are called these poor people suffering from an incurable disease. They are considered resigned but also happy, a thing that surprises European visitors who question whether these people they are going to die. The text explains that their joy comes from especially the faith they have in the heart, and the hope of reward that they wait for after leaving this life.

Other piece of information about Kisubi concerns the coming of the White Sisters who arrived on 28th December 1905 and got settled at the mission. Two are assigned to work in the hospital, another teaches girls in a school and Catechism to children preparing for First Communion. Other details are about the constructions taking place. It reports that the house of the sisters with some extensions was built and the new house of the fathers is not yet completed. It reports of the rains that disturbed the work of making bricks. Another important report is about the cultivation of rubber and coffee with already 400 trees of ceara rubber and 200 of Funtumia elastic. As for coffee a certain species called Nyana is being planted.

There are other mission stations which are reported in this document and the progress of the work of missionaries. Each station is talked about in its own unique context and how the missionaries adapt to such a setting. In the subsequent sections are the mission stations of Entebbe which had not only native blacks, but also many European Catholic parishioners and hundreds of Goans. The foreigners reported as residing in Entebbe are: Europeans, Arabs, Indians, Waswahili from the coast and between 5,000 and 4,000 Baganda. As for Sunday mass, the homily is given in Kiganda for the natives and English for the Goans.

Another mission station that is reported in the Chronicles is Nandere, Our Lady of Grace. This mission station is located in what is described as the province where all the heads are heretics and which was formerly called the Boulevard of Protestantism. In giving the history of this mission station, it was founded at the beginning of 1900 and that Protestant teachers did their best to prevent their followers to go to Catholicism by employing mostly slander and bitter disputes. That failure for slander and bitter disputes to yield any meaningful results, the Protestants used another method when they considered both religions as the same and having the same Lord Jesus Christ. With all the bickering between Catholics and Protestants the text claims that the lives of the Protestants are hardly different from that of the pagans. The same conflict goes to impact the relationship between the leaders of the area and the priests for fear to be rated poorly by the Reverends. Even the County Chief, Kangawo avoids as much as possible to meet the priests

but it is different with the regent Kisingiri who never fails to visit the priests. The section on Nandere ends with a prayer-like statement against Protestants: "When the grace of God will have brought us all those of good faith who are in heresy, there will not be much Protestantism except two memories: the empty temples and the ministers always well paid though pastors without flocks."

The Chronicles then mention Bukumi mission station under the patronage of Our Lady of Guard. The text opens with an issue related to missionaries how the years 1905-1906 were not good since the Superior Fr. Lesbros and Fr. Gore left the station with health related matters. But that the missionaries were comforted by the loyalty of Christians to the Sacraments and the celebration of Easter and Christmas brought a lot of people which made them proud for being so many. However some individuals are particularly mentioned. One of them is a man named Kasatu, portrayed as a lost sheep for a long time also appeared on these occasions. The text takes a particular interest in this man because he refused to defend the position of the missionaries from whom he received baptism and went to join Mwanga and strengthened the lines of rebels. After disappearing in the bush where he developed very long hair and wild eyes, he is described as a bandit of Calabria. Another individual that is personally talked about is Sseddu, described as the old pagan who prayed with his wives and the whole village. The Chronicles indicate that the work of the schools is difficult and students have never been many. There is no valid explanation for this state of affairs. But the text only talks about the hope in the youth who must be prepared as future generations who will be entirely Christians. Other strategies mentioned for a Christian society are establishing among the Christian children and catechumens the society of young workers. The text already records some of the profit from such an arrangement: The young workers helped to build a new house for the fathers, the restoration of the cemetery chapel, that of the Blessed Virgin and for plastering the Church. The young women workers, fewer in numbers were employed in the cotton gin, clean the fields and take care of the crops. The main motivation is that because work supported by religion is eminently civilising and a lazy Christian will never be a good Christian.

The Chronicles give the details of the mission station of Bujuni whose numbers of Christians rose to 2848. This is considered a modest figure but also a cause of great consolation as all with faithfulness and devotion receive the Sacraments of Penance and the Eucharist. The number of baptisms for one year was put at 266 though lower than the previous year of 367. The number of marriages fellow from 69 to 49. There are two reasons given. One, the state of health of the two fathers at Bujuni explains partly. But the first and main reason is given thus in the Chronicles: "The change of spirit among blacks; they have the spirit of their age, and today this spirit is a dream of well-being, of wealth and pre-mature civilisation. There are slow in getting instructed, they marry with difficult, because they see in religion and marriage obstacles to get this ideal of well-being and of that wealth which is always elusive." Other factors cited for the failure of religious enthusiasm in this mission

station is the people's anxiety for becoming rich and how they have become traffickers of goat skins, others drive herds of goats and sheep on the Nile route hoping to get large profits and others go to Congo to trade in ivory and rubber. Such behaviour makes Catechists feel their zeal slow down and the text concludes here that these seem to be the causes which have brought down the number of neophytes.

The report about schools is that the Banyoro are happy to learn to read and write and they follow the classes of writing with much assiduity. Reading is compulsory and the motivation for this is that they all know that they will not be baptised if they do not know how to read correctly. They do their best to learn first the alphabet and then to read well. Talking about sickness, the text makes a comparison between the Banyoro and the Baganda. It claims that for the Banyoro people have repulsive sores which are sometimes caused by dirt and carelessness and that they sometimes lead to death. Other bewildering remarks attributed to the Banyoro are that syphilis is not even an evil and that they think they can make wonders by passing it on to new-borns because they say, syphilis rarely kills a child. The vast majority of the patients are people with syphilis, gnawed cancer or eaten by scabies. He claims that giving the people the knowledge of hygiene is a lost cause as they leave flies the task of drying the pus that flows from these wounds. It claims that the dispensary is besieged by crowds of unfortunate patients who have a boundless faith in the science of charitable nurse.

The Chronicles lastly talk about the mission station of Mitala Mariya under the patronage of Our Lady of the Mountains. The text in summary here in talking about Mitala Mariya begins with the arrival of the new Superior whose coming brought the number to five of missionary priests serving this territory. The apostolic tours are made in three provinces that depend on Mitala Mariya: Mawokota, Kitunzi, Butambala. The catechists are described as the most valuable auxiliaries of the missionaries and their number totals 77. Through the catechists the missionaries recruit the catechumens already educated in the great truths of the religion, informed of the trial of Christians and that the sick are visited and baptised in articulo mortis. The catechists are glowingly appreciated as being very helpful and especially those living in areas contaminated by sleeping sickness show admirable dedication. They do not abandon their patients; they expose themselves each day to this terrible scourge. The texts mention that two have already died, four are affected and would die soon and it ends with prayer committing them to eternity: May God reward them! The text reports unfortunate happenings among catechists. Because of finances, their number was reduced, others left on their own, and others temporarily left their work to get enough to meet the most pressing needs and the texts claims that the future is bleak.

About the new converts or Neophytes, the text goes into the details of the transformation this station has experienced. A portion of the population that was

close to Rubaga was assigned to Rubaga mission territory another portion to Busubizi for the same reasons and this explained the figures given that the Catholic population fell from 13200 to 13150. The nagging question posed was whether all these are saints and the response is no, as everywhere, there are some who are very good and others bad. The missionaries are impressed by the docility of the Christians in receiving the sacraments with staggering figures: 66,750 for confessions and 68,000 for Holy Communion and the Apostolic Vicar administered the sacrament of confirmation to 1, 269 neophytes. About the catechumens there are some facts recorded: those who agree to come and pray at the station are becoming increasingly rare. About sickness, the most reported disease is sleeping sickness which devastated the fastest growing part of the mission territory. The four islands of Bunjako, Buyiga, Zzinga and Bussi and all the sides of the lake are decimated. The Chronicles report the work of missionaries in such situation "...as assisting these poor people, visit them, administer last rites to the Christians and baptism as well as baptising the pagans who consented in articulo mortis." On the issue of material things, it reports that because of lack of resources the construction of the house for the community had to be abandoned. The chapel of Our Lady is coming up and the Christians have made a collection of 200 rupees that has allowed starting moulding bricks. It ends with an important note: While waiting that the thousands of vines of rubber planted this year..., we continue to cultivate cotton, coffee and pepper but unfortunately it is not a remunerative crop." The text ends with a prayer: Let us rely on Providence who will never abandon his people.

2. Analysis of Missionary Documents

After the description of the missionary documents we now make an in depth analysis of one of them using the three tools proposed by Norman Fairclough[388]: the analysis of linguistic practice, or the formal features of the text; the analysis of discursive practice, or the production, distribution and consumption of text; and the analysis of the social practice, or the social conditions and social effects of the text.

Analysis of Linguistic Practice

In this section we make an in-depth analysis of *A Short History of the Vicariate of the Upper Nile, Uganda*, written by Bishop John Biermans, MHM; the other missionary documents are used in analysing the discursive practice. The choice of this text is motivated by two reasons. First, it was written by one of the early missionaries to arrive in Uganda, who became a Vicar Apostolic and so he wrote with first-hand experience. Second, it was written in English as its original language without succumbing to change of meaning which happen in translations. It was observed in the general introduction that translations have some complications especially that

[388] Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 62-100.

meaning in the source language, rarely corresponds to that of a sign in the target language. In the same way Fairclough admits that one source of difficulty for textual analysis is the use of translated data. He thinks that to include textual analysis of translated data as part of the analysis of a discursive event, is a procedure which is open to serious objections.[389] This follows the view that, "In order to be communicatively effective, translations have to be modified at the level of content or the intention so that the recipients of translated messages can be addressed as primary readers wherever possible."[390]

The author is a Bishop, a member of the Mill Hill religious missionary Society and a spiritual leader at that. As noted in the summary above, this text is 39 A5 pages long and divided into eleven chapters. It follows a chronological development of events in the Vicariate of Upper Nile from July 6th, 1894 the date when it was created, up to 1920 when this text was written. It is, therefore, a text that narrates the events of one of the earlier missionary movements in Uganda and is representative of the history of the last part of the 19th century and first part of the 20th century Ugandan Church. Another important feature of this text is that it was originally written in English which makes the word meanings and language use to retain their original form. This reality could provide us with the insights into the mental models, subject positions and social relations that characterised the earlier missionary endeavour and how they were used and applied in the apostolate. Following Fairclough's three-dimensional conception of analysis, the first aspect of analysis is the analysis of the linguistic features of the text taking into account the vocabulary and grammar of the text. This will be done within the background of conversation as the sensitizing concept that we are developing in this research.

Right from the beginning, this text was written in English and it has not been translated into any other language. The title page opens with the abbreviation: A.M.D.G followed by the title of the book written in cursive form: A Short History of The Vicariate of the Upper Nile, Uganda. The title of this book starts with article "A" in the upper case followed by the adjective "Short" written in the lower case and it qualifies the noun "history" to form a compound noun 'Short History.' This is followed by the preposition 'of' and article 'the' attached to the noun 'Vicariate' again followed by the preposition 'of' and article 'the' and adjective 'upper' which qualifies the nouns 'Nile, Uganda.' The compound noun 'short history' is used in the possessive form of another noun 'The Vicariate' which as well is used as a possessive of another compound noun 'The Upper Nile, Uganda.' The adjective 'short' is not easily understood in its use to mean either 'short in content' or 'short in timeframe' or 'short in details' or short in information' presented in the text. The use of the preposition 'by' on the title page shows the author 'The Right Reverend J. Biermans, D.D, Bishop of Gargara and Vicar

[389] Norman Fairclough, "Discourse and Text: Linguistic and Intertextual Analysis within Discourse Analysis", *Discourse and Society*, Vol. 3, No. 2, (1992), 193-217.
[390] Anna Trosborg, ed., *Text Typology and Translation* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V., 1997), ix.

Apostolic of the Upper Nile. At the end of the title page is the noun Nsambya and Kampala with two abbreviated letters P.O and then it ends with the noun, Uganda written in the uppercase. However, in a nutshell the cover title gives the limits of this text as the history of the Vicariate of Upper Nile, Uganda as presented exclusively by The Right Reverend J. Biermans. This could explain the diminutive use of the adjective 'short' (which we questioned above) to qualify the noun history since it the work of a sole author who may miss out some information and data.

In the introduction, the first sentence opens with a period of time that has elapsed: 'Twenty-five years have now passed....' and it goes on to indicate the major event related to these twenty-five years '....since the first priests of St. Joseph's Foreign Mission Society to enter Africa, left the Mother-house at Mill-Hill, London.' In talking about the 'first priests' of the St. Joseph's Foreign Mission Society, he uses the official name of the society and this is the only instance that it is used. And Mill Hill is used only as a location where the Mother house is found. But in the following pages, he uses Mill Hill as the de-facto name of the missionaries. To describe the first priests' journey to Africa, he uses two verbs in two tenses, that is, an infinitive verb 'to enter' and the past tense of the verb leave, '...left.' The primary social identity in this sentence is the noun 'Priests' qualified by the adjective 'first' with the noun 'Africa' as the object. The use of the infinitive '...to enter' can be understood in the structure of the general properties of infinitives that they do not have tense, aspect, moods, and/or voice, or they are limited in the range of tenses, aspects, moods, and/or voices that they can use. And the use of the past tense expresses the idea that an action started and finished at a specific time in the past. So whereas the first priests left the Mother House in London once and for all, the text suggests their journey to Africa is an uncertain process. The text goes back into history and gives a particular date ...On July 6th, 1894 of which two events that followed that date are reported in the passive and one is reported in the active voice. It is recorded in text that, "...the Holy See had created a new Vicariate in Uganda," "...and it was to take charge of this new field..." "...that the Mill Hill priests went forth in the Month of May, 1895."[391] There is use of the pluperfect or past perfect tense 'had created...' In that same sentence the noun 'Vicariate' qualified by the adjective 'new' is used, with its alternative, the noun 'field' also qualified with the same adjective new.

The text introduces a number of subject positions that characterised the social relations in the Ugandan social setup. This is brought about by using the adjective '....previous' when the text stretches back into history to report the work of the Protestant missionaries. The text reports thus: "Previous to their arrival in the country Protestant missionaries of the Church Missionary Society had already been at work among the Baganda for seventeen years."[392] In the text the use of the compound noun 'Protestant Missionaries' is related to the noun Church Missionary

[391] John Biermans, *A Short History of the Vicariate of the Upper Nile, Uganda*, 1.
[392] Ibid., 1.

Society in a possessive form. The use of the prepositions 'at' and 'among' describes the work of these Protestant missionaries. And another important linguistic feature that the use of these prepositions suggests is that the work of the Protestant Missionaries is limited to the Baganda, a noun that suggests an ethnic group. But in reporting about the arrival of the Catholic Missionaries, the text uses the noun Uganda, a geographical entity with an active voice in the past tense: "...Uganda witnessed the advent of Catholic Missionaries." The text uses the noun '...priests' who is a person who has the authority to lead or perform ceremonies in some religions and especially in some Christian religions, to specifically describe the Catholic missionaries. The text uses the phrase '...the advance guard' to describe the first Catholic missionaries to come to Uganda who were of a French Society called Missionaries of Africa' more commonly known as the White Fathers. The use of the noun 'guard' qualified by the adjective 'advanced' is not explained and so is the use of the adjective 'French' in this sentence is as well unclear. The use of the adjective 'certain' in this sentence: "Both the Church Missionary Society and the White Fathers then had well established stations in certain districts of Uganda...."[393] suggests a gap in the missionary field that the Mill Hill Missionaries required to fill. And this scenario introduces the establishment of the Mill Hill missionaries in Uganda of which the use of the noun establishment denotes their coming and subsequent work of evangelisation in Uganda.

In Chapter One, by describing Uganda the text uses a passive voice of which its use presents it as vulnerable "...Uganda has long claimed the interest of countries which have spheres of influence..."[394] He uses the compound noun 'pagan hordes' to describe the people of Uganda both leaders and dependents alike. The reference made to the people of Uganda as pagan hordes which are an ambiguous collective grouping that he gives to a mass of people without a proper descriptive category. It should be noted here that in this collective grouping the noun 'hordes' qualifies the noun 'pagan.' The text uses the noun 'hordes' that signifies a people without proper identity and a name to be characterised with. The use of this noun implies a faceless group, an insignificant gang without any distinctive features to describe them. In other related instances, the noun 'paganism' is used to illustrate the work of the missionary in a self-questioning tone: "...and what good can one man do among so many thousands, and what effect can the labour of one short life, have on a paganism thousands of years old?[395] Whereas in other illustrations it is used with the qualification of the noun vortex as the author notes, "...and this was necessary for souls, drawn from the vortex of paganism in a country..."[396]

On the one hand, the text uses the phrase '...the power of a despot king' and other adjectives such as vicious, cruel, cowardly, cunning deceit to describe the King of

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393 Ibid., 1.
394 Ibid., 1-2.
395 Ibid., 34.
396 Ibid., 18.

Buganda (....) and on the other hand, the phrase '...abject servility of his subjects' is used to describe the people and their relationship to the King. The use of the noun missionaries in the text as understood according to nationality is qualified by the adjectives 'English' in reference to the Protestant Missionaries and the adjective French is used in reference to the Catholic Missionaries. The text presents Protestant English and Catholic French Missionaries as having a common purpose by claiming in this phrase "...both striving to teach and preach the Gospel and plant the Standard of Christianity."[397] In another instance, the nouns 'traders' and 'religious teachers' are both used to describe the Arabs through whom some knowledge of Islamism had been introduced. The use of the adjective 'some' in this diminutive phrase "...some knowledge of Islamism..." contrasts Islam to the more elaborate use of the noun 'Standard' in the phrase "the standard of Christianity...."[398] which makes Christianity to stand opposed to Islam.[399] There are many proper nouns used as names of individuals. Mwanga is the name of the King of Buganda. The name of the uncle of the King 'Mbogo' is prefixed with the vowel 'E' and hence written as 'Embogo,' Kiwewa is Mwanga's brother and Karema is the brother of Kiwewa, Hanlon is Vicar Apostolic of Upper Nile.

The text uses a variety of nouns and terms in reference to different categories of people whom the missionaries interacted with. These stand to represent the social identities that are predominant within the text. In more general terms, the common noun 'natives' in the plural is used to refer to the people of Uganda.[400] It evokes stereotypes of primitiveness or cultural backwardness as it used in many instances to form compound nouns to refer to whatever is specific to the people: 'native mind,' 'native solders,' 'native bridge,' 'native dug-outs,' 'native workmanship,' 'native-made-beds' 'untrained natives,' 'Kavirondo natives,' 'native artisans,' 'Catholic natives,' 'native nuns or native sisterhood,' and 'native priests.'[401]

However in some specific instances, the text uses proper nouns, that is, the people's ethnic names to describe them as in when it talks about, 'the Baganda (the people of Buganda), The Basoga (the people of Busoga), the Bavuma, (People from the island of Buvuma in Lake Victoria), The Wanandi (an ethnic group in Kenya)[402] whom he repeatedly portray as "wild or truculent."[403] This applies as well to the use of the noun Christians to refer to the adherents of the Christian faith and the Mohamedans as the noun used to refer to the followers of the Islamic faith.[404] There are other nouns constructed by the author and used to describe the people in

397 Ibid., 2.
398 Ibid., 2.
399 Ibid., 2.
400 Ibid., 2, 7, 19, 20, 29, 33, 36, 37, 39.
401 Ibid., 2, 5, 8, 10, 13, 20, 23, 29, 37.
402 Ibid., 1, 2, 7, 9, 10, 11, 26, 28, 29, 32, 33.
403 Ibid., 7, 8, 10, 13.
404 Ibid., 2, 19.

the text. A possessive noun 'a man-of-war'[405] is used to describe a colonial army Commander and 'The Great Unclad' is used to describe the people whom the author referred to as kilted tribes in the 'undress uniform.'[406]

There are a number of other subject positions noticed within the text and these are ranked in such a way as to determine social position and the social relations that exist between these identities. First in this sequence is the 'porter' which is a noun denoting people. In this text it is used to indicate a person employed to carry luggage and supplies. The text records "one hundred and twenty five porters and fourteen armed askaris...with one reliable headman."[407] The texts describes the general weight requirement that could be carried by a porter: "...a general supply of everything necessary for the long journey had to be packed in cases weighing not more than 65 lbs. the 'load' consigned to each porter."[408] The texts portrays porters in many ways: "...some of the porters were hiding in the bushes (....) if our porters and followers gave us so much trouble (....) if our porters and followers were so sulky and indifferent at the coast where they were well-fed and well-clothed (....) where shall we engage other porters in unpeopled places (....) and in other instances, he applies nominalisations when recounting some incidents that involved the porters: "Our ranks were thinned by the unfaithful ones who had thrown down their loads and run away, or had taken the loads with them, or had left us in the darkness of night.[409] The use of the noun 'ranks' here indicates that there was a power structure in which people were ranked accordingly with different responsibilities.

Related to the above, this noticeable power structure that the text brings to light starts in the ascending order with the porters at the periphery. It could be realised that there is a social identity of "the armed askaris" related to the porters but higher in rank and position who are described as "...the native soldiers...natives of Africa who have formerly been porters..."[410] In this text, the noun askaris in plural is qualified by the adjective armed. They are armed because they have to provide security. The text indicates that, "These askaris carry rifles and some ammunition, and their duties are to keep guard in the camps at night and on the march to keep the right path, to see that porters do not stray."[411] Another social position noted in this sequence is that of the headman qualified with the adjective 'reliable' for he is "to over-see the former."[412] The adjective former is used to indicate the previously listed identities, that is, the porters and askaris. That explains why in other instances the noun head-man is qualified with the superlative verb 'highly-recommended'

405 Ibid., 4.
406 Ibid., 10.
407 Ibid., 4.
408 Ibid., 4.
409 Ibid., 4, 5, 6, 8.
410 Ibid., 5.
411 Ibid., 7.
412 Ibid., 4.

used to show the priority of this social position and also define its relationship with the rest in the caravan. However, in this apparently constructed power structure, the topmost authority appears to rest elsewhere. The text uses the common noun 'man' qualified with the adjective 'white' to form a compound noun 'white-man' which is used unflatteringly as the centre of all authority and power. In the text it is recorded that "It required all the authority of the white man to insist that his way was to have the caravan proceed..."[413]

Although the author gives two purposes of this text, first, "...to describe the actual work done by the early pioneers," and two, "...the gradual progress of the work as more men came in after years..."[414] he gives substantial space to describe the context and uses such rich metaphors and imagery. The author describes the missionary encounter with the African terrain in rich striking language "...the long and trying match would not be less than ten weeks through the wilds of Africa, where absolutely no sign of civilisation was to be met with and where the only human guides along that unknown way were strange native men, who scarcely knew any word of English or French."[415] The country and the people through which the caravan passed were described in the same way: "...a wild and varying country, peopled with hostile tribes who lived in the most primitive fashion and affording in nothing the safety, protection or resources so desirable on the long journey..."[416] In narrating the joy at their arrival, he uses such images as to elicit a sense of wonder: "...we were received by the Catholic natives who all wore small crucifixes and long gracefully falling white robes; they knelt to welcome us, and their beaming faces were good to see. They accompanied us until were joined by the next crowd and then they broke out into joyous shoutings, running to shake one another by the hand, while saying 'We are healed; we are cured.' To see their state of childish excitement made one wonder, that adults could be so truly child-like and simple and sincere."[417]
But he immediately contradicts that observation in this sentence: "...the rejoicing 600 native Catholics pressed us much in their enthusiastic greeting, yet we noticed the absence of wildness, which one might be led to expect from an isolated race in the heart of equatorial Africa. They manifested intelligence and composure even in the enthusiasm of their welcome."[418] The author describes the King's palace as follows: "The state room resembles a barn, open in the front with three reed walls, and a thatched roof, supported on two rows of rough palm tree posts(....) and details about the King are interesting as well "....the king sat on his throne with uncovered feet" [419] In talking about his work, he applies the common Christian metaphors as he states: "...I turned then to dark and cloudy background and saw in

413 Ibid., 5.
414 Ibid., 9.
415 Ibid., 4.
416 Ibid., 4.
417 Ibid., 13.
418 Ibid., 13.
419 Ibid., 13-14.

the fancy, the outstretched arms of ignorant and little known tribes pleading with me to lead them out of the darkness in which they groped, into the light of God's love."[420] In other instances, he used military language to describe the work of the missionaries: "They were men of the old brigade – of the first few caravans to arrive in the country. They had taken trench by trench of their spiritual enemy's line on the Ugandan front."[421] He uses more military images, as "...an army of catechumenates (....) a regiment of catechists...."[422] He uses metaphors from agricultural, spiritual and geographical settings to describe the transformation that missionaries have ushered in Africa. "The long dry grass of the African veldt has given place to acres of gardens and native cultivation, and prayers and hymns of praise are offered God daily, where formerly the only sounds were the barking of jackals and leopards and the crying of hyenas as they moved noiselessly through the grass."[423]

In some instances, the text uses some nouns as verbs in what is referred to as the 'verbing of nouns. This is in such sentences as "...Churches, houses and schools now 'clothe' the crests of the prominent mission-hills, while villages of Christian families and Catechumens 'people' the slopes, ...the Bishop piloted the Vicariate safely..."[424] In some sentences the text uses diminutive forms to describe realities as in such sentences: "An elderly catechumen, a convert from paganism and a small chief in his way, had erected a small shed of reeds...."[425] The comparative common noun in plural "....more men"[426] is used as an alternative noun to the noun missionaries or the fathers. And in describing the Sudanese soldiers who had revolted against the government such labels as "...mutineers..., rebels...., or rebel army..."[427] are used. In some instances, the text disguises the author and renders him impersonal and faceless in order to deal directly with some facts. And since the first person pronouns are arguably the most visible manifestation of a writer's presence in a text, in these sentences, the author's making use of other lexical and syntactic choices instead of using the first person pronoun makes him to abdicate the responsibility from the text. "But the pioneer missionary does not look for quick results. He knows that a thousand years are but as one day in the sight of God, and the thought that he is at least doing something for the salvation of the immortal souls of these poor creatures, encourages him to continue in his solitary efforts. He may be tempted at times to ask himself, what good can one man do among so many thousands, what effect can the labour of one short life, have on a paganism thousands of years old."[428] In these sentences, there is an impersonal use

[420] Ibid., 31.
[421] Ibid., 32.
[422] Ibid., 36.
[423] Ibid., 12.
[424] Ibid., 12, 30.
[425] Ibid., 13.
[426] Ibid., 20.
[427] Ibid., 23.
[428] Ibid., 34.

of the pronouns for the passivisation of the social identity of the missionary qualified with the adjective pioneer.

The noun 'vicariate' appears a number of times throughout the text[429] whereas the noun 'vicar- apostolic'[430] which is suggested by the presence of the former is less pronounced. This dense concentration of the noun 'vicariate' is what Fairclough refers to as 'overwording' which is an intense preoccupation pointing to peculiarities in the ideology of the group responsible for it. And the equivalent term for Halliday is 'overlexicalisation' for the dense wording of a domain.[431] The recurrence of the noun vicariate in this text is associated with the purpose of the text which is to narrate the history and progress of the 'vicariate of Upper Nile, Uganda.' And since the text is about the history of the vicariate, it follows that the whole textual structure is meant to qualify this noun vicariate. Examples could be drawn from sentences with the noun 'vicariate' being qualified in various forms. "...the Holy See had created a new vicariate.....a new vicariate had been in existence.....with the establishing of second Catholic vicariate....the newly ordained priest leave Mill Hill for his African Vicariate...the vicariate was now eating up more and more ground..."[432] The noun 'Vicar Apostolic' is used in relation to the noun vicariate. Since a vicariate is an administrative territory, its creation suggests appointing an administrator of such a territory. In the text this development is suggested in the sentence "....the founding of a Vicariate naturally leads to the question of appointing a new Vicar- Apostolic."[433] So the noun Vicar Apostolic is relative to the noun Vicariate and they both qualify each other.

One of the subject positions described in the text is that of the catechist. The noun catechist appears in the text four times and is used differently in each case. In the first instance, they are positioned in second place as helpers of the fathers for the text says: "Helping these fathers is a regiment of native catechists…"[434] As that sentence indicates, the plural noun 'catechists' is qualified with the adjective 'native' to form an unclear compound noun "native catechists."[435] The use of this category is neither explained nor contrasted with any other group of catechists either professional or expert within missionary ranks. In another use of the noun catechist, it is qualified with the adjective "some" and creates an undetermined, unknown or anonymous noun "…some catechist."[436] In another instance, it is used in plural and in universalistic terms as representative of the institution: "Catechists are at work in all the countries between Nsambya, the capital and Fovera, the most

429 Ibid., 1, 2, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37.
430 Ibid., 3.
431 Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 193.
432 John Biermans, *A Short History of Upper Nile Vicariate*, 1, 17, 25, 26, 27.
433 Ibid., 3.
434 Ibid., 36.
435 Ibid., 36.
436 Ibid., 36.

northerly point of the vicariate and in many an isolated village…"[437] And lastly, it is used in the singular qualified with article "a" to characterize an individual: "…children are gathered round a catechist."[438] The use of this noun is varies in the text as it represents an institution of catechists or individual catechists.

Another subject position described in the text is that of the nuns. In its first use, the noun nuns are referring to the "…first community of nuns."[439] The text gives the original number of nuns to arrive, "These nuns were six in number….." It also gives the present number at the writing of this text as "…there are fourteen of these sisters."[440] The religious noun nun and the social noun sister are used interchangeably to refer to the other. The text is specific with the identity of the nuns: "…belonged to the Franciscan community of St. Mary's Abbey, Mill Hill."[441] Since the author was a Mill Hill missionary, he implicitly indicates that the two communities are familiar because the community of sisters is "…quite close to the missionary college."[442] In describing their work, the text uses the possessive adjective "their" and the pronoun "they" ….the good they accomplished….," "they take complete charge of the hospitals in the missions….," "they are attached….," "they have their own convent schools…," "…they visit regularly, villages and catechumenates…."[443] In another instance the noun nuns is presented in the plural qualified with the adjective native to form a compound noun 'native nuns.'[444] In reporting about the native nuns, the text uses a superlative to introduce this rather new event: "The most recent development in the Uganda District was the introduction of the native nuns."[445] In another sentence he uses the numerical noun 'four' and the adjective 'these' to qualify the noun nuns as a special and distinct group: "Four of these nuns have been at work in the Nkokonjeru mission…"[446] Whereas the foreign missionary nuns had their congregation named, there is silence on the name of the religious society to which these native sisters belong. The text only talks of the "…members of the native sisterhood."[447] The anonymous noun sisterhood is used instead of the actual name of the sisterhood.

In the text, the noun 'Father' is used interchangeably with the other related nouns 'missionary' and priest. But there is a more emphasised use of the noun 'father' than missionary or priests. The frequent use of the noun 'father' can be explained by the fact that it is used as a title. For example, the text speaks about "Father

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437 Ibid., 36.
438 Ibid., 36.
439 Ibid., 26.
440 Ibid., 26.
441 Ibid., 26.
442 Ibid., 26.
443 Ibid., 26.
444 Ibid., 36.
445 Ibid., 36.
446 Ibid., 36.
447 Ibid., 36.

Gaudibert..., Father Prendergast.....”[448] In other instances the noun ‘father is used to qualify some other nouns to form compound nouns. This is evident in the text as used in such nouns as “...White Fathers....Mill Hill Fathers...”[449] In some instances the noun ‘father’ is used in a possessive majestic plural as in “...our fathers.... their father.”[450] In other appearances in the text, the noun ‘father’ is used with either article ‘the’ as in “...the Fathers,”[451] or used with numerals as in “...one father, two fathers, seven fathers,”[452] or used with comparative adjectives as in “...the older Fathers,”[453] In this text, the noun priest is used in reference to what the noun father represents. Its use in such phrases as these is similar in reference to the noun father, “...the arrival of six new priests” “....eight newly ordained priest....as many priests as possible were selected from the annual ordination groups”..... “I heard them cry for priests”....”there were thirty-six priests at work”....“the number of my priests had increased....”[454] It is used in the same way but the emphasis and frequency of use differ.

The text uses the noun ‘tribe’ as a social identity and qualifies it with different adjectives and phrases. The noun tribe is a sociological, cultural and linguistic entity. It is used in many sentences and phrases like “....a country peopled with hostile tribes,” where we have the adjective hostile, which means having or showing unfriendly feelings or having an intimidating, antagonistic, and offensive nature, qualifying the noun tribe. This sets the precedence where the whole text is littered with a generalised qualification of this noun, described in a variety of ways using diverse adjectives and such phrases as: “...the scores of distinct tribes....” “....the numerous tribes to be met with...” “....any other tribe of Central Africa...” “...the kilted tribes...” “...seeing in imagination the hundreds of distinct tribes, - pastoral, agricultural, and hunting tribes...” “.....primitive and ignorant tribes...” “....this truculent tribe...” “...illiteracy had held in bondage these newly discovered tribes...” “...the outstretched arms of ignorant and little known tribes...,” “...a greater work among the more abandoned tribes...” “....catechists are brought from Uganda and are sent among the natives, until such time as the Mission has sufficient boys taken from the tribe itself and trained as teachers.”[455] In this context, the use of the term tribe remains confusing. In a solitary isolated incidence, the term tribe is replaced with another noun race: “...we noticed the absence of wildness which one might be led to expect from an isolated race in the heart of equatorial Africa.”[456] The choice of using one and other is not explained

[448] Ibid., 14, 19.
[449] Ibid., 1, 11, 12, 14, 15, 27.
[450] Ibid., 16, 30.
[451] Ibid., 21, 23, 24.
[452] Ibid., 15, 20, 21, 24.
[453] Ibid., 22.
[454] Ibid., 25, 27, 31, 32.
[455] Ibid., 4, 10, 11, 15, 18, 32, 34.
[456] Ibid., 13.

since the definition of race as a family, tribe, people, or nation belonging to the same stock implies tribe as well.

Summarising the findings thus far we note that the text uses binary oppositions to classify "pagan hordes" and "Catholic natives", including "native catechists" and the "first community of nuns."[457] The pagan hordes are described as "wild", hostile and primitive and they show "absolutely no sign of civilisation", but the Catholic natives "manifested intelligence" and "their beaming faces were good to see". Among them there was "absence of wildness". And the Christian missionaries "who were striving to teach and preach the Gospel and plant the Standard of Christianity" are sharply contrasted with the Arabs "who entered the country as traders and by whom some knowledge of Islamism had been introduced." There is a heavy use of the noun "native" both in singular and plural form to refer to the people of Uganda. We have noted that the use of this noun in this particular text evokes stereotypes of primitiveness or cultural backwardness as it is used to qualify almost everything local: "native mind," "native soldiers," "native bridge," "native dug-outs," "native workmanship," "untrained natives," "Catholic natives," "native nuns," "native priests." Except with the native Catholics, nuns and catechists, who are described as "helpers of the fathers" (not yet "agents" or "initiators" of change) to some extent, there is no social relation with the natives, certainly not in the sense of conversation.

Analysis of Discursive Practice

The second level is the analysis of the discursive practice. Analytical questions here are: how is this text/discourse refers to other texts/discourses? Is there an order of discourse? The underlying assumption is that in producing and consuming texts, speakers depend heavily on other texts/discourses. In this section the task is to relate the discourses that are referred to within the text. According to Fairclough the discursive practice mediates between linguistic practice (text) and social practice (context).

The text was written to give the account of the origin and growth of the vicariate of Upper Nile, Uganda which was entrusted to the Mill Hill Missionaries. This forms the dominant discourse in the text on which other related discourse revolve as on a fulcrum. In the introduction, the text indicates that the first priests were of "...St. Joseph's Foreign Mission Society" which is the official name of that missionary congregation and Mill Hill, London is identified only as the location where the Mother-house of the Society is found. Since this society was of British origin its official name, St. Joseph's Foreign Mission Society, carry references to the then

[457] See also binary oppositions between "reason" and "madness", "true" and "false", in the missionary discourse of the White Fathers in Stenger, White Fathers, 184-187. This leads to the ultimate questions if the "pagans" are nothing but a "social construct", and if "the missionaries created the pagans in order to convert them" in the same way as the so called savages are a creation of anthropologists". See Stenger, *White Fathers in Colonial Central Africa*, 190-191.

prevailing non-Catholic Missionary societies. Being a British founded society, it was built on the model of such British mission societies as the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (SPG), the Church Missionary Society (CMS) and the London Missionary Society (LMS)[458] which in a way explains the continuity between them all as mission societies. The text talks of them as active and working along with the Catholic missionaries. It says: "Previous to their arrival in the country Protestant Missionaries of the Church Missionary Society had already been at work among the Baganda" (....) "...both the Church Missionary Society and the White Fathers then had well-established stations in certain district of Uganda."[459] Yet, in the text, the Missionaries and their mission work are generally identified more with the place of their foundation than with their official name. Such instances in the text testify to this reality: "...Mill Hill Priests, Mill Hill Fathers, Mill Hill Missionaries and at times Mill Hill Men, or Mill Hill Mission..."[460] There is a particular identification with the place of origin than with the official name of the society.

In the text the author claims that "Uganda has long claimed the interest of countries which have spheres of influence on the great Continent of Africa."[461] This claim draws upon some important discourses that characterised Africa and its position in the 19th century geopolitics of the world. This interest and greatness could be implied, interpreted and understood in geographical, historical, political or even imaginary terms. Geographically, Africa is bigger than Europe by its landmass. This indicates that it could be a source of raw-materials, markets and research activities of European scholars, explorers, researchers and travellers. The European scramble and partition of Africa which was the focal point of the Berlin Conference of 1884 is a clear case in point. Historically, Africa has been described as the cradle of humanity and human civilization and has contributed to the growth of human culture. Africa has had strong bonds with the Middle East which is the cradle of the three Monotheisms: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. All these religions have a universal perspective and in their infancy each took time off in Africa as in an incubator.[462] The civilisation in the Nile Valley predates any other civilisation in the world. And Uganda as the country with the source of the Nile surely has claimed the interest of many countries which sought to control the Nile waters. Egypt wanted to control the source of the Nile as it is its livelihood. That is the reason that prompted the Egyptians to have direct control of Uganda. The Germans too fought with the English in the struggle for the control of this land. Imaginary, Africa held a spectacular potential as it was not yet surveyed or explored well and it carried the hope for the earth. Africa has a lot to offer in terms of the

458 Jeffrey Cox, *The British Missionary Enterprise since 1700* (New York, London: Routledge, 2008), 100-102.
459 John Biermans, *A Short History of the Vicariate of Upper Nile, Uganda*, 1.
460 Ibid., 1, 4, 9, 11, 17, 20.
461 Ibid., 1.
462 Cf. Moses in Egypt; Jesus escaping to Egypt; Mohamed escaping to Ethiopia. Also consider the early Christian centres of learning at Alexandria.

potential for missionary work. His choice of words hence has interrelatedness with other dominant discourses prevailing at the time especially missionary work.

There are other discourses that the text implicitly makes reference to, which came to influence the production of this text and the mission discourse in which it was written. It could be noted that Uganda became a reflection of the European religious discourse when the political and religious differences transplanted from Europe found a rich ground to blossom in Uganda and resulted in conflict. In European Church history it is reckoned that earlier in 1648, the treaty of Westphalia had affirmed the working compromise reached at the Diet of Speyer in 1526 which had been translated into the formula contained in the Religious Peace of Augsburg which stipulated that "The Prince would determine the religion of his subjects" (cuius regio, eius religio).[463] That is why the Protestant English missionaries originally considered Uganda as their area of influence and saw the French Catholic White Fathers as encroaching on their land. This explains why the text makes this reference that "the earliest pages of its history show religious and political differences which many are familiar with."[464] This was the case in Europe as well so he was just reminding his audience that what is happening in Europe is exactly the same as in Uganda.

He meticulously makes leave of the details of the conflicting spheres of influence both political and religious and begins to discuss the people in Uganda with such categorical descriptions. He considers the Ugandan people as spectators of the unfolding drama before them with such passivity and incomprehension. The text highlights that, "to the pagan hordes – both leaders and dependents – these differences among Europeans proved unaccountable in a land, which had only known the power of a despot king and the abject servility of his subjects."[465] The text presents the apparent confusion and conflicts between the parties in the power theatre and creates a hierarchy of sorts. There is a despot King, Protestant English and Catholic French Missionaries and the Arabs and at the margins are the pagan hordes. The pagan hordes represent a vulnerable group because it cannot make of the differences among Europeans who are squabbling among themselves. And the whole subject is of less interest to them given that they have only known the power of a despot king. They would still follow the European missionaries for they offer an alternative power base although they too are not settled among themselves.

The term pagan is used in the text to refer to uncivilized, wild, primitive, illiterate or even unchristian. Its use in this text signified all people in Uganda as contrasted to missionaries. The people are referred to as: "...the pagan hordes – both leaders and dependents..."[466] And the term hordes as an attribute of pagan signified the

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463 Stephen J. Lee, *Aspects of European History 1494-1789,* 2nd ed. (Suffolk: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1984), 91-93.
464 John Biermans, *A Short History of the Upper Nile Vicariate*, 1-2.
465 Ibid., 2.
466 Ibid., 2.

collective labelling of all non-Christians. It is a determining relationship between the missionaries who are senders of mission messages and the people who are receivers of the mission message. The author heavily drew upon the vocabulary that was common at the time in European scholarly communities as evidently attested in many European historical and anthropological accounts. By speaking about "pagan", "wild" and "primitive" natives the author uses words that we referred to in chapter one where we introduced the philosophy and anthropology of Lévy-Bruhl. He considered primitive mentality as almost exclusively directed by culturally constituted collective representations and as such is bound up with pre-perceptions, pre-connections, and he maintained that we might almost say with prejudgments, which serve to alter the functioning of such mental capacities as reason, logic, and inference.[467]

The text makes a distinctive description of missionaries calling them Protestant English and Catholic French missionaries.[468] Here the text follows a popular discourse in the general consciousness of the people of Uganda who made these sharp categories of the missionaries relating them to their countries of origin. So in order that the text reflects that popular discourse, it too, followed exactly the prevailing classification that the people had created among the missionary groups and among themselves. For the people of Uganda, the Protestant Christians were referred to as English and the Catholic Christians were French. But despite these delineations as rooted in the text, their work is described as both striving to teach and preach the gospel and plant the Standard of Christianity.[469]

The reference made in the phrase "Standard of Christianity" is related to many discourses in history. First of all, Christianity and Christian missionaries are sharply contrasted to Islam and Islamic teachers as described in the text "...Protestant English and Catholic French Missionaries, both striving to teach and preach the Gospel and plant the Standard of Christianity as opposed to the teaching of Arabs, who entered the country as traders and by whom some knowledge of Islamism had been introduced."[470] Second, despite the apparent divisions that Christians manifest in their various traditions and confessions, they retain the basic teachings of Jesus Christ who is considered the principle and foundation of their faith. So in the text there was an attempt to address these differences and present Christianity as basically one but with manifold expressions. "It was necessary to rectify the idea that the differences between the Christian religions depended on nationality, a false idea which had led the natives to believe that a Catholic European was necessarily French and that Protestantism exclusively was the religion of the English."[471] Thirdly, there is a Christian ethnocentrism which proclaims Jesus as the Saviour of

[467] Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, *How Natives Think*, 5.
[468] John Biermans, *A Short History of the Vicariate of Upper Nile*, 2.
[469] Ibid., 2.
[470] Ibid., 2.
[471] Ibid., 3.

all mankind and hence it follows that his teaching and all Christianity must be the Standard for regulating human life.

The use of the biblical theme of the Jubilee places the text in both the ancient biblical and Christian traditions although the connections between the understandings may be different. The biblical jubilee is understood as a time of liberty in the community. The biblical text that stipulates the observance of the Jubilee state: "In this Year of Jubilee, each of you shall return to his possession. And if you sell anything to your neighbour or buy from your neighbour's hand, you shall not oppress one another . . . If one of your brethren becomes poor, and falls into poverty among you, and then you shall help him, like a stranger or a sojourner that he may live with you. Take no usury or interest from him; but fear your God, that your brother may live with you. You shall not lend him your money for usury, nor lend him your food at a profit. I am the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, to give you the land of Canaan and to be your God. "And if one of your brethren who dwells by you becomes poor, and sells himself to you, you shall not compel him to serve as a slave. As a hired servant and a sojourner he shall be with you, and shall serve you until the Year of Jubilee. And then he shall depart from you — he and his children with him — and shall return to his own family. He shall return to the possession of his fathers." (Leviticus 25:8-14, 35-41). The Jubilee year was to begin on the Day of Atonement and was a period of emancipation in which in addition to the usual sabbatical observance, all alienated property was returned to the owner. Thus the central tenets of the Jubilee year are related to the practice in the community especially to support the most vulnerable. The major elements of the Jubilee year are: Restoration, Liberty, Respect for the poor and Solidarity.[472] But its use here is related to the Latin derivative jubilo meaning shout, as well as Middle Irish '*ilach*' victory cry, or from the Proto-Indo-European root *yu- that stands for shout for joy. That explains why the text talks of the "...the year of its jubilee"[473] in other words, the year of joy with its concomitant attitudes of celebration, of joy.

The text is fairly interdiscursive as it makes use of extracts from the letters and diaries of missionaries of the pioneer caravan, passages from the bible, the British colonial administration and Church history. There are three extracts from the original letters of the missionaries of the pioneer caravan which written on their way from Mombasa to Kampala. The first extract was drawn from a letter written at Endoma Ravine on 5th August, 1895, the second is drawn from a letter on September 1st, 1895 on the occasion of crossing from Busoga into Buganda and the third extract is drawn from a letter on arrival at Mengo on September 10th, 1895.[474]

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472 Simeon Tsetim Iber, *The Principle of Subsidiarity in Catholic Social Thought: Implications for Social Justice and Civil Society in Nigeria* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. 2011), 97.
473 John Biermans, *A Short History of the Vicariate of Upper Nile*, 1.
474 Ibid., 6, 7, 12.

There are other extracts from the diaries of the missionaries describing their experience in Uganda.

In their descriptions as reported from the diaries, they talk about the difficulties of travelling from the coast to Uganda: "The party of seven Missionaries from Mill Hill who left the Coast for Uganda towards the close of 1896, has had, we regret to say, a very trying journey. They took the southern route through the German territory and not only had many misadventures along their road, but also suffered very severely from sickness...."[475] The text of Alice Monica Forbes details the problems and difficulties which partially were met within the mission. Chief among them is the lack of roads and the wilderness in which missionaries had to trek hundreds of kilometres.[476] The biblical discourse is used in passages that compare labour and pain and the work of the missionaries and the ones comparing the mission work in Uganda to the text about the Kingdom of heaven as a mustard seed.[477] The text draws heavily on the anthropological and geographical discourse as it describes some African tribes as hostile, wild, primitive, truculent and having no natural civilisation.[478] And it gives the heights and length and size of the geographical features in measurable terms. "....the equatorial line, exactly 35.48" east, just beyond a stream known as the Besoi River, 6, 650 feet above sea level....The Eldoma station is 7.000 ft above sea level,.....Eldoma Ravine is 300 feet deep and ....and the Mau Mountains lie at a height of 8,275 feet; and there are examples scattered in the text.[479] It as well applies the colonial discourse by referring to the Imperial British East African Company as the ruling power in Uganda.[480]

The text follows a narrative genre as a medium for the representation of historical facts and processes related with the Mill Hill Mission in Uganda. By narrative discourse we mean a discourse that gives an account of events, usually in the past, that employs verbs of speech, motion, and action to describe a series of events that are contingent one on another, and that typically focuses on one or more performers of actions. It is argued that what makes narrative unique among text types is its chronologic, it's doubly temporal logic.[481] In the introduction of the text, here in analysis, therefore gives the outline and the confines within which this discourse is located. It opens with a time frame and the major subjects of this narrative: Twenty-five years have now since passed the first priests of St. Joseph's Foreign Mission Society to enter Africa left the Mother House at Mill Hill London"

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475 Ibid., 21.
476 Frances Alice Monica Forbes, *Planting the Faith in Darkest Africa: The Life story of Father Simeon Lourdel*, (London: Sands and Co.), chapters 2&3.
477 John Biermans, *A Short History of the Vicariate of Upper Nile*, 6, 32, 34.
478 Ibid., 5, 7, 11, 29, 31.
479 Ibid., 7, 16, 17.
480 Ibid., 3, 15.
481 Abbott H. Porter, *The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 16.

...and it ends the introduction with an invitation.... "It is opportune, therefore, to give an account of the origin of the Upper Nile Vicariate, in the year of its jubilee, and to mark the progress that has been made during these twenty-five years."[482] In the conclusion the text talks of another twenty five years as a future event connected to the last twenty years: "But wailing and wriggling of hands will not avail us much, so we shall begin another term of twenty five years with a perfect trust in the guidance of God, and in the never-failing charity of our benefactors and friends. And in another instance, the text talks of twenty five as a past event that could be evaluated of its merits and successes and an expression of inadequacy in what have been achieved as it claims that much more needs to be done: Much has been done during the past twenty five years, much more remains to be done...."[483]

The text is scattered with various descriptions of African 'tribes' which carry some surreptitious references to the combined efforts in the fields of linguistics, archaeology, conventional history, physical anthropology and other social sciences where such a theme is more developed. It has been presumed by Greenberg that the major discourse to describe the traditional African way of life may be called the tribal way. In spite of the vast diversity of custom, language and race, the basic outlines of the tribal manner of living show everywhere a certain general similarity particularly when contrasted with the institutions of modern industrialism and nationalism. The tribe as a group of people inhabiting a common territory, speaking a common dialect or language, practicing similar customs and bound by ties of real or fictitious common descent from a single ancestor is very characteristic of African societies.[484] The texts describes the "...the caravan route of eight or nine hundred miles passed through a wild and varying country, peopled with hostile tribes who lived in the most primitive fashion...." and it talks of "...Not one single catholic priest at work among the scores of distinct tribes peopling that country..." And it uses various other representations like "...the treacherous wild tribes..." "...settling among the numerous tribes to be met with between the coast and the lake," "....the countries inhabited by these peoples are scornfully referred to by the kilted tribes as the countries of the Great Unclad" "....open up a station among the more primitive and ignorant tribes....." "....when this truculent tribe will witness the coming of priests...." "Many tribes differing from one another in every respect..." "....since illiteracy had held in bondage these newly discovered tribes." "....the beginning of a greater work among the abandoned tribes."[485] In the above references to the use of the term tribe, there are a number of discourses in the text which are not adequately accounted for but make themselves apparent in the phrases in which it is used.

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[482] John Biermans, *A Short History of the Vicariate of Upper Nile*, 1.
[483] Ibid., 39.
[484] Joseph H. Greenberg, "African Tongues and Tribes," *The Rotarian: An International Magazine* (April 1960): 35.
[485] John Biermans, *A Short History of the Upper Nile Vicariate*, 4, 7, 10, 11, 17, 18, 32. See also Frances Alice Monica Forbes, *Planting the Faith in Darkest Africa*, chapters 2&3.

The discourses within the text are testimony that its production and distribution was not meant to be consumed by a Ugandan audience This is attested to the description of Uganda and language medium used in the text which was unfamiliar in Uganda since in the text the missionaries themselves had the task of learning the local language. It is articulated in the text that "The language was for a long while an important study, as without knowledge of it, the missionaries could not order, nor instruct the natives.....and so ...setting themselves diligently to study Luganda was no mean task."[486] The text shifts from Ugandan discourses and talks in generalised terms on Africa in a mood more likely to be for another audience: "But the wattle-and daub buildings will be a familiar sight in Africa for centuries to come, for there are regions still untrod by missionary feet, and generations of missionaries in a still unreckoned future will come and open up new stations...."[487] In other instances, the author of the text positions himself in the middle of the discussion by describing one community for the other: "I am talking now, of course, of practical results, after thirteen years work among these people. I reality, the tribes in Bukedi and Kavirondo were so very primitive and were ridiculed to such an extent by natives of more advanced tribes, that work was begun among them as an experiment."[488]

And in other discourses, the text addresses an anonymous audience with such authority on the facts about Africa: "To people unacquainted with conditions in Africa, the above account of what has been done during the twenty-five years of the existence of the Upper Nile Vicariate may not seem extraordinary. But let them bear in mind that we are in a country, where one has always to be most careful of his health, where the fierce rays of a blazing sun beat down on one all day long and all the stinging insects seek their sustenance in human blood, where swamps and marshes charge the air with poisonous damps, where singles priests are working a parish as big as a home diocese, where building, carpentry, brick-making, surveying and other professions fall under the heading of ordinary parish duties...."[489]

The discourses on Episcopal power and Church Unity are referred to implicitly and with less emphasis. In the text, these discourses are presented as a normal consequence of the founding of the Vicariate but carry deep historical and theological nuances. The text hypothesizes that, "The founding of a new Vicariate naturally led to the question of appointing a new Vicar-Apostolic."[490] But this seemingly insignificant question of the Vicar-Apostolic is meant to satisfy the principle of Unity, one of the characteristics of the Catholic Church. That the Church is one, there is needed to guarantee that unity which in another way suggests the fact that the Church is hierarchical. This, therefore, resonates with the

[486] Ibid., 14-15.
[487] Ibid., 20.
[488] Ibid., 29.
[489] Ibid., 37-38.
[490] Ibid., 3.

phrase "*ubi episcopus, ibi ecclesia"* (where the bishop is, there is the Church), which sums up Catholic teaching on this point. It is this principle which guarantees the validity of the sacraments and other liturgical actions in an ecclesiastical territory. It is further postulated that Church communion, in its perfection, takes shape as the existential common or social life of believers gathered round the altar and the Bishops, in virtue of their sacramental status, have an authority which has partial expression in juridical terms.[491] This Episcopal authority and centrality in the Church is referred to in the text that after his consecration in Rome, "...His Lordship left Mill Hill with Fathers Matthews, Kerstens, Plunkett and Prendergast..."[492] who are described as "...his Associates in the great work."[493] However, the *Ubi Episcopus* phrase is challenged with arguments which favour what they assert as a more deeply true phrase that: *Ubi Eucharistia, Ibi Ecclesia* which means that the local church centred in the Eucharist which can only be celebrated as a space-time event, is, as has been said, one of a number of cells of which contains the whole living mystery of the one body of Christ. That it is at the local level of Eucharistic fellowship that the people of God actually live and that Christ is made present through that people.[494]

In speaking about catechists this text refers to a social position that is also mentioned in *Les Chroniques Trimestrielles* but not in the other texts that were described in the previous subsection. The work of the catechists was considered to be very essential and was greatly acknowledged by the missionaries as the text that is analysed here clarifies that: "Catechists are at work in all the countries between Nsambya, the capital, and Fovera, the most northerly point of the vicariate, and in many an isolated village of the beaten track between Fovera and the 'German' border, a continual droning may be heard where children are gathered round a catechist, who is teaching them their prayers and the words of the catechism."[495] In *Les Chroniques* it is said that the catechists are the most valuable auxiliaries of the missionaries, that their number at one time totalled 77, that through the Catechists the missionaries recruit catechumens already educated in the great truth of the religion, informed of the trials of Christians, and that the sick are visited and baptised in *articulo mortis*.[496] Biermans considers that the catechists were accordingly fundamental in the success of the missionary undertaking and his text recounts their contribution thus: "Helping these fathers is a regiment of native catechists, through whom the work is spread further afield."[497] The work of the catechists is applauded highly in the Chronicles thus: "The Catechists are very helpful and especially those living in areas contaminated by sleeping sickness show admirable

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491 Michael A. Hayes and Liam Gearon, eds., *Contemporary Catholic Theology: A Reader* (New York: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1998), 365. Cfr. *Les Chroniques Trimestrielles 1879-1909*.
492 John Biermans, *A Short History of the Vicariate of Upper Nile*, 4.
493 Ibid., 4.
494 Michael A. Hayes and Liam Gearoneds., *Contemporary Catholic Theology, A Reader*, 365.
495 John Biermans, *A Short History of Vicariate of Upper Nile*, 36.
496 *Les Chroniques Trimestrielles (1879-1909).*
497 John Biermans, *A short History of Vicariate of Upper Nile*, 36.

dedication. They do not abandon their patients; they expose themselves each day to this terrible scourge."[498] But the Chronicles also say that various obstacles to the faith "make Catechists feel their zeal slow down". And due to lack of finances, their number reduced, others were left on their own, or temporarily left their work to meet their most pressing needs.

As hinted on above, the missionary enterprise in Uganda had a fruitful collaboration between the missionaries and the local agents especially the catechists and the native sisters. In the narrative of the work of the native sisters, the text outlines it with glowing admiration: "They do the school-work, visit the nearest catechumenates and villages, to find out the children of school age, visit those who are inclined to be slack, etc... Being themselves Baganda, they have a marked influence on the people, who really respect them, and their quiet control over the noisy groups of school children is wonderful."[499] In contrast to the *Les Chroniques Trimestrielles*, there is scant mention of the work of the native sisters. It is mainly the work of the White Sisters that is mostly commended. The text says: "The White Sisters are responsible for the cleanliness of various types of patients, and teach catechism to those who have not yet been baptised."[500]

Summarizing the findings in this subsection we note that in speaking about "pagan", "primitive" and "wild" natives this missionary text is heavily influenced by theories and their vocabularies in philosophy and anthropology as we have seen in chapter two in reference to Lévy-Bruhl. The catechists performed auxiliary roles to the missionaries. But they were perceives as "helpers" and in no way equals to the missionaries. The differences and sharp categories used to portray the people surpassed any common ground to have meaningful conversation between the two categories of people. But despite all these discourses, the texts are rooted in a strong Christian foundation that informs their production because they end in a prayer like mantra: "Let us rely on Providence who will never abandon his people."[501]

Analysis of Social Practice

The third level of analysis is of social practice or the analysis of the socio-cognitive effects of the text. Again Fairclough mentions a variety of tools for doing this.[502] Here the main focus is on ideology and hegemony. The guiding questions are: What is the link between language use and social reality in terms of belief systems, social identities and social relations? Are they simply reproduced or transformed by the way they speak about them?

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498 Cf. *Les Chroniques Trimestrielles*(1879-1909).
499 John Biermans, *A Short History of Vicariate of Upper Nile*, 37.
500 Cf. *Les Chroniques Trimestrielles*.
501 Ibid.
502 Fairclough Norman, *Discourse and Social Change*, 86-96; 237-238.

In describing the social structure of the Vicariate of Upper Nile, the text looks at each group of people as a distinct cluster that inhabits the whole vicariate. There is no uniform characteristic for the whole vicariate. Each group is considered separately and the language used is representative of the hegemonic struggles between races. According Teun van Dijk, "these various mental strategies and representations of individual speakers in positions of power are of course premised on the condition that white speakers share their attitudes and more fundamental anti-black ideologies with other whites, that is, as a legitimation of their dominance. This also explains why in similar situations other white missionaries may engage in similar behaviour, and how through repeated instances in various contexts Africans may learn to interpret specific discourse forms as being racist."[503] The text here in analysis describes the people in the Vicariate both leaders and dependent alike as "…pagan hordes."[504] And the text defines the route from Mombasa as "….a wild and varying country, peopled with hostile tribes who lived in the most primitive fashion, with no signs of civilisation to be met with and where the only human guides along that unknown way were strange native men, who scarcely knew one word of English or French."[505] Some of these descriptions of the people lead to the fact that language and conceptual ideas can be dramatic sites of violent imperial activities in which the humanity of others' is violated.

The text describes the Ugandan society as a society of conflicts both from within and from without the country. It talks of the Ugandan society having a despot King and the people were in abject servility. And they were not helped by the coming of the religious teachers because the text reports of the conflicts that sprung from religious differences and the confusion that ensued thereafter. It describes the conflicts that were brought by the differences between the Protestant and Catholic missionaries as "…unaccountable in the land, which had only known the power of a despot King… and since Protestant English and Catholic French missionaries both (were) striving to teach and preach the Gospel and plant the Standard of Christianity as opposed to the teaching of the Arabs..."[506] The text talks of another conflict which was bred by the practices which the King introduced into his court and was discountenanced by members of any faith and this brought him into collision with them. The executions which are described in the great Ugandan holocaust are attributed to the evil practices of the King since they brought him into an open conflict with believers. The text narrates that: "…several cruel executions followed, and the persecutions of both Christians and Mohamedans became so vehement, that…a strong feeling grew up for the deposition of Mwanga and he knew it."[507] The text presents the King as the cause of his own deposition

[503] Teun van Dijk, "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis," 249-283.
[504] John Biermans, *A short History of Vicariate of Upper Nile*, 2.
[505] Ibid., 4.
[506] Ibid., 2.
[507] Ibid., 2.

because of his unbecoming practices for he is branded as a "…vicious youth."[508] The text stratifies the society into three substrata. There are the local people called the natives, the European missionaries, both Catholic French and English Protestant Missionaries and Arabs with their Mohamedan religion. These three groups have come to form the major discourses in the Ugandan society and their eventual competition for hegemony has influenced the history and social relations in Uganda up to this day.

In chapter two which discusses the founding of the new Vicariate, the text does not mention at all the details about the size and borders of this new ecclesiastical zone. There is an intended silence which portrays the ignorance about the geographical coverage of this territory. This explains why the text applies an imagination to give a faint glimpse of what this new Vicariate looks like. "We can imagine the Fathers standing on the hill and picturing to themselves the natural wonders, the Vicariate would one day reveal to them and their successors, and seeing in imagination the hundreds of distinct tribes, - Pastoral, agricultural, and hunting tribes they were eventually to meet with in this huge Vicariate that began where they stood and stretched on and on, covering an area of forty thousand square miles."[509] It is not clear whether the figure given here, forty thousand square miles, is actual or imaginary. This is so, because the text refers to the Decree of Foundation of 1894 and another decree of 1895 that defines the size of the Vicariate as "…all those regions which were under British rule and which formerly looked to the Vicariate of Unyanyembe for spiritual protection."[510] Also, it goes on in a sort of rigmarole to describe the Vicariate in such uncertain terms using the physical natural features prevalent in this region to attempt describe its scope.

It mentions "…the edge of the mighty lake, half of which was in the Vicariate. The text indicates also as borders "…the huge islands of the lake, some of which are as large as an English county; in the country of Bukedi, again a country of great lakes, chief of which is Lake Kioga, then the unexplored country through the wastes of Turkana as far as Lake Rudolph in the north. The Eastern boundary runs from Lake Rudolph to the west of Mount Kenia across the Masai Reserves and over the rolling plains of Nakuru. Among the natural wonders embraced by the Vicariate boundaries are the great lakes, Nyanza, Kioga, Nakuru, Naivasha and Sutoga, the rivers Nile, Sezibwa and Mporagoma in Uganda and the Nzoia, Yala and Lusumu Rivers in Kavirondo. So far as mountains are concerned at least three huge extinct volcanoes are worthy of mention – Mount Elgon on the borders of Bukedi and Kavirondo, Longonot near Naivasha and Mount Menengai at Nakuru. Such was the country that opened itself before the first Mill Hill men as they stood on the crest of Nsambya Hill and peered into the future.[511] This mode of description is

[508] Ibid., 2.
[509] Ibid., 15.
[510] Ibid., 15-16.
[511] Ibid., 16-17.

still prevalent in the Ugandan society today as people using natural features like trees, swamps, hills, stones and other noticeable natural features as signpost of their address to their homes, businesses and stages for bus stops. It is indicative that the country is not yet fully explored and scientifically demarcated even after a hundred years of contact with the external world. This is an area that is not yet conversable with the external world.

In analysing the various African peoples, the text carries a scientific discourse of objectivity of observation where the author presents himself as a detached observer. Looking at the world impersonally, neutrally and indifferently, which is the view of a detached objective observer, is a way of relating it from a certain perspective.[512] This is expressed in the way the text looks at the various African peoples and the description made of the developments realised in their social and cultural setting and the place of the missionary among them. In talking about the natives of Uganda, the text describes them as "…centuries ahead of any other tribe of Central and East Africa and had already loomed large in history long before the existence of other East African races had been made known to an outer world."[513] They are described as "…intellectually superior to all the surrounding peoples, whom they despise, and while their inferior neighbours are governed by petty chiefs, who were always warring one against another, the Baganda acknowledged the supreme sovereignty of one king over all the country. The Baganda were always a perfectly clothed people while even the full-dress of the less advanced tribes consisted only of a spare covering of animal skins or a fibre kilt."[514] The text describes the districts of Bukedi and Kavirondo as "…inhabited by the people referred to as the kilted tribes and as the countries of the Great Unclad."[515] And in an apparent detached, indifferent, disinterested, neutral, impartial and privileged mode the text portrays the work of the missionary among such people with glowing self-flattery. "Only the missionary who opens up a station among the more primitive and ignorant tribes can realise what a happiness it is to see the baptised children of Christian marriages coming for daily religious instructions. When he compares the childhood of these little creatures with the childhood of their parents and considers what the grace of baptism has done these people, his heart overflows with gratitude to God for having deigned to call him to share in the work of His Apostles."[516]

The text is deeply rooted in the traditional perception of mission as an outside activity organised from outside and accomplished by outside missionary agents. The text here in analysis presents, implicitly, this contrast between the Christian society and the mission field when it states the "…arrival and reception of the Mill

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512 Lawrence W. Neuman, *Social Research Methods*, 4th ed., (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999), 9.
513 John Biermans, *A Short History of the Vicariate of Upper Nile*, 10.
514 Ibid., 10.
515 Ibid., 10.
516 Ibid., 11.

Hill priests in Uganda."[517] And it describes the gradual springing up of new mission stations in the Vicariate and what they are now as a result of the work of the successors of these very same men, who bring out forcibly the powerful influence of missionary endeavour."[518] The text portrays the work in the Vicariate as the work of the Missionaries for it states that "….there are whole regions still untrod by missionary feet, and generations of missionaries in a still unreckoned future will come and open up new stations in much the same way as the first men from Mill Hill opened up Nsambya and Nagalama."[519] In discussing the subject of maintaining the vigour of the missionary work in the Vicariate, the text confirms that "… a request was sent to Mill Hill for more men,"[520] and that "…as many priests as possible were selected from the annual ordination groups."[521] While talking about the health condition of priests in the Vicariate, the author talks of sending home those who are sick and weakened by missionary work to recuperate but gives a condition that he gets "…other priests to take their places first..."[522] This practice of mission could be understood in the dominant paradigm of mission at the time which considered mission in terms of social contrast. In this approach, Christian mission was conceived of mainly in geographical terms. Mission consisted in crossing geographic frontiers for the purpose of taking the gospel from the 'Christian West' to the mission fields of the 'non-Christian world,' the heathen.

However, despite the above developments, there are some subliminal discourses in the text which are very critical to the understanding of the success of Christian mission in the Ugandan Church. These are not so pronounced but they could be considered the protagonists of mission history in Uganda. In giving, for instance, the origins of Nagalama mission, the text outlines the work already done by the catechists: "For some months three native catechists had been teaching there. Four hundred catechumens living in the midst of Protestants gave every evidence of their good-will and desire to become Catholics."[523] In recounting the events surrounding the opening of new mission stations in some districts, the text observes that "All the chiefs were very friendly."[524] In the following pages, it continues to register the position and the contribution of the Catechists in the success of the mission when it states that: Helping these fathers is a regiment of native catechists through whom the work is spread further afield."[525] And it gives evidence when it states that "…and in the most out of the way places (one) will meet natives wearing medals of Our Lady, which they got from some catechists."[526]

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[517] Ibid., 9.
[518] Ibid., 10.
[519] Ibid., 20.
[520] Ibid., 20.
[521] Ibid., 27.
[522] Ibid., 32.
[523] Ibid., 18.
[524] Ibid., 28.
[525] Ibid., 36.
[526] Ibid., 36.

The text gives a universal presence of this institution of Catechists when it claims that, "…Catechists are at work in all the countries between Nsambya, the capital, and Fovera, the most northerly point of the vicariate, and in many an isolated village of the beaten track….a continual droning may be heard where children are gathered round a catechist who is teaching them their prayers and the words of the catechism."[527] Evidence in the text of the local agency in the success of mission in Uganda is reported in the work of the native nuns as well. The text reports that "Four of these nuns have been at work in the Nkokonjeru mission for the past six months. They do the school work, visit the nearest catechumenates and villages, to find out the children of school age, visit those who are inclined to be slack, etc. Being themselves Baganda, they have a marked influence on the people, who really respect them, and their quiet control over noisy groups of school children is wonderful."[528] The text goes on to recognise the work of the sisters when it claims that "…preparations are being made in other Uganda missions, for the reception of more and more members of the native sisterhood."[529] This observation resonates well with the texts from the White Fathers which gives the details of the emergence of the local mission agents as it notes that "The missionaries began withdrawing from certain regions where the Church had enough indigenous personnel."[530]

Conclusion

The mission texts that we have described (section 1) and analysed (section 2) in this chapter constitute and are constituted by the early missionary period in Uganda. These texts are rooted in a missionary paradigm that was informed by the philosophical and anthropological distinction between "civilized" and "primitive" people of the time. Although the Catholic natives identified themselves saying "we are cured", "we are healed", and the missionaries noted "absence of wildness" among them, the social relation between the missionaries and the natives was not a relation between equals. Native catechists and nuns were identified as "helpers" of the fathers, but a dialogue or conversation in the sense of Rorty was not yet within the missionaries' horizon.

For Richard Rorty conversation is built on anti-foundationalist principles where "the good kind of prophet thinks of herself as just someone who has a better idea, on an epistemological par with the people... Good prophets say that if we all got together and did such and such, we would probably like the results. They paint pictures of what this brighter future would look like, and write scenarios about how it might be brought about."[531] This is the basis of conversation. He contrasts this

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527 Ibid., 36.
528 Ibid., 37.
529 Ibid., 37.
530 Marinus Rooijackers, *The Beginning of the White Fathers' Mission in Southern Uganda and the Organisation of the Catechumenate, 1879-1914* (Rome: Society of Missionaries of Africa, 2008).
531 Richard Rorty, "What can you Expect from Anti-foundationalist Philosophers?: A Reply to Lynn Baker," *Virginia Law Review*, Vol. 78, No. 3 (April, 1992): 719-727.

with the other "...prophet, the kind who thinks herself the voice of something bigger and more authoritative than the possible consequences of the application of her ideas."[532] This is the foundationalist claim where prophets think of themselves as not just one more voice in the conversation, but as the representative of something that is somehow more than another such voice.[533]

This is what formed the early mission paradigm in Uganda with its sharp categories and differences that considered the people in Uganda as subjects of mission work and civilisation rather than as active participants in their own process of missionary practice. However, there was a growing appreciation of "Catholic natives" who "manifested intelligence" and "native catechists" who were considered to be "helpers of the missionaries" in propagating the true faith.

We have conducted the analysis in this chapter with conversation as our sensitizing concept. At this stage we cannot adequately describe what conversation as mission model would entail. But certainly we would draw upon the notion of conversation as Rorty used it in his ideal of 'keeping the conversation going.'[534] In the next chapter, we shall describe and analyse pastoral documents of Kampala Archdiocese yet again with conversation as the sensitizing concept.

[532] Ibid., 722.
[533] Ibid., 724.
[534] Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 377, 378.

Chapter Four:
Mission Concepts in the present: A Discourse Analysis

Introduction

In this chapter, the main emphasis is placed on describing and analysing mission practice in Kampala Archdiocese as reflected in the official church texts. This covers the contemporary period when the Church is under the stewardship of the indigenous episcopate and clergy as the foremost mission agents. The texts in our analysis are basically from Kampala Archdiocese because it represents the earliest missionary movements in Uganda as far back as the 19th century. But the present Kampala Archdiocese was erected in 1966 after the merger of the former Archdiocese of Lubaga which was being administered by the Missionaries of Africa (White Fathers), and a part of the former Kampala diocese which was under the administration of the Mill Hill Missionaries.[535] The Archdiocese boasts of this double heritage which forms and informs the basis of her mission practice today.

The present Kampala Archdiocese has had three Archbishops since its inception. These are: His Eminence Emmanuel Cardinal Nsubuga (1966-1990), His Eminence Emmanuel Cardinal Wamala (1990-2006) and His Grace Cyprian Kizito Lwanga (2006- to date). As any bishop in the Church, the Archbishop of Kampala is bound by the laws of the Church as stipulated in the Code of Canon Law which states that: "A diocesan bishop in the diocese entrusted to him has all ordinary, proper, and immediate power which is required for the exercise of his pastoral function except for cases which the law or a decree of the Supreme Pontiff reserves to the supreme authority or to another ecclesiastical authority."[536] In order to exercise well the pastoral office and fulfil her mission, the archdiocese has held two major diocesan synods in 1989 and 2006[537] and the archbishops past and present have published some pastoral letters to guide the Christians on matters of great concern to their life as Christians. In this chapter therefore, we shall concentrate on reading and analysing these texts focusing on the vocabulary used and the social identities and social relations therein. Furthermore, in this chapter, we shall apply the method of critical discourse analysis, as proposed by Norman Fairclough, in reading and analysing these texts under consideration. The texts that are described in the first section are: (1) *A Catholic's Mission in the Archdiocese of Kampala 2006: Grassroots Evangelization*, (2) *A Pastoral letter: You are the Salt of the earth, the light of the world*, by

535 Cf. Archdiocese of Kampala, *The Five Year Pastoral Strategic Plan (2010-2014*), 7.
536 Cf. Can. 381 §1.
537 From the 1989 Synod which was convened by Cardinal Emmanuel Nsubuga and was to be implemented by Cardinal Emmanuel Wamala, the synodal acts were published as "Obutume Bw'omukatoliki mu ssaza ly'e Kampala 1990" (A Catholic's mission in Kampala Archdiocese 1990) and it was revised in 1999 mini-synod as "Obutume bw'Omukatoliki mu Ssaza ly'e Kampala 1999" (The Catholic's mission in Kampala Archdiocese 1999). In 2006 shortly before his retirement Emmanuel Cardinal Wamala convened another synod and the consequent synodal acts were published as "A Catholic's Mission in the Archdiocese of Kampala 2006: Grassroot Evangelisation."

Emmanuel Cardinal Wamala, (3) *Archdiocese of Kampala: The five year Pastoral Strategic Plan 2010-2014*, and (4) *The Pastoral Letter: Partnership for the Gospel* of Archbishop Cyprian Kizito Lwanga. In the second section the Five Year Strategic Plan is analysed in detail.

1. Description of pastoral documents

In this section, I will describe Kampala Archdiocesan pastoral documents written either as pastoral letters of bishops or as synodal resolutions or as pastoral strategic plans. These documents outline the policies and pastoral programs of the Archdiocese and they may be correctly referred to as the policy-reference-documents of the Archdiocese as far as pastoral practice and programs and actions are concerned. These documents are designed and addressed particularly to the local church of Kampala Archdiocese as the main audience of their consumption. The texts described here are written mainly in English which, together with Luganda, are the two languages officially adopted for use in the archdiocese. The choice of these languages reflects the interaction between the national language policy that adopted English as the official language and Luganda as the language of the region in which the archdiocese is found. And the two languages are spoken widely in the area under consideration.

A Catholic's Mission in the Archdiocese of Kampala 2006

In 2006, Kampala Archdiocese convened the 6th synod in its 40 years of existence and the synodal resolutions were promulgated on August 15, 2006. Unlike the previous synods, the 2006 synod had a different arrangement of the synodal resolutions, into three parts each with subparts under it. The major divisions are: (a) the Sanctifying Office of the Church, (b) the Teaching Office of the Church and (c) the Governing Office of the church. This division is rooted in the understanding of the baptismal grace which incorporates the baptised person in the threefold ministry of Christ as Priest (Sanctifier), King (Leader) and Prophet (Teacher). The 2006 synod wanted to go back to the basics of Christian life as founded in baptism and this explains why the main theme was Grassroots Evangelisation. This implied going back to baptism, that primordial sacrament that initiates one in the Christian life in which one is grafted in the godhead of Christ. The synodal resolutions were all written, primarily, in English with a glossary of Luganda words used in the text. The document has a brief introduction by Emmanuel Cardinal Wamala who was the Archbishop by then. He presents to the Christians the resolutions of the synod with a call on all to hold the responsibility of working on deepening the faith in oneself and in others.

The first part is titled "The sanctifying office of the Church" and has nine sections. The first section describes the liturgy because it is considered as "the summit toward which the activity of the Church is directed; at the same time it is the

fountain from which all the Church's power flows."[538] The second section outlines the work and role of Catechists. The third section illustrates the apostolate of Catholic health facilities and the policy to guide them. The fourth section gives details about the role and work of Caritas in the Church and its biblical foundation. The fifth section deals with the Pontifical Missionary Societies and their contribution in the work of evangelisation. The sixth section deals with Lay Apostolate Movements in the work of deepening religion and directing Christians travelling on the theme of the word of God in their daily lives. The seventh section talks about Ecumenism in the effort of cooperation with Christians of other denominations. The eighth section talks about Marriage and Family life as the basis of the church and human society. The ninth section is about the mass media communication as a means of the church to fulfil her mission by proclaiming the gospel, to build and spread the kingdom of God.

In the second part, "The Teaching Office of the Church" the stress is laid on the prophetic ministry of the church and how to realise the same in the concrete pastoral practices. It is divided into four parts. The first section is about the teaching of Catechism where this duty is given to every baptised person but primarily starting with parents since the family is described as the primordial church. Others named in this duty are bishops, priests, the religious, catechists and teachers. The second section is about Christian education and this is contextualised in schools and as a consequence a teacher is considered the right hand of the church in matters pertaining to education. The third section sketches out the priestly and religious vocations. It maintains that the priestly vocation stems out of the Christian vocation in the sacrament of baptism and a Catholic is chosen to share in the priesthood of Christ the head, to feed the church with the word and sacraments. Whereas a religious is a man or woman determined to follow Christ and to be his witness in the world in obedience, poverty, and evangelical chastity. The fourth section outlines the relationship between the youth and the church. This section looks different from the rest because the title seems to suggest a rupture as in the text it says that young people are asserting themselves very strongly and are also exerting a lot of influence. The church therefore cannot ignore their importance. The document proposes an engagement with the youth in a friendly dialogue so that they may assist them through sound advice and guidance to develop them and to participate in apostolic work.[539]

The third part titled "The governing Office of the Church" with eight sections intends to develop the common vision of leadership in the church without distinction between laity and clergy. The first section outlines the roles of pastoral councils. It highlights the developments that came up with the merger of the lay apostolate councils and the parish and archdiocesan councils to form one pastoral

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[538] Second Vatican Council, *Sacrosanctum Concilium. On the Sacred Liturgy, December 4, 1963* 10; *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 1074.

[539] Second Vatican Council, *Apostolicam Actuositatem: Decree On the Laity*, November 18, 1965 12.

council comprising the clergy and laity so as to carry out pastoral activities smoothly. The second section deals with politics and it exhorts and encourages all the citizens to be mindful of their rights and duty to work hard and actively by participating in the service of their nation without claiming that politics is none of my concern. The third section deals with finances because the church as the body of Christ needs money to be able to fulfil her apostolate. The fourth section is about land which is considered to fall within the church's inherent right and full authority to acquire, retain, administer and sell temporal goods independently aiming at fulfilling her mission.[540] And land as a temporal good of the church must be strictly preserved and properly used. The text gives the four categories of land in the archdiocese: 1. Freehold, 2. Mailoland, 3. Leaseland and 4. Plots. It goes into the details of the challenges about land, the policy to guide land matters and the strategies to develop the land available. Section five is about cemeteries and places where our friends are buried. It gives the teaching of the church about cemeteries, the challenges and the policy that would guide the use of cemeteries in the archdiocese. Section six is about construction as a very important aspect of the life of the church for it gives the church a visible presence in society. The types of buildings mentioned that must be taken care of in this department are: The Church, the Priests House, Houses for the religious, parish hall, health centre and schools. All these buildings must be approved by the archbishop before they are put up. Section seven gives the synodal resolutions and recommendations from each of the fourteen departments. Section eight is the appendix indicating the delegates to the synod and their different backgrounds.

You are the Salt of the Earth, the light of the World

This is a pastoral letter written by His Eminence Emmanuel Cardinal Wamala in preparation for the February 2001 general elections. It opens with a greeting in the name of Our Lord Jesus Christ and addressed to "all of you my brothers and sisters: Priests, Religious men and women, lay people in the Catholic Church."[541] Then he equally greets all peace loving Ugandans with whom we share faith in God, the Creator of us all.

It is divided into four sections. The first section is titled: A challenging moment in the history of our country. He opens this section with an apparent general consensus that "we all agree that we are living through a challenging time both in the world and in Uganda."[542] And with this fact, he detaches himself from all the rest and considers it his responsibility to "help the Christian faithful and the people of goodwill to reflect upon various issues and trends which are relevant to us today as citizens of this country."[543] Although he indicates that he is to reflect on various

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[540] Cf. Can. 1254.

[541] Emmanuel Cardinal Wamala, *Pastoral Letter: You are the Salt of the earth, the light of the world*, (Lubaga, January 1, 2001), 3.

[542] Ibid., 3.

[543] Ibid., 3.

issues and trends, he highlights only "the forthcoming Presidential and parliamentary elections"[544] and he observes that there is already rising interest among the electorate and the candidates.

Section two is titled: Recalling Archbishop Joseph Kiwanuka's Pastoral Letter on "Church and State."[545] In this section, he likens the period in which he is writing this letter with the period preceding Uganda's independence in 1962. Archbishop Joseph Kiwanuka wrote a pastoral letter on "Church and State" as the guiding principle for the people of that time. He states that it left a deep impression in him and hence suggests that 40 years later it may offer good guidance. He points out that the Archbishop was a prophet because he announced that our country would go through many types of governments. He laments that we have lost so much time and energies for development and have roamed in darkness; he questioned if it is not that we have thrown our faith in God and our religious values out of political endeavours? He notes that to realise the development of the people and to serve the common good there is a need for a deep sense of justice which is one of the fruits in our life of our faith in God. And so to prepare a better society, there must be a spirit of conversion and renewal. In light of the above, he mentions a number of actors in Uganda's political life. First, he mentions the political candidates and what it means to be a candidate for a political office. Secondly, the electorate with whom he identifies by saying that "our lack of sufficient and objective civic education leads us to be unaware of our role and power through our vote."[546] But he also speaks away from them when he says that "the electorate should be educated to be responsible and to ask constantly accountability from their representatives."[547] Thirdly, he talks about the participation of the people when he calls upon each voter to remind himself or herself that it is an inalienable right to participate responsibly in the life of our country. He mentions the qualities of good, honest, courageous politicians and also committed people who know their rights and duty to participate actively in the life of the nation."[548]

On the relationship between religion and politics, Church and State, he recalls the age-old song sung by some people claiming with such catchphrases "keep religion out of politics;" "take religion out of our schools;" "religious leaders should leave politicians alone"; as religion is seen as a factor of division, limit it to the private sphere of the life of the people." In an apparent reply to the above with what he has called a song, he provides a few guidelines about the relationship between religion and politics. First, he outlines the main task of the government as enabling people to live in peace, in harmony and to enjoy their rights. He describes the

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544 Ibid., 4.
545 In this Pastoral letter, Archbishop Joseph Kiwanuka urged democratic maturity and rule of law as the nation sought independence.
546 Emmanuel Wamala, *You are Salt of the Earth*, 6.
547 Ibid., 6.
548 Ibid., 7.

government as 'good' when it does whatever to build a society where there is peace, where the rights of everyone and of all are respected and promoted, where all are given opportunity to participate and exercise their responsibilities, with an economy serving the whole community regardless of status. As for the Church, it actualises the constitutional mandate of the freedom of worship which he says Ugandans would take advantage of to serve well their God and their countrymen as true believers in God. As a consequence, faith should be reflected in society when true believers will promote the gospel values through their practical contribution to the betterment of the society. So, the relationship between Church and State should be guided by mutual respect and a fruitful collaboration, as both are serving the same human person and society as a whole. The Church and State have distinct services to offer and a particular mission to fulfil in society and therefore he calls on each institution to value and acknowledge each other's distinct role.

He contends that as the church does her work motivated by her faith in God, so also the civil rulers must do fulfil their obligations. He thinks that because civil rulers serve human beings made in the image of God, so they must feel bound by the laws of God, so relate all their activities to God. This has consequences for if a ruler even when engaged in state duties and neglect to concern himself with religion, he would be openly violating God's law and would not achieve the end for which he was created as well as that for which the country he governs was created. Then faith and religion have an obvious role to play in strengthening good morals among peoples including rulers. So, no politician could dissociate himself/herself from religion or its principles without incurring guilt or committing a scandal. He indicates that the country needs leaders who could set themselves as examples for the people they lead, with the courage to show their faith and to witness its values. The values that he seems to propose are reported in the negative: not condoning immorality such as corruption, abortion, homosexuality, or any other forms of behaviour which he considers contrary and offensive to both God's law and to our own culture.

In section three, he highlights the kind of government needed in Uganda today. But before that, he provides as a background to achieve this kind of government, the people's knowledge about their rights and duties regarding elections, and their responsibility to promote and choose the government they want. Here, he takes a position to speak with authority and makes an urgent appeal to all to register and to promote and participate in the civic education, so that every person may cast his/her vote being properly enlightened about such responsibilities.[549] In his view, he mentions some of the features of a good government which he considers very important. He mentions these features as exemplary leadership to society, general economic empowerment of the community, integral development of individuals, improving on the quality of life of the people, promoting justice based on social

[549] Ibid., 11.

equity and harmony, work for peace within and outside Uganda's borders, committed to advocate for laws that advance moral rehabilitation and instil a sense of unity in order to achieve the common good.

In the fourth and last section, he suggests practical proposals on how to prepare for the elections. The following are the practical guidelines he suggested to the country in order to prepare for the 2001 elections: First, there is need for proper civic education given by well-intentioned, committed and competent people; the people have to go for registration; potential leaders must be identified and encouraged to offer themselves to stand for election; and finally the right to vote for any candidate must be guided by principles. The underlines the following principles in voting for any candidate: One who is God-fearing; one with high moral character and record; one who has a good understanding of what is right; one who is unselfish and committed to promote the Common Good; and finally one who is firm and objective with ability to judge with the criteria of justice and truth.

In conclusion, he makes reference to the 1994 African Synod when the African Bishops identified the urgency to improve the administration of public affairs in the key areas of politics and economy in order to respond to the challenge of bringing peace and justice in Africa. He reinstates the appeal made earlier that Africa generally and Uganda in particular, needs politicians who are guided by a rightly formed conscience, politicians, who love their country and its people, politicians who like Christ are willing to serve rather than being served. In an apparent invitation to the people of Uganda to be free and make independent decisions, he ends with a quote from 1Peter 2:16 which states: "You are slaves of no one except God, so behave like free people and never use your freedom as a cover for wickedness."

The pastoral Strategic Plan for Kampala Archdiocese (2010 - 2014)

This is a document prepared to implement the synodal resolutions of both Kampala Archdiocese of 2006 and the Second Synod of Bishops for Africa 2009 with the purpose of fostering Grassroots Evangelisation for the Church to be at the service of reconciliation, justice and peace. Further, according to the text, this is to help the church realise her identity of being the salt of the earth and light of the world (Matt. 15:13-14). It is specifically prepared for use in Kampala Archdiocese for a period of five years 2010-2014. It is divided into four parts with four appendices attached.

Part one is divided into 3 sections with other numerous smaller subsections. Section one gives the heritage of the present Kampala Archdiocese. It outlines the history of the Archdiocese and gives the line of succession to the former Archdiocese of Rubaga and Kampala diocese, the two which were merged to form the present Kampala archdiocese. It narrates in brief the history of the archdiocese

with the names of the former and present archbishops and their contribution to the growth of the church in Kampala. Section two is devoted to the Uganda Martyrs singling out their contribution in creating a positive image about Uganda in Africa and all over the world. The martyr are given special mention and inclusion in this section of our heritage because they were not clerics but their faith is talked about as has having set a formidable example which is may be taken as the basis for grassroots evangelization as the theme which was adapted by the 2006 synod of the archdiocese. The martyrs are presented as having a prominent role to play in the life of the Ugandan church and hence the text goes on to outline the contributions of the past Bishops in promoting the devotion to the Ugandan Martyrs. The text recalls the 2006 synod and the need "to bring the Martyrs in the life of the faithful, to promote their devotion especially through an amended Uganda Martyrs Guild which shall be the umbrella organ for the Catholic lay apostolate as a strategy for Grassroots Evangelization."[550] In the last section, the text gives a cursory look at the archdiocesan synod of 2006 whose theme "Grassroots Evangelisation" rhymes with the second synod for Africa whose theme: The Church in Africa in service to Reconciliation, Justice and peace is equivalent to Grassroots Evangelisation. The text sees the two synods as having in common an urgent need, at this historic moment, of an on-going in-depth Grassroots Evangelization.

In section two, special mention is made of the challenges faced today especially the accelerating pace of change, the numbers and complexity of mushrooming sects, poverty, superstitions and witchcraft. With this background, a suggestion is made to develop a renewed sense of direction for the future, "....we need therefore to revise our methods of evangelisation if we are to remain relevant and faithful to the church's mission in this changing world."[551] The Pastoral strategic plan as outlined in part two, gives concrete steps in realising the synodal acts and resolutions which would be accompanied by a process of transformation for the whole archdiocese of Kampala, its staff, its structures, its systems and its management and this plan has as its goal to attempt to address all these mentioned issues and respond to them.[552]

The last section gives, in a summary form, six challenges and their proposed responses. The mentioned challenges end part one and their direct solution is to be found in the Pastoral Strategic Plan which opens the following part and it is noted that in order to face these challenges, the pastoral strategic plan must be effected.

Part two presents the Pastoral Strategic Plan with three sections. In section one; the text gives the pastoral framework which provides the guidelines for all the work of evangelisation in the archdiocese. It provides a common vision for Grassroots Evangelisation in Kampala archdiocese and this vision is found in the motto of the archbishop of Kampala: Ora et Labora (St. Benedict) Ut Habeant Vitam (Jn.10:10)

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[550] Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral strategic plan*, 11.
[551] Ibid., 12.
[552] Ibid., 13.

and it is explained as: Pray and work so that they may have life in its fullness. This implies that all activities done in the Kampala Archdiocese must reflect a spiritual and social development of the people, having in minded what Christ said in reference to being a good shepherd.[553] So, the vision of the archdiocese is set by the archbishop as presented in his motto. However, at this point a distinction is made between the mission of Kampala archdiocese and its vision. The mission statement of Kampala archdiocese is identified with the mission of the entire church as explicated in the gospel text of Mark: Go into the whole world and preach the gospel to the whole world (Mk 16:15). The text goes into details of fulfilling this mission with pledges to play a leading role in the socio-pastoral mission of the Catholic Church through the spreading of the gospel in its entirety of solidarity and social justice. Four ways are suggested in carrying out this mission: (a) providing a forum for dialogue and exchange of ideas among all agents of evangelisation; (b) helping the faithful at all levels to build their capacity through education and on-going formation; (c) acting as a voice or advocate for the cause of the poor at the local council levels and enable them to be their own advocates; (d) facilitating both pastoral and social cooperation within the parishes and archdiocesan departments. In all this, the understanding is that the mission statement should capture the essence and purpose of the Catholic Church in accordance with the vision.

In order to realise grassroots evangelisation, there is a need for affirming the identity, values and principles of the Catholic Church. As for the identity of the Catholic Church, the emphasis is placed on the symbol of the crucified Lord and of his resurrection which gives strength and hope for the future.[554] As a consequence all church buildings, schools, health units, presbyteries, religious houses and families shall have crucifixes, photos of the Pope and that of the diocesan ordinary. The archdiocese as a conference of families, small Christian communities, parishes, schools and health units shall draw inspiration from the Holy Scriptures, tradition and social teaching of the church as well as the lived experiences of those served. Also mentioned as important is being receptive to the signs of the times and adapt new working methods, structures, actions so as to meet challenges of the new millennium and also striving to be a befitting family of God working in a united way to transform the world. Intrinsically, the objective is expressed in the wish "...to position ourselves strategically so that we have an impact on society, in our present times and in the years to come."[555] In working as a Church, there are some guiding principles and values which are noted as important and hence to be followed strictly. These are listed as (a) dignity of the human person, (b) Option for the poor, (c) the universal destination of the earth's good, (d) solidarity and (e) stewardship.

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553 Ibid., 16.
554 Ibid., 17.
555 Ibid., 18.

But above all there are three basic guiding principles for Grassroots Evangelisation. These basic guiding principles described here, are an attempt to theorise the pastoral approach of Grassroots Evangelisation as envisioned in the archdiocesan synod of 2006. First is the Sanctifying Principle. There are three elements here described. One, that the Church will make use of the already provided deposit of Holy Scriptures, Tradition, the Catechism of the Catholic Church and Church law. And agents of evangelisation must be an example to all believers in their way of speaking and behaving and expressing their love, faith and purity. They should as well, take great care about what they do and what teach (2Tim 4:12-16). Two, the potential of Grassroots Evangelisation comes as a result of "...the ability to identify issues at the grassroots level, to organise reflection and analysis at all levels and then initiate action simultaneously at the small Christian Community level, Sub-Parish, Parish, Deanery, Pastoral zones and archdiocesan levels."[556] And three, subsidiarity as the principle of respect for local autonomy for all activities at local level while pursuing the common vision and mission.

Second is the Teaching Principle. This principle is scantily developed but it only notes in passing that "....as we teach others, we should as well learn from our weaknesses, from new trends and promote development. And that as ever learners, greater emphasis be placed on becoming a learning church local church in terms of deepening the faith, sharing experiences and ideas and on transforming what is learnt into action."[557]

Third is the Governing Principle which is demonstrated with five aspects for its proper realisation. One is development: The understanding of development is modelled on Paul VI's encyclical *"Populorum Progressio"* where development is interpreted as the new name for peace. This understanding implies that development must encompass integral development in its political, economic and cultural aspects. The pursuit of development goals is to promote the dignity of the human person. And in the archdiocese of Kampala these would involve initiating Caritas activities and programmes at parish level and seek increasingly to integrate evangelisation, development, reconciliation, peace building, human rights activities, disaster preparedness and emergency response. However, the omission of spiritual values in the understanding of development remains unaccounted for and it could imply that either development could not be guided by spiritual values or that culture could embody what is spiritual as well. Two is partnership. This is understood as a long term commitment to agreed objectives based on shared values, strategies and information. Partnership is motivated by the fact that the Catholic Church is a big family of local churches spread all over the world. This reality suggests that there must be relationships based on mutual respect, trust and good will. The pastoral plan makes a firm resolve that "we shall strengthen the existing partnerships between the Archdiocese of Kampala with the Pontifical

[556] Ibid., 20.
[557] Ibid., 20.

Missionary Societies, with other dioceses in the world, with the Caritas confederation, with Catholic and non-Catholic organisation that promote development, justice and peace, education, social and pastoral activities."[558]

However, on a local level, the pastoral plan urges only developing close working relations, not partnerships, with Catholic and Christian Churches under the Uganda Joint Christian Council and the Inter-Religious Council of Uganda. The rationale is that these two bodies share in the vision of peaceful co-existence and combating HIV/AIDS. Three: stewardship of resources. This derives from the fact that those engaged in the work of Grassroots evangelisation, have the resources at their disposal which have been entrusted to their care. So, there is an obligation at all times to be transparent and accountable, to the people, the church and to one another. Four, is strengthening capacity of the local communities from the grassroots to the Archdiocesan levels so as to deliver effective programs and services to all members of the faithful. This is to be achieved by improving stewardship of resources, strengthen management and leadership skills at all levels and use new technology in administration. Five: witnessing the faith not only in words but also in deeds especially in the area of visible faith, openness, transparency and accountability.

Section two of the pastoral strategic plan spells out the pastoral roles and goals for the commissions. It states that in the work of Grassroots evangelisation, six central roles will be assumed. These roles as enumerated are to form the essential content of the work of the commissions and their end as well. Role one: forum for Grassroots Evangelisation. This intends to provide a forum for Grassroots Evangelisation at various levels so that all become the salt and light of the world (Mt.5:13-14) with the objective of enabling local communities to deepen their faith, promote dialogue, share ideas, learn from each other and support their efforts. To achieve this, there would be a forum for each of the agents of evangelisation namely the clergy, the religious, the catechists, the teachers, the seminarians, the novices and the laity under various categories. This forum will address the challenge of fidelity and relevancy to the church's Mission and People's ownership of the church.[559] Role two, Organisational development from the grassroots to the archdiocesan level: With the resources based upon the Holy scriptures, the Catholic Social teaching and canon law, there would be capacity building of the archdiocesan leadership at all levels streamlining the various roles each category plays in the various communities.[560] This is to confirm continuity and harmony in the process of evangelisation. The third role: education, particularly promoting the education project of the Uganda Episcopal Conference. This role is based on the fact that the Church has Christ's mandate who commissioned his Apostles to go to the world and teach all Nations (Mt. 28:18-20) and also an epistemological allusion that

[558] Ibid., 21.
[559] Ibid., 20-21.
[560] Ibid., 23.

knowledge is power. These two facts would be the motivation to strengthen the education system in all church schools so as to form the children into good leaders both in the church and in civil society taking into consideration religious education, formal education and vocational skills. The fourth role, advocacy and capacity building sketches ways to fight various forms of poverty from the grassroots. It specifies the resolve to build commitment among the agents of evangelisation and among policy makers with the objective of eliminating poverty and injustice. It names those to be trained in advocacy action as those at Archdiocesan and District levels, Parish and L.C. levels. And the content of training would involve advocacy skills, organise people in Basic Christian Communities or Community Based Organisations to promote Grassroots evangelisation, food security, savings and credit scheme. It includes promoting Home Improvement Scheme in collaboration with organisations that offer this service. The fifth role is Health Issues and there is a particular stress laid on HIV/AIDS and other killer diseases. The main programmes outlined here is organise diocesan, zonal, deanery and parish levels to fight the spread of HIV/AIDS and other killer diseases at the grassroots. And the sixth role is Construction, Maintenance and rehabilitation of all church institutions. The primary concern here is that all church institutions are well maintained and rehabilitated whenever and wherever it is necessary. For construction plans for new churches, presbyteries, schools, and health units, approval for such undertaking must be sought first from archdiocesan authorities. The main objective is to have a common standard and policy on all construction; maintenance and rehabilitation work on all church buildings.

Section three of the pastoral strategic plan aims at achieving the pastoral goals for the commissions to strengthen the faith as per the baseline survey recommendation. Between May-October 2007 Kampala Archdiocese commissioned a baseline survey whose report was released in December 2007. It was conducted by Winsor Consult Ltd, a Development Consultants company based in Kampala. The survey was part of the process for the preparation of the Archdiocese Strategic Plan spearheaded by the Archbishop of Kampala the Most Rev. Cyprian Kizito Lwanga. The survey covered, *inter alia*, basic data on all parishes in the Diocese, Government of Uganda key statistics on the local governments that form the diocese, and findings resulting from primary and secondary data. Other findings of the Survey such as those relating on understanding the Catholic Doctrine, traditional religiosity of paganism, Liturgy and Spirituality, and Pentecostalism. The general objective of the baseline survey was to establish baseline data within the framework of the three operating commissions; Teaching Office, Governing Office, and sanctifying office. The survey aimed at taking stock of the existing situation/modes of service delivery in each of the three pastoral zones of the Archdiocese namely; Kampala, Mitala Maria,

and Wakiso, with the overall purpose of contributing to the realization of the goals of Kampala Archdiocese Strategic Plan.[561]

The survey recommendations have been grouped according to the six goals as pursued by the archdiocese in the five-year pastoral strategic plan. Each recommendation has achievable objectives with the actions required to realise them. The first recommendation: Forum for Grassroots Evangelisation of the three commissions. This has four objectives. (a) It aims at organising forums for the pastoral and social development activities such as teaching catechesis and liturgy at households, basic Christian community, schools and institutional levels. Also included are SACCOS, Micro-credit schemes, and Good Samaritan groups. (b) Guide children and youth to effectively undertake their apostolate since they hold the future. (c) Educate Catholics on Church Marriage; mixed marriage (interfaith) and customary marriages and explore options for strengthening married couples in each parish. (d) Promoting regular orientation and training of catechists. The second recommendations: Organisational development from the grassroots to the archdiocesan level. It states six goals to achieve. (a) Develop a five-year strategic plan that is well costed with clear directions, goals and objectives. (b) Create avenues for professional development and motivation of the clergy, the religious and Catechists to facilitate them perform beyond their clerical mandate. (c)Insist in hiring technically trained and competent personnel to manage specific archdiocesan departments and projects. (d) Develop an elaborate monitoring and evaluation framework for the archdiocese to effectively capture progress. (e) Develop an effective Management Information System for the archdiocese. (f) Develop key policy and administrative manuals to streamline organisational development at all level. The third recommendation is: Education and Promotion of the Catholic formation in the archdiocese. This outlines five goals to achieve: (a) strengthen the coordination and partnerships with both central and local governments as a mechanism for maintaining adequate and positive influence in all Catholic founded Educational institutions. (b)Put in place or strengthen the Catholic founded Head Teachers' Association in the entire archdiocese. (c) Increase the Catholic Church's visibility in all Catholic Founded educational institutions. (d)Develop a sector based strategic plan for education to align its priorities and focus on the Ugandan Government education strategic investment plan and policy. (e) Review the composition and suitability of the Catholic Church's representation on all the current School Management committees and Board of Governors. The fourth recommendation: Advocacy and capacity building to fight various forms of poverty from the Grassroots. There are two things to note here, one, that advocacy is done at various levels and each level may require unique approaches and two, that capacity to fight poverty should also be understood within the framework of mobilising, encouraging and training all Agents of Evangelisation, Catholic structures, organisations to refocus energies, strategies and efforts towards poverty

[561] Cf. Archdiocese of Kampala, *Baseline Pastoral Survey Report* (Kampala, Windsor Consult Ltd, December, 2007).

eradication. The fifth recommendation is: Improved Health vis-a-vis HIV/AIDS and other killer diseases. Caritas Kampala is particularly singled out in this venture to step up its mandate to sensitize and mobilize all Catholics about the killer diseases using the media and available opportunities such as Sunday services, Radio Maria, Radio Sapientia. And the sixth recommendation is: Land Management, Construction, Maintenance and Rehabilitation of all Church structures. To achieve this goal there are two objectives: (a) Create an Archdiocesan Investment Advisory Board to guide investment thinking for the entire archdiocese and (b) Adopt and cascade the strategic planning culture.

Part four is titled: Strengthening the Archdiocesan Grassroots Evangelisation. It has six sections in all. Section one titled 'Strengthening the Pastoral Governance Structures' opens with a reference to the sentiments expressed in the synodal assembly related to the archdiocesan governance structures calling on them to be more accountable, better known to people and more streamlined.[562] In order to improve upon the governance structures to be more streamlined and efficient, the following are proposed: the number of commissions is reduced to three, an Episcopal executive council is established, annual retreats and monthly recollections are be organised, hold weekly management meetings for departments, parishes, Schools and health units, equip archdiocesan commissions and other institutions with competent staff and modern equipment.[563]

Section two is titled 'building the image of the Catholic Church'. This section is concerned with the image of the Church in the modern society where Radio, Television, the Internet and other means of electronic communication reach all corners of the earth and exert such influence on people's minds. In this situation, the pastoral plan calls for a coherent communication strategy which reflects the vision and mission, the guiding values and principles so as to witness and uphold the highest ethical standards while proclaiming to the people the gospel, work for justice and peace and social development.[564] This is, first of all, to be achieved by recognising the identity of the leadership in the archdiocese as embedded in the motto and coat of arms of the archbishop of Kampala, which currently is: *Ora et Labora: Ut habeant vitam* (Jn.10:10). Secondly, there will be on-going formation or capacity building to focus on responding rapidly to the pastoral challenges posed by mushrooming sects, the media and African Traditional Religions. Thirdly, each department is to have a communications secretary, who, on a monthly basis will produce reports summarising key areas of work in each department.[565] And there would be concerted efforts to strengthen the social communications group to promote IT, Print media, TV and other media outlets.

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562 Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic Plan*, 37.
563 Ibid., 38-39.
564 Ibid., 40.
565 Ibid., 41.

Section three dwells on the implementation of the synodal resolutions and the pastoral strategic plan. To correspond with the synodal theme "grassroots evangelisation" of which the pastoral plan is its practical and concrete realisation, it is determined that its contents are made known and owned by the entire membership of the faithful within the Archdiocese.[566] And for implementing these resolutions, the Pastoral cycle is suggested as a tool for use in this process. This is because the pastoral cycle was adopted by the 15th AMECEA Plenary Assembly in Dar-es-Salam as a way forward in the pastoral approach in handling and analysing issues. And the pastoral cycle recommended for use by all agents of evangelisation is one with three classic steps: See – Judge – Act. However, a clarification is made that the application of the pastoral cycle is for planning purposes only.[567]

In the concluding section, there are some challenges pointed out about strategic planning. These are some people who recognised it as irrelevant, or related to government policy planning while others are put off by the complicated terminology used.[568] But despite all the challenges, the strategic plan is considered as a guide in implementing the resolutions of the synod so that all may participate in the Grassroots Evangelisation for the better glory of God and for the apostolate which is the salvation of souls.[569] There are four appendices attached to this Pastoral Strategic Plan. The first appendix is a table illustrating the Kampala Archdiocesan Administration[570]; the second illustrates the communication strategy in Kampala Archdiocese[571]; the third illustrates the Communication strategy in Kampala Archdiocesan Episcopal Zones[572] and the fourth details the relevant agenda for commissions and department meetings, reports, activities and those responsible for their implementation.[573]

Partnership for the Gospel

This Pastoral letter was written on the occasion of the closing of the year of the priests in the Archdiocese of Kampala. It is a short letter written in English and Luganda with just 5 A5 pages of five sections running from A to E. At the beginning of the letter, there are identities of the people to whom the letter is addressed and these are the Priests, Religious and all people of God. However, in the body of the letter, the author abandons the schema of these identities and turns to a collective identity when he says: "I dedicate this, my third Pastoral letter, to you all the People of God in the Archdiocese of Kampala."[574] In order to place this letter in the perspective of continuity with the theme of the past year, he notes in

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566 Ibid., 42.
567 Ibid., 45.
568 Ibid., 47.
569 Ibid., 48.
570 Ibid., 49-54.
571 Ibid., 55-56.
572 Ibid., 57-58.
573 Ibid., 59-96.
574 Cyprian Kizito Lwanga, *Pastoral Letter, Partnership for the Gospel*, 29 June 2010, 10.

passing that the entire church has dedicated this past year as a Year of Prayer for Priests. The verb dedicate is used in two different ways: first, he uses it in reference to this particular letter as dedicated to all the people of God in Kampala Archdiocese and secondly, it is used in reference to the entire Church having dedicated the past year as a "Year of Prayer for priests." He highlights the importance of priests in the church noting that they represent Christ in the faith community of believers; they are ordained for others and act as mediators between mankind and God. Though he lauds the position of the priest as important, he cautions seriously against the failure to appreciate the presence of the people that the priest serves. As a consequence of that caution, he highlights the fact that "while the laity needs the priests, priests in their turn also needs the laity"[575] and so calling for mutual cooperation to exist between the two, he introduces the theme of the letter: Partnership for the Gospel.

In the section B, he talks more of the experience from his personal priesthood in the first person with some identification with the people. He says: "As a priest...i have felt something within me every time we concluded with the prayer for the priests at Holy Mass. I felt your prayers..."[576] He applies an "I – You" relationship in addressing the people and in other instances he seems to speak for the priests as well in the I – We approach when he addresses the people as you. He said: "I felt your prayers and love for me as you prayed for me and my fellow priests."[577] He points at sickness as the lowest moment of a priest's life that the religious and laity have showed them love, care and support. He appreciates the encouraging collaboration that exists between the religious and laity and the priests in the pastoral ministry and social development initiatives.[578] He makes his own the words of St. Paul to pray for the people for their partnership for the gospel.

Section C dwells mainly on partnership for the gospel and he thanks God for the cooperation that exists between the priests and in a nominal mode he refers to those whom they work with in what St. Paul calls the Partnership for the Gospel.[579] He makes some observation about this partnership. First, he insists that cooperation between priests, religious and laity is not an option but a basic requirement as it is rooted in the Trinity. Second, cooperation improves unity and once united the purpose is surer and the impact more pronounced. Third, cooperation becomes a partnership for the gospel and fourth, cooperation is co-responsibility in the cause of the gospel. He highlights the challenges that may come up since the church is a hierarchy, but he clarifies that the hierarchy emphasises responsibility for all categories for it is intended for the sanctification,

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575 Ibid., 10.
576 Ibid., 10.
577 Ibid., 10.
578 Ibid., 11.
579 Ibid., 12.

stability, and progress of the church since everyone is held responsible and hence partners for the sake of the gospel.[580]

Section D is a prayer of trust to God who is the source of all good. He observes that as priests lead the community in prayer, celebrate mass and the sacraments and hence lead the people to a personal encounter with Jesus Christ,[581] may the people reciprocate by continually lifting up the priests to God, affirming the partnership for the gospel. He makes a personal appeal to the laity to continually pray for priests whom he calls "these men your brothers and mediators to God our Father."[582]

Section E is the conclusion wishing God's choicest blessings and entrusting the people to the Blessed Virgin Mary our Mother and the Uganda Martyrs. He ends with his motto *'ora et labora ut habeant vitam.'*[583]

2. Analysis of Pastoral Documents

In this section, I will analyse the "Five Year Pastoral Strategic Plan: 2010-2014" using Norman Fairclough's three dimensional framework for analysing discourse. As we saw in Chapter two, in this framework, the first stage analyses discourse as linguistic practice ('text')[584] focussing on linguistic features and organisation of concrete instances of discourse. Other considerations would be choices and patterns in vocabulary, grammar, and cohesion and text structure. The second stage analyses discourse as discursive practice ('interaction')[585] that is discourse as something that is produced, circulated, distributed and consumed in society with particular attention given to speech acts, coherence and intertextuality, the three aspects that link a text to its context. The third stage analyses discourse as social practice ('context')[586] where the ideological effects and hegemonic processes in which discourse is a feature.

The choice of this text is that it is more concrete and well adapted to the Kampala Archdiocesan pastoral context than the synodal resolutions of 1989 and 2006 which are more generalised with less concrete contextual references. Therefore it is supposed to be more representative of the Archdiocesan pastoral context, mission practice, actions and programs and needs. The 2009 baseline survey findings as included in the strategic plan makes it a document that is designed to address actual context of Kampala Archdiocese and its mission objectives and goals. The other

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580 Ibid., 13.
581 Ibid., 13.
582 Ibid., 14.
583 Ibid., 14.
584 Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 73.
585 Ibid., 78.
586 Ibid., 86.

pastoral documents described above are used in making an analysis of the discursive practice.

Analysis of Linguistic Practice

At the outset, the document was published in English and there has been no translation so far though the region in which it is used is predominantly a Luganda speaking area. A particular critical look at the title on the front cover page written in the upper case: Archdiocese of Kampala is in the genitive where the noun archdiocese modifies the noun Kampala[587] to form one partitive noun as a mechanism of individuation. Since in Christianity, the term archdiocese indicates a juridical area in the structure of Church governance under the charge of the archbishop, the use of the possessive case is an implicit reference to the universality of the Church which transcends any local context but only understood and interpreted in the local context. So, it indicates interplay between the global and the local contexts. The choice of word arrangement may be motivated by 'Grassroots Evangelisation' which is the centre-piece of the pastoral strategic plan. Again, as we stare critically at the title, the choice of words used suggests an encounter of two contexts and this carries several interpretations. First, it may imply the work of the Church in the evangelisation of Kampala. Two, it may imply that Kampala is a passive recipient of that evangelising activity. Three, it may suggest the pre-eminence given to the norms, values, creeds and confessions that the term archdiocese, as an ecclesial term, represents over those of Kampala as the local context may suggest. The use of English as the main language of the text other than Luganda which is the mother language of the area in discussion suggests a linguistic encounter in the text with concepts drawn from both languages being used side by side.

The second part of the title on the cover page, "The five year pastoral strategic plan", indicates the limits this document imposes on its content. As for the time frame, it is specifically limited to five years (2010-2014) and for the activities; it is restricted to regulating pastoral activities. The pastoral strategic plan is best understood in the context of the term 'pastoral'. In ecclesiastical vocabulary, which is used in this document, the term 'pastoral' refers to the image of the good shepherd who cares for his flock. This image is used for ministers or clerics, priests and bishops. In this text, the term 'pastoral' is qualified by 'strategic plan' which is a process by which guiding members of an organisation envisions its future and develop necessary procedures and operations to achieve that future.[588] So the title on the cover page communicates the objective of the text which is the planning of pastoral activities in the Archdiocese of Kampala in the five year time frame. And the term Archdiocese of Kampala represents institutional power and structure or simply: the territory in which this takes place? "In" would refer to place; "of" would refer to actor.

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587 Cf. Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic plan,* Cover pages.
588 Ibid., 47.

On the title page, the strategic plan considers implementing the synodal resolutions of both Kampala Archdiocesan Synod of 2006 and the Second Synod of Bishops for Africa 2009. 'Both' can be used in sentences as a pronoun, a conjunction or as an adjective. In this sentence it is used more as a pronoun because it "talks of the synodal resolutions of both Kampala Archdiocesan synod of 2006 and the second African synod of 2009."[589] The text also uses the compound noun "grassroots evangelisation" as the theme of both synods. In this text, the use of the noun grassroots is qualified by another noun evangelisation. In most instances, this noun grassroots appears in plural and compound form as in grassroots mobilisation, grassroots communities, grassroots institutions, grassroots democracy, grassroots marketing, grassroots lobbying or grassroots campaigning. The noun grassroots has generally a rural-agricultural connotation, but it is a relative one. Since it is qualified by the noun evangelisation, its alternative in the context of Kampala Archdiocese would be 'Basic Christian Community Evangelisation."[590] In this instance, grassroots is alternative word for basic

In the introduction while describing the beginnings of the Church in Uganda as owed to the Missionaries of Africa, the text uses the passive past participle verb 'was founded' by two Missionaries of Africa namely Fr. Simon Lourdel and Bro. Amans. And these are the only proper nouns given; moreover for the other missionaries who joined them, the text just notes in a disinterested passive voice phrase that, "...four months later they were joined by three colleagues."[591] The use of the noun missionaries in plural is in relation to the founding of the present Archdiocese of Kampala where the first group arrived on 17th February 1879. The noun archdiocese and the adjective archdiocesan are used commonly in the text and appear a total of 69 and 54 times respectively. It seems there is more institutional concern in the text than the individual persons. The text does not mention the recipients of the missionary activity it rather states "....despite the difficulties they went through, the missionaries never gave up but got committed to Grassroots Evangelisation."[592] This is what Faircough refers to as "nominalisations that involve the omission of participants other than agents."[593] This is so because nominalisation turns processes and activities into states and objects, and concretes into abstracts.

In discussing the history of the present archdiocese, the text again uses a passive verb "was erected" in 1966, and there is a consistent use of the noun archbishop in its singular form in relation to the noun archdiocese. The noun archbishop is used 38 times in the text. It is used mainly in reference to the past and present archbishops and their contribution and work in the archdiocese of Kampala. But

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589 Cf. Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic plan,* title pages.
590 Cf. Archdiocese of Kampala, *Quenquennial report, 1991-1995*, par. 25.
591 Archdiocese of Kampala*, Pastoral Strategic plan, 7.*
592 Ibid., 7.
593 Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 182.

again it could be noticed that the use of the noun archbishop is mostly used in the text in relation to the deep social nuances as those related to the identity of leadership of the archdiocese. The text gives "the Motto and Coat of arms of the reigning archbishop"[594] as the definitive symbols of the identity of the leadership in the archdiocese.

While discussing the beginning of the archdiocese the document speaks about the role of the Martyrs of Uganda. The text names the different archbishops in whose tenure; the devotion to the Uganda Martyrs has been greatly promoted and put as an important element in the life of the archdiocese. In this text, the Martyrs of Uganda can only be understood in relation to the archbishops of Kampala. The text describes in general how all the former archbishops promoted the devotion to the Martyrs of Uganda. The devotees of this devotion and the place in which this devotion took place are not mentioned. It is noticed that the text makes a reference to a practice and a process. In the first instance, when talking about the first Archbishop of Rubaga, Louis Joseph Cabana, the text uses an active verb in the past tense "promoted" to refer to the practice of the devotion of the Uganda Martyrs. Secondly, when in this phrase the text makes a particular reference to "the cause for the Canonisation of the Martyrs was intensified,"[595] this is used in reference to a process with particular events. Among the events mentioned, "the Martyrs performed one of the miracles,"[596] after this affirmative the text goes into a narrative that archbishop Cabana "called upon the faithful in the archdiocese to conduct a novena through the blessed martyrs of Uganda."[597] The following sentence gives the purpose of the novenas as "...seeking God's intervention for the miraculous cure of the two sisters," and also the cause implied in the use of the noun cure "...the sisters contracted bubonic plague from patients they were treating at Lubaga hospital."[598] The following events are all reported in the active and passive voices: "God answered their prayers...." and "...the sisters got cured miraculously," and after the cure "....the good news was sent to Rome" "....and Rome asked a Muslim medical doctor", the doctor examined the sisters and testified....and finally to end the process Pope Paul VI canonised the 22 Uganda Martyrs."[599]

The text uses the phrase "...he too promoted the devotion of the Uganda Martyrs"[600] in reference to two Archbishops: Archbishop Joseph Kiwanuka and Archbishop Emmanuel Wamala. But he uses a different description when referring to Archbishop Emmanuel Nsubuga. The text says of him: "Cardinal Nsubuga

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[594] Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic plan*, 40.
[595] Ibid., 9.
[596] Ibid., 9.
[597] Ibid., 9.
[598] Ibid., 9.
[599] Ibid., 9.
[600] Ibid., 10.

contributed a lot to the promotion of the Uganda Martyrs."[601] Whereas for the other Archbishops, the verb "promoted" was used in the past tense, for archbishop Nsubuga, the noun "promotion" preceded by a past tense verb ...contributed" and qualified by the noun "lot" with article "a" is used. This difference in the description of the same practice is not accounted for in the text. Again, there is a self-invitation "let us promote their devotion..."[602] which looks vague because it does not indicate the "us" to mean any social category. It raises some pertinent questions! Could it be the successors of the archbishops so as to perpetuate a tradition? Could it be the Christian community of the archdiocese of Kampala? Or could it be the readers of the strategic plan?

In talking about the Martyrs' death, there are two passive verbs used in the text to describe this event. The text says "...the first 22 Martyrs...were killed by King Mwanga (1885-1887). The two new ones David Okello and Gildo Irwa were martyred in Paimol in Gulu Archdiocese."[603] The motive for the use of the two verbs to describe the same event though at different times, is not clear. In this text, the use of two different verbs to describe the death of the martyrs of Uganda may represent a data vacuum on some historical events related to the two sets of martyrs. The text indicates an agent in the martyrdom of the 22 martyrs "...were killed by King Mwanga 1885-1887,[604] that's why the verb kill is used because it is agentive. As for the two new Uganda Martyrs, there is no agent mentioned apart from the location of their martyrdom, "...were martyred in Paimol."[605] The text would also have said: "The martyrs gave their lives for the faith."[606]

In talking about the Church, the text uses "We...." which is not qualified to map out a specific identity "...are parts of..." an institution "...the Universal Catholic Church...." And this Church has recognised leadership as the text highlights all the titles to portray the leader describing him as: Holy Father, His Holiness, Pope, Vicar of Christ and Successor of Peter.[607] The use of these titles in the text seem only to serve a social purpose and are employed chiefly to indicate the Pope's social or hierarchical rank. Again, the use of these titles in general implies varying degrees of social dignity and social significance as well as social exclusiveness for the Pope. This is so because the text does not dwell on the person of the Pope. It rather goes on to say "...we derive our inspiration from the Holy Scriptures, Tradition, the Catechism of the Catholic Church and Church Law."[608] The text seems to presuppose a rupture between the leadership of the Pope, and that which offers inspiration as listed above and what is called the 'doctrine of the Catholic Church'

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601 Ibid., 10.
602 Ibid., 11.
603 Ibid., 11.
604 Ibid., 11.
605 Ibid., 11.
606 Benedict XVI, *Apostolic Letter, Porta Fidei*, (11 October 2011).
607 Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic Plan*, 19.
608 Ibid., 19-20.

as a separate deposit. For the text makes a strong resolve expressed in this commitment "...we shall make efforts to promote what the doctrine of the Catholic Church teaches without any compromise."[609] The use of this phrase '...without any compromise' is difficult to contextualise as the following paragraph appeals to the agents of evangelisation "to be an example to all the believers in the ways we speak and behave and in our love, our faith and purity."[610] And since the text has applied the term 'believer' in unqualified terms, it may suggest any believer and as we have charity as a virtue that makes all the other virtues redundant, the text would have read "...we shall make efforts to promote what the doctrine of the Catholic Church teaches with love."

In talking about agents of evangelisation the text uses a *pluralis majestatis* ("we") when it is suggested that, "we shall therefore have a forum for each of the agents of evangelisation namely the clergy, the religious, the catechists, the teachers, the seminarians, the novices and the laity under their various categories."[611] The use of the majestic plural in this text and context suggests a previous named institutional power and the offices attached to this institution. The usage of the first person plural pronouns here may appear problematic because it consists of at least three important operations. Firstly, the speaker refers to a set of human individuals which were introduced in some way or other in the previous discourse. Secondly, he determines this set of people as a group or institution, and thirdly, he explicitly states that he is a member of this group excluding others from membership in this group at the same time. The first two operations constitute the anaphoric side of first person plural. And this generally poses some challenges because it is generally not possible to start some conversation with 'we' without a previous introduction of the members of this group. But on the cover page of the strategic plan, the very first text in the upper case reads: Archdiocese of Kampala. This presupposes that the "we" in the subsequent texts is representative of that institutional structure. This "we" comes out vividly in the proposal expressed in the following sentence: "Each forum will also be encouraged to use modern communication technology in order to comprehend our traditional ways of facilitating dialogue."[612] It suggests that there is an institutional program to be realised by agents of evangelisation.

In section two which describes pastoral roles, the text uses a compound noun 'agents of evangelisation' which names all the identities of the agents under that category: Clergy, Religious, Catechists, Teachers, Seminarians, Novices and Laity. A compound noun consists of more than one word, but count as only one noun. The use of the compound noun in this text is suggested in the background of 'promoting dialogue, share ideas, learns from each other and supports each other's

609 Ibid., 20.
610 Ibid., 20.
611 Ibid., 23.
612 Ibid., 23.

efforts.'[613] Compound nouns are different from collective nouns which may be regarded as the collective claim of our notice because some of them are occasionally so employed as to give rise to certain peculiarities of construction. They are called collectives, because they express an assemblage of objects contemplated by the mind as forming a single conception and capable of being embraced collectively under the same assertion. The individual objects which form such assemblages are contemplated as united together by some common bond, or for some common purpose, and we appropriate to them, as thus united, a collective name.[614] In one instance, this compound noun 'agents of evangelisation,' is used in relation to contemporary developments in technology and intercultural encounter. The agents of evangelisation are called upon to 'use modern communication technology' to complement what the text calls "our traditional ways of facilitating dialogue."[615] But there is no mention of the third parties with whom dialogue could be exercised and the nature of the traditional ways of dialogue is not explicated. In applying a compound noun, agents of evangelisation, and including the laity among them, the text looks inclusive as if avoiding the historical dichotomies between clergy and laity or evangeliser – evangelised. Although it makes reference to a contrast social category, 'the faithful' but it is only in a different context altogether unconnected with this event where its use is related to another event, "...Archbishop Cabana, with deep faith called upon the faithful in the Archdiocese...."[616]

The use of the noun "agents of evangelisation" other than the traditional dichotomies of clergy – laity, brothers – sisters, religious priests – secular priest has a wider impact on the whole text. By having one single category with all the active agents named therein, this compound noun "agents of evangelisation" is used in contrast to the historical past and ushers in a new development of looking at social categories. In the text other social categories are used autonomously without contrasts. The use of the noun sisters is in reference to the religiously professed Sisters and not as a contrast to brothers. The use of the common noun Muslim is in reference to an individual medical doctor, Dr. Ahmed, an Egyptian.[617] The use of the noun father is qualified with "Synod Fathers" and "Holy Father"[618] and not as a contrast to son in a biological or adoption relationship. The use of the noun "leaders" is in reference to them as "...caretakers of God's creation and Church property"[619] and not as contrasted to the masses. Other categories such as "secretary", "auditor", "married couples," "youth," "children," "stakeholders,"

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613 Ibid., 22.
614 John Mulligan, *Grammatical Structure of the English Language* (London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co. 1854), 16.
615 Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic plan*, 23.
616 Ibid., 9.
617 Ibid., 9.
618 Ibid., 12, 19.
619 Ibid., 19.

"office-bearers," "chaplains," "consultant"[620] are used independently and not as contrasted to their opposites. With this new development when there is less importance attached to dichotomies in the social identities, the text takes into consideration having common activities for agents of evangelisation in the Archdiocese. The texts suggest it in this sentence: "we shall organise annual retreats and monthly recollections for the Clergy and Religious at zonal levels.... and for the other agents of evangelisation."[621] The use of the adjective 'other' as a pronoun in the phrase "others shall also be organised for the other agents of evangelisation...." provides the possibility that anyone in the Christian community could be mentioned as an agent of evangelisation.

In general, the text uses a multiplicity of discourses as suggested by the prevailing proposals and programs to be followed. It recommends cooperation with many government entities at district levels, parish and local council levels, and community based organisations so that pastoral and social activities like health, education, development, roads, water and sanitation, agriculture and many others can be better streamlined and linked to those of the district.[622] It considers food security and savings and credit schemes (SACCOS) Good Samaritan groups, and nutrition programs, business skills nurturing, information dissemination on markets, cooperatives, taking up farming as a business both at small scale and large scale levels, educating communities on when and when not to borrow funds from the mushrooming Micro-Finance Institutions and Banks.[623] It validates the laws of the country concerning marriage when it argues that, "...when a man was previously involved in a customary marriage (*kwanjula*) he should not be allowed to pursue church marriage and wed a different woman as this contradicts the laws of Uganda (Marriage Act) ....when this happens the church marriage becomes null and void."[624] The text uses an inclusive way of speaking when addressing issues that impact human quality of life as it makes a suggestion this sentence: "All agents of evangelisation have full understanding either through workshops or other avenues, of government programs like Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS), Universal Primary Education (UPE) and PMA to create an opportunity for effective Policy Monitoring and influence."[625] The document considers two important basic principles to be followed. It names subsidiarity considered as "action at the appropriate level, mindful of the good and the involvement of Christ's faithful at the right level and participation of leaders at both the parish and archdiocesan levels."[626]

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620 Ibid., 12, 25, 27, 29, 30, 33.
621 Ibid., 38.
622 Ibid., 24 and 29.
623 Ibid., 24-25, 32-33.
624 Ibid., 26.
625 Ibid., 33.
626 Ibid., 42-43.

The text proposes the pastoral cycle as the tool to apply in implementing the resolutions of the archdiocesan synod and in planning. In the text of the strategic plan, the term pastoral cycle is used in different ways. It is described in the passive voice as, "an approach used by.....Parish and Diocesan Councils, Justice and Peace groups, developments, and others engaged in social action."[627] And in the context which is not named explicitly but only referred to in the majestic plural "us" the purpose of the pastoral cycle is expressed with an infinitive verb "to provide....." which is used with a preposition "with...." to indicate a related fact or situation "....a comprehensive overview of a problem, situation or challenge that we want to take up."[628] In another instance, the pastoral cycle is referred to as "a way forward....."[629] However, the text states that: "The pastoral cycle that can be used by all agents of evangelisation is one which many are familiar with...." The use of the phrase "...that can be used..." with the stress on the modal verb "....can" and the use of the countable noun "...one" expresses the possibility that the pastoral cycle has a multiplicity of interpretations of which only one is applicable in the context of the pastoral strategic plan.

Using conversation as a sensitizing concept and summarizing the findings of this subsection we note that the Pastoral Plan speaks in terms of "partnerships", "working relationships", "promoting dialogue", "sharing ideas", a "forum" (for "each of the agents of evangelisation" separately) and "cooperating". But by using a majestic "we", referring to the author himself, and using imperative language, "We must improve", "We must strengthen", "We must use", the vocabulary suggests a monologue, rather than a dialogue with the intended readers. The text speaks about the "Challenges" which the Church faces today. And because of these the Church needs to revise its mission. But the challenges are formulated in terms of "complexities" to be overcome, "mushrooming sects", "poverty", "superstitions" and witchcraft", not in terms of opportunities to be used.

Analysis of Discursive Practice

In this stage of analysis we shall analyse the discursive practice which, according to Fairclough, "involves processes of text production, distribution and consumption," although he notes that "the nature of these processes varies between different types of discourse according to social factors."[630] According to Fairclough, there are specifically 'sociocognitive' dimensions of text production and interpretation, which centre upon the interplay between the members' resources which discourse participants have internalised and bring with them to text processing, and the text itself, as a set of traces of the production process, or a set of cues for the interpretation process.[631]

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627 Ibid., 43.
628 Ibid., 43.
629 Ibid., 43.
630 Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 78.
631 Ibid., 80.

The Strategic Plan explicitly draws upon and puts into actual pastoral practice the resolutions of the Archdiocesan synod of 2006. These are given in the text "*A Catholic's Mission in the Archdiocese of Kampala 2006"* which we described in the first section. So, intertextually, the Strategic Plan builds on the discourses in the texts above," particularly on the notion of "Grassroots Evangelisation."

According to a snippet view in the archdiocese, this text has not been widely read and thus has not been adequately applied in the mission strategy of the archdiocese. This has been anticipated in the text as it is echoed that "...There is a lot of unnecessary mystique over strategic Planning."[632] The term "unnecessary mystique," is used in the text to point to the objections which are presumed to be raised in the method of applying strategic planning in the archdiocesan pastoral program. The objections that are raised against the strategic plan are that, "Some see it as an irrelevant import from commercial organisations. Others think of the Government's Five Year Plan. Many people are put off by the complicated terminology used."[633] By using the noun 'mystique and qualify it with the adjective 'unnecessary' expresses sentiments which may impact on the consumption of the text and hence its overall purpose may fall short of success.

In the introduction, the Strategic Plan starts by highlighting the original personalities to whom the archdiocese and indeed the whole country, Uganda, owes its Christian heritage. The text applies a categorical historical narrative in this regard when it states that, "The Catholic Church in Uganda was founded by two Missionaries of Africa namely Fr. Simon Lourdel, popularly known as Pere Mapeera and Bro. Amans who arrived in the present Archdiocese of Kampala on 17th February 1879."[634] There is a robust historical discourse when the text goes into details to discuss the foundation of the present Archdiocese of Kampala. In the text it is written, "The present Archdiocese of Kampala was erected in 1966, made up of the former Archdiocese of Rubaga which was being administered by the Missionaries of Africa or 'White Fathers' and second, there was part of Kampala Diocese which was under the 'Mill Hill Missionaries.'[635] This is indicative that the present Kampala Archdiocese came into being after the merger of two missionary traditions as outlined in the strategic plan by the "lines of succession both to the See of Rubaga and to the See of the former Kampala Diocese."[636] The following is the line of succession to the See of former Rubaga Archdiocese:

The Rt. Rev. Leon Livinhac, W.F.	(1883-1890)
Rt. Rev. Jean Hirth, W.F.	(1890-1894)
Rt. Rev. Guillermain, W.F.	(1895-1897)
Rt. Rev. Henry Streicher, W.F.	(1897-1933)

632 Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic Plan*, 47.
633 Ibid., 47.
634 Ibid., 7.
635 Ibid., 7.
636 Ibid., 7-8.

Rt. Rev. John Forbes, W.F.	(1918-1926) (Co-Adjutor)
Rt. Rev. Edward Michaud, W.F.	(1933-1945)
Rt. Rev. James Smith, W.F.	(1945-1947) (Pro-Vicar)
His Grace Louis J. Cabana, W.F.	(1947-1960)
His Grace Joseph Kiwanuka, W.F.	(1961-1966)[637]

And the line of succession to the See of former Kampala diocese with its Cathedral at Nsambya:

The Rt. Rev. Henry Hanlon, MHM	(1883-1890)
The Rt. Rev. John Biermans, MHM	(1912-1924)
The Rt. Rev. John W. Campling, MHM	(1925-1937)
The Rt. Rev. John Reesinck, MHM	(1938-1947)
The Rt. Rev. Vincent Billington, MHM	(1947-1966)[638]

By citing "the line of succession of the two former dioceses" that constitutes the present archdiocese of Kampala, the text, interdiscursively, brings in an important doctrine of the apostolic succession in the Christian Churches. It is after listing the two lines of succession of the two former dioceses that the text names the first Archbishop of Kampala, Emmanuel Cardinal Nsubuga and his successors. These lines of succession are consistent with the doctrine of Apostolic succession held by some Christian denominations which asserts that the chosen successors (properly ordained bishops) of the Twelve Apostles, from the first century to the present day, have inherited the spiritual, ecclesiastical and sacramental authority, power, and responsibility that were conferred upon them by the Apostles, who in turn received their spiritual authority from Jesus Christ.[639] More to interdiscursivity, apart from the lines of succession, there is much reference to former archbishops in the pastoral documents which we described. Particularly to note is Cardinal Wamala's pastoral letter "You are the Salt of the earth, the light of the world" which was written relying on Archbishop Joseph Kiwanuka's pastoral letter "Church and State."[640] So this places the archdiocese and its leadership in the line that goes down into history of the archdiocese and down to Jesus and hence affirms the orthodoxy of faith.

With regard to the theme of "The Uganda Martyrs" there's reference to Tertullian, a second-century Christian apologist from whom this text "the blood of the Martyrs is the seed of Christianity" is adapted. This text is used to place the Uganda Martyrs in the general discourse on martyrology in Christian history. It is argued by A.D. Nock that there are three historical events in the history of the Church but all

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637 Ibid., 7.

638 Ibid., 7-8.

639 *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 77; Justo L. Gonzalez, *Essential Theological terms*, Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005, 15.

640 Cf. Emmanuel Cardinal Wamala, *Pastoral Letter: You are the Salt of the earth, the light of the world*, (Lubaga, 1st January, 2003).

woven around an important Christian principle spread throughout the history of Christianity, that the death of the Martyrs has powerfully confirmed the truth of the gospel. That is why it is not without reason that the strategic plan quotes from Tertullian who said, "The blood of Christians is seed."[641] But apart from this historical reference to the martyrs, we find that in the archbishop's pastoral letter, the theme of martyrs is applied in reference to liturgy. This is expressed because it is used as a prayer when he says: "I wish you God's choicest blessings and entrusting you to the Blessed Virgin Mary and 'the Uganda Martyrs.'"[642]

From the perspective of its production it seems a text with thorough planning and preparation. This is evident from the stages of preparation as stated in the text in universalistic terms although passively: "All Agents of Evangelisation were consulted. Leaders at the parish and archdiocesan levels, in turn, were encouraged to carry out as wide and representative a consultation as possible."[643] And to prove a still wider consultation the text notes that, "His Eminence Emmanuel Cardinal Wamala, His successor Archbishop Cyprian Kizito Lwanga, the Synodal preparatory committee, the Archdiocesan Pastoral Council, the Forum for Parish Priests and Heads of the Archdiocesan Departments, the forum for Assistant Parish Priests, Chaplains and Teachers in Seminaries"[644] were all involved in its compilation. From the perspective of its distribution and consumption it is noteworthy that the text was written in the English language and was not translated. Maybe this is because Kampala archdiocese is constituted of a multilingual, multicultural and expatriate population. Kampala city is both the political and commercial capital city of Uganda and hosts the headquarters of almost all the religious and non-governmental organisations, foreign missions, multinationals, as well as the intellectual centre of Uganda. So, this document could easily be available and intelligible to a wider population. This could be contested by the fact that the pastoral letter "Partnership for the Gospel" whose mode of production and consumption was directed to the priests, religious and laity was written in two languages: English and Luganda,[645] so may be the Strategic Plan had a different intended audience.

This variable context carries serious ramifications for the language used in the text and the various programs and activities proposed. The text talks of 'Good Governance through partnerships, Stewardship of resources, strengthening capacity and witnessing to Christ,' where it highlights a plethora of activities and programmes that it states "seek to increasingly integrate evangelisation, development, reconciliation, peace-building, human rights activities, disaster preparedness, and emergency response." The text calls for strengthening of

641 Archdiocese of Kampala, *The Pastoral Strategic Plan*, 9.
642 Cyprian Kizito Lwanga, *Partnership for the Gospel* (Lubaga, 29 June 2010), 14.
643 Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic Plan,* 43.
644 Ibid., 43.
645 Cf. Cyprian Kizito Lwanga, *Partnership for the Gospel.*

partnerships with Catholic and Non-Catholic Organisations that promote development, Justice and Peace, Education, Social and Pastoral activities with a commitment to agreed objectives based on shared values, strategies and information, characterised by feedback and joint planning, a display of transparency and accountability on both sides and a genuine openness and sensitising to the other's needs, feelings, expertise, experience and wisdom. For ecumenical objectives it seeks close working relations with the Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC) and for interfaith partnership, it seeks cooperation with The Interreligious Council of Uganda.

The discourse on partnerships is expounded further in the pastoral letter of Archbishop Cyprian Kizito Lwanga "Partnership for the Gospel" albeit with a particular emphasis. The partnerships in the Strategic Plan are broad and extended to Catholic and non-Catholic organisations. However, the partnerships in the pastoral letters are limited to the priests, religious and laity in the Catholic Church who are described as partners for the sake of the gospel.[646]

The text is produced in the post-synodal context of both Kampala Archdiocesan synod of 2006 and the 2nd Synod of Bishops for Africa, 2009. The 1994 African Synod of Bishops also constitutes the background for the production of the archdiocesan pastoral texts. This could be interdiscursively suggested by Cardinal Wamala in his pastoral letter when he noted that: "the synod of bishops identified the urgency to improve the administration of public affairs…in order to respond to the challenge of bringing peace and justice in Africa."[647] Another significant context that forms the background for the production of the pastoral texts is the 15th Plenary Assembly of the Association of Member Episcopal Conferences of Eastern Africa which adopted the Pastoral Cycle as a way forward in the pastoral approach in handling and analysing issues.[648] The texts therefore carry post-synod discourses because it recalls the theme of the Archdiocesan synod of 2006 "...Grassroots Evangelisation" and the theme of the Second Special Assembly for the Synod of Bishops for Africa of October 2009 "...The Church in Africa in service to Reconciliation, Justice and Peace: You are the Salt and light of the world." (Matt.5:13-14).[649] The text considers these two synods as having in common an urgent need of an on-going in-depth Grassroots Evangelisation. In the context of Kampala Archdiocese this Grassroots Evangelisation is reflected in the concretisation of baptismal promises in the Archdiocesan structures considering: (a) the Sanctifying Office of the Church, (b) the Teaching Office of the Church and (c) the Governing Office of the church. This division as rooted in the understanding of the baptismal grace incorporates the baptised person in the threefold ministry of Christ as Priest (Sanctifier), King (Leader) and Prophet

646 Ibid., 14.
647 Cf. Emmanuel Cardinal Wamala, *You are the Salt of the Earth, the Light of the world*, 13.
648 Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic plan*, 43.
649 Ibid., 12.

(Teacher).[650] In the 2006 synod theme 'Grassroots Evangelisation' the Archdiocese wanted to go back to the foundations of Christian life as rooted in baptism to be the basis of evangelisation. True grassroots evangelisation, therefore, implies going back to baptism, the primordial sacrament which initiates one in the Christian life and is grafted in the godhead of Christ.

The above, however, does not imply that the text carries a sense of discontinuity with the pastoral strategies already suggested in the earlier Archdiocesan and AMECEA region documents. Among the approaches suggested was the pastoral program of the "basic Christian communities." In their 1973 Study Conference on "Planning for the Church in Eastern Africa in the 1980's:" AMECEA Bishops issued a key statement: "We have to insist on building church life and work on Basic Christian Communities in both rural and urban areas. Church life must be based on the communities in which everyday life and work take place: those basic and manageable social groups whose members can experience real inter-personal relationships and feel a sense of communal belonging, both in living and working."[651] In the 1976 study session, the AMECEA bishops made it categorically clear that: formation of Small Christian Communities should be the key pastoral priority in the years to come in Eastern Africa.[652] And in the Archdiocesan quinquennial report of 1991-1995 it is clearly stated that: "The Basic Small Christian Communities are the grass-root level of Catholic Apostolate."[653] This therefore, proves that the text is heavily interdiscursive as it brings into life other discourses.

Still on interdiscursivity, the text relies on numerous discourses for instance, mission history discourse, traditional theological discourse, socio-economic discourse, post-modern discourse and other discourses as is apparent in the text The document makes references to several sources from Vatican II documents, Code of canon law, Papal encyclicals, the African Synod, documents from the Uganda Episcopal conference, Theological treatise especially, the Pastoral Circle though in the text, the "Pastoral Cycle is preferred," and the various manuals published by the archdiocese like: The Priests' Directory – Kampala Archdiocese 2006, The Statutes of the Archdiocesan pastoral council, the pastoral guide and Human Resource Manual, The Episcopal Council Manual, Educational policy

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650 Cf. Kampala Archdiocese, *A Catholic's Mission in the Archdiocese of Kampala 2006: Grassroots Evangelisation,* Lubaga, 2006.

651 This reference emerged from the first Study Conference of the Association of Member Conferences of Eastern Africa (AMECEA) which was held in 1973 in Nairobi, Kenya. It sought to imagine and develop local Churches that would be self-ministering, self-supporting, and self-propagating. The centrepiece of this imagination was a Church that would arise from active participation of all the members of the Church.

652 Cf. AMECEA Study conference 1976 which specifically chose the word small rather basic to indicate that the movement was growing on its own in Eastern Africa and to avoid certain undertones of the word basic that is particularly connected with Latin America where it has a different meaning than Eastern Africa.

653 Archdiocese of Kampala, Uganda – East Africa, *Quinquennial report 1991-1995, 36.*

handbook, Caritas Activities guide, land board policy, the archdiocesan curia operational manual, family life ministry and the Archdiocesan financial manual.[654] There is no explicit reference to post-modern management discourse but the charts showing "Kampala Archdiocesan policy"[655] and the "Kampala Archdiocesan Administration"[656] as well as charts in the appendices II, III and IV[657] heavily depend on this discourse given that it considers "organisations as structures...systems..."[658] In the text the critique of a church document that relies heavily on modernist discourses is anticipated with these apparent objections: "There is a lot of unnecessary mystique over Strategic Planning. Some see it as an irrelevant import from commercial organisations. Others think of the Government's Five Year Plan. Many people are put off by the complicated terminology used."[659] The uneasiness expressed about the strategic plan suggests that it is still a new form of management strategy applied in the pastoral ministry but still foreign to many and hence may impact on its consumption.

While drawing attention to the challenges faced by the Church today, the text presents them as particular to this contemporary era and as completely disconnected from the past. The text uses the sentence "The challenges we face to-day are not the same as those we have known in the past...."[660] to highlight the challenges of the contemporary society. With this assertion, there is a complete rupture of the present from the past which would demand new approaches and solutions as have never known before since even the problems being tackled are new and never known before. The challenges presented in this section are profoundly of two types. Firstly, we have social challenges, those which seem to affect everybody in society and secondly, we have institutional challenges, those which affect the church particularly in her mission and apostolate. In the text, there is a worry expressed about the changes that are taking place in the world today and their mode of acceleration is discomforting.

In the examples presented to explain the present pastoral challenges, but apart from the emphasis, it does not show anything new in contrast to what has been happening before. The text talks of "The numbers and complexity of mushrooming sects, poverty, superstition and witchcraft."[661] There are several discourses that form this section. The first is that mankind is always scared of changes whereas changes define our existence. Changes bring unrest in humanity and hence always seek those stable unchanging realities. It is formed by a certain

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654 Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic plan*, 28-29.
655 Ibid., 36.
656 Ibid., 49.
657 Ibid., 55-96.
658 Martin Parker, "Post-Modern Organisations or Postmodern Organisation Theory," *Organisation Studies*, Vol. 13, No,1 (1992): 001-017.
659 Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic Plan,* 47.
660 Ibid., 12.
661 Ibid., 12.

philosophical discourse. The named challenges stand as challenges because they are a stark contrast to the primary mission of the church. There is a repeated theme of change when the text says "...the Church and our society are experiencing profound changes."[662] There is no precise solution presented to counter these challenges and changes apart from a pragmatic approach proposed as the text says: "We have learned that if the world is to change, we too must change."[663] In a deeper analysis of this text, it is realised that among the challenges named in this changing society, three are religiously oriented: mushrooming sects, superstition and witchcraft and one is anthropological in nature: poverty.

The above suggests that there must be a multi-pronged approach in facing these challenges as they look different and hence demand different solutions. In other words, there are three possible ways to face the religiously inclined challenges. Either one faces the adherents of these beliefs for conversion to the Catholic faith which is confrontational and may bear bad consequents; or just ignore them and leave them with their business and work and hence become competitors in the religious field and then remain as permanently scorned for their unbecoming beliefs or just engage them in a fruitful conversation and then they become conversation partners on the way searching for the truth. As for the anthropological challenges of poverty which is not qualified in this sense, but in most instances reference is made of material poverty and total deprivation of opportunities for growth and development, the answer is for the church to be "...the voice of the voiceless poor and lobby for them government funding for their projects and development in their neighbourhood."[664]

On the institutional level the text summarises in a tabular form the challenges and their possible responses. In this section six challenges motivated by a multiplicity of discourses are presented: the first challenge motivated by an ecclesiological discourse for it talks of a "lack of a sense of ownership of the church by the Clergy, Religious and Laity and the response is to make use of the social teaching of the Church using the Bible, the Catechism of the Catholic Church, the Vatican II documents, the Papal encyclicals and other local Ugandan writings particularly '*Unveiling Witchcraft*' by Bro. Fr. Anatoli Wasswa and *'Amagezi g'Ab'Edda'* by Msgr. William Mpuuga."[665] This ecclesiological discourse could adequately explain the title and content and purpose of the pastoral letter "*Partnership for the Gospel*" of Archbishop Cyprian Lwanga which we described above.[666] The second is motivated by a modern management discourse for it highlights a "lack of improved organisational development of the Church at all levels and the response is evaluate the current situation of the organisation of our parishes, schools, hospitals, health

662 Ibid., 12.
663 Ibid., 12.
664 Ibid., 13, 20.
665 Ibid., 13.
666 Cyprian Kizito Lwanga, *Partnership for the Gospel*, 29 June 2010.

units and the top Archdiocesan structures and plan accordingly for the future."[667] The third which deals with "the increasing poverty vis-à-vis financial sustainability of the families, local communities, parishes and other Archdiocesan structures" falls within the ambit of developmentalist discourse. The response is to "draw up poverty eradication programmes that will fully empower people so that they become self-reliant and are able to make long term investments to support their families and the Church's activities and structures."[668]

In the same vein, the fourth challenge is more informed by anthropological discourses in its quest for "Integral human development" and the response proposed is "provide effective technical expertise and coordination to parishes, schools, hospitals, health units and to the people so as to empower the poor to become agents of their own development."[669] Fifth, the family and marriage are weakened by lack of faith, hope and charity, domestic violence and poverty. The response to this challenge is to "promote faith, hope, charity and sustainable peace in the families, in small Christian Communities, in schools, hospitals, health centres and in all our parishes. It shall also coordinate processes aimed at transforming parishes into Christian Caring Communities that promote faith, hope and charity, peace-building and transform unjust structures and conflict non-violently through dialogue and building the local Church as a family of God."[670] Sixth, lack of proper land management at the family, sub-parish, parish and archdiocesan levels plus lack of a maintenance culture at all levels. The response to this challenge is that the "archdiocese shall organise workshops at all levels to assist people manage better their land, construct well their homes, sub-parishes and parish infrastructure."[671] There are other discourses such as humanist, legal justice, peace and reconciliation which are heavily implied in the text especially in the argument for peace-building, dialogue, land management and transforming unjust structures as well as having decent and well-constructed homes.

In the section on the vision of the Archdiocese of Kampala for its grassroots evangelisation, the text provides it all as summarised in the motto of the reigning archbishop "*Ora et Labora* (St. Benedict) *Ut Habeant Vitam* (John10:10).[672] This motto has two pieces put together to form one meaningful phrase. First, it carries the spirituality of St. Benedict which is rooted in work as a basic human component to cater for his physiological and material needs generally. The second part is derived from the gospel of St. John 10:10 a text in which Jesus talks to his disciples that he came that they may have life and have it to the full. It is rooted in the Old Catholic dual consideration of the human nature as having the body

667 Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral strategic plan*, 13.
668 Ibid., 13-14.
669 Ibid., 14.
670 Ibid., 14.
671 Ibid., 14.
672 Ibid., 16.

satisfied by material needs and the soul that is catered for with spiritual needs. That the vision of the archdiocese is set by the archbishop's motto is motivated by historical discourses of the church which affirm the hierarchical status of the church as noticed with the relationship between the archbishop and the archdiocese. This discourse carries deep historical nuances as those mostly related to a treatise attributed to St. Cyprian on the preservation of unity in the Church written around 260AD. For St. Cyprian's conception of the Church, the minister is more important than the message.[673] This explains why in the text "...the Motto and Coat of arms of the reigning archbishop"[674] are the definitive symbols of the identity of the leadership in the archdiocese.

The text provides the understanding of the mission of the archdiocese of Kampala and its vision. Whereas the vision is founded in the motto and coat of arms of the archbishop, the mission is identified with the entire Church, namely: Go into all the World and Preach the Gospel to the whole World" (Mk. 16:15).[675] The text considers the task of evangelising all people as constituting the essential mission of the Church. It then provides four ways in which this mission will be approached: One, providing a forum for dialogue and exchange of ideas among all agents of evangelisation, to share ideas, learn from each and support each other's efforts. Two, helping the faithful at all levels, to build their capacity through education and on-going formation in order to evangelise more effectively in their respective communities. Three: acting as a voice or advocate for the cause of the poor at the local council levels and enabling the faithful to become their own advocates through empowering them to take up leadership roles at all levels. And four: facilitating both pastoral and social cooperation within parishes and the archdiocesan departments.[676] The ways suggested here carry various nuances because they place the archdiocese as an institution in the position of a facilitator for the various institutions and individuals to realise their potential. This institutional prominence overshadows the main social category of 'priests' who are the major actors behind this institution. This detail is made more manifest in the pastoral letter where there is an overconcentration of this social category as it appears more than 21 times.[677]

While highlighting the guiding principles of the strategic plan, the text borrows heavily from the Catholic Church's social teaching as expounded in the official magisterial documents. Such documents as "The Universal destination of the earth's good" (*Centesimus Annus*), *Ecclesia in Africa*, *Solicitudo Rei Socialis*, *Evangelium Vitae* of John Paul II; *Apostolicum Actuositatem, Populorum Progressio*, of Paul VI, *Deus*

673 Peter Raedts, "Closing Speech" in *Dutch Review of Church History: The Pastor Bonus Papers read at the British-Dutch Colloquium at Utrecht 18-21 September 2000,* ed. Theo Clemens and Wim Janse (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill BV, 2004), 479-484.
674 Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic plan*, 40.
675 Ibid., 16.
676 Ibid., 17.
677 Cf. Cyprian Kizito Lwanga, *Partnership for the Gospel*, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14.

caritas est, Spe Salvi of Benedict XVI are cited in the text. And the main traditional Catholic theological themes such as the dignity of the human person, option for the poor, solidarity, stewardship, universal destination of the earth's good[678] are developed and incorporated well in the text. The text perpetuates the discourse on human dignity which has been the church's fundamental teaching for centuries.[679] This theological consideration is carried by the Strategic plan which considers "human dignity as the foundational moral value."[680]

In terms of distributions, the Strategic Plan as a text did not appear in bookshops as a for-sale-article. Rather its mode of distribution has been the annual seminars and workshops for the various agents of evangelisation conducted at the beginning of each calendar year. This is consonant with what Fairclough refers to as transformation. By transformation he refers to "a major text being transformed into other texts of various forms like reports, analyses, and commentaries, academic books and articles, into speeches which paraphrase it, elaborate it, answer it, and so on."[681] The various transformations that this text would undergo would be various pastoral activities proposed in parishes, schools, hospitals and health units as outlined in appendix II of the strategic plan.[682] These same activities are the means as well for its consumption. This implies that the text fulfils its plan of facilitating pastoral practice in the various contexts in which the agents of evangelisation do exercise their ministry. So the text has a systematic strategy of distribution as well as consumption with an audience for which it has been drafted. From the perspective of this research, this text is distributed and consumed in a conversational model because its author and supposed audience meet regularly for discussions in retreats and annual pastoral meetings. So its significance is measurable because it is designed to be a daily reference guide for the entire pastoral practice in the archdiocese.

In its conclusion, the text suggests the pastoral cycle as the tool to apply in the implementation of the strategic plan. The pastoral cycle is described as "...an approach used by parish and diocesan councils, justice and peace groups, development teams, and others engaged in social action."[683] The use of the pastoral cycle here is in the context of pastoral practice and not theological discussion. This is evident from the consideration of the three classic steps of this cycle: See – Judge – Act or Discern – Evaluate – Respond or Look – Love – Live of which it's opposite is See – Judge – File.[684] Without explicit reference to its source, the text

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678 Archdiocese of Kampala, Pastoral Strategic Plan, 18-19.
679 Cf. Gunnlaugur A. Johnson, *The Image of God: Gen.1: 26-28 in a century of Old Testament Research* (Lund: Almquist and Wiksell International, 1988), 1.
680 Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic plan,* 18.
681 Fairclough Norman, *Discourse and Social Change*, 131.
682 Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic plan*, 56.
683 Ibid., 43.
684 Ibid., 43.

goes into describing the four moments of the pastoral cycle[685] which closely rhyme exactly with what Peter Henriot presents in the four dimensions of the pastoral circle as: First, Contact or Immersion: "When contact is made, a privileged question to be asked is: What is happening to the poor in this situation?" This option for the poor "places a priority on the experiences, views, needs, feelings, and stance of the poor and most vulnerable in a community."[686] Second, Analysis or Social Analysis: "The question of why such conditions exist will be guided by those whose rights are being violated and whose responsibilities are called upon to change the situation.

The language of rights and responsibilities--rooted in the human dignity of each person in community--pushes analytical approaches beyond economic and political causes to social and cultural causes."[687] Third, Reflection or Theological Reflection: "When we come to ask what it means to our faith to evaluate this situation and what is really most at stake in this situation, we can be guided by the church's social teaching about human dignity and solidarity. Every person is made in the image of God. Dignity is not earned; it is a gift."[688] What is fundamental to this dimension of the pastoral circle is the Bible. Fourth, Response or Pastoral Planning goes with "What to do is an inevitable question in the movement around the pastoral circle. Two principles of the church's social teaching orient the threefold response of planning, action, and evaluation. The first is the principle that places action at the lowest level possible--subsidiarity. The second is the principle that reckons the most efficient, equitable, and sustainable use of resources, stewardship." Each of these four moments or dimensions is fundamental for real discernment among pastoral teams, social activists, development workers, instructors, and especially the laity. Effective movement around the pastoral circle must be grounded in experience, not books or the experience of others. Analysis must "pay attention to the many structures of reality." Theological reflection must be "cognitive or beliefs, affective or trusts, and effective or deeds." The strategic plan as well in its conclusion on the pastoral cycle states the argument that "Response should always be the aim of going around the pastoral circle."[689]

As noted above, apart from the production of this text and its distribution, and consumption is yet to be achieved. It appears that the whole process of text production was done extensively with wide consultations as noted that "all agents of evangelisation were consulted..... Leaders (...) were encouraged to carry out as wide and representative a consultation as possible."[690] But its consumption is still to be realised because the text says: "what remains for everybody in the Archdiocese

685 Ibid., 45.
686 Frans Wijsen, Peter Henriot, Rodrigo Mejia eds., *The Pastoral Circle Revisited: A Critical Quest for Truth and Transformation* (New York: Orbis, 2005), 23.
687 Ibid., 23.
688 Ibid., 23.
689 Ibid., 25.
690 Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic plan*, 43.

of Kampala is to see to it that we own this Pastoral Strategic Plan.....so that we all participate in the Grassroots evangelisation.[691] Although all agents of evangelisation have the basic knowledge of the English language in which the text is written, the question of ownership of the text could impact its consumption.

Summarising the findings in this subsection, we note that the strategic plan is fairly interdiscursive with references drawn from the Church documents especially the Scriptures, the social teaching of the Church, the Code of Canon Law, some modern management discourse texts and the pastoral cycle. With respect to its production, the text says that "All agents of evangelization were consulted", but when it proves evidence of this, it only mentions the clergy explicitly, not the laity. Combined with the facts that the text was not translated in Luganda, and not for sale in bookshops, the text neither gives the impression to be product of conversation nor to promote conversation. This is confirmed by a comparison with the Pastoral Letter 'Partnership for the Gospel' which seems more conversational in the sense that it promotes "mutual cooperation" and states that "the laity needs the priests" and the priests "need the laity".

Analysis of Social Practice

In this section on social practice, the analysis focuses on the dialectical relationship between texts/language and social structure[692] in terms of reproduction and transformation.

The text applies the term "Grassroots Evangelisation" as the theme of the two synods of which the strategic plan is to implement. By using the term grassroots, the text considers the Ugandan society which is generally regarded as a people of the grass-roots communities as reflected in their struggle for life, the effort to be a community built in the strict hierarchical structure ending in the Kabaka of Buganda. This community aspect has traditionally the whole society organised by a strong clan system which in the Buganda region culminates in the Kabaka (King) who is the head of all the clans. These small units therefore have become the basis for evangelisation, the equivalent of which is the Basic Christian Community. And this applies even for economic activities as witnessed in the many Saving and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCO) and Solidarity Groups and Village Savings and Loans Associations.[693] Using the term grassroots is indicative of the benefits which the text suggests in the approach to evangelisation.[694] The strategic plan does not owe credit by direct reference to the political origins of the term 'grassroots.' But its origins from the political sphere as a method of mobilisation and bringing together people of different backgrounds for a common cause is more expressed in the title page. In its phrasing, the term grassroots qualified here with evangelisation

691 Ibid., 48.
692 Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 87.
693 Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic Plan*, 32.
694 Ibid., 20, 22, 23.

mobilises the church "to be at the service of reconciliation, justice and peace so as to be the salt and light of the world in the Archdiocese of Kampala."[695]

In describing the Ugandan society, the text identified it as changing rapidly and that the pace of change is constantly accelerating. There are no specific areas of society in which these changes have been noted. The challenges which are noted are mainly three: the complexity of mushrooming sects, poverty, superstition and witchcraft which are reported to be increasing. The text expresses a general uneasiness about a growing multi-religious nature of the Ugandan society and the challenge to the Catholic numerical dominance. Uganda, we could say is increasingly becoming a multicultural and multi-religious society. According to the 2002 population and housing census analytical report, Uganda's religious affiliation were put at the following statistics: Roman Catholic 41.6%, Anglican Protestant 36.7%, Moslems 12.4%, Pentecostals 4.7%, Seventh Day Adventist 1.5%), Orthodox Christians 0.1%, Other Christians 1.2% Traditional Religions 0.4%, Others 1.3%.[696] In a similar manner, according to the World Refugee Survey 2008, published by the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, Uganda hosted a population of refugees and asylum seekers numbering 235,800 in 2007. The majority of this population came from Sudan (162,100 persons), but also included refugees and asylum seekers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (41,800), Rwanda (21,200), Somalia (5,700) and Burundi (3,100). Indian nationals are the most significant immigrant population; members of this community are primarily Ismaili (Shi'a Muslim followers of the Aga Khan) or Hindu. Today there are about 15,000 compared to 80.000 who were present 40 years ago before Idi Amin expelled them. The strategic plan, evaluates these developments in relation to the family and marriage which are the basic units of society and claims that there are weakened by lack of faith, hope, charity, domestic violence and poverty.[697] So, the strategic plan does not look at these events in isolation but rather in the confines of its main objective of grassroots evangelisation.

The Ugandan society generally is experiencing profound changes. This is evidenced from the specifics of the human development theory which has created a standard to which all countries make every effort to attain and to work for the establishment of the minimum basics for the well-being of the human person. As for the increasing poverty, it is reported that the country has seen the incidence of poverty at the national level decline from 56 percent in 1992 to 37.3 percent in 2003. This has been achieved by "structural strategies for translating the macroeconomic successes into real improvements in people's standards of living were developed into the main policy framework, the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). The

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695 Ibid., title pages.

696 Cf. Uganda Bureau of Statistics, "Uganda Population and Housing Census Analytical report of 2002," http://www.ubos.org/onlinefiles/uploads/ubos/pdf%20documents/2002%20Census%20Final%20Reportdoc.pdf.

697 Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic Plan*, 14.

PEAP is the policy vehicle for translating the country's long-term development aspirations, some of which are expressed in the Uganda Vision 2025, into specific and achievable goals."[698] With these details, there is a parallel with what the strategic plan suggests that "the Church and our society are experiencing profound changes."[699] This statement assumes that there are a lot of social changes which have come to destabilise the cultural and societal norms and hence the focus of the church in her ministry. But in this situation the text of the strategic plan has been quite pragmatic in its approach to the circumstances as it has been suggested from a silenced source that "we have learned that if the world is to change, we too must change."[700] And in another instance, the strategic plan observes the same reality as it calls for "a need to be receptive to the signs of the times and to adapt our working methods, structures and actions to meet the challenges of the New Millenium."[701] Change as a phenomenon is not alien to man for he grapples with it each day. However, the text does not tell from which point is the change to begin and up to what point.

Without allusions to globalisation, there is a general lingering and marginal African discourse that 'we are experiencing wide and sweeping changes.' And that these have come as a result of the sweeping changes in the traditional structures of local communities – family, clan, tribe, village groups and social relationships.[702] Industrialization is on the increase and has radically transfigured ideas and social practices hallowed by centuries. Urbanization too is on the increase, both on account of the expanding number of city dwellers and the spread of an urban way of life into rural settings. Recent more efficient mass media[703] are contributing to the spread of knowledge and the speedy diffusion for and wide variety of habits of thought and feelings, setting off chain reactions in their wake. A change in attitudes and structures frequently calls accepted values into questions.[704] This is not a statement of despair but rather of hope and courage to face-off this challenging situation. The text calls for an approach that will meet the changes in the society and church since the two institutions are partners for growth and development. Although the text has spoken about the rapid changes witnessed everywhere, it has not made any reference to the good olden days as a kind of mimicry or reminiscing the good old past. So there is an air of optimism to go with the changes and hence avoid the irrelevance that may come up with complacent clinging to the past without any reference to the new developments.

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698 John A. Okidi, "Andrew McKay, Poverty Dynamics in Uganda: 1992-2003," paper on-line available at http://www.chronicpoverty.org/pdfs/27Okidi_Mckay.pdf (accessed Wednesday April 5, 2011).
699 Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic plan*, 12.
700 Ibid., 12.
701 Ibid., 17.
702 Ibid., 12.
703 Currently, Uganda has over a 200 licensed FM radio stations scattered all over the country and have contributed a lot to the dissemination of knowledge and change of attitudes and usher in new habits as a result of advertising. Also many people have access to television.
704 Second Vatican Council, *Gaudium et Spes. Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World*, 6.

In the section on development, the strategic plan considers social development as convertible with peace. This development discourse is linked to the theories of social analysis where the society is considered governed by two major institutions: The political and the economic. And that once these two are not adequately addressed, they are likely to cause social unrest. Any unequal distribution of goods as in distributive justice is likely to affect the stability of a community. This development discourse is deeply rooted in the social teaching of the Church. The strategic plan states that, "Where there is lack of development peace is missing too and the unhappy consequences of disease, unhappiness, anger and envy"[705] and not only peace is missing in the underdeveloped areas, but the text goes on to narrate other consequences such conflicts, superstition, sorcery and witchcraft.[706] In its consideration of development, the text goes a step further and qualifies development as integral which implies "...initiating activities and seek increasingly to integrate evangelisation, development, reconciliation, peace building, human rights activities, disaster preparedness and emergency response.[707] This development discourse is specific to Ugandan society which has been torn apart by a series of conflicts and spiralling violence over time. In the strategic plan, there is no reference to Uganda's turbulent historical past, but the emphasis on peace building and reconciliation just suggests that reality.

Slight considerations of the post-independence period suppose that Ugandans have been exposed to a level of violence that far exceeds that of any other people in eastern Africa. Well a million Ugandans have been killed through violence that is invoked for political purposes. Many people have been murdered with the approval or complicity of political leaders whose main duty is the protection of life[708]. Hundreds of others were slain by powerful persons who are always shielded by state authorities. It is estimated that the number of people slain for political motives during the first Obote administration (1962-71) ranged between four hundred and one thousand[709]. The number of people killed for similar reasons during the Amin regime (1971-79) was not less than 50.000 and could have been as high as 300.000.[710] In the second Obote period (1980-85), the estimated number of those killed ranged between 300.000 and one million.[711] In 1984 it was estimated that the Ugandan army had killed between 100.000 and 200.000 people most of whom were non-combatants, since 1980. It is this background that makes the themes of peace building, reconciliation, human rights activities, disaster preparedness and emergency response to be prominent in this strategic plan.

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705 Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic plan*, 21.
706 Ibid., 21.
707 Ibid., 21.
708 Kasozi Abdul B. K., *The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda: 1964-1985*, Montreal&Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994, 3.
709 Ibid. 4.
710 Ibid. 4.
711 Ibid. 5.

When it comes to the guiding principles, the strategic plan has placed a particular emphasis on the two concepts of dignity of the human person and option for the poor. The text states "that our first emphasis is on the dignity of the human person....and...the preferential option for the poor and marginalised."[712] The preferential option for the poor is convertible with human dignity as well since both affirm the integrity of the human person. By emphasising human dignity the text situates itself in the long tradition of protecting human dignity which has been developing over the course of time right from antiquity. And this is an ever valid concept because it is related with the main subject of history, and in the context of strategic plan, the main subject of evangelisation who is man himself. Subsequently, it grows with man himself and its understanding reflects man's understanding of oneself. It is a concept which is completely woven in the very fabric of human nature and society, related with human history and the focus of man's self-perception. With this thought the text proposes to empower the poor so that they may retain their dignity. It makes a resolute assertion though stated in the negative that, "we should not look down upon the poor but rather seek to make them subjects of their own development and not objects of our pity."[713] Taking poverty as a humiliating situation the text makes a strong resolve to combat the dehumanizing poverty which robs people of their dignity and humanity.[714] Among the categories named the texts considers "...the position of women particularly widows, people with disabilities, orphans and vulnerable children."[715] Since the text has considered dehumanizing poverty, it gives poverty wider consideration since every situation that dehumanises is linked to poverty. This would impel the church to intervene in other human situations other than economic for instance politics, cultural practices, and science and technology even biomedical research. This is so because if we consider the progress so far achieved in the biomedical field, it is understandable that serious concerns about the protection of individuals and humanity are raised and given that other arguments fail or found insufficient, human dignity appears as a last resource for such a protection

On the other hand, when it comes to partnerships, the Strategic Plan positions the Catholic Church as a big family of local churches all over the world. By reproducing this image of the Church as a family may be used to reinforce the community's highly stratified hierarchy of power and privilege. But the text makes use of this family metaphor in complementary terms in view of the beneficiaries of the partnerships who are the poor, the hungry, the enslaved, the imprisoned, the orphans and the widows. This is a reproduction of the image of the church as Hellerman thinks that "those who had the most to gain from the image of the church as a family were the poor, the hungry, the enslaved, the imprisoned, the

712 Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic plan*, 18.
713 Ibid., 18.
714 Ibid., 18.
715 Ibid., 18.

orphans and the widows."[716] The text pleads thus "All of us make up the body of Christ and we need each other to supplement each other."[717] It lists three qualities on which the relationship in a partnership must be based: mutual respect, trust, and good will.[718] At the beginning of this section, the text looks like it proposes forging partnerships with only Catholic organisations. But it goes a step further and suggests that "we shall strengthen the existing partnerships...with Catholic and Non-Catholic Organisations that promote development, justice and peace, education, social and pastoral activities."[719] It even suggests developing close working relationships with...other Christian Churches under the Uganda Joint Christian Council which is described as "sharing our vision in the work of evangelisation."[720] It goes on to include working with the interfaith organisations, for instance, the Uganda Inter-Religious Council which is taken as sharing our vision in peaceful co-existence and combating HIV/AIDS. The text proposes that the Church is willing to cooperate with anyone in a fruitful partnership as long as we share common values, strategies and information for the benefit of the whole society. So the text confirms the fact that Church is open towards society and other confessions for the furtherance of the common good.

In the section on grassroots evangelisation, the text talks about the forum for grassroots evangelisation at various levels with the purpose of enabling the local communities to deepen their faith, promote dialogue, share ideas, learn from each other and to support each other's efforts.[721] By proposing a forum which suggests public meetings open for discussion, the main idea is to provide a place where people can meet and interact and discuss specific topics. By using the term local communities without qualification whether Christian or not, the text goes beyond the old paradigms and just considers human needs as the basis for her activities. Apart from the forum for the local communities, there is a forum for the agents of evangelisation. The category agents of evangelisation include clergy, the religious, the catechists, the teachers, the seminarians, the novices and the laity under their various categories.[722] To be at par with the developments in society, each forum will be encouraged to use the modern communication technology with the purpose of complementing our traditional ways of facilitating dialogue.[723] In this proposal of a forum the text suggests that it is open to dialogue and communication with the wider society. The text also assumes that the forum for grassroots evangelisation will address the challenge of fidelity and relevancy to the Church's mission and people's ownership of the Church. The social identities cited in the text, that is, Pope, the Bishops, Clergy and the Religious is a reminder of an ecclesiological

716 Joseph H. Hellerman, *The Ancient Church as Family* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2001), 221.
717 Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic plan*, 21.
718 Ibid., 21.
719 Ibid., 21.
720 Ibid., 21.
721 Ibid., 22.
722 Ibid., 23.
723 Ibid., 23.

structure where the Church was considered as consisting of mainly those in the hierarchy. The text deconstructs this old ecclesiological model and proposes a new one where the church from below meeting in a forum is placed at the centre and hence the suggestion of grassroots evangelisation.

The above model is achieved in the actions proposed where by opportunities for the children and youth to understand catechesis and liturgy are suggested. Such opportunities follow the structure whereby those youth in schools are supported by chaplains and others outside the schools are assisted by the parish priests. There is also mention of guiding the children and youth to effectively undertake their apostolate. This suggestion for self-evangelisation or mutual evangelisation is a shift from the old hierarchical top-down structure where all the mission work was presumed done by the Pope, bishops, priests and religious to a representative approach that considers other members of the church. The text notes a disconnected relationship between youth coordinators or chaplains because of applying ad-hoc and inconsistent approaches. These approaches are not mentioned, but this is suggestive that there is an apparent disconnection between the leaders and the youths. So, the text proposes locally instituted or formed organisations like the Bannakizito Children Association for children and the Karolines youth association to cater for the youth.[724] It also calls on the training of the catechists insisting that their formation is vital and need to be promoted. These identities as outlined in this section are an eye opener to the strategy of evangelisation which is in harmony with the local needs. The text observes a reality which is meaningful that the gospel to be meaningful must be promoted by people who are rooted in their contexts applying the common categories that they are familiar with.

In describing organisational development, the text calls for "views from all stakeholders in the Archdiocese."[725] In the actions recommended, it calls for identifying a competent consultant and participatory planning with all stakeholders and make efforts to ensure that all stakeholders are involved. The text calls as well for the professional development and motivation of the clergy, the religious and catechists to enable them perform beyond their clerical mandates.[726] The idea in the strategic plan which aims at diversifying the competencies of the clergy beyond their clerical roles is timely. It aims to correct an out-of-date vision of the priesthood which has reduced it to the sacramental function only. Whereas the priesthood is such a productive force, the text takes into account their social position as means for more interaction with people of different fields of competency and social relations. Since the archdiocesan juridical division is done to match the civic districts,[727] so the competencies of the priests in other fields of

[724] Ibid., 25.
[725] Ibid., 27.
[726] Ibid., 27.
[727] Ibid., 29.

work brings them in interactions with other people qualified in education, health, development and socio-economic development.

The strategic plan outlines ways of strengthening the coordination and partnerships with the central and local government so as to maintain adequate and positive influence. By calling for more close collaboration this section intends and proposes to perpetuate the long-held belief in the centrality of the human person and in a way it forwards this objective: "To educate the people on the reflections and guidelines on the education of the human person and contribute to the nutrition for all programmes at each parish."[728] The text goes into the details concerning economic development when it talks of "...enabling teachers accessing loans at a lower interest rate."[729] It discusses forums where education officials from the district and the ministry could be invited to share ideas on a harmonious and productive working relationship with the archdiocese. The text carries wider plans for the collaboration with all kinds of associations such as the Head teachers' Association, the School Management Committee and Board of Governors of schools. The strategic plan has the idea of aligning its priorities and focus on the Government of Uganda's Education Strategic investment plan and policy.[730] This particular consideration for social relations in the education sector is aimed at "...the performance and ability to promote the interests of the Archdiocese."[731] When the text talks about the 'interests of the archdiocese,' it remains ambiguous without giving any explanation of what is included in these interests. Nevertheless, the document suggests a robust interactive model with most of society's key social identities and social relations[732] in the provision of educational services since education cut across the boundaries of faith or any other human social category.

The strategic plan adopts developmentalist strategies in community mobilisation as it proposes advocacy and capacity building to fight various forms of poverty from the grassroots. By adopting such measures, it intends to mobilise the people at various levels of society with what it describes as "unique approaches, efforts and resources."[733] With a concern that income inequalities between the rich and the poor continues to widen in the Archdiocese, the strategic plan suggests plans to fight poverty by mobilising, encouraging, training or orienting all agents of evangelisation, Catholic structures and organisations to refocus energies, strategies and efforts towards poverty eradication. This call to refocus almost all the resources towards poverty eradication is indicative of the dangers and threats that poverty poses to human dignity which is regarded as "our foundational moral value"[734] and the central subject and end of evangelisation or any human

[728] Ibid., 30.
[729] Ibid., 30.
[730] Ibid., 31.
[731] Ibid., 31.
[732] Ibid., 29, 30.
[733] Ibid., 32.
[734] Ibid., 18.

endeavour. It goes into the detail of the actions required to achieve this objective. In the area of advocacy and capacity building it suggests developing Savings Credit and Cooperative Organisations in parishes and encourages communities to engage in savings, mobilisations through Solidarity Groups and Village Savings and Loans Associations. This is borrowed from Care International as practiced in Niger and Northern Uganda. It also seeks to empower Catholic Communities to demand for accountability in governance and fight corruption and other forms of injustices in their respective local governments so as to improve on service delivery in such critical areas as roads, water and sanitation, health, education, agriculture and many others.[735] Because of the technical nature of some of these government policies and programmes, it only seeks to ensure that all agents of evangelisation have full understanding of these programmes and policies like PEAP, NAADS, PMA, UPE[736] so as to create an opportunity for effective policy monitoring and influence.[737] The text however notes the challenges of inadequate knowledge and ignorance which may characterise those involved in advocacy and capacity building in relation to the government sponsored programmes.

Because of the above the strategic plan suggests setting up an advocacy unit or research centre in the diocese to study government programmes and projects that focus on poverty in the districts and at the national level for it admits that without proper knowledge "...it becomes difficult to influence policies."[738] With this fact as stated the text adopts a pragmatic approach and make an observation to the archdiocese itself that "...this demands that the archdiocese remains strong and committed to research and preparation of research and position papers."[739] The strategic plan suggests organising targeted poverty eradication workshops at parish level for youth, women and men. And it draws the agenda for the same workshops as well with its focus on: prayer, business skills nurturing, information dissemination on markets, cooperatives, taking up farming as a business both at small scale and large scale levels, educating communities on when and when not to borrow funds from the mushrooming micro-finance institutions and banks. Identify, form and strengthen community based organisations at sub-parish and basic small Christian community on issues of mutual concern such as poor sanitation, food security and etc...[740] In order to utilise well its basic structures, the strategic plan suggests creating a model parish or community which would be

735 Ibid., 32.

736 These are government programmes which are designed to address the development of the community and are mostly implemented at the local or grassroots level. So, their proper monitoring and supervision by the people would ensure their effective realisation of their objectives. But since the majority of the people do not know about these programmes and how they operate, so empowering the agents of evangelisation would ensure passing on the knowledge to the lower grassroots communities and since the agents of evangelisation have attained some good education, it is easier to understand the technical language that may be involved in such policies and programs.

737 Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic plan*, 33.

738 Ibid., 33.

739 Ibid., 33.

740 Ibid., 33.

evaluated on such areas: farming, business skills and enterprise development, infrastructure development through self-help, school enrolments and grades, health improvements, vocations, Sunday collections and payments of title, church marriages, youth mobilisation for participation in economic activities and Catholic Church activities.[741] This approach makes the church more visible in people's experiences and lives.

In the section on improved health the text only mandates Caritas Kampala to sensitize and mobilise Catholics using the media and other available opportunities to fight other killer diseases such as HIV/AIDS and Malaria. It is silent about the foremost points on which the Catholics are to be sensitised before naming what has been called 'other killer diseases like Aids and malaria.' But according to the health and morbidity report on Uganda, Aids and Malaria claim 60% of total admissions in health centres countrywide and malaria alone kills 1000 people per day in Africa. So, this document fell short of the fact that in Uganda the major health hazards are Malaria and Hiv/Aids, but the text just seem to consider them secondary and referred to them as "other diseases."

In part four where the questions of governance are streamlined, the strategic plan points to dialogue qualified as 'quality' and decision-making as the main end. And to achieve this end with efficiency, it gives only three commissions configured to the three ministries of Christ: The Sanctifying Office; The Teaching Office; and the Governing Office.[742] There are a series of activities suggested for instance, having annual retreats and monthly recollections for the agents of evangelisation rotating from parish to parish. Weekly management meetings for all departments, parishes, schools and health units with minutes noted down. Also suggested is having quarterly management meetings for Episcopal councils and the respective heads of zonal departments and quarterly meetings of the pastoral Coordinator with the deans in the company of the zonal Episcopal vicars. Commissions and departments be equipped with competent staff and modern information technology. Apostolate of the laity be organised under the Uganda Martyrs Guild; Children Apostolate under the Banakizito Association, Youth Apostolate under the Karolines Asociations and the Major seminarians Apostolate under the Carolines Association. There is a new distinction between the different forms of apostolate. This structure looks particular to Kampala Archdiocese because it does not consider the laity as a huge segment but rather a small segment among others whose apostolate is unique.

In an implicit reference to the developments that have come with globalisation, the strategic plan expresses a need "to be open and visible especially in the modern society where the radio, television, the internet and other forms of electronic communication reach all corners of the globe and exert such influence on people's

741 Ibid., 34.
742 Ibid., 37.

minds."[743] These are transborder and transnational systems of communication that are available to anyone who wishes to access them from any locality on the globe. Their use has not been regulated because there is no single legal or moral code to bring them to accountability. This explains why they have been referred to as instruments of empowerment for the grassroots because anyone with whichever motive can post any message in any form whether visual or audio and it spread through the global in an instant. With such background the text highlights the dangers and threats such means of communication could pose for a Church institution and calls for a strict code of conduct in the process of using them for the better. The text considers it "vital for the archdiocese to promote a coherent communication strategy which reflects our vision, mission, guiding values and principles as part of witnessing and which upholds the highest ethical standards while proclaiming to the people the work of evangelisation, social development, justice and peace."[744] In fact the text confines the main areas in which these means of communication could only be used since they have the potential of damaging the relations between the individuals and institutions. So, the text reserves the work of regulating any access to information to the Communications Working Group which is to develop a clear system of handling communications in all situations in the departments of each commission.[745] With all the problems that may revolve around the wrong use of the media, should we consider this a form of self-censorship? And if the whole issue is about building the image of the church, then should this be considered as ideological spin within the archdiocesan structure?

The process of implementing the pastoral strategic plan is rooted in the process which brought it into being. It is claimed that the strategic plan came into being "...as a result of a large consultative exercise which involved the various agents of evangelisation."[746] By suggesting that "some of the elements of this plan may have to be endorsed by the Council of priests and the archdiocesan pastoral council"[747] implies that there are some unfamiliar and new suggestions that need to be incorporated in the system and become part of the policy framework. The idea that "the plan will be disseminated in all parishes to ensure that its contents are known and owned by the entire membership of the faithful within the archdiocese of Kampala"[748] implies an interactive mode of idea when ideas came from below and so formulation into a plan, they have to go back to the grassroots. And the two basic principles of subsidiarity and participation as recorded in the text invoke that reality. So, the text names His Emmanuel Cardinal Wamala and Archbishop Cyprian as being involved and all the agents of evangelisation. So it is a document that grew from the grassroots and back to the grassroots.

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[743] Ibid., 40.
[744] Ibid., 40.
[745] Ibid., 41.
[746] Ibid., 42.
[747] Ibid., 42.
[748] Ibid., 42.

By suggesting the use of the pastoral cycle as a tool in pastoral planning, the text intends to not only deal effectively with the local issues arising in the context of the pastoral ministry but also improve on the relationships between the agents of evangelisation and the faithful. Among the local issues noted are: "...high rate of unemployment among the youth in the Parish; spread of AIDS among school children; low wages paid to church workers and grave issues."[749] By employing the method of the pastoral cycle with its three classic steps of See – Judge – Act or put the other way Discern – Evaluate – Respond or simply Look – Love – Live, there is an assumption expressed in the text that the pastoral cycle will "offer more effective and understanding responses"[750] to the people's experiences. Incorporating the pastoral cycle in the strategic plan is motivated by its use by other parish and diocesan councils, justice and peace groups, development teams and others engaged in pastoral action."[751] And it is purposed to provide a comprehensive overview of a problem, situation or challenge that is to be taken up effectively. But apart from its effectiveness as a method, it is considered as a pastoral policy adopted by the AMECEA Bishops in 2001 to help in handling and analysing issues. So, the strategic plan is in a way implementing a regional Bishop's resolution in a local context. Perhaps the questions would have been that had it not been that resolution, would the strategic plan have founded reason to include it?

The strategic plan has not adequately applied and made use of the traditional and cultural symbols and systems of the Baganda who form the majority of the Archdiocesan catchment area. The cultural institution of the Kabaka (Kingship) is mentioned singularly in reference to Kabaka Mwanga of Buganda (1885-1887) who killed the martyrs.[752] Other elements of culture are evaluated in the background of superstition and witchcraft[753] and African Traditional Religions[754] which are posed as challenges to prevail over. However, there is use of some Luganda concepts that describe key social identities and social relations in the archdiocesan structure, for instance, Kwanjula, Wekembe, Ssabakristu, Ssabasomesa, Ssabayigisa, Ssabatetenkanya, and Bannakizito.[755] These concepts as deeply founded on the Buganda culture make a rich representation of a repressed cultural tradition which keeps questioning the hegemony of another culture in a society that has a rich tradition and culture! But despite all the dynamics within, the text does not lose sight of its ultimate purpose which is all summarised as "the salvation of souls"[756] which rightly places it in the conversion of souls approach. In all ways, this strategic plan keeps a steady focus on the social set-up of the archdiocese and it almost

749 Ibid., 44.
750 Ibid., 45.
751 Ibid., 43.
752 Ibid., 11.
753 Ibid., 13.
754 Ibid., 15.
755 Ibid., 25, 26, 38, 49, 50, 55.
756 Ibid., 48.

engages all the dimensions of society though the intensity differs as it is rooted in a particular discourse which motivates its language, structure and authority.

Conclusion

In this chapter we described and analysed Kampala Archdiocesan documents published either as pastoral letters of the Archbishops, the Archdiocesan Synodal resolutions or as Pastoral Strategic Plans. In the analysis section the main emphasis has been placed on the Pastoral Strategic Plan (2010-2014). This document calls for collaboration among the agents of evangelisation in the exchange of ideas in mission practice for the purpose of mutual evangelisation. In a world jam-packed by the plurality of ideas and beliefs, characterised by multiculturalism and migrations, and driven by the forces of globalisation, the Strategic Plan seems to suggest that there is an answer to these "complexities" which calls for facilitating each other's efforts or just to say building capacity.[757] It seems a timely document which is in line with today's society which requires theology to be increasingly done in conversation with other disciplines. The terminology suggests that conversation is practiced more with agencies outside the Church than within the Church. Unlike the Pastoral Letter "You are the Salt of the Earth", which uses egalitarian discourse, greeting "all of you my brothers and sisters", including the "lay people in the Catholic Church", the "Pastoral Strategic Plan" uses quite hierarchical discourse, culminating in the use of the pluralis majestatic, "we", despite the fact that the texts speaks a lot about "partnership".

Most of the issues raised in the strategic plan revolve around grassroots evangelisation as the end of all the pastoral programs, practices, and actions in the archdiocese. And to bring all these proposed pastoral projects, practices and actions to their fulfilment the text mention "all agents of evangelisation" as the executing group. More than the earlier mission documents published in the missionary period the Strategic Plan fosters a collaborative approach to mission practice in Kampala Archdiocese. But, unlike the Pastoral Letter 'Partnership for the Gospel', this seems to be primarily a collaboration or partnership between the agents of evangelization among themselves, and between them and outside agencies (government officials, other denominations and religions).

The meaning of conversation as understood by Rorty is not developed in the texts that we have analysed. Our reference to conversation here is limited to the collaboration of the agents of evangelisation and their call to grassroots evangelisation. We could say that there are sources, suggestions and approaches offered in the exercise of mission practice and the new social categories developed, like agents of evangelisation. Grassroots evangelisation marks a shift towards a mission practice that is built on Conversation in human relations and identities in

[757] Ibid., 23.

the mission of the Church. But this understanding is limited to the members of the church only and it is still rooted in the mission model and practice that is traditionally associated with the identity of the church. We have seen from the analysis of Archdiocesan texts, that there are allusions to conversation. But this conversation falls short of the Rortian ideal of "keeping the conversation going." Therefore the task in chapter five is to attempt to develop this Rortian conversation in full as a mission theory.

Chapter Five:
Mission Concepts in the Future: Mission as Conversation

Introduction

In this chapter, the task that is set before us is to elaborate conversation as the new model of mission in the Ugandan Church in the 21st century, characterised by globalisation, multiculturalism and migration. The use of the concept conversation in this research is rooted in the work of Richard Rorty '*Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*' which brought him to prominence at its publication in 1979. As it was observed in Chapter two, Rorty's own understanding of conversation is in reality drawn from his own notion of language and thought as well as an appropriation of Oakshott's famous work, "*The Voice of Poetry in the conversation of Mankind.*" This philosophical understanding of the concept conversation as adopted and illustrated by Rorty forms the theoretical basis of its use and application in the present study. Elizabeth Cook observed that "One of Richard Rorty's most famous and controversial philosophical positions has been his replacement of knowledge with conversation, whereby the old goals of progress, truth, and consensus under ideal conditions are replaced with Rorty's ideal of "keeping the conversation going."[758] As it was stated in the introduction, this thesis uses conversation as a sensitising concept and is intended to develop further what conversation could mean in the context of mission theory and practice. After studying Rorty's concept of conversation (chapter one and two) and analysing mission theory and practice in the Archdiocese of Kampala in past and present (chapter three and four) we came to understand that people's grasping of the truth is always progressing and partial. There is no single tradition, system or worldview that could claim to hold the fullness of truth. All that people have are partial and imperfect acquisitions of truth. Therefore, as people strive to grasp the fullness of truth, they must be open to the reality of plurality and allow a healthy interaction imbued in our intersubjective nature for a consistent conversation. In other words, the reality of plurality here suggests that despite people's particular disagreements, they are usually quite able to talk to each other and discuss matters.[759]

In Chapter One, by reading Rorty's famous work, *'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature'* it was demonstrated that, part of Rorty's point in giving historical accounts of philosophy is to urge listeners to realize that traditional epistemological projects have failed. In light of the above, he contends that we must stop asking questions motivated by such projects, and get back to vital questions. He reasons that we must embrace a more pragmatist view to philosophy and accept the social dimensions of inquiry, thought, and action. In doing this, Rorty believes it is

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758 Elizabeth F. Cook, "Rorty on Conversation as an Achievement of Hope". *Contemporary Pragmatism*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (June 2004): 83-102.

759 Friedrich Kratochwill, "Are Dialogue and Synethesis Possible in International Relations," *International Studies Review*, No. 5, Issue 1 (2003): 123-153.

helpful to speak in terms of conversations and vocabularies rather than truth, representation, and foundations of knowledge. And this is part of his overall rejection of grounding as transcendental or universal. Such a conclusion from Rorty brings to the fore some difficulties in putting to use the concept conversation in Christian mission. Now that epistemology no longer counts, whereas we noted in Chapter two that theology has always developed her vocabulary from epistemology, it looks incompatible to apply the Rortian 'conversation' in Christian mission practice. This is so because Rorty removed the foundations on which the Christian base is built and his views negated Christianity as an organised religion and labelled "religion as a conversation stopper."[760] From a missiological perspective the main question is, how do you put to use a concept whose origins and proponents negate the very idea it is intending to serve? In other words, how could theology canonise the concept conversation despite its tainted background and promoters? In this research, our concern lies with the concept conversation and its usability in mission studies and theology generally. And that is what we are set to demonstrate in this chapter.

It was observed in Chapter Two, that Rorty's concept of conversation and the claims of Christian mission are close in the sense that both deal with truth. As was noted in chapter two, the key concept of Christian mission is Truth and Christianity is boldly proclaimed as true and its truth is in some sense universal. This is due to the fact that Christian truth claims are said to be based on events having taken place in history, that is, the passion, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. It was noted in that chapter that Christ is considered the Truth because he referred everything back to God the father, perceived things and acted in the context of a proper relation to God. Christian truth, therefore, is not primarily propositional, rather it is relational. It concerns the proper relationship of humanity, creation and God, a relationship which is promised as the future fulfilment of the whole of reality before God. According to Richard Rorty, "…If we see knowing not as having an essence, but rather as a right, by current standards, to believe then we are well on the way to seeing conversation as the ultimate context within which knowledge is to be understood."[761] The question of truth has pre-occupied the human mind throughout history but none has provided an adequate interpretation and meaning of it. Even Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (now emeritus Pope Benedict XVI) observed that "… at the centre of theology lies the question of truth."[762] By using the noun question in reference to truth, Cardinal Ratzinger expressed an interminable exploration that the noun truth offers in

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760 Richard Rorty, "Religion in the Public Square: A Reconsideration" *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Spring 2003): 141-149.

761 Rorty, *Philosophy and Mirror of Nature*, 389-390.

762 Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, "Question of Truth Lies at the Centre of Theology" An address to the symposium on "The Primacy of the Successor of Peter", sponsored by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, opened on Monday, 2 December 1996 and published *by L'Osservatore Romano*, Weekly Edition in English, 1 January 1997.

theology. And as we have all along stated, that certainly the question of truth was so central to Rorty as well.

We again, followed Rorty's argument when he claimed that we need to make a distinction between the claim that the world is out there and the claim that truth is out there. He thinks that to say that the world is out there, that it is not our creation, is to say, with common sense, that most things in space and time are the effects of causes which do not include human mental states. He affirmatively maintains that "truth cannot be out there, cannot exist independently of the human mind, and because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. The world on its own unaided by the describing activities of human beings cannot. So, he attaches the notion of 'truth making' to human capacity for language or communication at that. Rorty disputes the thinking that the goal of enquiry is truth. He argues that one cannot say this without misleading the public. He considers that 'Truth' only sounds like the name of a goal if it is thought to name a fixed goal, that is, if progress towards truth is explicated by reference to a metaphysical picture, that of getting closer or getting there anyway. Without that picture, to say that truth is our goal is merely to say something like 'we hope to justify our belief to as many and as large audiences as possible. But to say that is to offer only an ever-retreating goal, one which fades forever and forever when we move. It is not what common sense would call a goal. He concedes that truth is not even something to which we might get closer; much less something we might realize we had finally reached. To try to make truth approachable and reachable is to do what is deplorable, to humanise truth.[763]

In chapters Three and Four, by applying the tools of critical discourse analysis, we have described and analysed mission history in Uganda following Fairclough's three-dimensional analytic framework. As we saw in Chapter Two, this framework involves linguistic description of the text, interpretation of the relationship between discursive processes (production and interpretation) and the text, and explanation of the relationship between the discursive process and social phenomena.[764] The use of critical discourse analysis is motivated by the fact that mission is basically founded on 'proclamation' which implies the use of language as a medium. And since the noun 'proclamation' means the act of saying something in a public, official, or definite way or the act of proclaiming something, then CDA is applicable to establish how missionaries in the past and present, used language in the proclamation of truth. Another important element that was set to consider in the use of critical discourse analysis is to find out the model of mission that the missionaries applied in their strategy. The findings that we have developed from the missionary texts and the pastoral documents of the archdiocese of Kampala

763 Richard Rorty, "Is Truth a Goal of Enquiry? Davidson vs. Wright," *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 180 (July 1995): 281-300.

764 Fairclough Norman, *Critical Discourse Analysis: the critical study of language*, (Harlow, England: Pearson Education, 2010), 97.

bring to light the fact that mission has maintained a consistent method and practice that has a deep foundations in the Catholic self-understanding and in the Catholic theology of religions.

In discussing the above subject, James Fredericks locates this problem in the pre-Vatican II Catholic theology of religions as represented by Karl Rahner and Jean Daniélou. He considers principally Daniélou's approach to the question as governed by a theology of history. In his view, history is the progressive manifestation of the divine to humankind. Within this general history of creation, salvation history proper begins with Abraham and reaches its apex in Jesus Christ whose saving presence within time is now continued by the Church. Daniélou locates religious traditions other than Judaism and Christianity within this theology of history by means of a Scholastic distinction between the natural and the supernatural orders. Although the natural order has its own proper autonomy and intelligibility, it has been ordained by God to find its ultimate fulfilment in the supernatural. This fulfilment of the natural order in its supernatural destiny and finality is manifest in the progressive unfolding of the divine within history. Therefore, Christians may speak not only of two orders, the natural and the supernatural, but also of two covenants, the cosmic, which includes the entire natural order, and the historical covenant, which begins in the Jewish people and continues today in the Church.[765]

Based on this distinction, Daniélou concludes that the other religious paths are human expressions of a real knowledge of God available to human beings through the proper use of natural reason that has a supernatural finality. This natural knowledge of God, however, should not be confused with a supernatural faith which comes only from God's active intervention into the unfolding of a history of salvation beginning with Abraham and culminating in Christ. He claims that: "The essential difference between Catholicism and all other religions is that the others start from man. They are touching and often very beautiful attempts, rising very high in their search for God. But in Catholicism there is a contrary movement, the descent of God towards the world, in order to communicate his life to it."[766] But however "touching" and "beautiful," the other religious paths are located within the natural order and have no power to provide human beings with the salvation that God has made available only in the Church, and indeed, the Catholic Church.[767] This concludes that Christian mission is founded on a theological tradition which shapes its practice regardless of the time and context. And placed in the confines of this research, Christian mission has foundations which inform its

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765 Cf. James Fredericks, "The Catholic Church and the Other Religious Paths: Rejecting Nothing that is True and Holy" *Theological Studies*, Vol. 64 (June 2003): 225-254; See also, Jean Daniélou, *Lord of History, Reflections on the Inner Meaning of History* (London: Longmans Green, 1958), 107-121.
766 Jean Daniélou, *The Salvation of the Nations* (South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1962), 8.
767 Fredericks, "The Catholic Church and Other Religious path," 225ff.

truth claims and is heavily contrasted to the non-foundationalism of Rorty which surrenders the rational quest for truth.

The dilemma above draws attention to two contrasting positions prevailing in philosophy that is foundationalism and non-foundationalism as we have presented it in Chapter One. If we consider it from the epistemological standpoint, foundationalism at all times implies the holding of a position in an inflexible and infallible manner; invoking ultimate foundations on which to construct the evidential support system of various convictional beliefs. Foundationalism as a thesis holds that all our beliefs can be justified by appealing to some item of knowledge that is self-evident or indubitable.[768] And for Calvin Schrag, foundationalism finds its mission in a quest for certainty. Unimpeachable knowledge claims is what it is after. These foundational systems of knowledge are called 'first principles' or 'aristocratic beliefs', which are intrinsically credible. Such basic givens can be anything from sense data to universals, essences, and experiences, including religious experiences.[769] And for Christian theology, the given is God himself who makes his revelation known to humans through Jesus Christ. Faith in Christ therefore grasps the promise that we shall be led into all truth. In receiving the gift of faith the proclamation of Christ confirms itself to people, in which people, touched by its truth, themselves become its bearers, and in which the knowledge of God becomes real. In order to avoid the possibility of reversing this order, which would result in knowledge of human invention, theology consequently must assert that it does have a foundation.[770] This confirms that Christian mission is rooted in an inflexible and secure foundationalist tradition as we have noted it above.

These explanations present positions which are necessary for understanding conversation as our sensitising concept. We have all along maintained that the concept 'conversation' as applied in this thesis has been understood in the Rortian sense as propounded in his book '*Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*.' But this Rortian conversation as rooted in a non-foundationalism which informed his works raises some difficulties in applying it adequately in Christian mission. This is so because Christian mission begins with the given of revelation which forms its foundation and legitimacy as we have seen above. In order to achieve this objective, we shall have to assume the via media between foundationalism and non-foundationalism.

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768 Wentzel Van Huyssteen, *Essays in postfoundationalist theology*, (Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1997) 2-3.

769 Cf. Calvin Schrag, "Traces of rationality: Acknowledgment, recognition, and repetition," in *The evolution of rationality* ed. F.L. Shults (Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2006), 19-29; Thiel, J.E., *Nonfoundationalism* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 2; Rescher, N., *A system of pragmatic idealism*, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 161.

770 Cf. Kevin Diller, "Does contemporary theology require a post-foundationalist way of knowing?" *Scottish Journal of Theology*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (August 2007): 271-293.

Rorty, Religion and Conversation

Because we use Rorty's notion of conversation to construct a mission method, we have to prove that it is plausible for use in theology and particularly in mission studies. It was mentioned in Chapter Two, that religion had a significant place in the works of prominent pragmatists such as Dewey, Peirce and James. They contributed a lot to the development and intellectual respectability of religion as a human endeavour. Richard Rorty following his pragmatist mentor John Dewey believes that we might usefully substitute faith in human potential for retrograde faith in a benevolent God. This is a reversal of his hardliner views on religion and the beginning of flip-flopping on this theme. As it was noted in Chapter One of this research, Rorty is such an accomplished and nuanced writer. It is nearly impossible to know where to begin a discussion of his views on any topic, let alone religion, a topic on which he writes so elliptically and separately. For most of the 1980's and well into the 1990's Rorty wrote very little about religion, and when he did, he came across as a relatively sharp critic of any agenda that pertains to defend religion. It was assumed that Rorty would think that he would be better off without religion altogether. This is very clear in his essay with a provocative title *"Religion as a conversation stopper"* where he refers to himself and like-minded intellectuals as "we atheists."[771] The following debate here below accentuates the difficulties that pertain to the convergence of two social systems motivated by different truth claims with diverse epistemological backgrounds. This debate sets religion against politics and the arguments between the two traditions gives way to a conversation that shapes their relationship without discounting their differences.

We have seen above that Rorty considered religion a conversation stopper. This remark was prompted by the publication of Stephen's Carter's religious apology in the book *The Culture of Disbelief*. This book is written on the premise that the principalities of government and religion, when not producing oppression from their merger, are necessarily generating friction from their separation. Likewise, it is no secret of contemporary society that unresolved tensions between religion and the state continue to surface and that there is yet any satisfactory concordance on the proper role of religion in public life. In this book, Carter "….argues that there has emerged a legal and political culture of disbelief, one that prompts us to belittle religious devotion, to humiliate believers and even if indirectly, to discourage religion as a serious activity, one that presses the religiously faithful to be other than themselves, to act publicly, and sometimes privately as well, as though their faith does not matter to them."[772] Carter's words represent a view that contemporary society must begin taking religion seriously as a central source of understanding and moral reasoning for majority citizens and as a necessary and beneficial component

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[771] Richard Rorty, "Religion as a Conversation Stopper," in *Philosophy and Social Hope,* Richard Rorty (New York: Penguin, 1999), 168-174.

[772] Stephen Carter, *A Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivializes Religious Devotion* (New York: Basic Books), 1993, 3, 16.

of the socio-political system. In particular Carter insists that religion be allowed to fulfil its historic and functionally optimal role of checking the power and policies of the states. According to Carter, religion is at its best, and thus the state and society derive the most from it, when it serves as a mediating institution between state and citizen, never in substantial alliance with the former and always a potential source of moral dissent for the latter.[773]

The most provocative and useful part of Carter's book is his normative conception of the proper relationship between government and religion which are entities with varied truth claims. In his understanding of religion which is fairly traditional, he claims that, "Although many thoughtful sociologists and historians have defined religion in other ways, the belief in the supernatural intervention in human affairs is a useful divider for our present purposes, because that is where the culture seems to draw the line between that which is suspect and that which is not."[774] This conception is premised on the idea that religious involvement in politics and law can be indispensably beneficial for the state, even if, and perhaps especially if, the former is in vigorous dissent from the latter. Carter draws this theory from the observations of Alexis de Tocqueville: "Translating Tocqueville's observation to the present day and removing his pro-Christian bias, one sees two chief functions that religions can serve in a democracy. First, they can serve as the sources of moral understanding without which any majoritarian system can deteriorate into simple tyranny. And second, they can mediate between the citizens and the apparatus of government, providing an independent moral voice. Indeed, from Tocqueville's day to contemporary theories of pluralism, the need for independent mediating institutions has been a staple of political science. Like other intermediate institutions, religions that command the devotion of their members actually promote freedom and reduce the likelihood of democratic tyranny by splitting the allegiance of citizens and pressing on their members' points of view that are often radically different from the preferences of the state."[775]

Basing on this understanding, Carter insists that the religious presence in politics and society should generally be welcomed, not feared. This to be sure, is one of the great ironies in contemporary perceptions of religion: "The very aspect of religions that many of their critics most fear, the religiously devout, in the name of their faith, take positions that differ from approved state policy, is one of their strengths. Taking an independent path, exercising what is termed as the power of resistance, is part of what religions are for.[776] Although this kind of perspective on the political value of religion is not universally held, either as a normative goal or as an empirical norm, but rather derives from Carter's particular view of religiosity. According to Carter, "…religion…is not simply a means for understanding one's self, or even of

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[773] Ibid., 39.
[774] Stephen Carter, *The Culture of Disbelief*, 25.
[775] Ibid., 36-37.
[776] Ibid., 37; David Tracy, *Plurality and Ambiguity,* (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1988), 83.

contemplating the nature of the universe, or existence, or of anything else. A religion is, at its heart, a way of denying the authority of the rest of the world; it is a way of saying to fellow human beings and to the state those fellow human beings have erected, "No, I will not accede to your will."[777] In the context of his theory of religion and government, the paradigmatic illustration of religion as a mediating source of resistance would thus be the religious citizen who, when confronted with a government action antithetical to his/her faith, must profess to the state Luther's *"Ich kann nicht anders, hier stehe ich"* (I cannot do otherwise, here I stand").[778] We should not assume, however, that this dissentient function of religion, this power of resistance, is limited to the sphere of the individual or that, as its name implies, it is concerned only with resistance and not with the transformation of the political and social order. To the contrary, Carter contends that we must properly attribute to it the moral determination of such transformative figures as Martin Luther King and Joseph Rummel, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of New Orleans who, in 1956, threatened Roman Catholic legislators with excommunication if they supported de jure segregation of private schools.[779]

The central point of Carter's theory, then, is that a vigorous religious presence is a necessary part of a vigorous democratic order and that we stand to lose when religion is excluded from the public square, even if such exclusion seems expedient in the short run. In turn, it is precisely because of this institutional or structural relationship that the culture of disbelief, as a paradigm of religion in politics, is so inherently problematic. For just as the excessive entanglement of government and religion "tends to destroy government and degrade religion," the excessive detachment of religion from government, in this case through the related phenomena of trivialisation, privatisation, and secularisation, may either emasculate religion and thus unduly empower government, or alienate religion and thus threaten government. But the question is: How should we deal with the overzealous religious movement that purposefully seeks either to use the state as a conduit for its entire agenda, thus offending a liberal conception of the state or effectively to become the state? After all, a simple exposition on the virtues of separation and robust democracy would likely do little to dissuade such a movement from pursuing its goals, particularly when each side defines a healthy constitutional order in starkly different terms. Aware of this possibility, especially given the recent rise of the Christian Coalition, Carter argues that the proper response is not to single out religion from exclusion from the political process, but to confront such attempts within that process. "The error, as a matter of secular

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[777] Ibid., , 41.

[778] Harold J. Berman & John Witte, Jr., *The Transformation of Western Legal Philosophy in Lutheran Germany*, 62 S. CAL. L. 1575, 1647 n.209 (1989) (citing and translating 7 D. Martin Luther's Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe 838 (1974) as noted in Scott C. Idleman, "The Sacred, the Profane, and the Instrumental: Valuing Religion in the Culture of Disbelief. The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivializes Religious Devotion", *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, Vol. 142, No. 4 (April 1994) 1313-1381.

[779] Stephen Carter, *A Culture of Disbelief*, 63-64.

politics, is to suppose that it is the Christian Coalition's religiosity rather than its platform that is the enemy."[780] If it is the religious right's conservatism that is problematic, he contends, rather than using religion as an overbroad proxy for conservatism and banish it judicially by calling it an establishment, the conservatism should be confronted directly in the polls and on the legislative floor. It is these for the political market, and not the courts, he says that "will always check on potential oppressors."[781] And those opponents of the new Christian right who see this as too much work – Why can't we just litigate? Won't a press conference do just as much? – simply are less serious than the Christian Coalition itself about winning."[782] Such an approach, he suggests, would be fairer both to religion or religious citizens, many of whom harbour no such agendas and often have a great deal to contribute, and to our basic commitment to participatory politics, a commitment that is potentially undermined when citizens attempt to defeat or exclude one another through non-political channels.[783]

By and large, Carter appears to provide a viable theoretical framework to explain and justify the relationship between government and religion, or at least some aspects of that relationship. Carter is certainly correct that religions may serve society through their ethical and prophetic functions. As a practical matter, moreover, his model works because it would apparently encompass any religion that chooses to participate in the political and legal processes, for when a religion engages in such participation, it would presumably be fulfilling one of its functions as a mediating institution by serving to counterbalance the excesses and errors of the state. At the same time, any religion choosing to forego the benefits and burdens of political participation could do so and would not be obviously penalised for its choice. In short, if society is to benefit from the unique contributions that religions can make, then at least as a non-constitutional matter, religions need to have full and equal access to the political and legal realms.

I wish to conclude this part of Carter's ideas by highlighting the catalogues of the various conceptual paradigms which I think might lead to describe and understand his Culture of disbelief. Specifically, there are six interrelated theses proposed by various scholars which are in turn raised by Carter in his book, that either describe a phenomenon or state a perspective relating to the relationship between religion and the political culture. These are: (1) the trivialisation thesis,[784] (2) the double standard thesis,[785] (3) the privatisation thesis,[786] (4) the false neutrality thesis,[787] (5)

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780 Ibid., 266.
781 Ibid., 267.
782 Ibid., 268.
783 Ibid., 267-268.
784 Ibid., 48-51.
785 Ibid., 52-55.
786 Ibid., 56-63.
787 Ibid., 64-67.

the hostility thesis,[788] and (6) the secularisation thesis.[789] These theses are meant to offer a more refined way of examining the phenomenon that lead Carter, for one, to conclude that a full-fledged culture of disbelief certainly exists. And if it exists it negates and stifles the human quest to search for truth, a notion which cannot be confined in a single interpretation.

In his strident critique, Rorty takes on Carter and his work *'The Culture of Disbelief.'* He rebukes Carter for putting in question what, to atheists like him, seems the happy, Jeffersonian compromise that the Enlightenment reached with religion. This compromise consists in privatising religion, keeping it out of the public square, making it seem bad taste to bring religion into discussions of public policy.[790] Rorty assumes the position of a speaker for the atheists by charging that: "We atheists, doing our best to enforce Jefferson's compromise, think it bad enough that we cannot run for public office without being disingenuous about our disbelief in God; ….We also resent the suggestion that you have to be religious to have a conscience, a suggestion implicit in the fact that only religious conscientious objectors to military service go unpunished."[791] He makes some bewildering remarks about religion when he proposes that, "Such facts suggest to us that the claims of religion need, if anything, to be pushed back still further, and that religious believers have no business asking for more public respect than they now receive."[792] He tries to debunk Carter's arguments to render them vague when he claims that, "Carter, however, thinks that privatising religion trivialises it."[793] He does not agree with Carter who says that "the legal culture that guards the public square still seems most comfortable thinking of religion as a hobby, something done in privacy, something mature, public-spirited adults do not use as the basis for politics."[794] He appropriates Carter's term "trivialisation of religion" to "privatisation of religion." Rorty is firm in insisting that religion is a private affair that does not have any significance in the public affairs. He compares religion to family and love lives which are private, non-political and nontrivial. In doing this he refutes the trivialisation thesis of Carter.

Rorty gives the basis for his exclusion thesis by refuting the idea of Carter who thinks that any exclusion of religion from the public square is unjust and limits the conversation. But Rorty responds that such exclusion is at the heart of the Jeffersonian compromise and that it is hard to see what more just arrangement might take the place of that compromise.[795] He presents the conviction of the contemporary liberal philosophers who think that to keep a democratic political

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788 Ibid., 68-70.
789 Ibid., 71-72.
790 Richard Rorty, "Religion as a Conversation Stopper," 168.
791 Ibid., 169.
792 Ibid., 169.
793 Ibid., 169.
794 Ibid., 170.
795 Ibid., 170.

community going, religious believers must remain willing to trade privatisation for a guarantee of religious liberty.[796] In order to galvanise his privatisation argument he declares that: "The main reason religion needs to be privatised is that, in political discussion with those outside the relevant religious community, it is a conversation-stopper."[797] However, Rorty appreciates and agrees entirely with Carter on two thoughtful and persuasive parts of his book where Rorty, in unpretentiousness, acknowledges that it "…points up the inconsistency of our behaviour, and the hypocrisy involved in saying that believers somehow have no right to base their political views on their religious faith, whereas we atheists have every right to base ours on Enlightenment philosophy. The claim that in doing so we are appealing to reason, whereas the religious are being irrational, is hokum."[798] He as well accepts that, "Carter is also right to say that the liberal theory has not shown that the will of any of the brilliant philosophers of the liberal tradition, or, for that matter, the will of the Supreme Court of the United States, is more relevant to moral decisions than the will of God."[799] We end this response of Rorty to Carter by his message to religious citizens that they should restructure their arguments in purely secular terms by dropping reference to the source of the premises of their arguments and that this omission seems a reasonable price to pay for religious liberty.

Rorty's distrustful reaction to Carter drew a furore of replies from authors who criticised him for promoting an uncoordinated pragmatic tradition with a blind secularism. For the purpose of the argument in this section, we shall limit these responses to two because of their close affinity to Rorty and his philosophical tradition. In his article, *"An Engagement with Rorty*", Nicholas Wolterstorff finds it difficult to reconcile the incongruence in Rorty's thought when he assumes that Rorty "…hopes for what he calls 'universal intersubjective agreement,' but agreement achieved by the social practice of what he regularly calls justification."[800] Also, he chides Rorty for being inconsistent in his self-description for at one time calling himself an atheist and another moment referring to himself as anticlericalist. And in doing this, he runs away from epistemological and metaphysical controversies which the word 'atheist' evokes and he does want to get into and uses a political term 'anticlericalist' to describe a location in the controversies that he does want to enter.[801] Wolterstorff also finds it difficult to account for the public/private dualisms in Rorty's privatisation of religion. He is surprised to see Rorty, an implacable enemy of dualisms, placing so much weight on this particular dualism.[802] Again, he charges that Rorty, in his use of the phrase 'Religion as Conversation-Stopper' he was merely tweaking a comment of Stephen Carter

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796 Ibid., 171.
797 Ibid., 171.
798 Ibid., 172.
799 Ibid., 172.
800 Nicholas Wolterstorff, "An Engagement with Rorty," *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, Vol. 31, No.1 (Spring 2003): 129-139.
801 Ibid., 130.
802 Ibid., 131.

which went like this: "One good way to end a conversation…is to tell a group of well-educated professionals that you hold a political position (preferably a controversial one, such as being against abortion or pornography) because it is required by your understanding of God's will;"[803] when he offered an unusually flat-footed example of a religious argument for a political position. So, Rorty appropriated Carter's words and coined a new phrase which in fact was only a re-statement of the same words in another form.

In addition to the above, Wolterstorff finds it conflicting that Rorty's comments about the role of religion in the democratic polity breathe a very different spirit from that of his comments on every other topic that he has developed. In his other passages Rorty praises imagination, openness, re-description, and self-creation whereas here, the talk is all about limits. Religion is to limit itself to the private; the conversation is to be limited to the premises held in common.[804] He also wonders why Rorty who bases his arguments and social positions on Darwinian pragmatism, does not base the same on premises held in common! And that all Rorty's books are addressed to the public in general and not just to his fellow Darwinian pragmatist.[805] But in a surprising U-turn, Rorty points it out that "…moral decisions that are to be enforced by a pluralist and democratic state's monopoly of violence are best made by public discussion in which voices claiming to be God's, or reason's or science's, are put at par which everybody's else.[806] This he argues that it is allowance that constitutes a social policy and not limitation. But claiming that religion must be privatised, Rorty wants to forestall the conversation even before it is there. He brings to the attention of Rorty that conversation-stopping is not some appalling evil perpetrated upon an otherwise endlessly talkative public by religious people. Stopped conversation is an all-pervading feature of political debate in a democracy; and voting is provided as a procedure for arriving at a decision of the body when conversation is stopped. So for Rorty to call on the religious people to shape up in order to be in a democracy, implies that also the pragmatists with their philosophical reasons must shape up to fit well in a democracy.

We end Wolterstorff's rejoinder with this rather long observation: "It belongs to the religious convictions of a good many religious people in our society that they ought to base their decisions concerning fundamental issues of Justice on their religious convictions. They do not view as an option whether or not to do so. It is their conviction that they ought to strive for wholeness, integrity, and integration in their lives: that they ought to allow the Word of God, the teachings of the Torah, the command and example of Jesus, or whatever, to shape their existence as a whole, including, then their social and political existence. Their religion is not, for them, about something other than their social and political existence; it is also

803 Ibid., 132.
804 Ibid., 134.
805 Ibid., 134.
806 Ibid., 135.

about their social and political existence. Accordingly, to require of them that they do not base their decisions and discussions concerning political issues on their religion are to infringe, inequitably, on the free exercise of their religion."[807]

Another response to Rorty's essay, *'Religion as Conversation-Stopper'* came from Jeffrey Stout whose differences with Rorty fall into two main categories. On the one hand they pertain to the rhetoric of objectivity and, on the other, to what pragmatism implies concerning the role of religion in democratic politics.[808] He invokes a point of unanimity with Rorty that both of them have been persuaded by their pragmatist forebears to treat rationality as a more permissive and context-sensitive notion than Victorian critics of religious superstition took it to be. Also both are inclined to agree with William James that some theists might well be rationally entitled to their religious commitments. However, he expresses his differences with Rorty because he considers that Rorty's writings on the role of religion in politics often retain the spirit, if not the letter, of militant secularism. He recognises that in many of those writings he treats religion per se as an unwelcome intruder in the political sphere, and is looking for ways, consistent with his own pragmatic philosophical commitments, to mobilise opposition to its influence.[809] Stout takes a different path from Rorty and sees religion, in its public as well as its private manifestations, as an ever-changing mixture of life-giving and malignant tendencies. He thinks that any citizen who shares the desire for justice and freedom, be they religious or not, is welcome into the public conversation. Far from embracing Rorty's vision of the future which is a perfectly secular utopia, Stout dreams of reviving the sort of coalition between religious groups and secular intellectuals that characterised the civil rights movements.

Stout articulates a stark reality as a counsel to Rorty that there is no reason to think that human beings are going to stop being religious in the foreseeable future. He maintains that: "If we are not at all likely to enter an age in which religion ceases to have public influence; it seems unlikely that pursuing a secularist political agenda is going to have beneficial consequences on the whole."[810] To support his assertion, he recalls the historical events of the 1960s when de-divinization was widely thought to be an essential component of modernization; when it was thought, religious belief and practice were in the process of withering away. He states that all this proved a myth when the death of the secularisation thesis was announced in the early 1980's by Mary Douglas when she declared that events have taken religious studies by surprise. She explained that scholars had had their eyes "…glued to those conditions of modern life identified by Weber as antipathetic to

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[807] Robert Audi and Nicholas Woerstorff, *Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate,* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), 105; see also Stuart Rosenbaum, "Must Religion be a Conversation-Stopper," *Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. 102, No. 2 (October 2009) 393-409.
[808] Jeffery Stout, *Rorty on Religion and Politics*, 2.
[809] Ibid., 3.
[810] Ibid., 5.

religion. Perhaps, also, their inclinations misled them….. Certain religious form might have a natural appeal to intellectuals if they are going to be religious at all. People whose occupations do not require submission to authority or conformity to outward forms, and who are paid to ask searching questions and to take an independent stance, are likely to be more drawn to a personal style of religious worship than to a publicly conforming one. Their own religious preferences could conceivably dim their perception of what other people like."[811] Stout further reminds Rorty about another historical detail that as a consequence of the declaration of the demise of the secularisation thesis, even one of its leading proponents, Peter Berger, abandoned it.[812]

In the same vein, Stout points out that there is tension within most of Rorty's writings on the topic of religion and politics. He charges at Rorty for the way he makes objections to the use of scriptural authority in public discussions as something more than an arbitrary expression of his own preferences. Stout is astonished at Rorty's reasoning that citing a biblical passage aligned with his liberal sympathies is permissible, while citing a biblical passage that he dislikes is not permissible. Also that citing any biblical passage in support of a conclusion Rorty agrees with would be permissible, while citing any passages in support of contrary conclusions would not be. And in either of those interpretations, Rorty would be proposing himself as the arbiter of discursive legitimacy. Again Stout points to Rorty that it is not justifiable to claim that all ecclesiastical organisations are seeking economic and political clout, it is reasonable enough to evaluate them one by one and offer encouragement to the good ones and expose the wrong ones as well.

These responses had a remarkable impact on Rorty and he softened his stance against religion. This is most evident in some aspects of his writings in which he, in the last decade of his life, became an enthusiastic promoter of reconcilability of pragmatism and religion. This led to an intellectual respectability of religious convictions and attitudes generally. In fact, he insisted on the individual's right to believe what they will and for the rights of the private, the unshared, and the imaginative vis-à-vis the public, the objective and the universal.[813] Although, he was generally committed to his pluralist and anti-foundationalist agenda, he created the possibility of productive conversation between the believers and non-believers. It was observed earlier on, that Rorty had all identified himself as an atheist and his labelling of "religion as a conversation stopper" proves this point. But he confesses

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811 Ibid., 6. See also Mary Douglas, "The Effects of Modernization on Religious Change," in *Religion and America: Spirituality in a Secular Age,* ed. Mary Douglas, Steven M. Tipton (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), 25-43, 25-26.

812 Ibid., 6. See also Peter Berger, "The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview," *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, ed. Peter Berger, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1999), 1-18.

813 Serge Grigoriev, "Rorty, Religion and Humanism," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. 70, Issue 3, (December 2011): 187-201.

that, "…it was a hasty and insufficiently thoughtful response."[814] He further confessed that "Although I have indeed used atheist as a self-description, I have never felt very comfortable with the word. It has a distinctly old-fashioned flavour. It has come to seem a relic of the quarrel between religion and science. That quarrel was far more central to intellectual life at the end of the 19th century than at the end of the 20th century."[815] This was a turning point in Rorty's attitude towards religion for he concedes his snobbery and "…rejects the possibility of dismissing religion on purely epistemic grounds."[816] But then he was determined to treat it, instead, as a matter of politics.

He worked to achieve his objective by reconsidering his position and attitude towards religion and religious beliefs. So, he preferred to label his views 'anti-clerical' a term with political inclinations. With this he considers religion as a matter of politics other than atheism, which carries religious overtones. These views encouraged him to suggest that anti-clericalism might be a better term for his outlook than atheism. He begins by making a distinction between congregations of religious believers ministered to by pastors and what he called ecclesiastical institutions, organisations that accredit pastors and claim to offer authoritative guidance to believers.[817] In his reconsideration of religion, he shuns what he calls religious professionals who devote themselves not to pastoral care but to promulgating orthodoxy and acquiring economic and political clout. He argues that it is mostly religion above the parish level that does the damage. He claims that ecclesiastical organisations typically maintain their existence by deliberately creating ill-will toward people who belong to other such organisations, and toward people whose behaviour they presume immoral. They thereby create unnecessary human misery. However, he also challenges his fellow atheists that "…there is hypocrisy, in saying that believers somehow have no right to base their political views on their religious faith, whereas we atheists have every right to base ours on Enlightenment philosophy. The claim that in doing so we are appealing to reason, whereas the religious are being irrational, is hokum."[818] He therefore urged a shifting of the ground in arguments for secularism away from the question of religion's Objective Truth, a concept he regarded as fictional and one we could be better off if we dropped. And so the principal concern of secularists must be the extent to which the actions of religious believers frustrate the needs of other human beings, rather than the extent to which religion gets something right or wrong.

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814 Richard Rorty, "Religion in the Public Square: A Reconsideration," *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (March 2003): 41-49. We shall basically rely on this essay to articulate Rorty's ideas on Religion and Conversation.

815 Richard Rorty, "Religion after Ont-theology: Reflections on Vattimo's Belief," paper delivered at the award of the Meister Eckhart Prize (Berlin, December, 2001).

816 Serge Grigoriev, "Rorty, Religion and Humanism," 187-201.

817 Richard Rorty, "Religion in the Public Square: A Reconsideration," 41-49.

818 Richard Rorty, "Religion as a Conversation Stopper," 164.

In his swipe against ecclesiastical organisations, he places his hopes that they will eventually wither away. He recalls the feeling that militant atheism is as unattractive as militant religious proselytising and therefore there is a need to distinguish between atheism and anti-clericalism. Although he recognises that the disappearance of ecclesiastical institutions would leave a gap in the lives of religious believers, for they will no longer have a sense of being part of a great and powerful worldly institution. But he thinks that that gap will be filled by an increased sense of participation in the advance of humanity, theists and atheists together, shoulder to shoulder, toward the fulfilment of social ideals. As social justice increases there is hope there will be less temptation for the poor to murder the rich and consequently less need for religion as a device for diminishing social unrest. So, the only role left for religious belief will be to help individuals find meaning in their lives and to serve as a help to individuals in their times of trouble. In the secularist utopia, religion will be pruned back to the parish level.

Rorty with time assumed a comfortable relationship with religion and religious beliefs to the extent of becoming a religious apologist but again developed a bitter hostility against ecclesiastical institutions which he considered political. He contends that "…religious belief is not irrational, or intrinsically wrong-headed."[819] He objects that those opposed to the idea of God and claim that: "To say that talk about God should be dropped because it impedes the search for human happiness is to take a pragmatic attitude toward religion that many religious believers find offensive and that some theologians think beside the point."[820] He argues that although religion no longer possesses the power it once did, we remain firmly under the spell of foundationalism every bit as fantastic as its supernatural predecessor. He thinks that the beliefs and truth-claims, however secular, are corresponding to and grounded upon a reality existing beyond the language games invented to get on in the world. So rather than attacking religion, most of Rorty's intellectual energies in his later years were devoted to popping these foundationalist elements and imagining what it might be like to live without them.

Another important element to note in Rorty is the way he considers religious language use. Rorty has a style of writing that apparently position him as a spokesperson for a group. He uses a lot of 'we' as when he claims that the social ideals 'we' secular humanists champion are often cast in religious terms. He expresses an optimistic hope that such ideals will eventually cease to be so stated. This, he maintains, does not imply that there is something intrinsically wrong with religious language. His only assumption is that putting political convictions in religious terms gives aid and comfort to ecclesiastical organisations, and thus to religious exclusivism and contempt for people who should be accorded the same respect as the rest of their fellow-citizens. This leads him to argue that religious

819 Richard Rorty, "Religion in the public Square," 42.
820 Richard Rorty, *Philosophy as Cultural politics, Philosophical Papers* Vol. 4 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 4-5.

people who claim a right to express their views in public because it is a result of their religious conviction should be ashamed of themselves and should be made to feel ashamed. He proposes that such citation should count as hate speech, and treated as such. He states that religious people with their convictions should not use religious language as an excuse for inflicting the suffering on their fellow citizens. He believes that religious people should trim their utterances to suit the utilitarian views and their citing of the sacred texts should not be a way of finding a vent for their own sadistic impulses.[821] In this aspect of language use, Rorty does not fear that it could generate into a full scale religious war, but the sort of everyday peacetime sadism that uses religion to excuse cruelty. By cruelty he meant the steady barrage of contempt from the religious people which provide the recipe for violence against others. Among those he mentioned as enemies are the ministers of the Christian religion who recite Leviticus 18:22 and gay bashers.[822] In this example he continues to disentangle clearly the distinctiveness of religious beliefs from the people who use religion for political and social recognition.

Rorty thinks that religious believers should not base their opinions and utterances on authority and tradition only. He argues that religious believers should not base their support of or opposition to a legislation simply by saying that "scripture says" or "Rome has spoken; the matter is closed" or "My Church teaches…" he assumes that it is one thing to explain how a given political stance is bound up with one's religious belief, and another to think that it is enough, when defending a political view, simply to cite authority, scriptural or otherwise. He thinks that if Christian believers have Christian reasons to an issue of public policy, they should not simply quote the Bible or papal encyclicals while discussing issues, these passages should only be used to help one articulate the views held. There should not be any mere appeal to authority. Rorty makes his problem with authority appear when he prefers Protestantism as more congenial to liberal democracy than Catholicism.[823] This is motivated by the priesthood of all believers which encourages the believer to interpret Scripture, theology and devotional literature on his own, rather than simply waiting to be informed by church officials about what is required to be a member in good standing of a given denomination. The Catholic attitude, he confesses, does seem to be the sort of thing democratic societies have a right to discourage. In this he highlights what he means by saying that there is a dichotomy between a believer and the institution of faith to which one belongs. He makes his recommitment that religion should be pruned back to the parish level. He said: "we should continue to view with alarm every attempt by ecclesiastical authorities to tell individual parishes or individual believers how to conduct themselves, or to limit the freedom of congregations to agree among themselves on the form of worship to be conducted."[824]

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821 Richard Rorty, "Religion in the Public Square," 144.
822 Ibid., 145.
823 Ibid., 147.
824 Ibid., 148.

Rorty back-pedals as he concludes his essay *"Religion as Conversation Stopper"* which was a response to Steven Carter's book. He corrects that impression when he says that it is false that religion is "essentially a conversation-stopper, because it is not essentially anything. He however continues to say that, "…it is true that one variety of expressions of religious beliefs does indeed stop the conversation, as when somebody says, "Do not ask me for reasons. I do not have any. It is a matter of faith."[825] So, Rorty corrects the above impression as he adopts a new position when he says that "…instead of saying that religion was a conversation stopper, I should have simply said that citizens of a democracy should try to put off invoking conversation stoppers as long as possible. We should do our best "to keep the conversation going" without citing unarguable first principles, either philosophical or religious."[826] From the above, we note that religion in itself was indeed not a conversation stopper as Rorty had claimed from the beginning. What is mostly at stake is the way that people use religion and apply religious language that seems to stop the conversation. Also, we have to note, that Rorty's take on religion was more informed by his jealousy concern for his liberal democratic principles and not religious mission as such. So, his treatise on religion was more about the position of religion in the public square where a multiplicity of voices converge and contribute to the conversation of mankind. Rorty's presupposition was that religion should not assume a controlling posture if it is to contribute effectively to the conversation of mankind, otherwise it becomes a conversation stopper. This debate over religion has generated some useful insights in the understanding of mission in contemporary society which is characterised by globalisation, multiculturalism and migration. It provides Christian mission with clues of positioning the Christian faith in its encounter, and its relationship with the various traditions and voices that seem to inhabit the public square.

In this section, we have seen how Rorty suggested that religion is a conversation-stopper. Jeffrey Stout has questioned this claim, gently chiding Rorty for his hostility toward increasing assertiveness on the part of religiously committed individuals in their address of public issues. Stout concludes that conversation is the very thing that is not stopped when religious premises are introduced in a political argument. He is convinced that Rorty is overly sensitive on this matter and believes, with Nicholas Wolterstoff and others, that religious people in a pluralistic democracy have not only the right but also the responsibility to share their convictions and the reasoning that leads to their opinions on vital moral and social issues. This observation then implies that religion can as well be a conversation starter other than a conversation-stopper which Rorty took it to be. The conclusion on this section leads us to some interesting developments. Firstly, the Church existing and exercising her mission in a pluralistic society cannot abandon its foundations which constitute her identity, her religious language and vocabulary. Secondly, Christianity in her mission must use her resources in the furtherance and

[825] Ibid., 147.
[826] Ibid., 149.

maintenance of the conversation with other departments of human society. Thirdly, Christian mission can enter into meaningful conversation as her mission and ministry and thus remain faithful to her history and traditions but also relevant in her service to mankind. In the following section, the main task is to articulate mission as conversation.

Mission as Conversation

Mission as conversation presupposes that the experience which characterises human existence is never single but always a plurality. By plurality I refer to varieties in beliefs, opinions, interests, world views, culture, political inclinations, religious and faith commitments, educational attainments, social status and all that which entails human life. David Tracy having indicated that there is no intellectual, cultural, political or religious tradition (of interpretation) that does not ultimately live by the quality of its conversation, puts it bluntly that "…there is also no tradition that does not eventually have to acknowledge its own plurality and ambiguity."[827] This plurality of human experience was at the core of the pragmatic tradition which shaped Rorty's thinking and the articulation of his metaphor of "keeping the conversation going."[828] This on-going conversation meant to renew the sense of community and that what matters in life "…is our loyalty to other human beings clinging together against the dark."[829] But despite the afore-mentioned plurality, people also find themselves engaged in a communication that binds them as a community with common things to share. Dewey observes that, "There is more than a verbal tie between the words common, community, and communication. What they must have in common in order to form a community or society are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge, a common understanding.... Such things cannot be passed physically from one to another, like bricks; they cannot be shared as persons would share a pie by dividing it into physical pieces. The communication which insures participation in a common understanding is one which secures similar emotional and intellectual dispositions like ways of responding to expectations and requirements."[830] There is always a kind of tension in political and social theories that stress the centrality of what is shared, held in common, and universal to the detriment of the integrity of what is different and genuinely plural among individuals. Given the plurality of society, we have a basis for conversation as the mission theory in the Church in Uganda.

The model of mission as conversation is based on the understanding of conversation and indeed of the essentially conversational nature of the theological

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827 David Tracy, *Preface to Plurality and Ambiguity*, ix.
828 Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 377, 378.
829 Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism,* 166.
830 John Dewey, *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* (Los Angeles: IndoEuropean Publishing, 2011), 3.

enterprise itself.[831] We apply the concept Conversation in mission studies following its primary form as an exploration of possibilities in the search for truth.[832] This reality is concomitant with the observations we made in Chapter Two that truth is at the centre of Rorty's conversation and similarly truth is at the centre in the understanding of Christian mission. In Chapter One we indicated that Rorty claims that we cannot regard truth as a goal of inquiry. The purpose of inquiry is to achieve agreement among human beings about what to do, to bring consensus on the end to be achieved and the means to be used to achieve those ends. Rorty contended that inquiry that does not achieve co-ordination of behaviour is not inquiry but simply wordplay. Further, it was observed in Chapter Two that for Rorty truth cannot be out there, it cannot exist independently of the human mind, because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. He maintained that the world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. The world on its own, unaided by the describing activities of human beings, cannot. Rorty attaches the question of truth to the capacity of human beings to interrelate in conversation and as people come to the truth. So, Rorty's conversation disdains the western tradition which centres on the notion of the search for Truth for its own sake, that is, not because it will be good for oneself or for one's real or imaginary community, but because such a notion attempts to give sense to one's existence by turning away from solidarity to objectivity.

Mission can be understood in terms of Rorty's conversation. This is the possibility which is arrived at by the fact that no particular conception of the truth can be imposed on any individual person. In fact this is what led Benedict XVI to contend that in this way: "Truth is controversial, and the attempt to impose on all persons what one part of the citizenry holds to be true looks like the enslavement of people's consciences."[833] He further argues that the concept of "truth" has in fact moved into the zone of antidemocratic intolerance. It is not now a public good, but something private. It may perhaps be the good of specific groups, but it is not the truth of society as a whole.[834] If we consider actual mission practice, this reality rhymes with the observation of Boyd that "…older churches and younger churches are no longer thought of as patrons and beneficiaries respectively, or even as senders and receivers, but as partners not merely in a contractual sense, but set by God in that relationship."[835] What we may find as fascinating here is that the search for truth that characterises human life both in its vertical dimension (in relation to

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831 Anne Hunt, "Trinity and Paschal Mystery: Divine Communion and Human Conversation," in *Theology and Conversation: Towards a Relational Theology,* ed. Jacques Haers and Peter De Mey (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003), 69.

832 David Tracy, *Plurality and Ambiguity*, 20.

833 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, *Values in a Time of Upheaval*, trans. Brian McNeil (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2006), 55.

834 Ibid.

835 Alexander John Boyd, *Christian Encounter* (Edinburgh: St. Andrews Press, 1961), 19; Carlos Rene Padilla, *Mission Between the Times* (Cumbria: Langham Monographs, 2010), 150 (revised and updated: Mission Between the Times, Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1985).

God) and its horizontal dimension (in relation to fellow human beings and all creation) involves a multiplicity of voices. The successful collaboration of the voices constitutes a conversation that leads the participants to seek the truth about their identities and to work for a concern greater than all. And this point marks a shift in vocabulary and language use in mission practice whereby binary oppositions of saved-pagan will give way to a new identity of seekers of the truth. This reality improves on the earlier mission history and the present mission practice as evidence suggests in the mission texts we have read, described and analysed. And according to the goal of this research, this is our objective for mission practice in the Church in Uganda.

In the description and analysis of mission practice in Chapter Three it was admitted that the beginning of mission practice in Uganda was rooted in the traditional understanding of mission. This traditional view is motivated by the imperative: "Go you therefore, and teach all nations" (Matthew 28:19). This imperative inclines mission to the propositional understanding of truth which was the motivation for the White Fathers Mission to Uganda. Many were convinced that Christianity had a duty to bring civilisation to the pagan world of Africa. They thought that Africans had to be evangelised to save them from the fires of hell. They received instructions which defined Africans thus: "It is doubtful if the blacks of the interior have any ideas at all about the afterlife or about the immortality of the soul. In any case they do not seem to have any religion, but only gross superstitions, without any form of worship, which resemble witchcraft. Their idea of God is so vague that certain explorers have been able to say they had none. As for morality, since their foundation is absolutely lacking, it can be said that it does not exist. All vices are found among them, and the scanty notions which they possess concerning right and wrong are nothing more than the dying rays of that light which God gave humanity at its origins."[836] These same representations of Africa were evident in Lavigerie's personal communications, as he wrote in this letter: Apart from physical sufferings a missionary has other trials which are perhaps harder to endure, and this is the case especially in recently founded missions. It takes a very long time to lead a whole race from error and barbarism to truth, virtue and civilisation, and the task is even more difficult when God's curse has rested on that race for centuries."[837]

In the third chapter, we described the texts where the missionaries set themselves as the standard with the normative validity claims while describing their mission work and encounter with the people in Uganda. They reserved a right to themselves to construct the identities of the people and their social environment. In their evaluation they reported that "…there were difficulties in the region as

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[836] Cardinal Lavigerie, *Instructions aux missionaires*, (Editions Grands Lacs: Namur 1950), 107. H.P.Gale, *Uganda and the Mill Hill Fathers* (London: Macmillan Co. Ltd. 1959), 88-89 as quoted in Tusingire Frederick, *The Evangelisation of Uganda: Challenges and Strategies,* (Kisubi: Marianum Publishing Company, 2002).

[837] Bouniol Joseph, *The White Fathers and their Missions* (London: Sands&Co., 1929), 73.

paganism with its foul rites, its witchdoctors and polygamy; the tropical jungle with malaria, the scourge of the Whites; sleeping sickness, the scourge of the natives; the compendium of all evils, slave trade; the hostility of Mohammedan and Protestants." In some sections of the Chronicles, they described the Baganda representing them as natives and men in rugged character. And they talked of people who had died of sleeping sickness that "...they are in paradise next to the good thief, who during their lives had only the appetite for crimes."[838] Again they continue to name the people as 'these unfortunate people.' What we have gathered from the evidence of the texts that we have read, described and analysed is that the perception of some missionaries towards the people was low and almost negative though not hostile.

The mission texts in the two previous chapters, speak about the work of the missionaries as singularly directed to the people of Uganda. And the natives are almost constructed as passive recipients of the gospel. Narrating about their missionary work, the missionaries reported that: "We preach several times a day: the neophytes, catechumens, children who are preparing for First Communion. Every Sunday, in addition to the homily in Church, we also preach to novices who are preparing themselves at the Sisters place to become catechists, and also to the sponsored children who are divided into two groups, one for girls and another for boys." Also in Chapter Three in the Chronicles outlines the number of baptisms for one year was put at 266 though lower than the previous year of 367. The number of marriages fellow from 69 to 49. There are two reasons given in the text. One, the state of health of the two fathers at Bujuni explains partly. But the first and main reason is given thus in the Chronicles: "The change of spirit among blacks; they have the spirit of their age, and today this spirit is a dream of well-being, of wealth and pre-mature civilisation. There are slow in getting instructed, they marry with difficult, because they see in religion and marriage obstacles to get this ideal of well-being and of that wealth which is always elusive." Other factors cited for the failure of religious enthusiasm in this mission station is the people's anxiety for becoming rich and how they have become traffickers of goat skins, others drive herds of goats and sheep on the Nile route hoping to get large profits and others go to Congo to trade in ivory and rubber.

However, a cursory look at the context of Uganda's mission history gives the impression that the missionaries employed a number of strategies. After their arrival, they recognised that they had to respond to the demands of the local context and throw away the idealism filled in the mission manuals and instructions. According to the '*Les Chroniques*', the White Fathers rejected the 'Christian village' method of evangelisation in Buganda. This meant that candidates for the priesthood were neither freed slaves nor members of the lowest class. But there were some dramatic developments as well. The Baganda converts, having learned

838 Cf. *Les Chroniques Trimestrielles*.

self-reliance early, were always ready to work with the Fathers in the strengthening of their Church. This apparent local ownership of the church was motivated by the view to compete with the Protestants. Buddu the Catholic province par excellence provided a highly suitable atmosphere for the recruitment and training of local priests. The incorporation of several aspects of Baganda culture and mentality within Catholicism helped to give a popular support to the work of the missionaries, not only from the Catholic chiefs and ordinary Catholics but also from many traditionalist clansmen.[839] This collaboration as it was illustrated in chapter three boosted the work of the missionaries.

Again chapter three revealed that missionaries who came to Uganda had a number of ideas about the strategy to follow for the evangelisation of the country. They wanted to convert the country from above by first converting the king of Buganda (Kabaka) and that did not work. It was a typical approach of the White Fathers to win the masses through conversion of the elites. In his instructions to his missionaries, Cardinal Lavigerie had said: It is better to convert one chief than to win a hundred blacks. In his evaluation of this approach, Wijsen considers that by converting the chiefs to Christianity the missionaries tried to get a warrant for their activities. Moreover, the loss of trust in the indigenous religion was their aim, and they found that the shortest route towards it was the conversion of indigenous authority. But this policy of winning through conversion of the chiefs was not very successful. Most chiefs were not interested or were furious and against the first missionaries.[840] But, in the course of their evangelising work at the king's court, they won over the future leaders of the country so that, in an unexpected way, the method of conversion from above became a success a few years later. Buganda was converted by its aristocrats, who adhered to the new religion, and not, as in other parts of Africa by the schools – nor, for that matter, by ransoming slaves and creating Christians villages, a common enough method among late 19th century missionaries. It is true that at the very beginning some slaves were ransomed in Uganda and orphanages opened, but this was connected with the idea of founding a corps of doctor-catechists, another strategy which had little impact in Uganda. The missionaries practiced what Mudimbe refers to as "Africanisation of Christianity"[841] but the goal remained to introduce Africans into the Church.

We have, in the general introduction, said that conversion and implantation of the church were the main models of classical missiology. In these models, mission was understood to be that of faithfully producing a replica of the missionary's sending church and culture. This is evident in the early missionary period when mission writings indicated a glimmer of pride at the realisation that the Christians of Uganda had reached the level of European Christians in such things as the

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839 John Mary Waliggo, *The Catholic Church in the Buddu Province of Buganda 1879-1925*, (Kampala: Centre for African Christian Studies, 2010), 101-102.
840 Frans Wijsen, *There is Only One God,* 227.
841 Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa*, 59.

sacramental life, devotions, and respect for the discipline of the Church. They had reason to be proud, because the theology and pastoral practice at the time were completely framed by what we might call Roman uniformity whereby the missionaries attempted to create new churches which were daughters of the western version of the Roman Church, begotten practically by cloning. But two important local factors to be appreciated and whose contribution brought about this phenomenal change: the catechumenate and the role of the residential catechists in the outstations. In Chapter Three, we saw that a number of texts testified to this fact. In the history of the Mill Hill Fathers, Bishop Biermans says: "…Catechumenates were established and catechists installed in various parts, to give the people, who were too far away from the missions, a chance of becoming acquainted with the teachings of our holy faith."[842] Many people in Uganda learned their faith from their fellow Ugandan catechists and not directly from the missionaries. But despite this apparent positive development, the content retained its European essence.

The development of events as noted above has indicated that the missionaries appropriated a locally groomed institution of the catechists and placed it under their own control and organisation. However, apart from appropriating some local Ugandan language categories and terms and having Ugandans participating in the mission practice alongside the missionaries, the fundamental strategy remained conversion. Conversation as it was noted above is built on the premise of appreciating the truth claims of the other and having their voices heard. Conversation is about having competing traditions with their truth claims raising their voices, describing themselves in their own categories and seeking to exhibit their uniqueness and differences. This scenario is what we attested to in Chapter Two that "…properly speaking, conversation is impossible in the absence of a diversity of voices, because in it different universes of discourse meet, acknowledge each other and enjoy an oblique relationship which neither requires nor forecasts their being assimilated to one another."[843] A keen observation of the conditions in the early Ugandan mission context show a missionary discourse whose purpose was the proclamation of a truth which conquers the other presumed truth claims to submit them to the one absolute truth and level their voices into one particular voice.

It was noted in Chapter Four that the Archdiocese of Kampala was re-organised following the political administrative structure of the central government. The text of the Pastoral Strategic Plan outlines that the Archdiocese of Kampala will "Organise deaneries in each Civic District into a Pastoral Zone so that our pastoral and social activities can be better streamlined and linked to those of the District, e.g., Education, Health and Development."[844] Again, it was observed that Kampala

[842] John Biermans, *A Short History of the Vicariate of the Upper Nile, Uganda*, 23.
[843] Michael Oakshott, *The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind*, 11.
[844] Archdiocese of Kampala, *Pastoral Strategic Plan,* 29.

Archdiocese recognises that her mission can only be successful after working with government agencies as the strategic plan suggests to "Create forums where education officials from the district and the Ministry as appropriate can be invited to share ideas on a harmonious and productive working relationship with the Archdiocese; and develop a sector based strategic plan for education and align its priorities and focus on the Government of Uganda's education strategic investment plan and policy."[845] With these plan and programs, the Church recognises that the efficacy of her mission lies in aligning all her programs with those of other sectors in society.

The above strategy takes into account cooperation with many entities such as the government leaders at district levels, parish and local council levels, community based organisations so that pastoral and social activities like health, education, development, roads, water and sanitation, agriculture and many others can be better streamlined and linked to those of the district[846] and considers food security and savings and credit schemes (SACCOS) Good Samaritan groups, and nutrition programs, business skills nurturing, information dissemination on markets, cooperatives, taking up farming as a business both at small scale and large scale levels, educating communities on when and when not to borrow funds from the mushrooming Micro-Finance Institutions and Banks.[847] It takes into account the laws of the country concerning marriage when it argues that, "...when a man was previously involved in a customary marriage (kwanjula) he should not be allowed to pursue church marriage and wed a different woman as this contradicts the laws of Uganda (Marriage Act) ....when this happens the church marriage becomes null and void."[848] In further streamlining her mission strategy with the social context, the Archdiocese suggests that "all agents of evangelisation have full understanding either through workshops or other avenues, of government programs like Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS), Universal Primary Education (UPE) and PMA to create an opportunity for effective Policy Monitoring and influence."[849]

Kampala Archdiocese adopted the inclusive and compound nouns that describe the major social identities in mission practice. Among these we have "Agents of Evangelisation, People of God and Grassroots evangelisation." The use of these compound nouns marks a major shift in the language of mission practice. The common feature of all these nouns is that they imply a relational mission practice. In Chapter Four we indicated that by using the noun 'agents of evangelisation' where the texts names the clergy, the religious, the catechists, the teachers, the seminarians, the novices, and the laity under their various categories, it reduces the

845 Ibid., 30, 31.
846 Ibid., 24 and 29.
847 Ibid., 24-25, 32-33.
848 Ibid., 26.
849 Ibid., 33.

gap that existed in the traditional understanding of mission agents with the clergy as senders and the laity as the receivers of mission. Also by using the common name 'People of God' the text goes back to God as the author of mission and that all the other human agents are participants in the one missionary endeavour of God. This is what we noted in the introduction of this research that God is a missionary God and that Christian mission has that Trinitarian origins. However, at the end of Chapter Four we also indicated that the collaboration and partnership was mainly between the 'agents of evangelization' between themselves, and between them and 'outside agencies', less between the clergy and the laity, although theoretically speaking the laity is included among the 'agents of evangelization'.

With the use of such nouns as grassroots evangelisation as we saw in Chapter Four, we realise that mission is evolving with the application of terms from other areas of study like politics and economics. These basic terms that describe the social identities and social relationships in the archdiocese have that relational dimension whose foundation is located in the gospel and mission of Christian faith. So, although these terms remain open to the new developments in society but still are used in an exclusive way as a means for the church's mission and at the service of the church's truth claim. Therefore, mission as expressed in the archdiocesan pastoral programmes, is still foundational given that it is rooted in the exclusive Christian proclamation of truth and salvation as rooted in Jesus Christ.

Mission practice was further realigned in the resolutions of the 2006 Archdiocesan synod and their arrangement suggests that the church's self-understanding is rooted in the sacrament of baptism where a neophyte participates in the threefold ministry of Christ. These ministries are reflected in the way all the synod outcomes were divided into these three ministries: First, The Sanctifying office of the Church which presents the whole Christian community of Kampala Archdiocese as one worshipping community with the obligation to sanctify the world with their activities. The second part is the Teaching office of the church which stresses the prophetic ministry of the church and how to realise the same in the concrete pastoral practice. The third is the Governing office of the Church which develops a common vision of leadership in the church without distinctions between laity and clergy. More than the missionary era (Chapter Three), the present document and other contemporary documents of the Archdiocese (Chapter Four) speak in terms of "partnership", "collaboration", "sharing ideas", "promoting dialogue", "working relations", "cooperation", and so on. However, despite this kind of remodelling, the underlying thinking behind all these changes remains foundational. It remains rooted in the deep Christian tradition which influences all the changes and in a nutshell it cannot influence mission practice to have mission as conversation. The Rortian conversation which is non-foundational negates the whole idea of foundations because it goes against his ideal of keeping the conversation going.

The pastoral document "You are the Salt of the Earth, You are the Light of the World, has in its opening paragraph the audiences to which it is addressed. It is addressed to: "all of you my brothers and sisters: Priests, Religious men and women, lay people in the Catholic Church." It is then addressed to "all peace loving Ugandans with whom we share faith in God, the Creator of us all." In using the pronoun "all" it opens with a universalistic tinge which gets limited when mention of those who are included in the "all" is made. The text opens with "….all of you my brothers and sisters" but the mentioning of priests, religious men and women, and lay people in the Catholic Church in Uganda" the texts limits its audience to only the Catholics. And in another category of those greeted, the text limits those to only the peace loving Ugandans and only those with whom we share faith in God, the Creator of us all. So, the text opens and limits its audience. It has no consideration of those who claim to be atheists and those belligerents who may be working against peace and stability in the country. So, the text has a particular audience which is well mapped out. It is rooted in a distinctively Christian discourse given the categories of people mentioned and the dominance of the Christian theme of peace.

At the beginning of this research it was asked if there must be a new model of mission in the Ugandan Church today. I proposed the Rortian notion of conversation as a sensitising concept to study mission theory and practice in past (Chapter 3) and present (chapter 4) in view of answering the question: what is an adequate model for mission in the 21st century? Can conversation be that mission model? The conversation referred to in this context is the Rortian ideal of conversation without foundations. With this understanding for Rorty, the term conversation offers a useful way to talk about the production of knowledge as a social process without reference to metaphysical foundations. Rorty's notion of conversation describes a discourse that has no beginning or end, but no crisis or contradiction, either. Cut loose from metaphysical moorings and transcendental backups, the conversation keeps rolling of its own accord, reproducing itself effortlessly. It is responsible only to itself, sanctioned by what Rorty sees as the only sanction credible: our loyalty to the conversation and our solidarity with its practices. All we can do is to continue the conversation initiated before we appeared on the scene. "We do not know," Rorty says, "what 'success' would mean except simply 'continuance.'"[850] Rorty's non-foundationalist view of things considers that not merely the aspiration for a context-neutral perspective must be given up as unachievable but the very notion of there being an objective reality to be engaged with must also be relinquished as an unhelpful distraction from the particularity of things.[851] Accordingly he calls for the replacement of the correspondence notion of truth, truth as an accurate depiction of things, with the much reduced notion of truth as a merely honorific title which communities

[850] Cf. John Trimbur, "Consensus and Difference in Collaborative Learning," *College English*, Vol. 51, No. 6 (October 1989): 602-616. See also Richard Rorty, *The Consequences of Pragmatism*, 172.
[851] Cf. Richard Rorty, *Consequences of pragmatism*, xvi.

bestow upon their favoured ideas and courses of action. In short, for Rorty, truth equates with whatever is considered socially helpful.

If we critically consider Rorty's conversation, it could be suspected that it impedes Christian mission. Therefore we have to acknowledge some difficulties which need to be addressed to make it an effective tool of mission practice. Firstly, Rorty's relinquishing of truth as the articulation of reality in favour of localised agreement is held to provoke the very sceptical concerns he seeks to quash. This difficulty is stretched more by Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI who chastised Rorty for formulating the new utopia of banality. He rebukes Rorty's ideal of a liberal society in which absolute values and criteria will no longer exist and a sense of well-being as the only goal worth striving for.[852] Secondly, the aspiration to know the reality is held to be essential to certain transformative praxis concerned to change the world and not simply our words about it. Thirdly, Rorty's abandonment of any concern to check conversation with the concern to know in words the world without words is held to offer insufficient resources to counter the tendency to limit access to conversation to the most powerful.[853] But above all as we have noted it already: how a non-foundational concept could serve adequately a foundational tradition?

Rorty acknowledges the tendency of discourse to normalize itself and to block the flow of conversation by posing as a canonical vocabulary. The conversation, as Rorty starts to acknowledge, is perpetually materializing itself in institutional forms, allotting the opportunity to speak and arbitrating the terms of the discussion. But Rorty backs away from the full consequences of conversation's normative force. At just the point where we could name the conversation and its underlying consensus as a technology of power and ask how its practices enable and constrain the production of knowledge, privilege and exclude forms of discourse, set its agenda by ignoring or suppressing others, Rorty builds a self-correcting mechanism into the conversation, an invisible hand to keep the discourse circulating and things from going stale. This is abnormal discourse or as Rorty puts it that is: "what happens when someone joins in the discourse that is ignorant of conventions or who sets them aside."[854] Rorty admitted that religions are not essentially nothing. It is both philosophically legitimate and theologically right for Christian mission to start with its own discourse and practice and to proceed to interpret the World in those terms rather than vice versa. The Rortian conversation downplays its own social force and the conflict it generates, the discourses silenced or unheard in the conversation and its representation of itself. They suspect there are other voices to take into account, voices constituted as otherness outside the conversation.

It has been presented above that Rorty following his pragmatist mentor John Dewey, believes that we can usefully substitute faith in human potential for

[852] Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, *Values in a Time of Upheaval*, 47.
[853] Cf. Paul D. Murray, *Reason, Truth and Theology in Pragmatist Perspective* (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 27.
[854] Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and Mirror of Nature*, 320.

retrograde faith in a benevolent God. This Rortian position falls within the ambit of prominent pragmatists who contributed a lot to the development and intellectual respectability of religion as a human endeavour. This implies that though Rorty is rooted in a non-foundationalist tradition, he at the same time appreciates foundationalism. The question we asked above, *"how do you put to use a concept whose origins and proponents negate the very idea it is intending to serve?"* props up again for a response. We have stated it clearly that Christian mission is foundational, that is, it has the Christ-event as the foundation from which its existence and practice is rooted, but the Rortian conversation is non-foundational. It is a free-fleeting endeavour. We need to find a way out of this dilemma. We have already maintained that in foundationalism, there is an underlying conviction that there is a rock bottom foundation to build and legitimize our knowledge claims. And in the foundation metaphor, what is right is that all cognition starts with pre-existent knowledge. This is so because it is presumed that "…each religion contains something that belongs to it alone, separately, distinctively, decisively: its particular grasp of divine truth. The truth it contains is uniquely important which must not be lost."[855]

In an attempt to overcome the above difficulty we may follow the position promoted by authors of post-foundationalism.[856] Post-foundationalism has mainly emerged from the work of Wentzel van Huyssteen who sought 'to move beyond the epistemological dichotomy of foundationalist objectivism and non-foundationalist relativism.'[857] In other words, it positions itself as an alternative to the modernist foundationalist claim to universal truths and to postmodern non-foundationalist relativism. It seeks to utilise the strengths of both in order to facilitate meaningful conversation between different disciplines, without having any discipline claiming dominant knowledge. Huyssteen further suggests that: "A post-foundationalist approach helps us realize "…that we are not the intellectual prisoners of our contexts or traditions, but that we are epistemically empowered to cross contextual, cultural, and disciplinary borders to explore critically the theories, meanings, and beliefs through which we and others construct our worlds."[858]

It is thought that having found both foundationalism and non-foundationalism inadequate for theological discourse, Van Huyssteen proposes a post-foundational theology that fully acknowledges the role of context, the epistemically crucial role of interpreted experience, and the role of tradition in shaping religious values.[859]

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855 Paul Knitter, *No Other Name?*, 220.

856 Ibid., 112; Also, Wentzel Van Huyssteen, *Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997); Van Huyssteen, *The Shaping of Rationality: Toward Interdisciplinarity in Theology and Science* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1999).

857 Van Huyssteen, *The Shaping of Rationality: Toward interdisciplinarity in Theology and Science*, 8.

858 Van Huyssteen, *Alone in the World? Human uniqueness in Science and Theology. The Gifford Lectures, Grand Rapids* (Michigan: W.E. Eerdmans Publishers, 2006), 25.

859 Sung Kyu Park, "A Postfoundationalist research paradigm of practical Theology," *HTS Theological Studies*, Vol. 66, No. 2 (October 2010), 1-6; see also Van Huyssteen, *The Shaping of Rationality*, 113.

Theological reflection in post-foundationalism also points creatively beyond the confines of the local community or culture toward a plausible form of cross-contextual and interdisciplinary conversation. Over against the alleged objectivism of foundationalism and the extreme relativism of most forms of non-foundationalism, post-foundationalism emerges as a viable third option that allows cross-disciplinary conversations with our beliefs intact, and the shared resources of human rationality in different modes of reflection. Müller calls this 'a third way', a way out of the 'stuckness' of modernistic or foundationalist science and theology, on the one hand, and the fatalism of some post-modernistic approaches, on the other.[860] A post-foundational space is then created between modernity and postmodernity as we reconsider postmodernity's farewell to reason, the disparagement of logos, and the celebration of difference, plurality and multiplicity.[861]

The above argument brings us to some stark realities that the foundationalism of the modernists and the non-foundationalism of the postmodernists are not applicable to theology anymore. Therefore we have to integrate both to yield a post-foundationalism of which the tension generated is what characterises the nature of conversation. This is so because in post-foundationalism conversation retains a foothold in tradition while at the same time recognises the liabilities of getting trapped in that position. This understanding then brings us to three major considerations to take into account.

Firstly, all knowledge is local in the sense that it depends on a language that has been learned in and through participation in communal practices. This local knowledge implies conceptual schemes and the know-how of using them in specific contexts. On a traditionalist reading, people are born into languages, frameworks of thought and communities and except on very special occasions, as in sudden conversions, this is not normally a matter of choice.[862] This does not reject the idea that people can become acquainted with other frameworks, and even can reflect on their own ideas from these frameworks. But this process of reflection is always caught up in the conceptual schemes that belong to the practices of the community in which they live: both within the theological level, and the level of the religious communities. In reference to Wittgenstein, one can rightly claim "that many beliefs are such that we would not know how to justify them in a noncircular and informative way even if we tried."[863]

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860 Julian Müller, 'HIV/AIDS, "Narrative Practical Theology, and Postfoundationalism: The Emergency of a New story" *HTS Theological Studies*, 60 (1&2) (October 2004): 293-306.
861 Calvin O. Schrag, *The Resources of Rationality: A Response to the Postmodern Challenge* (Michigan: Indiana University Press, 1992), 8.
862 Ibid., 206.
863 Jeffrey Stout, *Democracy and Tradition* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 234.

Secondly, '…conversation begins by bringing our fallible views and judgments to those who traditionally make up our epistemic communities.'[864] Each judgment takes place within the context of a specific community, and is based on arguments and ideas which are accepted in this community. We cannot abstract from a conversational context in the justification of beliefs, ideas and viewpoints. According to Stout, this implies three things. (a) The conversational context determines what sort of information is being requested in order to count as a justification; (b) The conversational context determines the audience of the justification process; and (c) The success of the justification can only be appraised in relation to this audience.[865] All justification is bound to a conversational context, and the audience which accepts or rejects the justification of certain beliefs or ideas. This audience is always limited to the class of people who understand the vocabulary in which this justification is cast and who have mastered the patterns of reasoning which are required to follow it. We need to broaden this limited audience, because of the fact that we are aware of the fact that our knowledge is fallible.

Therefore, this prompts us to extend our individual judgment or evaluation to communal evaluation to trans-communal evaluation.[866] But this does not imply the demand that we should include all rational agents in all contexts, regardless of time and place. If we would demand this, it would make the success of our justifications impossible to determine. Our justifications are fallible, and we should not require them to be infallible, because they are not. It is believed that: "Justifications are successful if they eliminate relevant reasons for doubting. The reasons future generations might have for doubting, being necessarily unknown to us, hardly count as relevant in out context."[867] We also do not know the epistemic context in which future generations have to make their judgments. Therefore we should not demand to judge from this perspective in actuality. In fact a God's eye view is not ours. This is consonant with what we observed in chapter one that Rorty rejected the Archimedean point or view from nowhere or God's eye view. With this, therefore, we need to seek ever wider audience for justification of our claims, but this will always be bound to the discursive practices of traditions which we have learned to understand and are committed to.

Thirdly, the combination of fallibilism and traditionalism implies recognition of diversity and plurality, and the rejection of a consensus approach. A contextual approach of human rationality gives room to epistemic tolerance. To strengthen this argument, Andy F. Sanders proposes the phrase "traditional fallibilism" as a middle way between relativism and foundationalism. He traces briefly the failure of foundationalism and the well-known self-defeating nature of relativism. He then

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[864] Wentzel Van Huyssteen, *The Shaping of Rationality: Toward Interdisciplinarity in Theology and Science*, 265.
[865] Jeffrey Stout, *Democracy and Tradition*, 235.
[866] Van Huyssteen, *The Shaping of Rationality: Toward Interdisciplinarity in Theology and Science*, 265
[867] Jeffrey Stout, *Democracy and Tradition*, 236-237.

emphasises that fallibilism avoids self-defeat, because it is aware that even the belief in fallibilism may be mistaken. But since it does not deny we can have true beliefs, it may consistently offer reasons for accepting fallibilism.[868] This is proved by the fact that people live in different contexts and different traditions, and based on these differences make different evaluations of situations. It is claimed that: "Constructive interaction should therefore be possible as we learn to acquiescence in difference, that is, come to term with the fact that others will not only differ from us in their opinions, customs, evaluations, and modes of action, but that it is perfectly rational for them to do so."[869] A traditionalist fallibalism gives room to a legitimate diversity in conversation, where cooperation and coordination would still be possible and rational.[870] According to the above, conversation gives room to be faithful to one's own tradition while at the same time admits the fallible nature of humanity which fails to grasp the fullness of truth and recognise the validity of truth claims in other religious traditions.

All in all, the application of the term conversation in mission then comes to mean that knowledge and teaching and learning are social and not cognitive acts. Knowledge, in this account, is not the result of the confrontation of the individual mind with reality but of the conversation that organizes the available means we have at any given time to talk about reality. Mission, therefore, cannot be understood strictly on cognitive grounds; it means rather joining new communities and taking part in new conversations. Mission becomes a shift in a person's relations with others, not a shift inside the person that now suits him to enter new relationships.[871] The consensus that keeps things rolling is no longer based on higher purposes but instead on the recognition that if we cannot discover the truth in any final sense, what we can do is to keep on talking to each other: we can tell stories, give accounts, state reasons, negotiate differences, and so on. The conversation, that is, gives up teleological ends to reaffirm the sociability of intellectual exchange not as an end in itself but as a means to the end, the truth.

Towards a mission theory of conversation beyond dialogue

In this section the main thrust is to demonstrate why this research proposes conversation other than dialogue. There has been a disconcerting question posed to me: What is it in conversation that has not been offered by dialogue? In the general introduction, we pointed out that dialogue has been studied, used, and applied by many theologians, scholars and experts in the area of interreligious relations with startling results. My argument is that we have to recognize that despite the apparent

868 Shults, F. LeRon, *The Post-Foundationalist task of Theology* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 1999), 58.
869 Van Huyssteen, *The Shaping of Rationality: Toward Interdisciplinarity in Theology and Science*, 271.
870 Chris Hermans, "Practical Theology Theory-Building Based on a Pragmatic notion of Weak Rationality," 113-115.
871 Cf. John Trimbur, "Consensus and Difference in Collaborative Learning," *College English*, Vol. 51, No. 6 (October 1989), 602-616.

success in research and the volumes of published works done in the area of dialogue, it all looks like an external obligation imposed on the religious traditions. Secondly, the hypothesis of theologians of dialogue concerning an alleged common ground and convergence of religious traditions, has been one of its most contested ideals.

I make these claims because it is argued that for the possibility of dialogue, there must be an epistemic priority for believers of faith and revelation over any external demands or expectations. This reason presupposes that if dialogue is to be possible, it must find its deepest reasons and motivations within the self-understanding of religious traditions themselves, and only thus will dialogue become an internal necessity rather than an external obligation.[872] This view is similar to the observation made about the challenges facing dialogue from within as the lurking sense of incompatibility between firm commitment to a particular religious tradition and openness to other religions. This is so because the history of religions seems to indicate that, exceptions notwithstanding, strong religious commitment coincides with religious intolerance, while attitudes of openness toward the truth of other religions somehow go together with a looser relationship to the truth of one's own tradition.

That's why it could be easily established that dialogue and especially interreligious dialogue has often come to be conducted by individuals who find themselves on the margins of their respective traditions, whether by necessity or by choice. This marginality may impose itself upon individuals as a result of attitudes of self-sufficiency and superiority that often characterize the mainstream self-understanding within religious traditions.[873] Insofar as religions lay claim to possess the absolute truth or the ultimate means to salvation, dialogue can but be regarded as a form of redundancy or a threat. While a certain degree of collaboration and mutual understanding has been allowed, the more radical forms of dialogue oriented toward the possibility of transformation and growth are rarely conducted by individuals who find themselves in the centre of institutional hierarchies. Religions are indeed not always ready for what transpires in dialogue.[874]

Also, it is worth noting that there are no monolithic singular religious traditions. It is evident that no single individual can ever claim to represent the whole of a particular religious tradition. Every participant in dialogue belongs to a specific school or tradition, favours particular forms of religious practice, and is influenced by the thought of a certain scholar or theologian. Dialogue between a Shi'ite and Methodist looks very different from a dialogue between a Sunni Muslim and an Orthodox Christian. Perhaps this is forgotten or obscured by the talk of the Hindu

872 Catherine Cornille, *The im-Possibility of Interreligious Dialogue* (New York: The Crossroad publishing company, 2008), 8.
873 Ibid., 59.
874 Ibid., 60.

– Christian Dialogue or the Muslim – Jewish dialogue. General religious traditions such as Christian or Buddhist have often obscured the reality of internal diversity and dissonance within religions, while at times setting unnecessary limits on our understanding of "sameness" and "difference" across religious traditions.[875]

Another complexity with dialogue is about traditions, which tend to be regarded as immobile institutions, concerned primarily with the preservation of established teachings, practices and hierarchical structures. Consequently, commitment to a particular tradition while in dialogue with another may be regarded as an undue limitation of religious options or as a hopeless attempt to transform a structure that is defined by its resistance to change. This view leads many to engage in dialogue from a position of freedom from all defined forms of religious conviction and religious identity. Some even claim a sense of belonging to two or more religious commitment and belonging. This is most evident in New age Movement which is characterized by a radical rejection of all forms of traditional religious authority and by a focus on the subject as the ultimate measure of religious truth. This concept of religious autonomy appears as one evident outcome of the modern shift to the subject and the development of notions of freedom and undetermined will. In this absence of objective or natural meaning, individuals have the liberty and the responsibility to constitute their own conception of truth. This defines what sociologists of religion describe as "disembedded, desituated, or detraditionalised selves" who consider themselves to be self-directional, authorial agents, relying on their own inner sources of authority, control and responsibility."[876] Within the domain of religion, it manifests itself in aversion to any form of religious commitment or in an attitude of believing without belonging.[877] Undoubtedly, such a loosening of commitment to a particular religious tradition renders dialogue less encumbered. Yet it also involves the loss of any firm religious foundation from which to engage other religious traditions.[878]

In addition to the above, we have to contend that some people have become suspicious about the manner in which some of the scholars use the term dialogue. According to Pim Valkenberg it is used so often in certain circles that it seems to be a magic word: every right-minded person must agree with it, because it seems to imply a certain basic kind of liberal politeness that is almost equivalent to being human. He thinks that in this sense, the word dialogue normally implies a kind of equality, par cum pari, as the Second Vatican Council called it, while the context of dialogue is usually such that there can be no such equality. Therefore, the word dialogue can easily be exploited to cover up a situation where equality is absent and

875 Ibid., 68.
876 Ibid., 63
877 Ibid., 63.
878 Ibid., 61.

even unwelcome.[879] This suspicion about dialogue made Valkenberg to think that a real dialogue should uncover the elements of inequality, so that dialogue gets a polemic ring to it. He considers that it is not a word that means that we leave things as they are, but it means that we should uncover the differences, whether they are of a theological, a cultural or a political nature.[880]

The suspicion that Valkenberg has of dialogue is similar to that of Cardinal Ratzinger (now emeritus Pope Benedict XVI) who looks at dialogue as an offshoot of relativism. He says that relativism has become the central problem for the faith at the present time. He is less surprised with relativism that "…No doubt it is not presented only with its aspects of resignation before the immensity of the truth."[881] He sees it presented as a position defined positively by the concepts of tolerance and knowledge through dialogue and freedom, concepts which would be limited if the existence of one valid truth for all were affirmed. In his analysis of the notion of dialogue, which he thinks that has maintained a position of significant importance in the Platonic and Christian tradition; it changes meaning and becomes both quintessence of the relativist creed and the antithesis of conversion and the mission. Ratzinger considers that in the relativist meaning 'to dialogue' means to put one's own position, that is, one's faith, on the same level as the convictions of others without recognising in principle more truth in it than that which is attributed to the opinion of the others.[882] Only if I suppose in principle that the other can be as right, or more right that I, can an authentic dialogue take place. He concludes that according to this concept, dialogue must be an exchange between positions which have fundamentally the same rank and therefore mutually relative. Only this way will the maximum cooperation and integration between the different religions be achieved. It could be deduced from Ratzinger's view that this is unacceptable scenario to subject all truth claims to the same scale for the sake of maximum cooperation.

The position of Cardinal Ratzinger (emeritus Pope Benedict XVI) expresses an underlying insecurity and fear that characterise most participants in dialogue which jeopardises its goal. It seems many dialogue partners have private misgivings and a sense of mistrust to the very meaning and purpose of dialogue which portrays it in the negative. A mention of the term dialogue evokes fear and revulsion against the very activity that the term implies. Liyakatali Takim in his article: From Conversion

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879 Pim Valkenberg, "Confessing One God Amidst Muslims and Jews: An Ecumenical-Theological Conversation (II)" *International Review of Mission*, Vol. LXXXIX No. 352 (January 2000): 105-114.

880 Ibid. See also Valkenberg W.B.M., Wijsen, F.J.S (eds), *The Polemical Dialogue: Research into Dialogue, Truth and Truthfulness, Nijmegen Studies in Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 24, (Saarbrucken (Germany): Verlag fur Entwicklungspolitik, 1997), 179.

881 Cf. Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, "Relativism: The Central Problem for Faith Today," an Address during the Meeting of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith with Presidents of the Doctrinal Commissions of the Bishops' Conferences of Latin America, held in Guadalajara, Mexico, (May 1996): 1-11.

882 Ibid.

to Conversation highlights these challenges when he states that, "Muslims have yet to be convinced that dialogue is a way for reconciliation or expressing their beliefs. Given the history of Christian missionary work in Muslim countries, many Muslims see dialogue as a subtle form of evangelisation."[883] This reality is further exacerbated by the fact that most religious traditions fail to appreciate that religious space is contested by many factions and that there are many perspectives within each religious tradition. This constitutes an assembly of diverse actors and agents, interests, beliefs, values, and ideas that often differ and are in conflict with each other. However, although this imposes limits on the very objectives and ends of dialogue, it presents a paradigm shift, a shift from attempts at 'conversion of' to those of 'Conversation with' the other.[884]

As we have seen above, in dialogue there is a hope or desire for universality, unity, understanding et cetera; whereas in conversation lost is the hope in a universality, unity, and understanding. And moreover we don't need that hope as long as we can keep the conversation going: here it is not the outcome but the process that matters. Theological legitimation for this argument can be found in the doctrine of eschatology: truth is "already here" but (also) "yet to come." Rorty helps theologians to re-discover this "yet to come" dimension, which according to Schillebeeckx is the "eschatological reservation."[885] There is a rediscovery of the eschatological dimension of truth. Openness and receptivity toward the truth of the other religion presupposes humble recognition of the constant limitation and therefore endless perfectibility of one's own religious understanding of the truth. This also includes recognition of the partial and finite nature of the ways in which ultimate truth has been grasped and expressed in the teaching and practices of one's own tradition. Most religious traditions regard themselves as the ultimate if not the sole repository of truth, as the highest path to salvation or the most efficacious means to liberation. It is this belief in the absolute and final truth of one's own teachings and practices that prevents one from listening to, let alone learning from other religious traditions. If the fullness of truth is already expressed within one's own beliefs and practices, then the other traditions can only be regarded as deficient and wrong, or at best as a partial and pale reflection of what one already knows.[886]

Of all Christian teachings, belief in the eschatological fulfilment of all goodness and truth at the end of times offer the most natural and compelling foundation for the development of doctrinal humility. The Christian notion of eschatology expresses on the one hand the Christian hope in the ultimate fulfilment of the kingdom of

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883 Liyakatali Takim, "From Conversion to Conversation: Interfaith Dialogue in Post 9-11 America," *The Muslim World,* Vol. 94, Issue 3 (July 2004): 343-355.
884 Ibid., 353.
885 Edward Schillebeeckx, *The Language of Faith: Essays on Jesus, Theology, and the Church* (New York: Orbis Books, 1988), 50-52; see also Malcolm L. Peel, "Gnostic Eschatology and the New Testament," *Novum Testamentum,* Vol. 12, Fasc. 2 (April, 1970): 141-165.
886 Catherine Cornille, *The Im-possibility of Interreligious Dialogue*, 10-11.

God while it points, on the other hand, the humble awareness of the partial and imperfect nature of any historical realization of the kingdom. The latter has been rendered in terms of the notion of "eschatological proviso" representing a permanent reminder of the conditioned and provisional nature of all historical understanding and realization. The notion of the temporality and imperfection of historical realities may be applied to personal accomplishment, human reason, as well as historical institutions.[887]

An eschatological understanding of the realization of truth is clearly expressed in various official documents of the Catholic Church. The Vatican II Dogmatic Constitution Dei Verbum, on Divine Revelation stipulates that: "This tradition which comes from the Apostles develops in the Church with the help of the Holy Spirit. This is so for there is growth in the understanding of the realities and the words which have been handed down to us. This happens through the contemplation and study made by believers, who treasure these things in their hearts (Luke, 2:19, 51) through a penetrating understanding of the spiritual realities which they experience, and through the preaching of those who have received through Episcopal succession the sure gift of truth. For as the centuries succeed one another, the Church constantly moves forward toward the fullness of divine truth until the words of God reach their complete fulfilment in her."[888] In this text, the church itself humbly recognizes the historicity of its own understanding of the truth and embraces the possibility of continuous growth.

The implications of this view are evident in the Vatican document 'Dialogue and Proclamation' which states: "Moreover, the fullness of truth received in Jesus Christ does not give individual Christians the guarantee that they have grasped that truth fully. In the last analysis truth is not a thing we possess, but a person by whom we must allow ourselves to be possessed. This is an unending process. While keeping their identity intact, Christians must be prepared to learn and to receive from and through others the positive values of their traditions."[889] The humility derived from the eschatological orientation of Christianity expresses itself not only as a principle of critique and vigilance against claiming absolute truth for historical categories of understanding, but also as a dynamic power of change and growth.[890]

The Christian belief in the Holy Spirit as the power and presence of God in the world, guiding humanity towards its fulfilment in the kingdom, that both reminds Christians of the partial or limited nature of their understanding or realization of the fullness of truth. Because of its eschatological nature, the kingdom of God is to be actively pursued by Christians in history. Taking all of this together, eschatology saves Christianity from simple resignation to the relativity of all truth and from

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887 Ibid., 36-37.
888 Second Vatican Council, *Dei Verbum. Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation*, (November 18, 1965), 8.
889 Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, *Dialogue and Proclamation* (Rome, 19 May, 1991), 49.
890 Ibid., 39.

indifference toward the truth of other religious traditions. While an understanding of the provisional relative and historical nature of truth provides a necessary condition for conversation, it is faith and hope in the possibility of growth and of the progressive understanding of the truth that constitutes the dynamic impulse to engage the world and other religions.[891] This understanding that the fullness of truth is to be fully revealed at the end of times obliges Christian mission to assume conversation as its primary model. This, as we have seen throughout the thesis, makes all people participants in a process of working and searching together towards the fullness of truth. The major church metaphor of pilgrim then applies to all humankind as a people on the way to the fullness of truth where we shall be free from all wrong perceptions and understanding of the truth. St. Paul says: "For the present we see things as if in a mirror, and are puzzled; but then we shall see them face to face. For the present the knowledge I gain is imperfect; but then I shall know fully, even as I am fully known" (I Corinthians 13:12 Weymouth Translation).

[891] Ibid., 40.

Afterword

Must there be a new model of mission in the 21st century? Most scholars would say, "Yes of course." But then the more challenging question would be, "what is it"? The answer is conversation! Then another question could be posed: "why is this so"? As we have seen above, the answer is that mission now is not what it should be. This is what, in the first place, prompted me to start this PhD research thesis. It all started while attending a PhD defence for Fr. Dr. Cornelius Ssempala at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in 2004. I was fascinated by one term in his work on Rorty. The term was conversation and I resolved to work hard to make that concept a usable one in theology. However, when I heard of conversation I did not know what conversation really mean. I took it to be this social chatter in a communal gathering without knowing its philosophical and especially epistemological nuances. My earlier consideration was for conversation in its social dimension as: a communication by two or more people, often on a particular topic. I had less idea about what the Rortian conversation is all about. It was a privilege to have Prof. Frans Wijsen who kept reminding me of the meaning of 'conversation' in the Rortian sense. It was a difficult thing to find out because for Rorty conversation has no foundations. One of the biggest challenges that I faced was that anyone who had read about Rorty had concluded that Rorty was an atheist. How comes that a Catholic priest, a teacher in a religious formation house is working on Rorty and trying to use his ideas in the mission practice of the church? It was difficult to comprehend as some people already used labels to describe me as a relativist and an atheist in the making! However, with much reading, I had to situate Rorty in his non-foundationalist tradition but his concept conversation; I had to conclude by placing it in the postfoundationalist tradition so as to use it well in mission. Another biggest challenge was to make a distinction between conversation and dialogue. The two are different although at face-value they look similar. But dialogue is too narrow and limited to the so called great world religions. As a fact dialogue is practically limited to the religious traditions of Asia and Europe. There is little regard for dialogue with African religions. And Laurent Magesa raised this issue in his seminal work: Christianity in dialogue with African traditional religions. Peter K. Sarpong says that: "For Africa, the role of traditional religion in determining the modus vivendi has been vital. African cultures are known for their religious orientation. In fact, African cultures are religious cultures. It is not possible to study African culture in isolation from religion. Religion permeates the ideal African from cradle to grave. African traditional religion, therefore, comes into play in the shaping of the African's future."[892] In Africa, the main thrust has been inculturation of the Christian faith in African cultures and there has been no open communication with these rather rich religious traditions. And for Laurent Magesa he claims that: "for most Christians for a long time, and

[892] Peter K. Sarpong, "Can Christianity dialogue with African Traditional Religions?" Available at http://www.afrikaworld.net/afrel/sarpong.html accessed (August 20, 2012).

indeed for many up to now, the question of interfaith or interreligious dialogue is a non-issue. For them the issue was and is rather conversion, making everyone as far as that is possible, Christian."[893]

I think, better than Friedrich Stenger, I have used the method of Critical Discourse Analysis to read and analyse mission texts in the past and the present as a means of generating the data for the proposal of a mission theory in the future. Applying the method of discourse analysis has not been easy as it was all new to me. However, it has broadened my mind and provided me a special position in missiology because I have not used the narrative-descriptive method of reading mission history. This method of narrative-descriptive style is common in many studies and it has generated enough data that at the moment we need to apply another method to generate more data for the development of scholarship in theology. So, discourse analysis has offered me a new way of reading and analysing mission history in the church. As a teacher in the seminary which has both faculties of philosophy and theology merged, this research project has helped me to develop both fields in one. It is noted in Catholic scholarship that philosophy is the handmaid of theology. Studying the philosopher Rorty has a great advantage that since Rorty has a heavy interdiscursive style in his writings, almost all the history of continental Europe as well as the Anglo-American tradition is all covered by reading and studying the works of Rorty. So, the concept conversation is very much apparent in Rorty himself as he engages different schools of thought challenging them and discussing with them and this discussion yields a great resource for philosophy and other districts of human knowledge.

Reading and describing mission history in the light of the Rortian conversation has widened my mind about the complexity of mission and the tasks ahead. Then the bitter arguments between foundationalism and non-foundationalism and its eventual resolve in post-foundationalism have helped me to give conversation a good footing in the most contemporary philosophical thought. As a lecturer in missiology at a catholic seminary, I have found that I must ground my students in the teaching of the church and its doctrine but also let them open their eyes about the need for reaching out to the other traditions. Since this research is philosophically grounded, I am planning to have an empirical study and see how to make the concept work in actual contexts in Uganda. This thesis only gives way to a new project and that is how to make conversation work in actual pastoral and mission contexts.

In the very beginning of this study I referred to Max Warren who wrote the well-known introduction to *The Primal Vision*, written by John Taylor, Anglican missionary to Uganda and later secretary general of the Church Missionary Society. In the very beginning of that book John Taylor describes the missionaries' presence

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[893] Laurenti Magesa, *African Religion in the Dialogue Debate: From Intolerance to Coexistence* (Münster: LIT, 2010), 89.

among Africans as follows: "one can enjoy the other's presence without fuss or pressure, in conversation or in silence as the mood dictates".[894] Maybe Taylor formulated in an intuitive way what Rorty meant by "keeping the conversation going".[895]

[894] Taylor, *The Primal Vision: Christian Presence amid African Religion* 17.
[895] Cf. Wijsen, *There is Only One God*, 272-273.

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Summary

The thesis *Mission from Conversion to Conversation* opens with a probing question: Must there be a new model of Mission in the Church? This question is prompted by the phenomena of multiculturalism and globalisation which have come to impact Christianity today. It is noted that in its history the Church has felt the obligation of executing the mission mandate which, in mission theology, was advocated by the Muenster school. This school has considered "conversion of individual souls" as the ultimate aim of mission.

In the course of mission history, however, the school of Louvain has suggested the model "implantation of the Church." The Louvain model is also based on the concept of conversion, but conversion that is not individual but institutional. The main aim in this mission model is to extend the borders of the visible church.

After the end of World War II, another mission method developed. Its aim was to bring the non-Christians to Christ and the Church. With this method Church could meet the potential converts half way by adaptating or accommodating Christianity to local cultures.

Even though Vatican II stressed incarnation as foundation for mission, inculturation became the dominant mission model. Inculturation as a process involves the proclamation of the gospel that calls people to conversion. This movement of process and call leads to a change of mentality that itself leads to a cultural change and to a response that builds a new community of love of God and neighbour.

During the 1970s and 1980s, two alternatives to the inculturation model emerged. The first model of liberation stresses the problems of social justice more or less in harmony with the social teaching of the Church. The second model of dialogue addresses mainly the issues of religious pluralism. Dialogue has been favoured as the most viable method of addressing religious pluralism. But the euphoria and enthusiasm that has characterised dialogue has slowly waned. In its place this thesis suggests conversation as the worthwhile alternative method of mission practice in the church today.

The conversation as discussed in this thesis is based on the work of Richard Rorty. For Rorty conversation is linked to the concept of truth, and in Christianity, truth is the primary content of mission. However, interpretations of this truth differ. For Rorty Truth is an outcome of an open, non-imposing way of communication to reach consensus; whereas in Christianity, Truth is revealed and proclaimed and discovered by those seeking it.

As a philosopher Rorty's actual concerns were philosophical problems. He blames René Descartes for distorting the philosophical development by creating the idea of the mind that from the beginning of philosophy was not considered at all. Rorty's views are akin to those of Dewey who claims that problems should be evaluated according to their relevance to contemporary life. For Dewey, all problems originate in some sort of social need, but they tend to outlive their usefulness and this is what he thought had happened with all the traditional problems of philosophy.

Given this background Rorty focused his perceived views on the biggest themes available to a philosopher: Philosophy itself and Truth. These two themes are deeply connected within Rorty but also very central to Christian mission theory and practice.

Rorty claims that we cannot regard truth as a goal of inquiry. He thinks that the purpose of inquiry is to achieve agreement among human beings about what to do, to bring consensus on the end to be achieved and the means to be used to achieve those ends.

These issues are contained in his book *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* published in 1979. In this work, Rorty set himself the task to deconstruct the whole continental philosophical edifice as previously known. By doing this, he renders philosophy scrawny and the understanding and explication of truth as lacking any foundation. The two ideas are considered together because for Rorty philosophy is the guardian of objective truth.

This strategy ushers in what is characterised as the post-philosophical culture, a culture without foundations, but which is built on the ideal of keeping the conversation going. This Rortian project has consequences for Christian mission especially if we consider the *philosophia ancilla theologiae* motif that has informed much of western Christian and philosophical thought. This is so because the foundations upon which Christian theology was established to articulate her claims for universal truth have been cracked. There is, therefore, a need to address the new mission situation with an applicable and related mission strategy.

Another observation in this thesis is that Rortian conception of conversation is related to the concept of discourse as it is developed by Michel Foucault and critical discourse analysts. The concepts conversation and discourse are concerned with language and truth - more particularly with the rejection of objective truth - and with intersubjective truth as constituted through discourse. For Foucault, people do not have access to absolute truth as they cannot speak from a position outside discourse. Truth therefore is not something that exists outside conversation or discourse. Both Rorty and Foucault assume that truth is constituted intersubjectively through language use.

From this Foucauldian inspiration, there have been a number of analyses of mission practice in the past by Mudimbe, Stenger, Nehring, Asad and Chidester. This thesis follows the same tradition and uses Fairclough's critical discourse analysis. The discourse analysis of past and present mission practice in Uganda has conversation as its background concept. It follows a three dimensional model: analysis of linguistic practice (text), of discursive practice (interaction) and of social practice (context).

The thesis used the method of discourse analysis to uncover the discourses that have shaped mission and pastoral practice in Uganda. Missionary texts in the past and pastoral texts in the present were described and analysed. The main purpose was to generate data to develop and apply conversation as the new mission method in the Church in Uganda. In these analyses, it is found that in the early mission practice, missionaries were steeped in a mission paradigm that was informed by the philosophical and anthropological distinctions between civilised and primitive. In this approach, native catechists and native nuns had an auxiliary role to the missionaries. However, there is a development in the present pastoral documents. They make reference to conversation, but it is only limited to the collaboration of the agents of evangelisation and their call to grassroots evangelisation. It falls short of the Rortian ideal of keeping the conversation going.

The thesis concludes by elaborating conversation as the new model of mission practice in the Church in Uganda. In order to apply this concept conversation to mission adequately, the thesis concedes that the extremism of both foundationalism and non-foundationalism are inadequate for theological discourse. Instead the present work adopts a third option, where post-foundationalism allows for cross-disciplinary conversations that leave human beliefs intact while accepting the shared resources of human rationality in different modes of reflection. The application of the term conversation in Christian mission, then, comes to mean that mission cannot be understood strictly on cognitive grounds. Rather, it means joining new communities and taking part in new conversations. Mission becomes a shift in a person's relations with others, not a shift inside the person that now suits him to enter new relationships. Mission as conversation helps to discover, disclose and unveil God's initiative and help turn human existence into human coexistence. In a world in which people go their own way, mission meets them at crossroads, where they discover the grace of becoming co-travelers on the way to the truth. Thus, truth in its fullness is an eschatological pursuit (cf. 1Cor. 13:12).

Curriculum Vitae

Ambrose J. Bwangatto was born on 14 April 1969 at Kalisizo in Masaka District, Uganda. In 1977 to 1983 he attended Primary School education at St. Kizito Primary School, Kikondo. In 1984-1987, he did his secondary education at St. John's Kabuwoko Secondary school where he obtained his Ordinary Level Certificate of Education.
In 1988-1990 he went to Entebbe Teachers' College where he trained as a teacher and was awarded a Grade III Teachers' Certificate.
He joined St. Mbaaga's Major Seminary, Ggaba in 1992 where he spent eight years of academic and pastoral training leading to the award of the following diplomas and degrees

- Diploma in philosophy of St. Mbaaga's Seminary
- Diploma in Theology of St. Mbaaga's Seminary
- Bachelor of philosophy Degree from Universitas Urbaniana, Rome
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In 2004 he got a scholarship to study Intercultural Theology at the Faculty of Theology, Radboud University Nijmegen. He was awarded a Masters Degree in Intercultural Theology and Licentiate in Sacred Theology from Radboud University Nijmegen. In 2008, he got a scholarship from Missio Aachen to do a research PhD degree in Theology at the same university.

Ambrose J. Bwangatto is an ordained minister in the Catholic Church. He has worked as a Primary School Teacher at St. Agnes Primary School, Entebbe from 1990 to 1992. He was Assistant Parish Priest at Our Lady of the Assumption Catholic Parish, Buyege in Kampala Archdiocese. He was also Chaplain to the Postulants of Daughters of Mary, a local religious congregation between August 2000 and August 2001.
He was appointed an Assistant Lecturer at Alokolum National Major Seminary, Gulu where he worked for six years from September 2001 to August 2004 and 2006 to 2009. Currently he is working at St. Mbaaga's Major Seminary, Ggaba-Kampala where he teaches Missiology and he is the Dean of Studies. He has published articles in scholarly journals and he is editor of 'Africa is not destined to die,' Paulines Publications Africa, 2012.